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Résumé
L’étude critique du film Miroir (1975) de Andrel Tarkovsky est un site où se déploient un
questionnement et une exploration, plutôt qu’une analyse de cas exemplaire greffée à un
argument déjà donné. Ce film mérite d’être approché, non comme une monographie
distincte, mais comme un chemin nous conduisant à la compréhension de «technics» --au
sens Fleideggerien--, à une exploration discursive et à une compréhension
épistémologique du médium cinématographique. Cette thèse poursuit des arguments à
partir de trois hypothèses : la matérialité dynamique du cinéma est toujours scellée par la
matière et inscrite par la technique ; le cinéma, comme la technique, conduit la pensée et
constitue l’expérience; et finalement, la matérialité du temps (rythme) dans le médium de
la cinématographie permet à la pensée de s’articuler et de cheminer à travers une série
infinie d’expériences. Une considération attentive des durées et des ruptures temporelles
dans Miroir nous mène vers la théorisation du rythme, l’investigation des approches au
visible ou le questionnement explorateur au sujet de ta médiation de la connaissance
historique.
Un bon nombre d’articles et de livres continue d’être publié au sujet des films de
Tarkovsky. La plupart des études essaye de corriger et d’authentifier la pratique
méthodologique établie par l’institution des études cinématographiques ainsi que de se
restreindre aux réflexions questionnant la poétique formelle du film ou l’histoire du film
en faisant intervenir des catégories de l’esthétique, du genre, de la narration, du cinéma
national et du cinéma d’auteur) Tout en profitant de certaines perspectives offertes par
ces études, cette thèse propose d’aller de l’avant, comme quelques penseurs remarquables
l’ont fait, en se questionnant en dehors des champs de ces disciplines et en générant de
nouvelles questions et considérations. Par exemple, les films de Tarkovsky ont été
examinés comme une instance exemplaire d’une vision spécifiquement
‘Ceci est discuté par la plus version critique récente de Vida T. Johnson et Graham Petrie. The Films of
Andrei Tarkovsky: A Visual Fugue. Bloomington t lndiana UP, 1994.
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cinématographique des liens et des ruptures de l’Histoire (Marc ferro), de la nouvelle
modernité du cinéma contemporain et des pouvoirs (powers) de la métamorphose du
temps dans l’image (Youssef Ishaghpour), et de la cristallisation matérielle de la mémoire
dans le cinéma sémiotique de l’image-temps (Gilles Deleuze)2.
À travers les différents thèmes et chapitres, je démontre comment le médium
cinématographique dépasse les relations binaires qui opposent l’apparence et la réalité;
l’écran manifeste l’évidence du contact et constitue une membrane magico-mimétique
entre le monde et le sujet dans lequel les plis et les pressions du temps peuvent être sentis,
perçus, et traversés avant que le discours ne les nomme ou ne les définisse. Ceci nous
permet de penser le cinéma au-delà de simples notions d’identification du spectateur, de
séduction ou de consommation. La «peau» temporelle du film, étant composée de
passages de temps toujours en devenir, résiste au statut d’objet fixe et assimilable en se
laissant exclusivement éprouver par une série de relations mobiles. Ainsi, en considérant
le médium comme une pratique signifiante, nous pouvons nous pencher sur l’action
sociale du cinéma sans réduire les liens entre la production, la circulation, et la réception
d’un film. Par ailleurs, ces liens continuent de générer d’autres expériences en
reconnaissant ta texture plurielle de la vie et des intervalles entre les mots, les silences et
les images, ils invitent ainsi les spectateurs à suivre ta trace d’un geste créatif qui peut, en
retour, être défaite ou renouvelée3.
Les pratiques signifiantes du cinéma évoquent inévitablement la question concernant la
figuration plus ou moins authentique du temps; ceci nous confronte encore avec les
paradoxes métaphysiques concernant l’essence du temps. Je fais référence à plusieurs
traditions philosophiques et mon travail de réflexion s’inscrit dans la pensée qui va
d’Aristote, Nietzsche, Bergson, Heidegger, à Benjamin et Deleuze. J’insiste par ailleurs
sur la nécessité de penser le temps à côté de la technique audio-visuelle et avec le cinéma.
2 Ces idées ont été élaborées respectivement par: Marc Ferro, Cinéma et Histoire. Paris: Gallimard, J 983
(pp.2l 7-226); Youssef Ishaghpour, Cinéma contemporain: de ce côté du miroir. Paris: La Différence,
19886 (pp.I7-5l; 29$-317); GilÏcs Deleuze, Cinéma 2: image-temps, Paris: Minuit, 1985 (pp.6O-6J;IOI).
Trinh T. Minh-ha discute les implications de celle perspective dans “World as foreign Land” dans When
the Moo,i Waxes Red, p.I 95.
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Les voies philosophiques de Bergson et de Nietzsche réarticulées par Deleuze, se
démarquent déjà par leurs capacités de renouveler cette tradition philosophique tout en se
connectant avec le cinéma, cette machine à voyager dans le temps. En démontrant que la
pensée est elle-même une technique informée ou sculptée par une technologie, Deleuze
critique la prétention métaphysique d’une exposition pure du temps et revendique la
puissance conceptuelle de l’idée d’une pensée de l’image-temps. Pour ma part, bien que
je suive les traces de cette conception, j’interroge plus spécifiquement comment une
théorie du rythme réarticule ces problèmes et paradoxes fondamentaux au sujet du temps
et de l’expérience temporelle. Quoique je prenne souvent une distance critique de
deuxième degré sur les discours en utilisant la voix passive ou le pronom de la troisième
personne, j’emploie la première personne lorsqu’iL est nécessaire d’articuler les mérites et
les limites de mon argumentation.
Dans la première partie de la thèse, j’esquisse une analyse discursive des études
cinématographiques dans la formation moderne de leur institutionnalisation afin
d’articuler une nouvelle conception du rythme. Il s’agit d’une critique se penchant sur le
rythme analysé comme élément stylistique de la direction intentionnette du sujet, un
élément qui, aussitôt qu’il est stabilisé par les discours du «film-form» et «film-art »,
peut être interprété et « lu.» De ce fait, j’interroge les limites des approches spécifiques
de l’étude du rythme. De plus, je remets en question la fondation de ces approches au
regard du dispositif littéraire, c’est-à-dire, leur « titeracy », la relation à la langue écrite
qui a été consolidée par la culture de masse de l’imprimerie. D’un chapitre à un autre,
j’indique la nécessité de penser à travers la matérialité du temps inscrite dans l’image
(rythme) à l’intérieur du cadre d’une théorie non-linguistique de la langue ; je revisite
certaines traditions sémiotiques des théories du cinéma, de Pasolini à Deleuze, dont je
critique également les limites.
Ma thèse revalorise la théorie du rythme articulée et pratiquée par Tarkovsky lui-même,
articule les limites de la notion d’une « poétique du rythme» et explore la possibilité
d’étudier le rythme dans le cadre d’une poétique-politique-éthique d’action qui, tout en
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brisant certaines conceptions modernes du sujet, reconfigure une autre conception de
l’agencement et de la conscience historique. Je me suis grandement inspiré de la
conception du rythme de Meschonnic, et j’ai transposé, dans le domaine des études
cinématographiques, plusieurs de ses gestes critiques afm d’examiner des questions plus
larges concernant la poétique, la subjectivité et la médiation de la langue.
Cette thèse défend l’idée que la temporalité rythmique du cinéma est une forme
révolutionnaire de médiation car elle bouscule l’essor des technologies hégémoniques
(l’imprimerie à caractères mobiles) dont l’influence, dans la culture collective de
production de masse, est généralisée. Par exemple, le rythme fait rupture avec cette
temporalité vide et homogène consolidée par la culture de l’imprimerie de l’état
(l’ontopologie nationale). Dans la perte de cette économie temporelle, le rythme introduit
un autre état d’être et d’appartenance pour la subjectivité, une autre façon d’être
historique, une autre manière d’agir à l’intérieur de l’expérience du passage temporel, là
où la temporalité est hétérogène, discontinue et contingente.
Dans la deuxième partie, cette théorie se situe dans le contexte de la critique de
l’historiographie. J’y interroge ce qui adviendrait de cette connaissance historique—
toujours articulée et constituée par le travail de mémoire et de médiation de l’expérience
dont elle est inséparablement liée—dans le médium cinématographique. J’articule
l’hypothèse du rythme qui met à l’épreuve certains modes conventionnels de narration
historique en proposant, dans le milieu historique des images, une nouvelle dimension de
la médiation des événements modernes. Qui plus est, le rythme contamine
potentiellement la culture de «literacy» et les pratiques institutionnelles de la langue
écrite en produisant une économie électronique de l’oralité (electr-orality) dans le passage
de la durée de l’image. Cette considération m’amène vers une réflexion au regard de la
matérialité du rythme dans le médium cinématographique. Cette matérialité transforme la
connaissance historique par le bégaiement de la langue, l’évidence de la respiration et
l’expérience du bruit du temps. Dans le cadre de cette poétique-politique-éthique du
rythme, j’articule la dimension utopique de cette nouvelle conscience historique et je
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démontre comment la poésie, en tant que pratique intermédiale, permet une expérience
singulière avec le mouvement de la parole (l’historicité de la voix du poète) qui interagit
d’une manière dynamique et organique avec la matérialité du temps inscrite dans l’image.
Dans la troisième partie, je fais une analyse, plan par plan, des séquences du film
Miroir. Je tente de démontrer comi:ient les temporalités complexes des images si
soigneusement composées par Tarkovsky peuvent générer et faire naître des idées à
travers une expérience élémentaire avec la matérialité des phénomènes inscrits sur la
pellicule. Quant à l’analyse du film, nous devons nous interroger sur la manière d’étudier
les images sans les réduire aux effets et aux fonctions métaphoriques de symbolisation et
d’interprétation. Les avertissements de Tarkovsky sur l’impossibilité de scruter
l’inépuisable polysémie de l’image doivent nous servir de guide. Comment peut-on
analyser les images sans en expliquer le sens et sans tenter de comprendre celui-ci dans le
cadre de la représentation? La langue et la pensée peuvent côtoyer la capacité magico
mimétique du cinéma, nous bousculant ainsi hors de ce geste quasi-inévitable d’interpréter
l’image. Or, cette approche rend visible et audible les qualités imaginatives inhérentes de
la technique audio-visuelle, puisque le médium du cinéma nous rapproche du (f dehors »,
de l« ouvert» et du « non-encore pensée ».
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Snmmary
The critical analysis of Tarkovsky’ s Mirror (1975) is flot to be secured in tins dissertation
as an exemplary case to be grafted onto a larger argument afready given, but as a site
through winch a questionning unfolds. Mirror is not to be pursued as an object of film
studies, meriting a special monography; rather, it is to be engaged in terms of the path it
builds leading to an understanding of technics—in the Heideggerian sense—to a
discursive exploration and to an epistemological understanding of the medium of film.
Tins means working under the three-fold assumption that the dynamic materiality of film
is aiways informed and inscribed by technique; that film, as technique, conducts thinking
and experience; and flnally, that the rhythmic materiality of the time-based medium of
film allows thinldng to take place in an infinite series of experiences. An attentive
consideration of the temporal duration and disruption of images in Mirror lends itseff
equally to the theorization of rhythm, to an investigation of approaches to the visible, or
to an explorative questioning about the mediation of historical knowledge.
Although numerous articles and books continue to be published on the subject of
Tarkovsky’s films, most studies attempt to correct and to authenticate the methodological
practice established by the institution of fiim-studies and restricts its reflections to
questions of fllm-poetics, fllm-history, genre, narration, national cinema and cinéma
d’auteur’. While supported by many of the insights these studies have to offer, this
dissertation proposes to follow the lead a few remarkable thinkers have taken to ask
questions outside the purview of these disciplines and to generate new questions and
considerations. For example, Tarkovsky’s films have been examined as an insightful and
exemplaiy instance of the speciflcally cinematic vision of the links and ruptures of
Ibis is attested by the Iatest version of critique by: Vida T. Johnson and Graham Petrie. TheFilms ofAndrei Tarkovsky: A Visitai Fugue. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1994.
xHistory (Marc ferro), of the new modernity of contemporary cinema and the
metamorphic powers of time in the image (Youssef Ishaghpour), and of the material
crystallization ofmemory in the semiotic cinema oftime-images (Gifles Deleuze)2.
Throughout the dissertation I show how the film medium may be regarded, over
against notions of the screen and the binary oppositions of appearance and reality, as a
kind of evidence of contact, a magical-mimetic membrane between the world and the
subject in which the folds and pressures of time may be feit, intuited and experienced
outside of or at least before, discourse speaks for them. Tins forces us to think about the
time-based medium of film outside of any simple notion of spectator identification,
seduction and consumption. for the temporal fabric of filin, as a dynamic passage of
time always in a state of becoming, challenges its flxed status as an object to be
consumed by letting itself be experienced only in a mobile series of relations. The
consideration of the medium as a signifying practice allows us to reflect upon the cinema
as a social activity without reducing the dynamic links between film production,
circulation and reception: continuously generating other experiences, acknowledging the
plural texture of life and the intervals between words, sounds, silences, and images,
constantly inviting viewers to follow the trace of a creative gesture that may be in tum
restored, unmade or remade3.
The signifying practices of cinema inevitably evoke the question concerning the more
or less “truthful” figuration of time and this would seem to confront us yet again with the
metaphysical conundrums concerning the essence of time itseffi My dissertation makes
reference to several philosophical traditions, and inscribes itself in the philosophical
2 These ideas are elaborated respectively by : Marc ferro, Cinéma et Histoire. Paris: Gallimard,
1993 (pp. 217-226); Youssef Ishaghpour, Cinéma contemporain: de ce côté du miroir. Paris : La
Différence, 1986 (pp.17-5l; 298-317); Gilles Deleuze, Cinéma 2: image-temps, Paris: Minuit,
1985(60-61; 101).
Trinh T. Minh-ha discusses this point in “World as Foreign Land” In When the Moon Waxes
Red, p195.
Xthought that moves from Aristotie, Nietzsche, Bergson, and Heidegger, to Benjamin and
Deleuze. I would like to insist on the necessity for thinking about time with the cinema
and alongside audio-visual technique generally. Deleuze’ s “Bergsonian-Nietzschean”
time-philosophy afready paves a way towards tins questioning because his inquiry shows
how this philosophical tradition might renew itself by connecting its thinking to the time
machine of cinema. By insisting that thinking is aiways already a technique informed by
a technology, Deleuze is at once challenging the metaphysical pretension to having a pure
conception of time and also defending the idea that the inquiry into the time-image is a
powerful modality of pursuing this conception, equal or even superior to metaphysical
conceptions. While following this lead. I would like to ask more specffically how a
theory of rhythm rearticulates these fundamental problems and paradoxes of time and
temporal experience. While ofien taldng a critical distance or second degree perspective
on critical discourse by using the passive voice or the subject pronoun in the first-person
plural, I will 5e employing the first-person in my dissertation when I believe it necessary
to directly argue the merits and the limits ofmy inquiry.
In Part I, I lay out a critique of the modem institutional study of film and the
subjection of “rhythm” to the subject-securing epistemology of representation. This is a
critique of the way rhythm is regarded as a stylistic element of the intentional “direction”
of the subject, an element winch, once stabilized by the discourses of “film-form” and
“film-art,” can then 5e interpreted and “read.” In other words, I critique specific
approaches to the study ofrhythm but also I critique that which grounds the field ofthese
approaches to literacy, the historically determining relationship to language which has
been consolidated by the mass culture ofprint. Throughout these chapters, I indicate the
necessity of thinldng-through the materiality of time inscribed in the image (rhythm) in
terms of a theory of language that is non-linguistic. This foregrounds a critique of the
semiotic traditions of film-theory from Pasolini to Deleuze.
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My disertation revalorizes Tarkvosky’s own theory and practice of rhythm in the
context of these semiotic traditions, it also articulates the limits of studying the notion of
a “poetics of rhythm” within these traditions, and it defends the possibffity of studying
rhytimi as a poetics-politics-ethics of action that shatters and reconfigures the agency and
the consciousness of subjectivity. I owe much of the movement of this kind of thinking
to Meschonnic’s conception of rhytbm, and I bave deliberately carried over into the fleld
of film studies many of bis critical gestures in order to examine some of the larger
questions about poetics, subjectivity, and the mediation oflanguage.
I defend the idea that the rhythmic temporality of film is a revolutionaiy form of
mediation because it potentially upsets the set-up of hegemonic technologies (the
moveable type of the printing press) that have spread their influence into the collective
culture of mass-production generally. For example, rhythm, intended as the materiality
of time inscribed in the image, potentially disrupts the empty homogenous temporality
consolidated by the print-culture of the state (national ontopology). In the ruins of tins
absolute temporality, rhythm introduces another mode of being and belonging for
subjectivity, another way of being historical and acting within the heterogeneous,
discontinuous, and contingent experience of temporal passage.
In part II, I place tins critical theory of rhythm in the context of the critique of
historiography. I discuss the transformation of historical knowledge—always akeady
articulated by the work of memory and the mediation of experience by winch it is
constituted—in the medium of film. The hypothesis is that rhythm challenges
conventional modes by winch history is narrated by showing how modem events are
mediated by the work of memory in the instorical milieu of time-images. More, rhythm
potentially contaminates literacy and the institutional practices of written knowledge by
producing an electronic economy of orality (electr-orality) in the duration of the flimic
image. This consideration leads me to argue that the materiality of rhythrn in the time
xli
based mediiim of film constitutes another form of historical knowledge altogether, one
that makes language stammer and stutter in the “noise of time” passing through film. I
argue for the utopian dimension of this poetics-politics-ethics of rhythm and show how
poetry, as intermedial practice, allows the singular experience of and experimentation
with the movement of the word (the historicity of poetry’s voice-over) to interact
dynamically and organically with the materiality oftime inscribed in the image.
In Part III, I have made a close analysis of the sequences and shots in Mirror. I
demonstrate how the complex temporality of Tarkovsky’s careffilly composed images
generate the possibilities of ideas out of an elemental experience with the material
phenomena inscribed on film. At the more immediate level of the analysis of the film
itself it might be asked how one should go about analyzing the images and sequences of
the film without reducing its effects to mere symbolism or metaphor? Tarkvosky’s own
remarks on the undecipherable or inscrutable polysemy of the cinematographic image
receive considerable attention and exact from us a kind of methodological caution. Is it
possible to think alongside film without reductively explaining it as meariing, without
pretending to comprehend it as representation?
Language and thought can move alongside the magical-mimetic capabffity of film,
taking us beyond the seemingly inevitable urge to interpret the image, when they
productively embrace the path-building or networking afready facilitated by the image as
an image. By extension, this might make visible and audible those imaginative qualities
inherent in audio-visual technique, the medium of film constantly bringing one into
contact with the outside, the open, and the not-yet thought.
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Shot 7, p.201 (digital camera) : http://www.arts.ualberta.ca/-diniall/Mfrror/Mirror.htm
Shot 11, p.203 (digital laserdisk): http://www.skywaildng.com/tarkovsky/tpics.html
$hot 14, p.205 (photo-stifi) Tarkvosky, Scuipting in Time, 1986, p.98
Shot 16, p.206 (scanned photo-stifi) Tarkvosky, Scuipting in Tirne, 1986, p.1 22
Shot 17, p.206 (digital camera) http://www.arts.ualberta.cak-dmialllMirror[Mirror.htm
Shot 19, p.207 (scanned photo-stilis): Tarkvosky, $culpting in Time, 19$6, p.115
Shot 21, p.208 (scanned photo-stilis): Tarkvosky, Scuipting in Tirne, 1986, p.l15
Shot 23, p.209 (scanned photo-stili): Tarkvosky, Scuipting in Time, 1986, p.115
Shot 26, p.21 I (digital laserdisk): http://www.skywalking.com/tarkovsky/tpics.htrnl
Shot 30, p.213 (scanned photo-stii): Andrei Tarkvosky, Rivages, 1989, p.112
Shot 39, 216 (digital camera) : http://www.arts.ualberta.cakdmiall/Mirror/Mirror.htm
Shot 40, p.217 (digital camera) : http://www.arts.ualberta.caJ—dmiall/Mirror/Mirror.htm
Shot 42, p.2 18 (photo-still): http://www.skywalking.com/tarkovsky/tpics.html
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Shot 44, p219 (digital laserdisk): http://www.skywalldng.com/tarkovsky/tpics.htmi
Shot 63, p.224 (scaimed photograph) : Andreï Tarkvosky, Rivages, 1989, p.105
Shot $6, p.227 (photo-stifi): http://www.skywalking.com/tarkovsky/tpics.html
Shot 92, p.230 (scanned photo-stifi): Johuson and Petrie, A Visuat Fugue, 1994, p.l23
Shot 94, p.23 1 (photographs): http://www.skywalking.com/tarkovsky/tpics.html
Shot 95, p.234 (digital laserdisk): http://www.skywalking.comltarkovsky/tpics.html
Shot 95, p.236 (digital laserdisc): http://www.skywalking.com/tarkovsky/tpics.html
Shot 111, p.241 (digital laserdisk): http://www.skywalldng.com/tarkovsky/tpics.html
Shot 114, p.242 (scanned photo-stili): Tarkvosky, $cutpting in Time, 1986, p.242
Shot 120, p.244 (scanned photo-stifi): Tarkvosky, $cuÏpting in Time, 1986, p.242
Shot 127, p.245 (scanned photo-stifi): Tarkvosky, Scuipting in Tirne, 1986, p.242
Shot 131, p.246 (photo-stifis): http://www.geocities.com/SoHo/Viflage/4736/article2.htm1
Shot 143, p. 249 (scanned photo-stili): Andrei Tarkvosky, Rivages, 1989, p.109
Shot 160, p.255 (scanned photo-stifi): Andrei Tarkvosky, Rivages, 1989, p.121
$hot 161, p. 255 (digital camera) : http://www.arts.ualberta.cakdnilall/Mirror/Mirror.htm
Shot 161, p. 255 (photo-stiI): http://www.skywalldng.com/tarkovsky/tpics.html
Shot 164, p.256 (scanned photo-stifi): Tarkvosky, Scuipting in Time, 1986, p.153
Shot 167, p.258 (digital laserdisk): http://www.skywalldng.com/tarkovsky/tpics.html
Shot 169, p.258 (digital laserdisc): http://www.skywalking.comltarkovsky/tpics.htmÏ
Shot 183, p.261 (digital laserdisc): http://www.skywa&ing.com!tarkovsky/tpics.html
Shot 186, p.261 (digital laserdisc): http://www.skywalking.com/tarkovsky/tpics.html
Shot 189 p.262 (digital laserdisc): http://www.skywalldng.com/tarkovsky/tpics.html
Shot 194, p.263 (scanned photo-stii): Andrei Tarkvosky, Rivages, 1989, p.1 10
Shot 202, p. 205 (digital laserdisc): http://www.skywa&ing.cornltarkovsky/tpics.html
Shot 206, p.267 (digital camera) : http://www.arts.ualberta.caI-’dmiaNfMfrror/Mirror.htm
Shot 207, p.268 (digital camera) : http://www.arts.ualberta.cal—dmialVMirror/Mirror.htm
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Avant-Propos
b a great extent, the paradigm of medium analysis allows one to question the binary
oppositions between theoria and praxis, and between the aesthetic categories ofform and
content, since the medium itself is that by means of which critical theory and technology
converge’ and resonate. In other words, the convergence oftechnology and theory in the
medium of film shows the necessity for an interdisciplinary mode of analysis that is
grounded in a method ofepistemological critique and exploratory questioning.
This mode of critique and questioning is one of the hallmarks of Comparative
Literature because tins “inter-discipline” is constituted by a reflexive understanding of
the way in winch the knowledge practices of the “Human Sciences and the Arts” are
themselves intimately related to and organized by what may be called, in foucauldian
terms, the literary “dispositif” For example, I problematize the critical response to
“read” a film narratively and to “decipher” the meaning of its image-surface by
discussing the historical problem--in critique itself--of the hegemony of one technology
over another the modem institutionalization of flim-studies in the twentieth century
having been appropriated for didactic and political purposes by the culture of literacy and
the discipline of art history.
My argument traces something of the recent breakdown of tins belonging, the
discursive shifi unmooring flim-studies from art instoiy into the sphere of media studies,
especiafly that study of the fiim-medium that treats the philosophical concept of
mediation. Touching upon the historical conditions under winch the rise of the media
ushered in a radical transformation of thinldrig from aesthetic to epistemological
categories, from a work-oriented to a medium-oriented conception of art and reality or
For a particularly insightful instance of this paradigm, in which theory of the “medium” and the
practice of the “media” cross and resonate, one might consuit George P. Landow 1992.
Kypertexi: The Convergence of Contemporaiy Critical Theory and TecÏrnotogy. Baltimore and
London : The John’s Hopkins University Prcss.
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technics and mediation2, this dissertation calis into question conventional theories of
rhythm in film and explores and creates other concepts of rhythm under the paradigm of
intermediality3.
Is there a methodological and epistemological mode! for the pursuit ofthis kind of
theoretical critique and invention under the paradigm of intermediality ? I have
continuously retumed to the refreshing and insightful work of Walter Benjamin as a
mode! for this kind of research and reflection. Although Benjamin did flot employ the
term “intermediality,” his thinldng marks the moment of the possibffity of theorizing a
“thinking experience” winch is caught between two epistemological systems, one afready
formed and one flot yet formed, one the dedline or twffight of winch appears and
disappears in the light of another; a thinking experience that can no longer be organized
by the epistemological system that generated it and winch must continue to work out
another system of conceptions in the debris lefi behind.
Tins thinldng experience is intermedial4 on at least three levels: it reveals the
historical relationship between different media in the complex processes of mass culture
2 In an erudite re-reading of Kant, Heidegger, and Benjamin, these concepts are explored by:
Samuel Weber. Mass Mediauras: Form, Technics, Media. Ed. Alan Cholodenko. Calïfomia:
Stanford UP, 1996.
Under the direction given this concept by Silvestra Mariniello in current publications CINéMAS(Vol 10/nos.2-3, printemps 2000) and interdisciplinary research seminars (HART/CRI, UdeM,
2000-2002), intermediality is an epistemological questioning concerning technology and modem
experience; It is also a dynamic state of becoming flowing between media, essentially open to
constant transformation, reappropriation, and relatïon, and apprehended most suggestively as the
hybrid crossing of signifying practices.
I borrow these distinctions from the broad sketch given by Eric Mechoulan, founder and director
of the new bi-annuel and transdisciplianry review «Intermédialités» for the CRI (Centre de
Recherche sur l’intermédiatité) at the Université de Montréal, who made the following
presentation of this paradigm s Le concept d’intermédialité opère alors à trois niveaux différents
d’analyse. Il peut désigner, d’abord, les relations entre divers médias (voire entre diverses
pratiques artistiques associées à des médias délimités) s lintermédialité vient après les médias.
Ensuite, ce creuset de médias d’où émerge et s’institutionnalise peu à peu un média bien
circonscrit s t’intermédialité apparaît avant les médias. Enfin, le milieu en général dans lequel les
médias prennent forme et sens s l’intermédialité est immédiatement présente à toute pratique d’un
média. L’intermédialité sera donc analysée en fonction de ce que sont des “ milieux “ et des
médiations “, mais aussi des “ effets d’immédiateté “, des “ fabrications de présence ‘ ou des
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within Môdernity; it recuperates, critiques and re-invents categories and figures of
thinking in the clash of opposing knowledge systems and institutional practices; and it
analyzes the passage between media practices in terms of their potential transmutabffity
and their material resistance to appropriation. Walter Benjamin’s work on photography
and the mechanical reproducibffity of the image, autobiography and storyteffing, the
language and the image ofallegory, the critique ofhistoriography, the material passage of
memory, and utopian awakening5 is trailbiazing. In the radiant wake of Benjamin’s
insights, tins dissertation attempts to fray a less-traveled path in film studies, by renewing
the study ofTarkovsky’s films and inventing a critical theory ofrhytbm.
modes de résistance “. L’intermédialité n’offre pas un “ dépassement “ des anciennes
intertextualités ou interdiscursivités : elle insiste simplement sur ce qui fondait ces concepts,
c’est-à-dire le sens privilégié alloué aux enchaînements, aux mouvements de dépropriation
approprïation, aux continuités tacites ou affirmées, aux résistances obstinées et aux recyclages
diserts. (x Présentation,» juillet, 2002).
Although a more comptete list of Walter Benjamin’s work may be consulted in the
bibliography, let me mention some of the English editions and anthologies of his work The
Arcades Project (1999); Illuminations (1968); The Origin ofGerman Trcigic Drama (1998); and
Reflections (1978).
Q
o
Introduction
Scuipting Out of Time
I think that what a person normafly goes to the cinema for is time; for time lost or spent
or not yet had. He goes there for living experience; for cinema, like no other art, widens,
enhances and concentrates a person’s experience—and flot only enhances it but makes it
longer, signfficantly longer (Andrey Tarkvosky, $culpting in Time, 1986, p. 69).
for many years I have been tormented by the certainty that the most extraordinary
discoveries await us in the sphere of Time. We know less about time than about anything
else (Andrey Tarkovsky, Time within Time, [Februmy 15, 19721 1994, p. 53).
Mdrei Tarkvosky’s semi-autobiographical film Zerkalo, or Mirror (1975), projects such
tonnented certainties and extraordinary discoveries, recording the coming to
consciousness of a change in the universe created by the cinema, a change in the
conception and experience of time. This is what really astounds audiences and turns
them into passionate admirers of films like Mirror according to Tarkovsky, for the
development of this cinematic technology lias “revealed hitherto unexplored areas of
reality” (1986, pp. 83-84). Cinema-goers, searching for lost time, and drifiing-
encountering new forms oftime.
At three separate moments in the argument of bis book of reflections on the cinema,
Scuipting in Time , Tarkovsky does allow himself room to comment upon the modem
spectator’s searching need for “time lost or spent, or not-yet had” (1986, p.63; pp.82-$3
p.1 79). Each time Tarkovsky implicitly invokes the redemptive power of the cinema as
that winch compels cinema-goers to compensate for the gaps of modem experience.
Tarkovsky makes it clear that the degree to winch this “lost-time” is restored and
restorative depends a great deal on the humanity and spirituality of the director who then
3vicariously shares it, condenses it, and sculpts it in the uncompromisingÏy affective
images of time printed on film (1986; 179). While tins redemptive theory of time
compensation in cinema seems to be argued consistently, it is fundamentally at odds
with Tarkovsky’s materialist conception of rhythm and its relationship to the dynamic
currents, pressures, and traces of life in film, as I wifl be arguing in Part I of the
dissertation.
Moreover, the “search for time lost, spent, or not yet had,” while motivated by the
critical impulse to recover from an alienated form of modem subjectivity, only
exacerbates such a crisis, seen in terms of losing, spending and not-yet having time.
Even Tarkovsky is flnally forced to admit that the rhythms of the time-machine of cinema
undeniably belong to the rhythms of modem life and their inevitable “time deficiency.”
In other words, we are aiways “out of time” even in the halls of the cinema, for the
attempt to make-up for time-lost is itself afready determined by the position of aiways
spending-time in order to gain it again. Moreover, this loss ofthe present, winch is feit as
nostalgia for what already was ami can neyer retum again, paradoxically produces
another level of nostalgia for something that remains in a state of anticipated desire in a
future endlessly deferred, a nostalgia for that winch is not yet had. Paradoxically then, the
cinema “produces nostalgia” even as it holds out the promise of recovering from the
“spiritual vacuum” of modem conditions—conditions that have exacerbated the sense of
flot having a present onto winch one might have a hold.
Ibis insertion and dislocation in the passing-splitting of the present, however, is
mediated by the virtual-actual economy of the image. In Bergsonian and Deleuzian
terms, Tarkovsky’s fllms-especially Mirror, explore and embody tins “passing” of time
as a kind of mobile mirror in winch perception and recollection endlessly pass into one
another in the medium or milieu of the tiine-image. The search for “lost time”
accomplishes in audio-visual technique what Proust’s stereoscopic economy of “writing
4remembrance” accomplishes in À ta recherche du temps perdu another temporal
experience of the phases of experience—buried and brought to life by the materiality of
memory and forgetting. Lost-time can neyer be re-possessed; the phases oftime can only
be re-run and re-played in other mediations.
for these reasons, what Tarkvosky cafis a “time-deficiency” is also a possibility for a
different mode of being and belonging in time and also, out oftime. b be “out of time”
implies an acute lack of time and this produces the desire to measure, compress and
accelerate the moments that we are in time; however, to be “out of time” also implies an
intense yearning for suspension., for timeless drifi, for remaining on the outside of time—
for remaining motionless. This patience, paralysis, or suspension ofjudgment may itseff
engender a new abffity to live in the phases of time; when boredom or mild suffering
exposes us to the immediacy or drifi of time and the sense of our own mortality is
brought to the fore, the expansion or contraction of temporal experience allows
something new to emerge—a moment of contact with othemess, words with winch to
speak, or perhaps, the silent openness to the time of waiting. finally, to be “out of time”
is to let oneseif experience the visceral lure of the end of time, to allow the temporal
extension and concentration ofthe viewing experience to open onto the explosive passage
of catastrophe itsell to access—in the accelerated or slowed down duration of an image
ofdisappearance--the epoch-ending moment ofdisaster.
In Mirror (1975), tins lire ofaccessing the end oftime is presented in the most banal
and creative ways. for example, just after the child of the narrator, Ignat, has been
visited by two mysterious guests and is asked to recite a fragment of Pushkin’s letter to
Chaadayev regarding the Christian destiny of Russia, we witness the passing of the
extraordinary in even the most domestic of shots: in the obsessive attention given to
5recording the disappearance of a humid ring of vapor lefi by a cup of tea’. As the
camera cuts to a close-up of the vanishing ring, the electronic track of choral music rises
in intensity. The voices of the low chant are drawn out, accelerated, and concentrated
into the terminal pitch of alarm. This climatic pitch suddeniy vanishes in the tremendous
silence of the graduai dissolution of the humid mark, a silence that is flot simpiy the
absence of sound but its very implosion, pregnant and resonating with the momentous
memory of the rise of voices— breaking the sound-barrier, irrnpting and accomplishing
itselfoutside ofthe material duration ofvapor, it seems to pass “out oftime.”
This disjunction between soundtrack and time-image allows for a new category of
perception and cinema-goers literally stand suspended and gaping before the
phenomenality of something so ordinary and yet usually unperceived, the inevitable
collapse and the etemally fleeting sense of material being in time. Tins perception is
accentuated by its being a natural, elemental mediation of vapor, its being between the
elements of water and air, being between visibility and invisibffity, and being between
death and etemal metamorphosis/transfiguration. Audio-visual technique operates an
allegorical inscription in the Benjaminian sense of the terni, as allegory is distinguished
from symbol: rather than symbolizing the eternal moment, h allows time to seep into and
materially inscribe itself in the etemally fleeting nature of the work of art as a fragmented
passage, ruin, and reminder ofthe immanence ofdeath in historical being.
Paradoxically, the elemental materiality of the cinematographic image winch is
“sculpted in time” also “sculpts out of time” because it puts viewers into contact with
something more, bcyond, accelerated out of invisible, yet accessible to, or in dialogue
This analysis also appears later in Part III (Sequence X, shot 96). The argument concerning the
temporal experience of vaporization discussed in this paragraph will be extended once again in
otder to nuance the materialist argument for an allegorical mediation of history. In other words,
the obsessive attention given to vaporous implosion introduces a form of historical mediation
which is strictly opposed to the ideological critique and dïscourse that Marxist fitm-critics and
sociologists usually rely upon “to explain” the images ofthe Pushkin-recita sequence.
6with that hope and that memory generating the more-than-mortal-being-in-time, and
death is merely a fiinction of this transformation. The heat-mark from the absent tea-cup
evaporates the magical water of Lethe in order to remember the truth (a-ietheia) of that
etemal side of change and mortality, just as the rhythmic gap of the musical reverberation
bears more than mere silence/absence of voices but continues to affirm the ontoiogy of
their tonal presence in the weight, ilfled by the overtone, oftheir echoing memrny.
The magical and mysterious aspect of this historical connection is made even more
tangible since a series of aurai and visuai correspondences are generated between the
“vaporous bodies” materialized on screen throughout the film. Tins image of the ring of
vapor, its implosive disappearance, reverberates later and sets the tonality for the vision
of the found documentary footage inserted into the diegetic environment of the film,
recording the explosive appearance of the building pressures of the nuclear mushroom
cloud rising above Hiroshima. Time breathes within the shots and sequences of the film
like a series ofhot expirations.
However, Mirror does flot record tins change in the experience of time by means of a
mere projection of apocalyptic endings nor by means of prophecies of the end of history.
In favor of tins closing of consciousness tins exemplary film relays to us, through the
velocities of modem mass events, the rhythms of the life-world of experience, and the
fictions of apocalypse, a visible and mysterious image of ourselves as mutants—of the
way we inhabit and are inhabited by conscious and unconscious forces of time and
powers ofmemory and forgetting.
Tarkovsky’s Mirror, from this perspective, incarnates one of the cinema’s ultimate
fantasies about time-travel in the medium of the cinematographic image. The subject
(viewer, director, people), endlessly being stripped of the capacity to hold or to fix time,
must relinquish tins impulse to confer continuity upon existence by becoming inserted
withiri the structure of homogenous, empty time. The subject must simply pass time in
7time’s multiple heterogeneity, discontinuity, and contingence. In the halls of cinema the
time-passer is a contemplative observer who loses time in the middle of a world that
materially passes at variable speeds, and this experience of no longer having a time to
himseif’herself is also the experience of the loss or the absence of an absolute
temporality. This is the fmal, and most important, meaning ofthe “time deficiency.”
No longer having the time ofone’s own, no longer being able to engage oneseif in the
temporallty of an action, this negative suspension means that the time-passer has lost time
in order to be able to open himselflherself to the temporal singularity of events, to bear
witness to the rhythms of these traces, and to be available to becoming transformed by
these traces. The temporal materiality of film, its rhythm. effects a serial metamorphosis
of reality; in the attentive absorption to the alien rhythms of the film we witness the
passage of time, from the intensity of its compression to the plasticity of its expansion—
and in the inscrutable cipher of pressures of this historicai material of duration—we relay
the radical aherity of this serial-becoming of temporality through which we too must
pass.
Tarkovsky’s work reveals, in an exemplary way, how the temporal materiality ofthe
cinematographic medium shatters the experience and perception of time itself and
challenges rnany of the epistemological categories and conceptions by which historical
knowledge is articulated and organized. Tins explains historically why ail of
Tarkvosky’s films, and especially Mirror, have inspired as much critical resistance as
they have inspired astonished fascination: they introduce a different, because less
rational, order of historical experience and knowledge—in the temporal materiality of
film. In Part II, I wiII be arguing that the terms of tins irrational, because a-logical,
knowledge and experience can be reformulated in other terms. For example, I will be
concemed with demonstrating how the rhythmic temporality of film, out of the ruins of
$narrative rèpresentation and historiography, introduces a poetic practice into audio-visual
technique that is close to a mythical form ofhistorical consciousness.
The Work of Memory and the Metamorphosis of Historicat Material
Tarkovsky’s Mirror (1975) is an implicit critique of historiography from this point of
perspective, for the phases of historical time are transmitted outside of their setting and
placement within an absolute temporality in the scriptural economy of a chronicle of
events. Like many postwar films, Mirror demonstrates that when time is fragmented and
chronology is pulverized--lilce so many pieces of a broken crystal shattering the past,
present, and future phases of time--the merely chronological continuum of history and
memory is flayed into a distinct series of discontinuous and incommensurable intervals.
For when time is no longer derived from movement but eccentric and aberrant movement
derived from time, then story, memory and experience are fundamentally transformed
because they are mediated by incommensurable intervals and irrational divisions of time.
As I will argue in Part II, the incommensurable and irrational divisions of time “pass” in
the rhythmic temporality of film and bring about a narrative crisis winch foregrounds a
larger crisis in the form of knowledge and truth: for that winch divides the inside from
the outside, the mmd from the body, the mental from the physical, and the imaginary
from the real are no longer decidable qualities because a certain regime of truth, to use
Deleuze’s Nietzschian terms, has become “falsifled” by the “irrational” powers of the
time-image.
Clearly such a perspective on the flimic vision of history is pertinent to the analysis of
the rhythmic temporalities of Mirror (1975), a film which is structured by the altemation
between the multiple rhythms of collective and personal memory and between historical
and fictional temporalities. Mirror reveals the fundamentally social character of
memory, the way in which personal memory and collective memory rnutually constitute
9one anothèr, and it is upon this mutuaily constituting work of memory that the historical
narrative of the film is articulated in ail of its complexity. The narrative “plotting” of
history in Mirror makes its appearance in the film in the altemate exchange between the
trans-generational story of a broken famfly (the narrator’s son repeating something of the
story of the narrator as a boy) winch is expanded onto the history of generations of other
familles (Soviet and Spanish) broken by the events of WWII. Ibis alternating exchange
is made intelligible in the complex visual structure of the chronotopes transmitted by the
memories of a narrator and other members of his family (1930’s at the dacha; 1940’s
events of WWII; 1970’s narrator’s apartment). Mirror is organized by the effiptical
“emboîtement” set between two mirrors that, facing each other, reflect the infinite series
of exits and entries set between the gaps of three generations of family—of the narrator
as a child and the child as a narrator (DeBaeque, 19$9, p.7$). Although such an
exchange of memoiy seems to make recognizable at least the semblance of a
transhistorical destiny of a people (fhmily/nation), it is itseff uncertainly shuffled and
“fabulated” between the historical and fictional temporalities of image-crystals.
If there is flot any clear central Text/Law or eschatological narrative around winch
these multitemporal sequences are organized, we may at least say that they carry the
burden of the absence of tins law; in other words, they do flot simply heretically reject
this mythic-epic Law. They do flot lose it to memoiy; rather, they are inscribed in the
memoiy of its loss. A memory of loss already carried by the tropes of XIX century
Russian literature (Dostoevsky/Tolstoy/Chekhov/Pushkin) and the prophetic word and
utopianldystopian vision ofthe poet, Arseny Tarkvosky the director’s father; tins memory
of loss organizes the intertextual-intermedial work of memory in Mirror. The religious
impulse surging out of Tarkovsky’s Mirror organizes and transmits tins mythic order of
truth somewhat diabolically through the absence or loss of the father/Moses-figure.
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However much Mirror models itself on the work of ifie passage of patemal tradition
and the memory of its loss, stiil it should be emphasized that this work of memory in
Mirror is nor a clear transmission of any kind of memory but a passage into its oblivion
also, a stammering through the gaps separating co-existing temporalities, the
impossibility of re-unions, the opacity and difficulty of homecomings. These gaps are
narratively imagined in Mirror through the divorce, misunderstanding. and absence of
family relationships (the hyphens separating three generations of father-son, husband
wife, son-mother relations). More, these gaps are rhythmically inscribed in the medium
of film, in the difference of time-pressures in scenes and between scenes, and in the
different charge of historical and fictional temporalities. The material duratïon of the
time-image and its multiple rhythms, always in a state of becoming, would remove the
possibility of there being any rationalizing or stabilizing logic to manage ifie multiplicity
and speed of temporal experience by which historical events might be chronicled.
Such an “irrational” and “a-logical” experience of time is heightened and intensified
by the spiritual tenor and nostalgie tonality of Tarkovsky’s cinematography.
Commenting upon the historical ontology of Tarkvosky’ s time-images and their
hallucinatory effects, Youssef Ishaghpour has observed: “Chaque fois, la «réalité» est
métamorphosée par la temporalité d’un regard devenu vision” (1996, p.75). In other
words, this transforming duplicity of the cinematographic image (gaze/vision) then
becomes an experience of a transforming encounter between the fldelity of a realistically
reflected double-image and the virulence of the powers of human projection to meet the
terrors and hopes of the passage of death. As Ishaghpour suggestively argues, these
magical and affective powers are the condition, the unconscious ground, for the
possibility of having a “realistic” perception and they strengthen the powers of
participation and identification: “L’image participe de la chose, le spectateur participe de
la réalité sur l’écran, fasciné par sa puissance de suggestion totale et irrésistible. à cause
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sa réalité. De là naît cette symbiose qui intègre le spectateur dans le flux du film et le flux
du film dans le flux psychique du spectateur” (1996; 92).
The “participation in” in the thing-ness of the world (image/thing: :spectateur/screen)
becomes the condition for the possibffity of a reciprocal exchange, creating a
metamorphic membrane of contact between the film and the viewer. I wifl argue that
this temporal and serial metamorphosis of reaEty is effected each time the historical
reflection of the gaze trarisforms the hot expiration of time into an anamorphic spectre of
death. The anamorphoses produced by Tarkovsky’s Mirror, then, are not merely
discursive reflections of a plurality of contesting ideological positions on History,
Counter-History, and Popular Memory. Rather, on the level of the time-based medium of
film, they effect a serial metamorphosis of historical reality by foregrounding the death
spectre in the multiple rhythms of the viewing experience, an experience that makes time
visible at the horizon ofthe end.
The anamorphic effect is signfficantly mediated by the figure of the orphan-rebel who
permits the passage from the personal memories of the narrator’s chfldhood to the
collective memories of the events of WWII. Masyev—an orphan boy, having lost bis
parents in the Leningrad blockade, rebeffiously disobeys the military discipline and
commands of his “shell-shocked” instructor to turn about-face or to shoot on target;
instead he turns about-face twice and shoots obliquely. The complexity, ambiguity, and
contradictory nature of such a scene as it produces a discourse on the production of the
temporal experience of history and memory cannot be underestimated. Mirror reveals
that to transmit is also to transform tins personal experience of rebellious refusai to speak
in the name of the absent—a shattering of mirrors—refracted in the polemical and
abandoned eyes of the child and reoriented as a wili to face the dead in ail their enigmatic
opacity, silence, and irrevocable distance.
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In othér words, there is an ethics-poetic-politics in the tact of tins counter-history;
Tarkovsky does flot contest officiai History for the purpose of skirting its authority with
playfttl frreverence ifice some Dadaist modemist flimmaker; on the contrary, Mirror
reverently refiects the utopian dimension of tins History negativeÏy in the anamorphic
effects of the temporal medium of film. Tins is the importance of understanding the
time-passer as a child, an orphan, hostile to instruction. Tins child is not merely an
instance for the enunciation of a counter-history or vision but a figure of the very
dislocation and transformation of tùne itself’ through the blockade-boy we are put into
contact with a kind of temporal transformation of experience, that through winch the
noise oftime may be heard and that through winch the breath oftime may be felt.
As a figure of disorientation and dislocation, it is through his rebefflous eyes that
viewers are taken through a series of three separate apocalyptic sequences of war the
hand-grenade prank, the Lake Sivash crossing, and the end of WWII. Tins audio-visual
drifi and dislocation permits viewers to pass and become the passage of the historical
traces of film, to witness a lime to winch they do flot belong but winch brushes up against
them, aclivating memories and inventing another form of historical consciousness.
Stuftering and Flashing: Mediating Modem Events
What happens to the historical memory of catastrophic events when the “sense of an
ending,” normaily consolidated by strategies of narrative representation, can no longer
contain the historical-material debris of time mediated by audio-visual technologies ?
This question is central to the analysis of Mirror and but also to an understanding of the
power of the tele-technic images of the mass-media generally. The fiuid, unstable,
phantasmagoric power of explosive images of catastrophes transmitted by the television,
such as those pathologically replaying the events of September tu are--as images-
impervious to explaiiation and resistant to narrative representation. 0f course such
13
images mûst aiways be explained, interpreted and accompanied by the sense of an
ending; this is the duty of telejoumalism, to build an explicative frame of speech that
might withstand and under-ride the images of historical events (like the running script on
the screen of CNN), to give the distance and time “covered” by the image the coverage of
a story (a stoiy that has an identifiable plot and intrigue, in which the framing of events
might index the ending of an epoch or a world with some traiis-social and trans-historical
significance). And yet, the images of events like these seem to overflow and to crumble
the veiy edifice of speech and the indexical nature of story; no matter how frequently
these images have passed on screen nor how much they have been exploited and
manipulated for meaning, their serial repetition bas neyer given mastery over the material
speed and bistorical weight of time inscribed in these images; the rhythmic temporality of
the motion picture has bad the effect ofmaldng speech stuffer.
Ibis affirmation takes us into the heart of the problem concerning the mediation of
the historical event in the multiple rhythms of film. As Walter Benjamin recognized, in
wbat has practically become a commonplace in critical discourse, human experience
retreated from the reaim of its possible transmission in story due to the acceleration of the
explosive forces of technological mediations such as those shocking the human body on
the battlefields of WVvI. If history can no longer be put into the narrativity of story, then
it reffises to be mastered, breaks down into images that outstrip the potential structures of
human comprehension, and can only be witnessed in its radical alterity.
Clearly the decline of storytelling as a cultural mediation of history-making has met
with the popular risc of a kind of therapeutic practice of remembering, repeating, re
telling in the audio-visual techniques of television and cinema—techniques that point in
the direction of obsession, trauma and fantasy (Elsaesser, 1996). However, there is a
difference to be made between the kind of obscene repetition of the society of the
“spectacle,” which Guy Debord has thoroughly critiqued for its self-enclosed circulation
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of simulations, and the kind of repetition offered by the serial experiences mediated by
films that are charged with the historical materiality of time. If we limit ourselves to the
second form of serial-experience, the question then becomes: What motivates the
compulsion to repeat? Can it in any sense be qualifled as a redemptive impulse?
Most critical analyses suggest that historical horizon of the work of memory in
Tarkvosky’s Mirror is essentially “restorative” by pointing out the redemptive motifs
and a few of the commemorative themes that structure the complex narrative; this is
legitimated and even reinforced to some extent by Tarkvosky’s writings and declarations
of the film as an emblem of “historical sacrifice.” The possibility of another perspective
is precluded by the rather superficial attention to narrative/thematic pattems and authorial
intentions winch prevail over any consideration ofthe time-based medium of film itself
I would like to argue for tins other perspective by showing how the film cails
attention to rhythm. the way the image speaks the melancholy work of memory and
mourning in time. In Tarkovsky’s Mirror the storyteiler is orphaned from the home of
memory; witnessing the clamorous noise of time the storyteller stutters. It is no accident
that the prologue-sequence of Mirror, a brief television documentary about the hypnotic
curing of a young man’s stutter, introduces and initiates the complex work of memory in
the film. from the point of view of the audio-visual critique of historiography to winch
the entire film responds, it signfficantly questions narrative capabffity itself The
prologue is more than the metaphorical springboard for the rest of the film but that winch
metonymicaily imparts a certain temporal tonality, tenor, and tremor to the various pieces
ofthe shattered experience of memory to foilow.
Beyond the mise-en scene of the stuttering boy, Mirror manifests tins stuttering-effect
of the historical event by pushing narrative principles (mise-en-récit, plot) to their limits,
acceterating diegetic strategies so that they no longer regulate the periodic occurrence of
events in a narrative structure but, in a kind of hyper-diegetic suspense, mark their arriva!
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in a flash of memory. Mirror does flot employ the technique of “flash-back” ; events do
flot flash in order to receive retrospective causal explanation, nor in order to generate the
narrative succession of action. I would like to argue that the “flashing” work of memory
in Mirror marks the moment of the arrivai of events in order to provoke a kind of startied
“awakening” to thefr radical alterity. This concept may be applied to a great number of
the moments of Mirror because it is a film concerned with the fiillness of memory, flot as
it is recollected in a story, but as it is founded in loss and absence and dispersed in the
fragments and traces ofa story.
Allegorical Endings and Utopian Beginnings
Enigmaticaliy enough, one of the key narrative moments of Tarkovsky’s Mirror, featured
towards the fllm’s ending concems the death of the narrator2. In tins scene we witness,
next to a wall of mirrors, the narrator Alexei hidden behind a screened curtain; as he is
lying down on his deathbed (Postwar 1970’s), we are informed by a doctor that he is
dying for personal reasons untreatable by medical science. In terms of the dying narrator
Alexei, we witness the narrative trope or pretext that would anthologize as well as
generate the heterogenous series of memories reflected tbroughout the film of a man
acquiring a conscience on the edge of death. We do flot hear the narrator speak of his
feverish guilt of being unworthy as a father-husband in a family fragmented by war,
misunderstanding, and divorce; bis gesture and his breath however do generate the work
of memory, opening out towards the luminous presence of the “child-figure” and to the
haff-remernbered and haif-forgotten experiences of bis childhood projected in the last
scene. Signfflcantly, the hyperdiegetic work of memory, a moment of startled awakening
to the figure of the “child” and the utopian memory of childhood—is founded in the
respiing-expiing breath ofthe time-image.
2 deal with this scene at greater Iength in Part III (Sequence XXII, shots 204-206).
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In Part II, I wffl discuss how the mechanics of this gasping of the last breath is
sustained throughout the film, from the opening documentary clip ofthe stuttering fit. In
this sense, Mirror is less interested in transmitting this story as a story, but in re
organizing it in terms of its gaps, send-bacb and cancellations; introducing the pause, the
hyphen, and the stutter to speech. Setting time loose from the structures of story, Mirror
transmutes temporal experience. The sequential passage of one historical or fictional
scene into the next must be seen as a flinction and configuration of this enigmatic
transformation of temporality.
I wifl be arguing, in Deleuzian terms, that the time-images of Iarkvosky’s Mirror are
constituted by the powers of the false even in those sequences and shots that seem to
seem to offer a kind of total narrative resolution and a retum to the origins of a founding
myth because they introduce “incompossible” moments of time in the materiality of
allegorical images. The images in this final sequence of shots, in winch viewers are
taken from the scene of the sick-bed of the dying narrator Alexei into the vision of his
childhood, would provide an excellent test-case ofthis hypothesis. from the image ofthe
hand of the dying narrator viewers are taken presumably back to the moment before the
narrator’s conception (dachaJl93O’s) where bis young parents are pictured lying in the
grass below the house wondering if they would have a boy or a girl. In the long duration
of tins shot, Maria’s (Alexei’s younger mother, played by Margarita Terekhova) face
makes several expressive changes—as if in the pause of her husband’s question ber face
were anticipating a lifetime of tremendous events: passing from anxious curiosity to
warm surprise, from hopeful bewilderment to pure desperation. In the following shot,
Alexei’s mother Maria is pictured as an older woman (played by Tarkovsky’s own
mother, Maria Tarkovskaya) who steps into view from behind holding a wash basin. She
is accompanied by a young child, presumably the image of the narrator as a child.
Together they behold the image of the hill where the dacha used to be. The co-existence
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of different temporalities reaches a climax in this image; for we have passed from the
image ofthe young mother Maria in the last shot (early 1930’s) to the image ofherseffas
a o!d woman (1970’s) and paradoxicaliy, we have passed from the deathbed of the
narrator who now remains the “age!ess mode!” of the child—holding hands with his
aging mother.
Critics ifice Johnson and Petrie find in this series of shots an extraordinary power of
explanation for, in their words, they represent a “reconciliation of the conflicting forces
in the liero’s life” as the “tenuous borders” crumble between dream and memory,
between past and present, between real and imagine characters (Johnson and Petrie, 1995;
129). However seductive and pertinent such an ana!ysis may be, it does ignore that
winch is equafly present in tins shot the persistent materiality of the time of the image
and the historica! niins and debris of the “place of memory” that it inscribes. I will be
arguing that the “tenuous borders” do not crumb!e but are in fact made even more
“tenuous” and permeab!e as the complex temporalities of the major chronotopes in the
film merge in phantasmagoric and allegorical images. Just as the images of the mother
can neyer be unffied but are radicafly disjoined in time, the narrator/subject is separated
from himseff by the impersonal form of time, by the “incompossible” forking or splitting
ofnon-chronological time. Invoking Deleuze’s categories ofthe time-image, I wffl show
how time is at once inscribed in the materiality of the medium and fabulated
allegorically.
The historical subject of Mirror (the author, the narrator, the family, the people) is flot
an ideal image of unity that afready exists and must only be awakened into self
consciousness, it is a profoundly historical image, re-membered in virtual and real
circuits, on the basis of winch a future might be invented. Remembering in Tarkvosky’s
Mirror is neither a psychological memory in winch the individual narrator recalis a
repressed past nor simply a historical memory that would represent the occluded story of
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a people; the time-series of remembering, bifurcating throughout the film, shows how the
inside and the outside, the public and the private, the individual and the collective can
meet and generate a collective enunciation ofhistory based upon the utopian potentials of
the not-yet, the darkness of experience, the half-awakened siumber of the dream; a
history that generates its remembrance around the figure of the child and the disorienting
experience of dreaming about childhood. I wffl also be concerned with demonstrating
how the utopian memory of childhood in Mirror invariably responds to the problem of
the mediation of the catastrophic historical events; the pathology of the narrator is related
to the traumatic remembrance of history, one in winch individual and collective
memories are transposed in the redemptive work of mouming or in the allegorical work
of melancholy grief The memories of childhood generate—out of the material pressures
and repetitions of historical time—an awakening and an openness to the potentially
radical alterity of the future.
When language stutters and “history breaks down into images” in Tarkovsky’s
Mirror, the child is the rebefflous orphan-figure through winch the velocities of
catastrophic events must pass; however, the child is also the ageless model of innocence
who inhabits the dacha of memory, the mobile symbolic space in winch tins history must
be organized for the future. The narrator’s tortured journey back to chfldhood and bis
repeated effort to access the house of memory (seen in the last four sequences) takes
viewers back to tins possibffity. In the dark-luminous visions of hope and desperation,
the child is inevitably tom between the melancholy of a lost world and the utopian wish
to generate a new world.
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Chapter 1: The Question Concerning Technology in the Medium of Film
The relationship between the philosophical discourse of modemity and the
institutionalized practice and study of film is extremely complex. In this section I
would ifice to outline some of the implications of this relationship by reflecting upon
some of those daims made by Martin Heidegger in his celebrated essays, “The Age of
the World Picture” and the “Question Conceming Technology.” The pertinence of
these daims in the context of film studies may then be qualffled in general historical
and philosophical terms by briefly discussing three critical perspectives of the
modemity of audio-visual technique. These daims set the groundwork on winch my
theory of rhythm in the medium of film is articulated, a theory emerging in relation to
Andrey Tarkovsky’s work.
The Time ofthe World-Picture
The most fundamental feature of modem times and of the modem spirit, according to
Heidegger, is the conquest of the world as a picture. Hence the title of the essay, Die
Zeit des WeltbiÏdes, names the epoch or time in winch the world is given only insofar as
it presents itseff as a picture. Weltbild does not refer necessarily to a picture of the
world but to the systematic conception of the world as a picture, in its pictoriality.
Common expressions 111cc “being in the picture” or “getting the picture” or “putting
oneself into the picture” capture the meaning of Weltbild because they imply a form of
mastery and control of what gets into the picture and what the picture is a picture of
What does this mean?
The flrst major implication of the assignment of Being under Weltbild is that the
heterogeneity of beings and the totality of their relationships can only be accepted
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insofar as they can be objectified and represented, or vorgesteit. This word, as Samuel
Weber reminds us (1996; 7$), has the original naming power to designate the double
movement of iiteraiiy setting things out in front of oneseif (vor-stellen) and bringing
things towards oneseif (her-stellen). Entities are brought doser and also kept at a safe
distance from the subject; above ail, they are put into thefr place, as the German root
“stellen” indicates, and this emplacement confirms and secures the place of the subject
“as the reference point of ah beings as such” (Heidegger,, “The Age of the World
Picture”; 1977. 128).
When such a movement is understood as encompassing the totality of beings as
such. the “world” itself has become a “picture” whose ultimate ffinction is to establish
and confirm the centrality of man as the being capable of depiction. The “Age”, or
more literally, the “Time” (Zeit) of the World-Picture thus flirns out to be that of the
presentation, the Vorstellung, the bringing-forth-and setting-before (the subject) of all
things. (S. Weber, 1996; 79)
In other words, the emergence ofthe modem World Picture or Weltbild involves a
systematic decision about the Being of beings, for tins Being can only be sought and
found in the “representedness” of beings. Ibis determination of the Being of beings in
the World-as-Picture correlatively determines the human as the founding, constitutive
subject (the Greek conception of “hypokeimenon, “meaning “what lies under” and
winch was later translated in Latin as “subjectum” or “what is thrown under,” and also
“the human subject”). Ihis philological and epistemological transformation of the
hypokeimenon into the subjectum has the extraordinary power to explain the advent of
Humanism in the Age of the World-Picture, “a philosophical interpretation of man that
explains and assesses beings in terms of man and with a view to man” (1976; 133).
According to Heidegger, with the dispersion of a fallen Christianity in eariy
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Renaissancé Europe, mari himseIt the human subject, came to equal the subjectum, or
the underlying substratum of any and ail predication and inquiry.
Heidegger outlines five constituent features of modernity that help to usher in and
consolidate this discursive shifi: mathematical science; machine technology; the
reduction of art as experience; the concept of human activity as culture and the
realization of values, as weil as the rising concem with cultural politics; and flnaily, the
loss of the Gods in the modernized Christian World-View. This configuration of
constituent features distinguishes modem man as a subject and radicaily sets him apart
from medieval and ancient man. Weltbild is unknown in Medieval times, Heidegger
argues, for men were assigned their place by God in a specific order of creation; the
Greeks had no conception of Weltbild either, for mari was at the beck and cail ofBeing
flot the subject or ground ofits predication and inquiiy.
Modemity is flot to be characterized simply as the continuous substitution of new
visions of the world, something captured by the German word “Neuzeit,” nor is it to be
equated with worldviews or “Weltanschauung,” a word incompatible with what
Heidegger sees as the essentiaily free and open relationships of philosophical inquiry.
Weltbild or World-Picture does, however, name the condition for the possibffity of
having a Worldview. This is why Heidegger can make the sweeping daim that
“Humanism” is moral-aesthetic anthropology; for even in a strictly historical sense,
humanism marks the advent of that systematic conception of the world of being in
winch things find an entire explanation and evaluation from the standpoint of mari and
in relation to man. In other words, “once the world has become an image, the human
position grasps itself as a Weltanschauung” (1976; 134).
The determination of the world as picture is cotermmous with the determination of
the human as subject. Once again, tins positioning of the subject is structural to the
essence of tecimology, considered as a command over place, emplacement, or Ge
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stelÏen. Thè connection between the Question Concerning Technology and The Age of
the World-Picture becomes clearer at this moment. Henceforth the subject takes a stand
over things, gets into calculating and conmianding position, assumes a posture and an
attitude with respect to himseff and others in accordance with this essence of
emplacement. The chief characteristics of tins positioning are the “planetary” ambitions
to totality, transparency, and universality, the reduction of knowledge into the
“orgaiiized exploitation” of research and experiment, and the pretension to
systematically challenge the world to report itseff witbin a uniformly representational
structure.
One might say that the Global Positioning System (G.P.S.) of telecommunications
satellites developed by the U.S. militaiy for the pentagon in the 1 990’s, to winch the
entire planet is subjected these days, technically materializes these essential traits of the
modemity of the World-Picture (Weber, 1996; 5). Not only do we live in a world
overseen by sophisticated techniques of military surveillance, flot only are we more
irilinitely and minutely localizable on the surface of the planet, but a calculating and
instrumental relationship to the totality of the beings of the world is predetermined in
the televisual availability of a picture of such a planetary scale. In tins instance, the
World-Picture of the GPS is both the potential to picture the planet in the totality of its
detail as it exhibits itself but also, more fundamentally, to technically materialize the
driving ambitions of Western Metaphysics—to secure the position and consolidate the
“World View” of a master subject by objectifying the Being of beings in an
epistemological structure of representation.
At the same time, beyond the model of the GPS, it is clear that the daily framing of
the world and the positioning of subjects through the sets and screens of cinema,
television, and video has ftindamentally changed the relationship humans have to time,
space, self and other. We are oursclvcs televised and transported, seeing through space
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over immejise distances and moving in time at greater velocities, positioned and
positioning, framed and enframing, in a world ofaccelerated transmissions.
Ibis brings us to the paradox, formulated very suggestively by Weber, in the
following words, “the subject-securing function of the world-picture raises the question
of what might be called the kinetic or “cinematic” structure ofthat picture” (1996; 81).
On the one hand, it might seem proper that the Weltbild be characterized by tins kind of
dynamic movement because it is aiways setting things out in front of the subject (vor
stellen) and bringing things towards the subject (her-stellen), the subject aiways
mastering the critical space and time between the near and the far. On the other hand,
tins very dynamic and kinetic movement, made possible by the proliferation of the
audio-visual technologies of reproducible images, would seem to dispiace or to
destabilize the centralizing reference of the subject in relation to an object-world. Tins
dispiacement would then put into question the centrality and the mastery of the human
as subject and also the modem grounds for knowledge of the world as picture. I wffl be
defending the daim that the reproducibffity of the image would then be related to a
form of displacement by winch the position of the subject, rather than being set over
against the world, might be said to dissolve in the middie or milieu ofthe world.
b recapitulate then, it may be argued that the cinematic structure of the world
picture would seem to materialize the culminating trait of modernity and Western
metaphysics, discovered in the essence of technology: the conception of the world as
representation for a calculating subject. Yet tins culminating trait of technoiogy and
metaphysics, of steilen or emplacement, because it is founded in a cinematic structure
of dispÏacement that decenters the subject, wouid seem to dissolve under the pressure of
its own internai ambivalences. After ail, Heidegger concludes, foilowing the
determination of the world as picture and the human as subject “an invisible shadow is
cast over ail things”. This shadow, as Weber argues, does flot designate a iack of light
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in the World-Picture nor indicate its negation; “it designates that winch escapes and
eludes the calculating plans of representation” (1996; $1). $uch a dual perspective then
might ailow us to move in the shadows or the concealed glows of a questioning
concerning technology, or a questing afler technics, that refuses to give itseff over to
that critical spirit that would merely negate technology but instead would move in
between critique and open inquiry.
Questing After Technics
It is from such a perspective that I would like to consider Tarkovsky’s films as a
cinematic modality of pursuing the “Question Concerning Technology,” a questioning
in winch the Heideggerian concepts of technics, poesis, and phusis corne to light. How
would such a perspective begin ? Briefly stated, it would begin by recognizing that
Tarkovsky’s film practice and theories articulate the experience of a “questing
conceming the goings-on technics,” a questing through a fleld of conceptions regarding
time, memory, nature, world, and subjectivity that ail converge around a philosophical
inquiry into technology. This questing or questioning consistently takes place in the
ruins of the modem representation of technology as instrument; in the fleld of these
ruins, another conception of technology becomes possible. Clearly, Tarkovsky’s films
thematicaily and narratively figure a kind of quest tbrough the wastelands of the
modem world of technology, as in Staiker (1979). The critical modemity of ins films
consistently raise tins thematic and narrative figuration to a philosophical height in
winch the human relationship to technology is put into question. More than tins, or
beside this, I would argue that the very rnateriality of the image of time, emerging from
the skin of the film in the haptic and hypnotic contact it makes with the film of the
world (as it does in the marshes of the nuclear war zone in Staiker), also constitutes
another experience (Erfahrung), another crossing, risking, or passage with the goings
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on of technôÏogy itself For example, the “zone” in Staiker is flot merely the scene of a
ruined wasteland to be denounced and redeemed by a kind of Dostoevskian anti-hero,
but a milieu in winch a crossing into danger is made possible—a zone of experience
with the mediations of technology itseffi The quest through the zone is also an
experience of complete disorientation in time and space: disorientation in time because
the future is in the here and now of the dystopian present, a present in winch terror and
disaster, even the othemess of the sacred, might break out of the ordinary footstep at
any moment; disorientation in space because the “what” of the film’s action is entirely
subordinated to an audio-visual questioning of “where”, to the shilling nature of the
“thereness” of being in the Iandscape/mindscreen of the camera’.
In other words, films like Staïker are flot constituted by a nostalgie desire to retum
to life before modem technocracy, nor by a humanist lamentation against the vices of
war. It is neyer simply a question of getting technology “spfritually in hand.” M
Heidegger notes, even this response is conditioned by the anthropological
representation of technology as instrument or instmmentum to be controlled : “The wiil
to mastery becomes ail the more urgent the more technology threatens to slip from
human control” (1976; 5). I wffl be defending the idea that Tarkovsky’s theories and
film-practice in Mirror (1975) are grounded in a questing that seeks to overtum the
modem representation of technology as an instrument in the service of a subject and
open alternatives towards a non-instrumental conception by winch the “subjectivity” of
the subject is shattered and rearticulated; an overturning and an opening that needs to be
explored by examliing and extending Tarkovsky’s theory of rhythm and the category
of language.
Tins reversai of the instrumental representation of technology may, in Heidegger’s
words, be characterized by the inter-animating relationship between the concepts of
l See John Orr’s essay on “The Sacrificial Unconscious” Contemporary Cinerna (1998; p.45)
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tecbnics, pôesis, and phusis; concepts the uncanny familiarity and strangeness of which
tease thought into a different kind of wondering and questioning, in the oppositions of
the modem to the ancient Greek world. for example, causality is flot thought of as an
effecting of resuits—for this would be equal to reducing the world to reporting itseff as
standing-reserve; instead causality is thought of as a bringing-forth of material
relationships of indebtedness or co-responsibffity (Heidegger, 1977, pp. 6-8). A
silversmith does flot simply stamp out the shape of the chalice in some resistant
material but in his maldng of a work, harbours-forth the material, formai, final, and
efficient modes of occasioning ; tins preserves and opens, in the dynamic materiality of
its substance, a net-work of relations to space, time, seh and world.
Pre-modem technics is flot thought of as a setting-upon or a challenging as modem
teclmics, but as a matter ofbeing entirely at home in a crafi ofthe fine arts or ofthe arts
of the mmd; related to the notion of episteme, technics is explored as «a mode of
revealing» or “unconcealing” (aletheia) less technical than scientific expertise and less
formai than artistic mastery. In the sphere of traditional, pre-industriai agriculture, for
example, technics is doser to the ordering of a relationship between humans and nature
(J)husis) winch can be understood in the movement of a making (poesis) that brings
things out into the open. Nature is tended, cared for in the tilling and working, rather
than being transformed into a storage of energy or goaded and maneuvered into
“standing reserve” as in the modem technics of industrial agriculture. Premodem
technics belongs to bringing-forth, the arising-of-something-out-of-itseff in poesis and
phusis; in tins, technics bas the character of dynamic becoming and reveals its
affinities to the way a fiower bursts into bloom (phusis) or in the way a silversmith
brings about the making of the chalice (poesis). Tins is why the essence (wesen) of
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technics or the goings-on2 of technics. as Heidegger emphatically declares, is flot itself
anything merely technical or technological.
Perhaps the best example of the difference between premodern and modem
technics, between the bringing-forth and goading-forth, is in bis discussion of man’s
relationship to the nature of the Rhine river.
The hydroelectric plant is flot constructed in the current of the Rhine as was the
old wooden bridge thatjoined bank with bank for hundreds ofyears. Rather, the
river is obstructed; dammed up in the power plant. The river is what it is now,
as river, because ofthe goings-on ofthe power plant. (1976; 15-16)
The wooden bridge reveals pre-modem technics as the milieu that bridges and allows
the dynamic current of the natural world to flow. The bridge joins bank to bank and
brings about a lasting relationship to place. The bridge therefore is flot only the material
support of easy travel since its materiality is afready informed by technics, and as such,
organizes a relationship to phusis that brings things out into the open (poesis). By
contrast, the being of the river , what the river is as river-current-bank, becomes the
standing reserve of hydroelectricity; for the dam of the hydroelectric power plant
obstructs and blocks the river; it exploits its current, extracts it as energy, and expels it
elsewhere. Just as it imposingly stands in place over against the river, it is that which
absolutely dispiaces its current and upsets the lasting relationship to place between the
two banks; for all of its gigantic mass, the power plant confers an unlasting or
unsecuring relationship to place.
2 As Weber remarks, the German word “wesen” has a verbal etymology from which the noun
“das wesen” 15 derived; instead of being construed as genre or essentia, essence signifies “to
hold sway”, to “stay in play”, or “to go on”; the essence of technics may be translated as the
“goings-on” oftechnics. “As something that goes on, technics moves away ftom itself in being
what it is. By determining the goings-on oftechnics as radically different from technics itself,
Heidegger leads his readers in a quest afier something that is flot simpiy equivalent to
technology, aÏthough it is that without which technology would flot be” (Weber, 1996; 63).
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What shail we make of this comparison concerning the goings-on of technics ? Tt
should be recailed that the decisive difference between premodem and modem technics
serves above ail to foreground Heidegger’s main concem with the modem subject and
the operations of subjecffication within Modernity: the attempt to understand how and
why the movement of dispiacement, “a movement of unsecuring cornes to evoke as
response its diarnetrical opposite—the frantic effort to establish control and security”
(Weber, 1996; 70).
How do these problems stand with the study and practice of filin, television and
video ? Does audio-visual technique ambivalently embody the paradoxes of place
setting and unsecuring, as in the example of the bridge and the modem power-plant ? In
other words, is the medium of film involved in the emplacement of the subject and at
the same time constantly undermining or unsecuring tins place? I would like to argue
this is the ffindamental defining question to be pursued in relation to the critique of the
modem institutional study and practice of film. It is a fundamental and definitive
question because it touches upon many of the discursive underpinnings and
epistemological tendencies that determine the “objectivity” or object-ness of film and
fl]m-study; tins objectivity then determines a relationship to language that inevitably
favors certain approaches and axes of pertinence; a relationship that articulates the
disciplinary structures that frame filin and the inquiry into film. for example, I would
argue that the concem with fixing and stabilizing the place of modem subjectivity has
historicaily determined the modem study of film as the “seventh art” with comparable
aesthetic forms to other plastic arts; or again, that is bas promoted the modem inquhy
into the narrative strategies of film with comparable poetic practices to the literary arts.
These disciplinary structures and aesthetic-poetic discourses have traditionally
precluded the inquiry into film as a medium. Ibis is a question to winch I wffl be
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will be returning periodically throughout the dissertation as it relates to a critique of the
subject and a theoiy ofrhythm.
The implication of the question concerning the place-setting or unsecuring of
subjectivity may be surmised in the foilowing words: the practice of audio-visual
technique generafly, as a questing aller the goings-on of technics, may hold out the
possibffity of overcoming its own determination in the representational structure of the
Time of the World-Picture. At a very particular level, and for the purposes of brief
exposition, k may be argued that were these principles of teclmics, phusis, and poesis
taken seriously by film-critics, even critics of Tarkovsky’s films, the hermeneutic
pursuit of deciphering symbols or the cognitive pursuit of narrative analysis would be
precluded in favor of an opening to the medium of film as a mediation of life liberated
from representation. for audio-visual technique, as a bridging contact with material
reality, would bring-forth a world uncontained by the rhetorical effects of literacy and
the matrix of representational thought by winch the subject/object relation has been
institutionalized, an a-logical world that « [...jretains ail its agential capabffity without
being mediated by us . . .a world that has been subjected to the workings of language and
lias corne out unaffected» (Godzich, 1993, p.2O). Does tins signify a general
withdrawal of meaning or a loss of certitude? Perhaps ; this may also explain why the
modem, institutional study of film resists such a perspective. Yet it has its
predecessors; for it bears the trace of an ontological rethinking of what Siegfried
Kracauer bas called «the affinities» the film medium has for unstaged reality, attracted
as it is to the indetermiriate, the fortuitous, the fragmentary and the endless aspects of
everyday life (1960, p.303). These affinities are images harboured-forth in film: the
metamorphic, apparitional medium of the life-world moving and breathing in light and
in shadow.
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Before êngaging more directly with Tarkovsky’s work in the interstitial zone ofthis
kind of thinldng concerning the cinematic structure and subject-securingldisplacing
function of the Time of the Wortd-Picture and as it traces paths into the Question
Concerning Technology, it would be helpffil to briefly discuss and compare the work
of Marc-Henri Piault, Youssef Ishaghpour, and Walter Benjamin. For each of these
thinkers helps to qualiI’ and to deepen Heidegger’s daims in terms that contribute to a
critical theorization of cinema and modernity; the first concerning the imaging of
alterity, the second conceming the imaging of reality, the third conceming the imaging
of time3. To disclose how audio-visual technique problematizes the imaging of alterity,
reality, and time is finally to allow my reflection on the theory of rhythm in
Tarkovsky’s work to emerge as a critical perspective on the modemity of film practices
and the institutionalization of film studies.
Imaging Alterity
Marc-Henri Piault’s important essay on the modernity of visual anthropology, “Du
colonialisme à l’échange,” while neyer referring directly to Heidegger’s argument in
the “Time of the World Picture,” may be read as a fairly rigorous application of the
daims that might be made on its behaif in the domain of cinema4. Read in the light of
Heidegger then, Piault’s thinking may be crystalized in the following thesis: the
goings-on of audio-visual technics, wbile attempting to secure the subject of “man”
(anthropos) as the universality of man’s designation and placement in the totality of
beings (WeÏtbild), fundamentafly unsecured tins subject by periodically calling into
I use the term “imaging” in order to intimate the philosophical conception of the image
(Heidegger and Benjamin’s conception of Bild), the reproducibility of the image, and the
rhetorical figuration involved in thinking through images.
‘ It be mentioned, however, that Marc-Henri Piault’s analysis is supported by the reflection of
Leroi-Gourhan, an anthropologist and zoologist whose entire work, according to Bernard
Stiegler (1998), was grounded in a consideration of the history oftechnics.
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question the constituent grounds of anthropological knowledge, its representational
structure (Vorstellen), and its wffl to being a model ofsystemic transparency.
Sans aucun doute, l’anthropologie visuelle est encore en son enfance, mais
l’anthropologie elle-même est une science du XVIlle siècle ! Elle cherche à tout
appréhender en un système ou s’attache aux inventaires sans fin d’une réalité
innombrable dont l’apparence est d’autant moins soupçonnée qu’aucun
instrument n’en perce l’opacité et n’en distingue les unités constitutives. (1992;
65)
How does Piault trace tins argument? First he discusses how the contemporaneous
birth of cinematography and anthropological field work, in their concerted efforts of
analytic scientific research, both participated in the saine process of scientific
observation. The reduction ofknowledge to the systemic attitude for the exploitation of
analytic research, Heidegger reminds us, is one of the characteristic traits of the modem
World-Picture. Rather than problematize this process of systemic exploitation of
research witbin the academy or analytic philosophy, Piault suggests that tins process
grew out of the larger social-political-economic context of other forms of exploitation:
for the colonial conquest of the Other, the de-realization of otherness in the discourse of
exoticism, and the industriai expansion and modemization of the 2Oth century, allowed
the emergent fleld of visual anthropology to justify” and render “operable” the larger
enterprise of domination and exploitation, necessary in order to secure varions
discourses and institutions.
Les images rapportées des “pays lointains” renforçaient l’ensemble des
représentations et des discours sur le progrès et les missions f< civilisatrices» de
l’homme blanc. Cinéma et ethnographie, enfants jumeaux de l’esprit de
collecte, d’identification et sans doute d’appropriation, caractéristique du
développement européen, contribuaient ensemble à la tentative d’assimiler toute
l’histoire à l’histoire de l’Occident. (1992; 59)
Piault also qualifies the modem spirit behind this immense collation of the diversity of
the world as it put into the perspective of a total picture ail ofthe cultural variations of
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the human according the Darwinian principles of social-evolution, such as his mastery
of the envfronment, the conditions of bis adaptation, and bis comprehension of the
world and bis limits witbin it. This justffied the enterprise of salvage-anthropology, of
recoding and collecting any and ail traces of the vanishing primitive races, themselves
considered as steps towards--or deviations from--an evolving humanity marching
forwards towards higher forms of superiority. The primitive and the savage quickly
became objects of study for film and fleld work in the effort to designate the place of
the human from “the dawn” of history: Regnault and Lajard’s tum of the century
project of imagining a comparative ethnographic history born out of ethnophotography
even the later mid-century bfrth of “urgent ethnology,” was informed by this spirit in
its effort to preserve its own objective productions and classfficatory archives of the
“vanishing people”.
While recognizing the anthropological critique of this spfrit and the numerous
debates surrounding ethnographic representation, Piault argues that no effort has been
made to give a cumulative effect to the old arguments nor enough attention given to
more fundamental problems which are lost largely to lyrical polemics, disciplinary
anathemas, and methodological disputes over the “place” given to ethnology on the one
hand and the nature of cinema on the other (1992; 59). Consequently, very littie
attention is paid to the epistemological question of mediation, an interdisciplinary mode
of thinking about the pertinence, the specfficity, and the potential hegemony of the
audio-visual inscription of culture in the age ofwriting-culture (ethno-graphy).
for example, it could not be noticed how the materiality of the moving images
(color, sound, gestures, face, rhythm, etc.) of even the earliest series of ethnographic
films (produced by Maré, Edison or the Pathé Society) had transgressed or renewed the
rules of perception and the structures for thinking in language. Piault’s argument
implicitly suggests that tins mode of questioning was ignored in the more urgent need
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to make legitimating daims about the modes of fllmic production (1992; 62). The
implication is that this crisis of legitimation brought about the need to instrumentalize
audio-visual technique generafly for disciplinary ends in order to determine and to
define its own methodology of fieldwork-fllmwork: the relations between professional
fiimmakers and professional anthropologist; the relations between fictional mise-en
scene and reality; the limits and conditions of restitution in post-production
interpretation or museology; or technological experimentation and methodological
reflection on the technical capacities of the apparatus (62). These problems, posed
before WVvl and determhnng in advance the major topics around which a century of
critical reflection would be articulated, did flot bring about any immediate changes; for
example, the question of whether and how technoiogy might fundamentally transform
the relationship between knowledge and life, between the subject’s place before the
world and the technics for apprehending reality, went unasked.
In a similar way, the question conceming technology in cinema couid not be posed,
for even when at the time ofthe birth of cinema on Decemeber 28th 1895, at the Grand
Café in Paris during the moment of August Lumière’s projection, L ‘arrivée d’un train
en gare de La Ciotat, the presentation of the film itseff was presaged by Henri
Langlois’ presentation of Monet’s tableau, La Gare Saint-Lazare. from the beginning,
the medium of film was tamed or put into picture by the medium of “oil-painting” and
the potentially unsecuring position of the spectator secured by the position of the
painter5. Piault’s words problematize the question of mediation in the following
reversai between the “frames” of film and painting:
[...] il ne s’agissait plus en effet de faire entrer la vie dans un cadre, ce que
s’efforçaient déjà de faire peinture et photographie, mais d’entraîner par le
Such a statement is flot meant to defend the history ofthe filmic image as a development out
ofpainted image, but only to trace Piault’s argument regarding the problem ofthe mediation of
perception, i.e. the subject’s relationship to the ftames and framing ofthe “visible”.
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regard le spectateur dans la vie innombrable de l’écran devenu fenêtre sur le
monde. (1992; 62)
The goings-on of technics, articulated and constituted by this intermedial series of
frames (painting, photography, and film), carnes the radical potential for rethinldng the
relationship between subject, life, frame and world. Piault, however, does observe how
this radical potential did bring about an important change : “dans le dispositif filmique
c’est la place même du sujet qui se définit autrement et rend compte d’une
transformation dans l’ordre des préoccupations intellectuelles” (1992; 62). Again,
while transforming the order of inteliectual preoccupations, the radical epistemological
ontological question concerning the place of the subject in the world brought about by
the transforming encounter with audio-visual technique cannot be pursued. Piault
implies that this question couid be asked only insofar as this encounter with tecbnics
indicated a critical consideration of the ideological position of an ethnocentric subject
behind a technology put to particular discursive uses; for example, the uses in winch
local interpretive communities of anthropologists had commented, voiced-over,
interpreted, and “given meaning” to the “voiceless and ciassifled natives” on behaif of
whom they founded their professional research and position.
Next, Piault sketches the two principle divergent orientations of visuai anthropology
as they were born at a histonical moment of institutional crisis during WWI, 1914-191$
(63). The films of Vertov and Flaherty set the scene in winch and through winch
modem visual anthropology would act out its internai ambivalences, as it staged
something of its own theatricality in the “gallery of portraits” and “stereotyped
discourses” ofthese “founding fathers.”
{. -.1 on peut considérer que le cinéma anthropologique restera partagé, depuis
ses origines symboliques, entre les fantasmes d’un enregistrement systématique,
quasiment naturaliste, du fait humain socialisé et les tenant hollywoodiens d’un
spectaculaire généralisé. Entre les deux vont se développer des tentatives plus
pragmatiques pour situer l’instrumentation cinématographique dans la démarche
etlmographique.( 1992; 63)
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Ibis seminal ambivalence at the heart of visual anthropology, or what may be called its
phantasmagoric and spectacular encounter with the fictive-magic of the filmic image,
marks the moment of a dissolving trust in an essentially realist epistemology which
conceives of knowledge as the reproduction., for a subjectivity, of an objectivity that
lives outside of it6. What happens when this mirror theory of knowledge is threatened
by the other side of the mirror encountered through audio-visual technique ? What
happens, in short, to this mirror-theory by winch Truth is aiways the measure of the
subject’s capacity for adjusting the accuracy and adequacy of observation to the
principles of analysis? As Piault implies, tins is the defining moment of pragmatics,
or what may be qualified as the moment of the restitution of certain regimes of belief in
scientific-analytic Truth by winch the subject might grasp hhrilherseff in the position of
a World-View. Not surprisingly, this pragmatic moment of restitution also subjects
audio-visual technique to the operations of a more rigorous instrumentation in the
service of several fields of cine-research (ethno-musicology, ethno-linguistics, social
morphology, etc.) modeled on empirical tendencies and shaped in the development of
positivism and narrative approaches.
Dans ces secteurs, l’instrumentation audio-visuelle peut, ou plutôt pourrait
devenir, à condition d’une démarche systématique, ce qu’a été le microscope
pour les sciences de la nature. Néanmoins l’anthropologie hésite à fonder une
approche programmatique dans l’ordre expérimental: elle oscifie entre un
repérage philosophique de l’universel humain et l’ordonnancement (sinon
l’inventaire) des procédures inhérentes aux différentes formations sociales.
(1992; 63)
In historical and institutional terms, this suggests that the goings-on of technics--or the
essence of audio-visual technique--escaped being reduced to the univocal and
6
• Jameson argues in these terms in order to qualify the postmodern moment of critique in the
preface to J.f. Lyotard’s Postmodern Condition (1984; viii). R. Rorty, in a different context
but similar vein of argument, also qualifies the modem model of knowtedge under the
Entightenment in these terms in Chapter 1, Philosophy and the Mirror ofNature (1979).
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programmatic purposes of a definitive methodological discipline of visual anthropology
but instead pluralized its practices. As a praxis, it would seem that audio-visual
technique inevitably surpassed its subjects (intentions of fiimmakers and
anthropologists), eluded its subjectification (neo-colonial practices of ethnography,
industrial expansion of Third-World exploitation and de-realization of other peoples),
and escaped its instrumentation (filmic apparatus of coverage and scientific
classification). What is the major implication of this triple movement of surpassing,
eluding and escaping ? That the practice of audio-visual technique upset the “set-up” of
the image of alterity by aliowing the question of the Other7 to intervene constantly in
the problematic thinldng of subjectivity and cultural difference.
This is the direction Piault’s thinldng takes, as lie qualifies the succeeding
generations of visual anthropology and experimental ethnography from the 1950’s —
1970’s; Leroi-Gourhan (cine-notes) Jean Rouch (cine-transe), Mario Ruspoli (cinema
direct), and John Marshall (flrst-person cinema). Each time the experience and
experimentation with audio-visual technique imposes upon the anthropologist
fiimmaker the necessity of defining his position in the spatial-temporal field of
observation and of asldng the question Is it the subject who defines the Other or does
the Other define himfher/itself ? Or, on the contrary, is the definitive subject to be
located in the relation between the one and the other as they mutually observe and
interrogate one another (1992; 64) ? Piault suggests that this kind of reflexive
questioning makes the institutionallzation of visual anthropology problematic because
the debates and contested methods neyer realiy progress but aiways refer back to an
indefinite object of anthropological study the Other and the subject. Yet this is also
This may serve as a preliminary distinction between altcrity and the Other which are flot to be
considered mere differences in the degree of otherness. Whereas alterity does flot unsecure the
subject-securing frames of representation but is subject to being inserted and understood as a
representable image within this framework, the Other would be that which fundamentally
upsets or defies this kind ofsystemic figuration.
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the promisé of audio-visual technics, since it makes the discipline of anthropology ail
the more conscious ofitselfas a problematic configuration of questions.
En réalité, l’anthropologie visuelle renvoie à une situation qui est précisément ce
qui devrait être l’objet de l’anthropologie: comment est-il possible de penser la
relation de l’un avec l’autre, de l’unique avec le multiple, de la vie avec la
substance, de l’individu avec la société, de la société avec la Nature ? (1992; 65)
It is in tins final sense that the goings-on of audio-visual technics potentially
undermines its determination iii the Time of the World Picture, for it does not need to
bring a totalizing World View of alterity into the frames of an image to be adjusted and
managed in order to secure the position of the subject. According to Piault, “L’objectif
n’est plus en réalité de décrire des faits et des objets mais de rendre pensable la
possibilité de toute relation8)) (1992; 65). In this sense, the essence of audio-visual
technique reveals another way of knowing and coming into contact with the world, one
in winch the potential of living substance and action is neyer fixed and objectifled in
the substrates of representational knowledge, but “productively embraced9” in that
movement of knowing by winch the subject yields to the unknown., a movement in
winch a dynamic poetics of relation and immanent being becomes thinkable.
Imaging Reality
The “World Picture” materialized by modem technologies of G.P.S “give us” or
conlirm for us a World Viewed, a world the “reality” of winch would seem for most to
I wilI be returning to this idea in the third part of the dissertation when discussing Edouard
Glissant’s ideas ofthe tout-monde, oralité, opacité, and the poétique de la relation.
Laura U. Marks (2000) discusses this possibility in these terms. Marks is able to sustain the
critique of instrumental “subject-centered” knowledge while defending mimesis as a tactile
epistemology by invoking the work of cultural critics like Benjamin, Auerbach, and Adorno;
anthropologists tike Michael Taussig; and phenomenologists like Merleau-Ponty. Marks
nuances the concept of mimesis as a responsive and metamorphic relationship between maker
and made; a sensuous knowledge made possible by the co-presence of body and world; a
productive embrace or contact between beings; a compassionate and immanent way of being in
the world; a yielding and mirroring form of the knower in the unknown (p.l 38-145). This kind
of theoretical groundwork allows her to show how cinema has the power to reconfigure rather
than to shatter subjectivity.
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be unquestioned. Yet what would happen if the “reality” of this world-viewed were
suddenly revealed to be a “discursive construct,” the “archaeology” of which might be
undertaken’°? Not only would an extreme “legitimation” crisis be provoked about our
ontological relationship to the economy of truth deflning “reality”, but the immense
sphere of possibffity—might end up getting into the picture, distort the frames of the
picture, and render the flctional and the imaginaiy “images of worlds,” in their multiple
heterogeneity, coterminous wïth the “real” make-up of the world we seem to be so
comfortable in naming as our own.
Something close to this bas afready happened in the world(s) viewed” by cinema.
Youssef Ishaghpour’s essay, Le cinéma, opens up the possibility for discussing the
permeabffity of these fictional and real world-views. Ishaghpour introduces a
philosophical rhetoric in the historical description of film by discussing the magical
mimetic and mythical-symbolic powers exerted by the reality of the image and the
image of reaÏity. These powers of the image open the space for an epistemological
inquhy regarding the way we know the world and the way in winch the world discloses
itseifto us through audio-visual technique. Each topic or topos concerning the status of
the image (image of reality/reality of the image) constitutes the persuasive ground for
the discussion of the other perspective conceming the powers of the image (magical
mimetic or mythical-symbolic). Ishaghpour constantly holds a mirror to tins profound
duality in the image as an image and plays in the rhetorical space opened between the
so-called “oppositions” of the fictional and the real in cinematography. In tins way, he
is able to move beyond the generic debate of documentary versus fiction, of purely
o One might take the work of foucault’s “panopticon” in Surveiller et Punir as a model for this
type of investigation, for it is a paradigmatic “dispositif’ of the microtechniques and
institutional practices the knowing subject employs in the vision and visuality of the given
world, in this case—of that winch needs to be masteredlgoverned in a optical-political
structure.
This is a deliberate play on the titie of Stanley CavelÏ’s “reflections on the ontology of film”
in The World Viewed(1971).
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objective versus subjective art, and also can avoid the traps of writing an
historiographical history of cinema by opting for a more ftindamentally philosophical,
phenomenological,, and anthropological history of film within the continuum of the
history of images and image-maldng (cave paintings, mirrors, photographs,
cinematography, video, digital technologies, virtual reality, etc.).
Ibis is accomplished through an understanding of how the cinematographic image
gradually revealed itseif as an image and its relationship to our imagination of reality.
for example, instead of seeking to crase an intrusive subject behind the
cinematographic apparatus he seeks to reconfigure the problem of human presence:
“Dès le cadrage, l’art s’affirme dans l’image de la réalité, et dans les dispositifs du réel,
on retrouve la présence humaine et son activité. Le cinéma n’est pas la révélation de la
nature grâce à l’objectif en absence de l’homme, mais une création» (1996; $7). This
productive power to create worlds, magicaily real and fantasticaily unreal, does not
situate the cinema on the side of the apparatus nor on the side of the director but in the
material-phenomenal agency that passes through them.
A similar logic characterizes ail of Ishaghpour’s writings, in winch the concern to
revalorize the new modemity’2 of contemporary cinema takes the form of a
12 Throughout his writings, Ishaghpour inscribes the historical development of the cinema and
its success in the targer portrait of the transition ftom medieval culture to modernity in which
the rise and fa!! of popular opera, for example, holds a privileged place in defining the role of
the arts and tradition in relation to the national culture and historical consciousness of the
modem state (Sec: D ‘une image à Ï ‘autre: la nouvelle modernité du cinéma contemporain,
1982; pp.13-8O)
. The term “new modemnity”, while referring to a conception of film-history
that may be outlined with the advent of particular films and directors in contemporary cinema
from Orson Welles’ Citizen Kane onwards, designates more than a modem aesthetic or
modernist style. In fact, lshaghpour’s term “new modemnity” of cinema carefully avoids a
periodic conception of the modemnist styles of fitm-history like those promoted by Orr (1995;
pp. 3-1 1). Rather than systematically insert films in periods, he always explores only a series
of examples which are “possibilities of newness” emerging outside of the hegemony of the
Hollywood Mode of Representation in the Age of Television. Their newness docs flot consist
in getting beyond or outside of modemity, as the term “post-modern” might suggest and which
Ishaghpour is careful to avoid, but rather the newness of these examples engages in a critical
mode of reflection in which the modernity of cinema productively fights against some of its
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philosophical discussion of the generalized disenchantment with the image in the age of
television and new image-technologies. Three general topics emerge from an
opposition with the themes oftwo major sources and discourses ofthis disenchantment,
Guy Debord’s discourse on the Société du Spectacle and Jean Baudrillard’s Simulacres
et Simulation. From the perspective of a critical and creative engagement with
Ishaghpour’s work, I have formulated these topics in the following terms:
- The new modernity of contemporary cinema recovers the magical and fflusionist
powers of the image as an image by transforming the ordinary materiality and
phenomenality of the world in the metamorphic powers of the mirror-screen. Tins
sets it apart from the discourse on the simulacrum (image of a reality without
origin) for these magical-mythical powers are grounded and constituted by the
participation of the image in an original., albeit transformed, relationship with the
real. In the light ofHeidegger’s theory ofthe modem subject, Ishaghpour’s concept
of metamorphosis allows us to think about what founds our relationship to the
image as an image, metamorphosis being that winch, aiways underlying the subject
(hypokeimenon), remains in the medium (milieu) of the image in a state of
dynamic potentiality.
- The new modernity of contemporary cinema is critically aware of the way its
images are constituted by the symbolic distance and separation with the world that
it reproduces and recreates. This cinema does flot privilege that form of knowing
structured by re-presenting since it allows the identity-principles of its knowing
(subject/object; object/image) to be transformed by tins fundamental principle of
difference and deferring; tins sets it apart from the televisual proliferation of
own tendencies and myths. Instead of being a “negative” mode of critique this new modernity
in contemporary cinema positively reclaims and revalorizes the specific, but repressed, powers
and functions of the film medium (See: Cinéma contemporain: de ce côté du miroir, 1986;
pp.7-13).
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images, in winch the pretension to abolish tins distance and to cover things in their
immediateness pre-defines the modes of the presence, visibility and occasioning in
the image.
The new modernity of contemporary cinema puts viewers in touch with the opacity
of the non-representable; in the symbolic distance or breach between the world and
the image it introduces the inlinite possibifities of fiction in addition to the limit
experience of the confrontation with death. Tins principle is at odds with the
pretension to transparency and the will to obscenity in the images transmitted in the
society of the spectacle, an age of generalized information that only produces
indifference.
By emphasizing the metamorphic powers, the symbo lic distance and the opacity by
winch the cinematographic image is constituted, Ishaghpour moves film theory outside
of the facile and sweeping gestures of “Marxist media-ideology” theory and
“postmodem” critique. Creating new concepts and rhetorical arguments concerning
the relationship between knowing and imaging reality, Ishaghpour nuances how the
reproducibffity of the image transforms what it means to know and also changes the
conditions under winch reality cedes itseff to being knowii For example, Ishaghpour
celebrates the aura of the dark room of the cinema as a place for the emergence of a
particular perception of the world, itself a cultural construction that makes possible a
new phenomenology in the conditions of the spectator and the screen; for it is a modem
collective retum to the necessities of the primitive cave, to that retreat away from the
empirical order of experience, to that ostentatious contact with the unreality of images,
to that possibility of seeing without being seen, to that physical immobffity and
relaxation and that mental mobility and unrest, to that state of active and regressive
perception that makes of the screen a hallucination between conscious wakefulness and
half-awakened reveric; in short, that tins dark room for the experience of an aesthetic
42
distortion and elevation might be the necessary condition for the possibiity of gaining
access to the visibffity of the world, in order that the world might cede itseff—give
itseff over to being seen, realisticafly, in the intense attention and suspension of ail other
interests, in those perceptive modes privileged by audio-visual techniques.
Such techniques remove the substance of the world and keep only its photogenic
and aural traces, that magical mirror-like duplication of the world, inimaterial and
absent in one sense and materialized and present in another. Ishaghpour argues that
spectators are flot fascinated by the mirror-correspondence between the image and the
object mirrored; rather, they are taken in by the “otherworldly, luminous, brillant,
unattainable” presence-in-absence in the image as an image (1996; $9). Ishaghpour
reminds us, in André Bazin’s terms, that this mirror-image, a preflguration ofthe magie
of the screen-image, embaims time, mummiiies presence organicaily, makes of it
something more than the memory of change: for as we view film we witness the
material co-existence of the past in the image projected in the present, a coterminous
presencing of what was once before the camera. The cinematographic image is
coterminous with the “thereness” of beings with this exception: that between the
material world in itse]f and the quasi immaterial world viewed, the specter or phantasm
ofdeath imposes itself on viewers:
Tout image photographique est ainsi la trace d’une absence, de quelque chose
qui a été et qui n’est plus. Entre souvenir et fantôme, Je deuil et la nostalgie sont
inhérents à la photographie.. .La photographie est la mort sans phrase,
signification et rituel, sans promesse d’immortalité. (1996; 90)
The photographic units ofcinema bring us the world ofthe dead to light but bides death
by always showing « beings in action» or by attempting to exorcise time altogether as
we participate and identify in its immortal wish: to allow the plastic art of reproducing
appearance save Being from only ephernerally being in time and disappearing forever.
Yet the cinerna introduces another decisive difference in this deferral of time : instead
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of being immortalized, this being is preserved in its ephemeral-ness and tins passing or
passage is also the life-force ofthe image.
Again, the cinema is related to the principles of life and death because of its
connection to the archaic’3 powers of the double and metamorphosis, but these terms
are inseparably intertwined:
Ainsi, l’image double liée à la mort est investie par les pouvoirs de désir et de
crainte qui font du double la métamorphose, la projection par le rêve, le mythe et
la fiction, dans le monde magique qui vainc la mort. C’est à travers la duplicité
profonde de l’image cinématographique que l’image reflet de Lumière s’est
métamorphosée en l’image fantastique de Méliès. (92)
The entire heritage and history of cinema may be surmised in the profound duplicity of
the image as an image, Lumière and Méliès being understood both as precursors but
more importantly as emblems of the two poles of the image and of the duality of
imaging-reality. Tins duplicity given by the cinematographic image then becomes an
experience of a transforming encounter between the fidelity of a realistically reflected
double-image and the virulence of the powers of human projection to meet the terrors
and hopes of the passage of death. More, these magical and affective powers are the
condition, the unconscious ground, for the possibffity of having a “realistic” perception
and they strengthen the powers of participation and identification: “L’image participe de
la chose, le spectateur participe de la réalité sur l’écran, fasciné par sa puissance de
suggestion totale et irrésistible, à cause de sa réalité. De là naît cette symbiose qui
intègre le spectateur dans le flux du film et le flux du film dans le flux psychique du
spectateur” (1996; 92). The “participation in” in the thing-ness of the world
(image/thing::spectateur/screen) becomes the condition for the possibifity of a
reciprocal exchange, creating a metamorphic membrane of contact between the film
and the viewer.
13 By archaic I mean primitive but also, more importantly, the Ïaw ofthe originating powers of
images.
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Such a symbiosis is heightened and intensffied by the spiritual tenor and nostalgïc
tonality of Tarkovsky’s cinematography. Commenting on his films, Ishaghpour
remarks, “Chaque fois la réalité est métamorphosée par la temporalité d’un regard
devenu vision” (1996; 75). This idea is extremely rich and wffl deserve more attention
than can be given it in this sectio&4. Suffice it to say that it crystaDizes that dual
relationship of the image of reality and the reality of the image: for in Tarkovksy’s
Mirror, reahty is constantly re-imagining and re-imaging itseW through those capable of
stalldng, collecting, drifiing in revery—its temporal traces: photos, repeated gestures,
found footage of documentary newsreels, mirror images, ambient sounds, orchestral
traces, and voice-overs of poetry. The image as an image may transcend the reality of
that of which it is an image without being abstracted from it—for through this very
materiality a different level of temporal, spatial and subjective-collective mediation is
made thinkable and possible. $uch an observation frees us from seeing the cinema in
the context of representation, or in the framework of semiology, for we are no longer
interested in the adequate or true correspondence to the original referent or in the
authentic identity of the signffled. Images that reveal a mirror-world present in absence
bring forth a world liberated from standing-for, from signifying, from re-presenting.
Watching Mirror, and perhaps ail films as filins, the temporality of our gaze may be
changed into vision when the materiality and phenomenailty of world and the subject
undergoes a metamorphic change.
Tins perspective also allows Ishaghpour to articulate a modem theory ofthe subject
in winch the theory of the image holds a special place. For the subject, Ishaghpour
suggest, does flot pre-exist the images of the world, setting the world in its place and
framing it in its pictoriality. Instead, audio-visual technique reveals how the subject is
constituted by the image-fluxes that promise a contact with a world at once more direct
I address this idea more thoroughly in Chapter 3. Part II.
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as the distance disappears between the image and the thing in itself, and yet more
spectacular, as that insurmountable distance multiplies images inllnitely. The world is
flot pictured as an object in order to secure the place of the subject but the subject is
unsecured and displaced, stretched across the surface of the world and dissolved in its
traces, constituted as one privileged site of image-flux among others’5.
Yet in order for this magical and mythical contact and projection to be made
possible, the “reality of the image” must be guaranteed, flot by the precarious place of
the subject, but by the subject’s relationship to the “image of reality.” This brings
Tshaghpour to reconsider the historical emergence of theoreticians like Vertov and
Bazin, contemporaries of the rise of the Socialist Machine and of Italian Neo-Realism
respectively; both men having institutionalized cinematic practices and approaches to
this “society of the spectacle” in an age seeldng to defend an ontological connection in
cinema, privileging that relation between the image and the reality of which it is an
image, a “revelation of reality” made possible by the thaumaturgical virtues of the
camera—virtues that liberate individuals to a utopian vision of the world because
objectively reproduced.
Accepting the importance of these ideas concerning the revelation of reality,
Ishaghpour decides to revalorize them in terms of the “myth of total cinema,” flot only
because they stiil project something of the utopian promise of cinema but also because
they allow an ontological and epistemological questioning concerning technology to
take place. However, in order to open free relationsbips to the Bazin’s conception of
magical-mimetic property or ontological connection to the photographic image,
Ishaghpour must nuance the conception of the “reality of the image,” themselves
15 This argument is flot explicitly argued by Ishaghpour but may be traced, in the implications it
raises, to Henri Bergson’s treatment of the subject and the image, in the first chapter of Matière
et mémoire. Gifle Deleuze’s commentaiy on Ibis chapter of Bergson’s work (Bergsonism,
1991) demonstrates how several ofthe premises outiine a radically different philosophy ofthe
subject.
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reformulatiôns of the notions of the “image of reality”. By criticaliy engaging with bis
text, I would like to end my discussion of Ishaghpour’s text by formulating the five
following paradoxes regarding the potential for “imaging reality”:
1) Wbile producing new mythical relations to the world through the metamorphic
double powers of the image, in winch the frame is no longer merely a window onto the
world but a mirror of mental projections and an off-scene space of pure fictional
potential, the cinematographic image is nonetheless constituted by the resistance of the
material inscribed in it, the unavoidable participation and emanation of the faces,
colors, lights, and rhythms inscribed in it. Tins would explain the attraction of the star
system, for even though we may be fascinated by Greta Garbo in the bifinite but only
partial metamorphosis of her off-screen life, her life as actress in a role and her life as a
star, we are nonetheless aiways enamoured by the faithflul materiality of lier face.
2) While the cinematograpinc image reveals the reality of the world of winch it is
an image before any intention, abstraction or enunciation, giving us an image of a world
that in our absence we could flot know nor see, this image does flot reveal the presence
that we might have expected but confronts us with the spectre of death, a spectre that
haunts the practice of audio-visual technique. The photographer in Antonioni’s Blow
up, in the successive magnilications of an image taken by chance, would seem to
stretch the ontological materiality and presence of the image to its limits as it discloses
the apparition ofa corpse; every photograph as a pliotograph would seem to be founded
by tins possibility offinding an original scene of crime and death.
3) Historicaily, the ideas behind the ontological realism of cinema are founded on a
facile illusion about the nature of Truth, for tins notion of Truth is nothing else than an
order of certairity confirmed by the beief in the principle of visible-verisimilitude. In
tins respect, it is worth considering how the tradition of “realist” films (from flaherty to
Kiarostami) are themselves the resuit of an extreme intention and violence to manifest
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the real in the absence of man, ironically observing a sublime natural world exempt
from the confrontation with a world contaminated by modernization. However
documentaiy the approach, tins tradition of film is also constituted by its distance with
the “real” world of nature it reproduces in its audio-visual traces; this is because it can
neyer coincide with an image of nature winch is not aiways already touched by its
reproduction in technology.
4) While we may have been educated by the modernist crisis, in winch the image of
reality was contested as a technological artifice (cafling into question the so-called
“neutrality and objectivity” of the apparatus since it is itseff founded upon the Western
conception of the laws of perspective in winch subjectivity is at the heart of
representation, contesting the status of the “realist” narration and the sutures of an
“invisible’ montage, etc.), the cinema nevertheless constantly exposes us to that winch
has neyer been seen before, making visible the unpredictable, aflirming itself as a
medium in winch a revelation of the unexpected may take place at any instant. Tins
promise of cinema also exposes it to its potential demise, to becoming something doser
and doser to the direct and obscene treatment of the image that may continuously be
played “live” in televisual psychodramas.
5) The final paradox is articulated by resuming the problem around winch Wim
Wender& film, Lisbonne Story, is articulated. In order to conserve the utopian myth of
total cinema for posterity, in order to assure the beief in the world recreated in the
image of cinema, in order to preserve the memory of the archaic powers of the
cinematographic image and resist the commodification of these powers in film-gadgets
and fllm-trash, nobody must film the film, nor anyone see the film, and the film must be
stocked in the ruined cinema of Paris. Only on tins condition can this myth be saved,
only under these circumstances can the cdlluloid-magic powers of the modernity of
contemporary cinerna be re-invented.
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Imaging lime
Ibis life-world of film has a cosmic and temporal character worth qualifying in relation
to the question concerning technology, a cosmicity and a temporahty winch is so
apparent in Tarkovsky’s relationship to the cinematographic image as to be
overwhelming. Walter Benjamin’s fragment, “To the Planetarium” in One-Way Street,
sketches out the stakes of the question concerning technology with impressive clarity16.
Benjamin’s statement begins in a portentous but ironic gesture. The wisdom of
antiquity, inscribed in a fragment and delivered by a man who can stand on only one
leg, reveals that the connection or experience of absorption between “anthropos” and
“cosmos” has been frrecoverably lost.
Benjamin explains that the waning of tins experience is coterminous with the
flowering of the science of astronomy in the modem age : “Kepler, Copemicus, and
Tycho Brahe were certainly flot driven by scientific impulses alone. AU the same, the
exclusive emphasis on an optical connection to the universe, to winch astronorny very
quickly led, contained a portent of what was to corne’7”. One would suppose that
Benjamin is referring here to the essence of technics; for the goings-on of telescopic
technologies, even as they refined the powers of the astrolab by exclusively delimiting
the human experience of the cosmos to an extension of optical measurement, inevitably
dissolved a certain “physis” and portended a certain disaster. This ancient “physis” is
what Benjamin cails the ecstatic trance : “for it is in tins experience alone that we gain
certain knowledge of what is nearest to us and what is remotest to us, and neyer of one
without the other” (19$6; 93).
16 Benjamin’s ideas, while neyer referring to Heidegger’s arguments or essays, may be read in
the light ofHeidegger’s questing afier technics.
This and the following citations ftom “To the Planetarium” are taken ftom the excerpted
edition of «One-Way Street », found in the collection of Benjamin’s critical writings in
Reflections, 1986; pp.92-94.
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The knbwledge of the remote and the far, very close to the movement Heidegger
describes in the “stelien” of technics, rather than securing the centrality of the subject
takes the subject outside of a stable positioning (ec-stasis) into a trance that Benjamin
qualifies as flmdamentally communal. Benjamin correlates the cosmic shocks of World
War I to the catastrophic recovery or inevitable retum of the ecstatic trance in terms of
warning and sacrifice:
It is the dangerous error of modem men to regard this experience [the ecstatic
tranceJ as unimportant and avoidable, and to consign it to the individual as the
poetic rapture of starry nights. It is flot: its hour strilces again and again., and
then neither nations nor generations can escape k, as was made terribly clear by
the last war, which was an affempt at a new and unprecedented commingling
with the cosmic powers. Human multitudes, gases, electrical forces were hurled
into the open country, high-frequency currents coursed through the landscape,
new constellations rose in the sky, aerial space and ocean depths thundered with
propeilers, and eveiywhere sacrificial shafis were dug in Mother Earth. This
immense wooing of the cosmos was enacted for the flrst time on a planetary
scale, that is, in the spirit oftechnology. (1986; 93)
Such an immense and planetary scale of technological-ecstasy huris human multitudes
just as it does electrical currents, the masses of generations and nations of people being
themselves organized and subjectffied by a movement that propels them through sky,
ocean and earth. As Benjamin explains, “technology is flot the mastery of nature” as
the imperialists would teach. Just as education is “above ail the indispensable ordering
of the relationship between generations and therefore mastery, if we are to use tins
term, of that relationship and flot of children,” so too “technology is flot the mastery of
nature but of the relationship between nature and man.” Here again we may see how
the mastery of place or emplacement is undermined ffindamentally because the subject
is hurled out of this securing and regulating relationship to the natural world. Rather
than un-secure the place of the subject, however, tins movement of un-securing
demands an ever more furious and imperial control winch leads to a political
“bloodbath” of class-war instead of leading to an act of consummation in which the
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cosmic powers are experienced in the “bridai bed” of the communal ecstasy of
teclmology.
Afier picturing tins immense vision and failed promise, Benjamin retums to quali1
the meaning of nature, physis and technology. The essence of technology, or the
goings-on of technics, belongs to the ordering of a physis much greater than the “tiny
fragment of nature that we are accustomed to caffing Nature,” a physis “through winch
mankind’s contact witb the cosmos takes a new and different form from that winch it
had in nations and families.” The ftmdamentai units of collective human existence are
shattered, dislocated and annihilated in tins “paroxysm ofgenuine cosmic experience.”
The implication is that this cosmic-technological paroxysm, as h shatters the
traditional social organization of humans in families and nations, disturbs a profound
sense of ontology, of the essentiality or inevitabffity of being and belonging by virtue
of the family or of the nation, or what may be called nationallfamffiai’8 ontopology 19
Benjamin implies that the instory of technics indicates how the human species (men)
recognize through technology their capacity as a species to mutate into different
“kinds” (manldnd). As an example of tins mutation Benjamin declares:
One need recail only the experience of the velocities by virtue of winch manldnd
is now preparing to embark on incalculable joumeys into the interior of time, to
encounter there rhythms from winch the sick shail draw strength as they did
earlier on ingh mountains or at Southern Seas. Luna parks are the prefiguration
of sanatoria. (197$; 94)
18 Benedict Anderson prefaces bis critical theory of Imagined Communities (Verso, 1992) by
discussing the failure of Marxist analysis to take into account the “Origins and the Spread of
NationaÏism” and argues that the study of Nationalism should integrate the anthropological
notions ofthe structure ofkinship and the organization offamilies.
‘ Homi Bhabha proposes this kind of reading of Benjamin, via another reading--against the
grain of Derrida’s affirmations (Spectres of Marx, 1994) concerning the transnational power
of “tele-technic media apparatuses” of communication, in his introductory essay “ArrivaIs
and Departures” to the anthotogy editcd by Hamid Naficy, Home, Exile, Homeland: film,
Media, and the Politics of Place, 1999, p.viii)
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Three things may be emphasized from this statement. first, the physis organized by the
goings-on of technology transforms or mutates human experience; neither “nature” nor
“mankind” can be thought outside an immanent relationship to the transformations
brought about by tecbnology. Second, this experience of transformation, while
potentiaily disastrous, is also potential curative, it holds out a saving power. Third, the
strength of the saving power is afready encountered outside of place and inside of time,
outside of the repose of high-mountains or the low-seas of the far away natural world
and into the experience of “velocities by which man is preparing to embark on
incalculable joumeys into the interior of time, to encounter there rhythms from winch
the sick shaH draw strength.” The lunaparks prefigure the preparation of such
incalculable journeys. I would like to suggest that the powers of the cinema render the
preparation of such joumeys even more figurable—for the time-travel made possible by
cinema is ail the more palpably real and magically suggestive as it unsecures our place
before and hold upon the world, by suspending us through the time of images into the
milieu or middle ofthe world.
As Benjamin has intimated in his celebrated essay on “The Work of Art in the Age
of Mechanical Reproduction,” the forces of distraction and shock located in the cinema
and in the processes of mass-reproducibffity generally, have transformed the
conventional “presence” of the human body, its integral “hereness and togethemess”
and its capacity for interior concentration, voluntaiy memory, and organized self
consciousness. The presence of the body is “dis-integrated” in distraction and shock
and the general categoly of subjectivity shattered and reconflgured. Tins dis
integration is due flot only to the forces of an “optical unconscious” and the
intervention of “involuntary and non-human” memory in the image but also to the
tremendous experience of velocities released by the image. Benjamin daims that the
velocities released by the images of modem film have also contributed to the shattering
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of the public spaces in winch the body deflned itsell the spaces of the “prison-world”
of modem life, its factories, taverns, raifroad stations, streets and offices winch were
explosively “burst asunder” by the rhythm of film, that “dynamite of the tenth of a
second, so that now, in the midst of far-flung ruins and debris, we calmly and
adventurously go traveling” (196$; 236).
If this is what happens to the body and to subjectivity then we are certainly qualffied
in asking, with Tarkovsky: “Why do people go to the cinema ? What takes them into a
darkened room where, for two hours, they watch the play of shadows on a sheet ?
(1986; 63). He answers this question flnally by remarking, “...I think that what a
person normafly goes to the cinema for is time; for time lost or spent or flot yet had. He
goes there for living experience; for cinema, like no other art, widens, enhances and
concentrates a person’ s experience—and flot only enhances it but makes it longer,
significantly longer” (69). His answer betrays a characteristic ambivalence winch goes
directly to the heart of Benjamin’s theory concerning the experience constituted by the
technology of film, an ambivalence winch wffl help to situate the affiliation of
Tarkovsky’s and Benjamin’s insights and also the opposing directions their thinking
takes.
To begin with, in the space between the question and the answer, Tarkovsky is
moved to deplore the “search for mere entertainment.” Then aller denouncing the
orientation of exploitation in the spectacle-culture of television and cinema, he goes on
to affirm the value of the “essential principles of cinema” winch have to do with the
“human need to master and to know the world” (1986; 63). Tins remark is repeated at
another point in bis argument when the question of the place of cinema in the history or
art is raised. Tarkosvky immediately responds by tracing tins “vital need for
knowledge” from the Italian Renaissance artists of the Quattrocentro to the technical
innovation of the twentieth century, claiming that the art-form of cinema, “was the
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instrument which humanity had to have in order to increase its mastery over the real
world” (1986; 82). Clearly, the instrumental and “anthropological-hurnanist”
conception of the audio-visual tecimique frames the history of the cinema in the
episternological horizon of Art History, the art of the cinema being the inheritor and
cultivator of unbroken traditions of optics and aesthetic forms of art that have been
progressively increasing knowledge as mastery ofthe world.
1f we read against the grain of this tendency in Tarkovsky’s writings, we will notice
that this critical gesture to secure the subjectivity of cinema or “to subjectilr cinema in
the age of the world-picture” seems to be evoked every time Tarkovsky cornes close to
exploring the definitive trait of flim-making and fiim-viewing experience: the
emergence of new forms of time consciousness in the un-securing moment of
subjectivity.
Indeed, before maldng Mirror, Tarkovsky portends in his journal of reflections:
“For many years I have been tormented by the certainty that the most extraordinary
discoveries await us in the sphere of Time. We know less about time than about
anything else. (Tarkovsky, Journal “Time within Time” [February 15, 1972] 1994; 53).
Mirror is about such tormented certainties and extraordinaiy discoveries, recording the
coming to consciousness of a change in the universe created by the cinema, a change in
the conception and experience of time. This is what really astounds audiences and
turns them into passionate admfrers of films Uke Mirror according to Tarkovsky, for
the development of tins cinematic technology bas “revealed hitherto unexplored areas
ofreality” (1986; $3-$4). Unexplored, flot because tins technology renders things more
precise or visible. As Benjamin daims, the technical possibifities of snap-shots, close
ups, actually “reveal entirely new structura] formations of the subject”; and within
familiar qualities of movement, slow motion images reveal entirely unknown qualities
of movement, winch far from looking like retarded rapid movements, give the effect of
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singularly gliding, floating, supematural motions” (Benjamin, citing Rudoif Arnheim,
1968; 236).
Cinema-goers, searching for lost time, and driffing--encountering new forms of
time. At three separate moments in the argument of Scuipting in Time, Tarkovsky does
allow himseif room to comment upon the modem spectator’s need and response for
“time lost or spent, or not-yet had” Q.63; pp.82-$3; p.179). Each time Tarkovsky
implicitly invokes the redemptive power of the cinema as that winch compels cinema
goers to compensate for the gaps of modem experience:
As he buys his ticket, it’s as if the cinema-goer were seeking to make up for the
gaps in bis own experience, throwing himseW into a searcli for ‘lost time”. In
other words lie seeks to fil that spiritual vacuum winch lias formed as a resuit of
the specific conditions of modem existence: constant activity, curtailment of
human contact, and the materialist bent of modem education. (1986; 82-83)
Tarkovsky makes it clear that the degree to winch tins “lost-time” is restored and
restorative depends a great deal on the dimension of humanity and spirituality in the
director who then vicariously shares it, condenses h, and scuÏpts it in the
uncompromisingly affective images of time printed on film (1986; 179). Wbile tins
redemptive theory of time-compensation in cinema seems to be argued consistently, it
is fundamentally at odds wïth Tarkovsky’s materialist conception of “rhythm and film
life” as I wifl argue in the foilowing chapters. Although tins theory of time
compensation)redemption seems to be affihiated with Benjamin’s conception of the
“saving power” oftechnology from winch the “sick may draw strength,” it occludes the
problem ofthe ontological unmooring ofsubjectivity in time.
The “search for time lost, spent, or flot yet had,” while motivated by the critical
impulse to recover from an alienated form of modem subjectivity, only accentuates the
crisis of losing, spending and not-yet having time. Even Tarkovsky is flnally forced to
admit that the rhythms of the time-machine of cinema undeniably belong to the rhythms
of modem life and their inevitable “time deflciency.” It is a commonplace to say that
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we are “overwhelmed” by the technological pace of modem life, flot only because we
cannot master its accelerations but also because it makes us anxious for having more
time. Even with ail of the time-saving machines of modem life we neyer seem to have
saved enough time. These machines also produce the desfre to make up for even more
time lost and we are attracted, and made more anxious, by the possibffity of managing
and planning the time we do have in order to make room for spending it elsewhere—
like the leisure time spent going to the cinema. This paradoxical relationship to the
production and consumption of time even organizes the experience of the body. In
Mandst ternis, our body—normally the measure of time, gets subordinated to
technology and the industrial forces of labor in order to make the production of capital
more time-efficient; conversely filin, however much it belongs to these processes of
mass-production in the industry of cinema, seems to give at least the promise of
temporal experience back to the body. As a medium embodying uncompromisingly
affective images of time, film expands, contracts, accelerates and compresses our own
sense ofthe measure and the passage oftime.
Yet this sense of being “in time” is also determined by another sense that we are
always “out of time” even in the halls of the cinema, for the attempt to make-up for
time-lost is itseff afready determined by the position of aiways spending-time in order
to gain it again. Moreover, tins loss of the present, winch is feit as nostalgia for what
already was and can neyer retum again, paradoxically produces another level of
nostalgia for something that remains iii a state of anticipated desire in a future endlessly
deferred, a nostalgia for that winch is flot yet had. Paradoxically then, the cinema
“produces nostalgia” even as it holds out the promise of recovering from the “spiritual
vacuum” of modem conditions—conditions that have exacerbated the sense of flot
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having a present to hold onto20. The cinema shows us, renders visible, and viscerally
attractive the nature of inserting oneself in passing time: we see passing time split or
shatter into an “event” that is simultaneously constituted by the distinct and
incommensurable moments ofthe present ofthe past, the present ofthe present, and the
present of the future. In other words, we are somewhat dispossessed of our being
“present” to our perception, memory and experience because we are inserted and
disjoined, even in the passing present, into the continuous clash of an infinite future and
past.
This insertion and dislocation in the passing-splitting of the present, however, is
mediated by the virtual-actual economy of the image. In Bergsonian tenus,
Tarkovsky’s films-especiafly Mirror, explore and embody tins “passing” of time as a
kind of mobile mirror in winch perception and recoilection endlessly pass into one
another in the medium or milieu of the image. The search for “lost time” accomplishes
in audio-visual technique what Proust’s stereoscopic economy of “writing
remembrance” accomplishes in À la recherche du temps perdu : another temporal
experience of the phases of experience—brought to life by the dynamic materiality of
20 In his very suggestive essay, “Consumption, Duration, and History” (In Modernity at Large),
Arjun Appadurai traces the production of nostalgia to consumer culture and the forces of
fashion and mass merchandising in the transnational public sphere. The production of ersatz
nostalgia and the production of patina on commodities produces a desire in consumers for
memories that they, or their social cÏass, have lost. The production of “armchair nostalgia”
takes this logic of the loss of the present to a new level: «Rather than expecting the consumer
to supply memories while the merchandiser supplies the lubricant of nostalgia, now the viewer
need only bring the faculty of nostalgia to an image that wiIl supply the memory of a loss he or
she has neyer sufferecl» (1996; p.78). This perspective on the “commodification of time”
while related mostly to the advertising and publicity of the fashion-world could be extended to
ail practices and modes of production of nostalgia in the cinema—even those that daim to be
more “spiritual”; the originality of this perspective does flot lie in the Marxist critique of
consumer culture but in the competiing observation that the production and consumption of
time as a commodity, in whatever form, has become a social practice of the imagination—a
political act of identification with the global flows of capital by which people are drawn into the
work offantasy.
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memory and forgetting. Lost-time can neyer be re-possessed; the phases of time can
only be re-run and re-played in other mediations.
For these reasons, what Tarkovsky cails a “time-deficiency” is also a possibffity for
a different mode of being and belonging in time and, also, out of time. To be “out of
time21” implies an acute lack oftime and this produces the desire to measure, compress
and accelerate the moments that we are in time; however, to be “out of time” also
implies an intense yearning for suspension, for timeless drifi, for reinaining on the
outside of time—for remaining motionless. This patience, paralysis, or suspension of
judgment may itself engender a new abllity to live in the phases of time; when boredom
or mild suffering exposes us to the immediacy or “drifl22” of time and the sense of our
own mortality is brought to the fore, the expansion or contraction of temporal
experience allows something new to emerge—a moment of contact with othemess, or
perhaps, words with which to speak.
finally, to be “out oftime” is to let oneseffexperience the visceral lure ofthe end of
time, to allow the temporal extension and concentration of the viewing experience to
open onto the explosive passage of catastrophe itself, to access—in the accelerated or
slowed down duration of an image of disappearance--the epoch-ending moment of
disaster. In Mirror, tins lure of accessing the end of time is presented in the most banal
and creative ways, engendering a series of aurai and visual correspondences between
the “vaporous bodies” materialized on screen. for example, we witness the passing of
the extraordinary in even the most domestic of shots, in the obsessive attention given to
21for the thoughts animating this paragraph I am grateful to Laura U. Marks for sharing lier
draft-versions of programme-notes for the special program “Out of Time” featuring works of
experimental video and film which she co-curated with Robin Curtis at the 2001 Oberhausen
Short Film Festival.
22
«Drifi », or the « inability to locate a stable sense of the present» is an epistemological
concept of the modernity of experience articulated by Leo Charney in Emply Moments:
Cinema, Modernity, and Drfl. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1998. Charney
suggestively identifies “drifi” with the constellation of problems and possibilities presented by
twentieth-century phi]osophy, physics, and modernist arts.
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recording a humid ring of vapor lefi by a cup of tea winch graduaily vanishes into a
wave of heat, a ring of vapor winch before disappearing extends itself into the awesome
silence following the “imploding” sound of a chorus of heightened voices; tins ring of
vapor, its “implosive disappearance,” reverberates later and sets the tonality for the
vision of the found documentary footage, inserted into the diegetic environment of the
film, winch records the “explosive appearance” of the building pressures of a nuclear
musbroom cloud.
As I wffl be arguing in the second part of the dissertation, Mirror does flot record
tins “coming to consciousness” of a change in the universe and in the experience of
time by means of a mere projection of apocalyptic endings nor by means of prophecies
of the end of instory. In favor of tins closing of consciousness tins exemplary film
relays to us, through the velocities of modem mass events, the rhythms ofthe life-world
of experience, and the fictions of apocalypse, a visible and mysterious image of
ourselves as mutants23—of the way we inhabit and are inhabited by conscious and
unconscious forces of time and powers ofmemory and forgetting.
Tarkovsky’s Mirror, from tins perspective, incarnates one of the cinema’s ultimate
fantasies about its rhythmic potential for the middle-passage of time-travel. The
subject, endlessly being stripped of the capacity to hold or to lix time, must relinquish
tins impulse to confer continuity upon his existence by inserting himseff within the
structure of homogeneous, empty time. In Heideggerian terms, even Nature and
History become “un-secured” from tins structure of time, for the calculable
23 As Schefer suggests: «Le cinéma, en le sachant très peu (attentif pour le mieux à ses
singularités formelles), a crée un autre monde. Ni le cinéma ni le roman ne sont pour cela
moribonds ou en crise. Nous en percevons pour l’instant un effet de retour dans une espèce de
conscience d’univers : et cet effet de retour dû à la multiplication d’images de toutes sortes est
de cet ordre: nous percevons comme une chose notre qualité de mutants historiques, notre
qualité d’espèce. L’image nous a montré que nous sommes une espèce mutante. Nous sommes,
depuis la première image projetée, l’impossibilité réelle des hommes-images; ils se sont depuis
lors multipliés, ils occupent la surface du monde (1997; 21).
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predicatabffity of Nature’s future phase of time, and the rationaÏ veriflability of the past
phase of time given by Historiography can no longer be “set in place” (1977; p.127)
Instead of ftanticaily attempting to secure the con-temporal setting of the subject in the
representational structure of the modem scientific view of Nature and Histoiy, the
subject must simply pass time in time’s multiple heterogeneity. The subject would
experience time as the body must experience its own generation and corruption and
become that “middleness” or medium/milieu through winch time passes and makes its
passage. finally, by passing time in the furrows, gaps, and drifiing suspensions of
these temporal traces, the subject would become both a witness and an assembler of
these traces, a time-passer.
Sylviane Agacinski has made a compelling argument in favor of tins conception of
the time-passer or “passeur du temps” when discussing the importance of Benjamin’s
figure of the “passeur” in the “Book of Passages” winch is The Arcades Project a
figure that belongs both to the flâneur and the ftriyman; to the flâneur because it is a
gratuitous way of getting lost and an inefficient way of Iosing time, and to the
ferryman because it is a way oftaking passengers across different shores oftime:
Notre passeur du temps évoque ces deux significations: il ouvre au temps sans
essayer de le maîtriser, il est disponible pour faire passer, pour ménager un
passage d’un temps à l’autre en se laissant sofficiter par les traces du passé dans
la ville, traces écrites des livres. Il est temoin, observateur passif mais sans
lequel le temps ne serait pas. En tant qu’il est à la fois passif et actif le passeur
est aussi celui par qui quelque chose se passe, lui-même «lieu» de passage. Il
est enfin l’impossible contemporain de lui-même ou de son temps, habitant une
époque où chacun fait l’expérience aigu du passage. (2000; pp.57-58)
In the halls of cinema the timc-passer is a contemplative observer who loses time in the
middle of a world that materially passes at variable speeds, and tins experience of no
longer having a time to himselllherseif is also the experience of the loss or the absence
of an abso Lute ternporaLity. This is the final, and most important, meaning of the “lime
deficiency.”
60
Perhaps this is why Tarkovsky’s films flot only enhance, widen, and concentrate the
experience of time, but that they also makes the passage of time “signfficantly longer.”
Even in films like Mirror the 106 minutes of the “actual chronometric time” of film
unrolling before spectators eyes seems to outstretch the normal experience of this
interval or period of time because the multiple registers of rhythmic duration inscribed
in the material passage of the film pull them hypnotically out of and into the difference
of co-existing temporalities, one image afier another. This also explains the strange
pleasure and difficulty the spectator faces when leaving the projection of Tarkovsky’s
films, for he/she must also “lose the temporalities” of the film to winch his/her thought
is afready intimately tied and bound in order to “wake up” from that ostentatious
contact with the haIfawakened state of reveiy induced by the fllm’s rhythms. For a
“heady” moment, the spectator as time-passer remains suspended between the different
orders of temporal experience, tins experience neyer being reducible to one or the other
shore but rather in the guffthat opens “in-between” each.
Tins suspension of interest before, during or alter the film does flot render the time
passer passively expectant and mute but opens up an attention to this guif “in between”
temporalities, creating an availability to becoming “charged with time” (Agacinski,
2000; 63). No longer having the time of one’s own, no longer being able to engage
oneseif in the temporality of an action, tins negative suspension means that the time
passer has lost time in order to be able to open himseli7herself to the temporal
singularity of events, to bear witness to the rhytbms of these traces, and to be available
to becoming transformed by the radical alterity of these traces.
The figure of the time-passer is the emblem of this cosmic-technological paroxysm
encountered in the rhythms of film, exposing humans to another mode of being and
belonging in lime, an “experience of the velocities by virtue of which” the mutating
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species of manldnd “is now preparing to embark on incalculable journeys” (One-Way
Street, 1986; 93).
Chapter 2: Interrogating Modernity through Haiku-Technics’
When extending Heidegger’s questioning conceming technology to the question
conceming audio-visual technique, how does one begin to put into question the
instrumental conception of technics and explore another, non-instrumental relationship
? Heidegger indicates a way by suggesting that technics belongs to poesis, the shaping
and maldng activity of poetry. In the foilowing sections, I wffl be arguing that
Tarkovsky is questing alter a non-instrumental relationship to cinematography tbrough
bis reflections on haiku poetry and that tins questing cornes to light in bis practice of
audio-visual technique. for this reason, haiku is flot to be understood in relation to the
traditional literary conventions of Japanese verse, nor to questions of formai poetics.
Before its determination in conventions of verse, hailcu is above ail a practice of
writing, a technique of language, related to a specific kind of knowing. For Tarkovsky
tins practice, technique, and form of knowing exemplffied by hailcu ailows him to
explore a relationship to the medium of film winch is aiways carefully aîticulated
within the constellation of concepts of language, image, and life.
Cinema and Ideogram
Créer n’est pas déformer ou inventer des personnes et des choses. C’est nouer
entre des personnes et des choses qui existent, et telles qu’elles existent, des
rapports nouveaux (Bresson, 1975, p.27).
Robert Bresson’s Notes sur le cinématographe reads like a welÏ-thumbed, pocket-sized
book of haiku: short notes of aphoristic wisdom and austere shnplicity that speak less
The following chapter is a direct continuation of an article published initially under the titie,
« Theoretical Apparitions of Haiku: An tntermedial Interrogation of Modernity» CiNéMAS,
Vol 10; nos.2-3, printemps, 2000, pp. 1 85-203. and attered as a conference, « L’intermédialité
du haiku : au delà de l’écriture de vers, vers une autre pratique, technique et connaissance»
given at a round-table seminar at the CRI (Centre de Recherche sur t ‘intermédiatité, Université
de Montréat, le 21 novembre, 2000).
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of aesthetic principles than of a way of being between the world and audio-visual
technique. Ibis duality, of aesthetic principle versus a way of being-between,
suggested by different ways of practicing haiku poetry as audio-visual technique, may
be more richly explored by pitting Tarkovsky’s ideas against flim-director and
theoretician, $ergei Eisenstein. Eisenstein, in the article «The Cinematographic
Principle and the Ideogram,» proposes a dialectical understanding of film form in the
theory of montage, a theory that might prepare the way for an intellectual
cinematography. Montage theory is developed by constant analogy to the haiku,
«[...J the most laconic form of poetry. . hieroglyphs transposed into phrases... montage
phrases. Shot lists» (1957, p.92).: «The simple combhmtion of two or threc details of
a material kind yields a perfectly flnished representation of another kind—
psychological» (p.93). This psycho-genesis of meaning and abstraction is achieved by
means of a chain of signaletic material, a mise-en-scène of image-conflicts: conflicts
between a series of graphie distortions, scales, volumes, masses, depths, lights, and
durations. Shots are conceived as montage ceils in the total make-up of film fonn; they
are aiways subordinated to a tertiary organization ofmovement, action, and narration.
This ideogrammic principle echoes Ezra Pound’s Imagist and Vorticist manifestos
before WWI (190$-1914), preoccupied with forging the principles that might meet the
ffiture capacities of a dynamic “imaging” of ideas, a kinetic poetry diagramming the
dynamic forms of Nature, an ideogrammic Image2. Pound explained the principle of
the Image as a kind of speech in itseli’, beyond the ornamental or formulated use of
speech, a direct treatment of tbings. However, the image is flot simply concrete but
phenomenological : it is
“[. . .j that which presents an inteliectual and emotional
2 Reed Way Dasenbrock distinguishes this early poetics of the parataxis of concrete images
from Pound’s more generalized and epic poetics informing The Cantos in the I 930’s through an
“the ideogrammic method.” “The Cantos in the Context of Vorticism,” from The Literary
Vorticism ofEzra Pound and Wyndham Lewis. (Baltimore ]ohns Hopkins UP, 1985, p.2O5)
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complex in an instant oftime” (Pound, 1970 [1913], p.4). Nor is the one-image poem
simply visual but generates a kind of paratactic superposition., as in the following poem
“In a Station at the Metro.”
The apparition ofthese faces in the crowd;
Petals on a wet, black bough. (Pound, 1957 [1913J, p.35)
Such a superposition is heard as the semantic double of the word “apparition,”
meaning both flashing appearance and ghostly flash,, suggesting the paffid!pure double
of commuter faces and failen petals; it is also feit as the juxtaposition of the
acceleration and the solitude of modem urban experience to the mythical repose of the
Oriental garden. It captures and combines “[...J the essentiality of the conceptual image
with the deflniteness ofthe perceptual image[...] “(Schneidau, 1969
,
p.45).
Like Pound, Eisenstein thinks of fllm-form in these quasi-Hegelian ternis, the
poetics of images in montage holding the power to arrest and to synthesize conceptual
and perceptual images3. Yet the wffl to systematize a dialectic of strips and cuttings, to
found ail film phenomena according to the blocking and the building of montage, and
to produce psychological abstractions out of the empirical clips and collisions of
images, while in conformity with the ideogrammic principle, is radically at odds with
the less wfflful spirit of hailw poetry. Ibis perhaps forms the central irony of
Eisenstein’s film Form, that the immense, architectural edifice of film montage would
be imagined in the fugitive atmosphere of the haiku idioni for haiku is on the side of
movement, becoming and multiplicity, not formal, abstract and flxed blocks of univocal
Being.
The term «quasi-Hegelian» is used here in order to make a comparison, however facile,
between the Hegel’s systematic conceptions of History and Spirit and Eisenstein’s theory of
fitm-form. Although both thinkers accord a priviteged place to movement itsetf, movement is
only made intelligible under a logic of synthetic propositions.
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Tarkovsky challenges the formalist idea of the hailcu idiom as ideogrammic
montage by discussing hailcu as a poetic practice of audio-visual technique. The
broader implications of this theoretical shifi are enormous, for this would flot merely
question the ideogrammic aesthetic but would put into question the institutional
framework of film studies imagined by Eisenstein, particularly insofar as its principles
are grounded in and constituted by the subject-centered epistemology of modernity. In
tins instance, Eisenstein’s ideogrammic principle of montage reveals what Heidegger
has called the culminating trait of Western metaphysics, the discursive organization of
the instrumental representation of technology4: the means of framing, empowering and
engendering complete control over the reproduction, ordering and emplacement of the
object-world-as-picture for a goveming subject (artist, party, State).
Andrey Tarkovsky’s Scuipting in Time (1986) offers one of the most ifiuminating
critiques of Eisenstein’s theory of the hailcu idiom and bis argument may be followed in
the light of Heidegger’s questioning. Although Tarkovsky constantly re-inscribes bis
critique of Eisenstein’s montage as a foil to bis own search for the aesthetic specfficity
of cinematography, bis experience may be characterized as a «questing afler
technics.5» His fllm-theoiy and film-practice does flot seek a cognitive-informational
definition for fllm-poetics or fl]m-aesthetics; rather, moving like techné itself tins
theory and tins practice open a free relationship to the matter at hand—by expÏoring the
inter-animating relationsinps between film and life.
For example, Tarkovsky displaces the idea of montage as the essential organizing
element in film by discussing how montage is afready presupposed, given by things as
“ This is my own paraphrastic thesis of the primary thrust of Martin Heidegger’s retated
arguments in “The Question Concerning Technology,” and “The Age of the World Picture,”
from The Question Concerning TecÏ;nology and Other Essays. Trans. Witliam Lovitt. New
York Harper & Row Publishers, 1977.
I borrow Samuel Weber’s equivocal titie to Heidegger’s famous essay in order to explore the
questioning process itself. See: “Upsetting the Set-Up,” from Mass Mediauras: Forrn,
Technics, Media. California: Stanford UP, 1996.
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they present themselves in time and in the rhythm and intensity of their duration
through film. Rather than producing a third sense, invisible and abstract, from the
collision of images, montage can organize a unique threshold of perception in winch
and through winch time is sculpted and materially inscribed in film through the
rhythmic expression of the becoming of things.
Cinema and Life
Something of the transforming reaction between the figurative power of language and
the phenomenal agency of the world is captured in the practice of reading and writing
haiku, a practice very close to the essence of audio-visual technique according to
Tarkovsky. For haiku belongs less to form and fllm-form than to the formlessness of
film, or at least, to that quality of fihn-form winch is aiways in formation, re-formation,
and un-formation and winch leaves its traces in the film of form, the residue or skin of
form in its emergence. As Trinh T. Minh-ha argues,
The basic urge to manifest (flot to arrest) the formless in form, seems, indeed, to
be what Tarkovsky yearns for. . . What Tarkovsky tries to retain and “make it
incarnate, new each time,” is the formless, or as he said it, the life principle itsel±
unique in each moment of life. Thus, fonn is flot intended to express fonn, but
rather, formlessness. The non-consumable relationship between form and
formlessness or between art and life defles every binarist attempt at reducing it to
the old dichotomy of form and content. In Tarkovsky’s definition, “the image is
flot a certain meaning expressed by the director, but an entire world reflected as in
a drop of water.” (“Bold Omissions and Minute Depictions,” When the Moon
WaxesRed: 1991; 161)
Tarkovsky does articulate something of this irreducible or non-consumable relationship
between film and life in the consistent comparison he makes between the experience of
reading haiku poetry and the practice of audio-visual technique, or what may be called
«haiku-technics.» It is important to understand that the analogy between haiku and
film is not a mere flight of poetic fancy nor a belletristic embellishment regarding the
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necessity of the interdisciplinary study of poetiy and film. It is through this analogy that
Tarkovsky’s central rernarks concerning the mediation of rhythmic pressures of time
corne to light. As I have been arguing and wffl continue to argue, Tarkovsky’s
consideration of rhythm as the primary cinematographic principle of the time-based
medium of film is aiways articulated wïthin the constellation of relationships between
image, language, and life. In tins instance, the cinematographic image dispiaces or
upsets the relationships that subject life to the workings of symbolic language,
especially those operations ofinterpretation6. Tarkovsky writes,
What captivates me here is the refusai even to hint at the kind of final image
meaning that can be gradually deciphered like a charade. Haiku cultivates its
images is such a way that they mean nothing beyond themselves, and at the
same time they express so rnany things at once that it is flot possible to catch
their final meaning. The more closely the image corresponds to its fiinction, the
more impossible it is to constrict it within a clear intellectual formula. (1986;
106)
The double condition of the cinematographic image, as irreducible to a definite
meaning and as undecipherabie polysemy, overturns Eisenstein’s notion of the haiku as
a laconic shot-list, to be subsumed under the generation of psycho logical montage
effects. Hailcu, like the cinematographic image, resists the operations of interpretation.
As Barthes rernarks,
Deciphering, normalizing, or tautologicai, the ways of interpretation., intended in
the West to pierce meaning, Le., to get into it by breaking and entering. . .cannot
help but fail to understand the haiku; for the work of reading winch is attached
to it is to suspend language, not to provoke it [...] (p.72)
Audio-visual technique repeats the experience of reading something as intelligible and
yet as inscrutable as haiku poetry, flot as a formai consideration of how it invests a
6 It should be noted that Tarkovsky’s writings often highlight the symbolic importance of the
image and its iconic nature in quasi-theological terms; he did, afier ail, film the life of Andrei
Rublev in order to expiore this reiationship. for the purposes of the argument in this section, I
am less interested in defending the integrity or consistency of Tarkovsky’s conception of the
image than I am in outiining some of the epistemological implications of one of bis most
firmty held convictions regarding the interpretation ofthe cinematographic image.
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wealth of meaning in terse form, but because it has the «negative capabffity7» to
suspend meaning anything at ail, avoiding interpretation and escliewing the operations
of symbo lic representation.
Again, Tarkovsky’s remarks may be apropos here: “In cinema—as in life—the text,
the words are refracted in everything apart from the words themselves. The words mean
notbing—they are like water” (1994; 92). In an interview, perplexed by the reactions of
misunderstanding to his film Mirror, Tarkovsky conlirmed the autobiographical nature
ofits episodes by tuming the question around and remarking:
The fficts are so simple, they can be taken down by everyone as similar to the
experience of their own lives. But here we corne up against something that is
peculiar to cinema: the further a viewer is from the content of the film, the doser
he is; what people are looking for in cinema is a continuation ofthefr lives. . .The
purpose of Mirror, its inspiration, is that of homily: look, learn, use the life here
as an example. (1994; p.367)
Ibis practice of auto-bio-graphy, as a reflexive instance (auto) of life (bio) writing itself
(graphy), takes people into the heart of their own lives the more they accept film as a
mediation of living examples rather than a chronological representation of the life of a
particular person. Tarkovsky was oflen asked about what kind of mirror Mirror reaily
was, what kind of “faitbful or truthful” reflection it realiy provided. He usually would
reply that the film, from the building of the set to the casting of his family, reproduced
his memories in quite an unexpected and uncaimy way, especialiy because these
memories, in their life-like repetition and singular difference, paradoxically belonged to
many other people as weU8.
‘ This term, white alluding to Keat’s own formula regarding one of the potencies of poetry, is
flot meant to answer In his poetics nor to the reflections of a whole host of critics of Romantic
poetry.
8 In the Stockholm intervbiew ([1985] 1987; Res Pubtica) Tarkovsky remarked, “Consider for
example my childhood home which we filmed, which you sec in the film
— this is a set. That
is, the bouse was reconstructed in precisely the same spot where it had stood before, many
years ago. What was lefi there was a... flot even the foundation, only a hole that had once
contained it. And precisely at this spot the bouse was rebuilt, reconstructed from photographs.
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In the interview mentioned above, Tarkovsky was asked whether or flot there was
any symbolism in Mirror—to which he emphatically replied, “No! The images
themselves are like symbols, but unlike accepted symbols they cannot be deciphered.
The image is like a dot of life, and even the author may flot be able to work out what it
means, let alone the audience” (1994; 369). In the context of the problematic of
mediation, the undecipherability of the image has enormous epistemological
implications, for the cinematographic image would no longer be legible, deflnable, nor
assignable under that regime of knowledge and that relationship to language brought
about by the hegemony of literacy. This contact with the excess of the image and
suspense of language would be an experience that largely escapes the hermeneutic
gestures of film-criticism, for the cinematographic image would flot be conceived as the
adequate and accurate and representation or reproduction, for a subjectivity, of an
objectivity that lives outside it, nor as a merely symbolic screen around a secret to be
constantly deciphered.
In favor of these conceptions, the cinematographic image would be considered a
medium of contact which--in its middleness (milieu)--opens itseW to the outside in a
This was extremely important to me — flot because I wanted to be a naturalist of Some kind but
because my whoie personal attitude toward the fiim’s content depended upon it; it would have
been a personat drama for me if the house had iooked different. 0f course the trees have grown
a lot at this place, everything overgrew, we had to cut down a lot. But when I brought my Mum
there, who appears in severai sequences, she was so moyeU by this sight that I understood
immediately it created the right impression. One would think: why was such an elaborate
reconstruction of the past necessary? Or flot even the past but what I remembered and how I
remembered it. I didn’t try to search for a particular form for the internai and subjective
memories, so to speak; on the contrary — I strived to reproduce everything the way it was i.e.,
to iiterally repeat what was fixed in my memory. And the resuit turned very strange... It was for
me a singular experience. t made a film with flot a single episode composed or invented in
order to interest the viewer, to attract bis attention, to explain anything to him — these were
truly recollections concerning our family, my biography, my life. And despite the fact
— or
perhaps because of it — that this was realiy a very private story, I received a lot of letters
afterwards in which the viewers were asking me the rhetorical question: “How did you find out
about my IifeT’
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state of active and intransitive becoming. Clots of life: an active and intransitive
becoming that mobifizes a series 0f relationships in the metamorphic powers of contact
between the material membrane of the screen and the memories and experiences of
viewers. While the word “dot” may suggest something counter to “free circulation and
flow,” it does flot designate stoppage but cails attention to the materiality of time in the
cinematographic image; it is a dot of life because it releases the residues of experience
and the layers of memory recorded and deposited in its enduring traces. 1f
cinematography, like poetry, bas its bloodlines of life clotted in the abundant and
inscrutable circulation of the image then, instead of asking questions about authorial
intentions, symbolism or surrealism, Tarkovsky proposes, it would be more interesting
to ask about the organizing principle of the medium of film itself to question film
rhythms; the densities, pressures, and speeds of time; the way that cinematography, in
its elastic sculpture of time, in the plasticity of light and shadow, materially mediates
the world as an example to be returned, repeated, and endlessly continued.
Haiku and the Exemption ofMeaning
Haiku, as a practice and a technique translated into the audio-visual medium of film, by
exploring another relationship between language, the world, and the subject (Aristotle’s
hypokeimenon), questions “that which lies under” modem knowledge and that which
“constitutes the grounds of the subject.” As a questioning, haiku-technics also “builds a
path” into a different kind of knowing, perceiving, and being. As Barthes remarks, for
example, the «exemption of meaning» in haiku poetry marks the possibiity of
attaining in language the measure of the Zen satori, an empty, spherical and pure echo
of nothingness9. Barthes sees in this practice of nothingness the possibffity of
One may, like Lisa Lowe “The Desires of Postcolonial Orientalism” question this critical
gesture in Barthes thinking which, in the utopian image of the Oriental other, would pretend to
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transcending the binary semiology of signifier and signffied in a language of self
effacing traits and traces. In tins sense, the practice of the Zen satori is less like the
search for an echo of nothingness in language and more like a kind of active
“emptying” of the entitihood of language’°. for poet, novelist and critical thinker,
Gerald Vizenor, the practice of writing haiku ailows one to experience something doser
to the movement of memory in “postindian” literature’ 11e writes, “Haiku is the
intuition of shadow words: a concise mediation of sound, motion, memories, and the
sensation of the seasons” (p.65). Next, Vizenor cites R S. Blyth, himseff notable as a
critic for linking Zen thinking to haiku poetics in Haïku: “Hailcu is the resuit of the
wish, the effort, not to speak, not to write poetry, not to obscure further the truth and
such-ness ofa thing with words, with thoughts and feelings” (p.65).
Between these two affirmations there is a problem that goes beyond the purview of
the aesthetic search for the “mot juste” and winch poses an epistemological
questioning on the way the subject is set into language. The condition for the possibifity
of shadow words circulates in the strange relationship the subject lias to the scene of
language, a scene that both reveals and conceals things in darkness and in light,
between landscapes and a word-events. for Blyth, tins is the scene of an impossibility
to winch haïku poets are sensitive because they do not constitute themselves as subjects
“transcend the semiology and the ideology of the signifier and the signified, to invent a place
that exceeds binary structure itself” (1991, p.154).
10 owe this insight to remarks made by Krishnan Venkatesh who points out that Barthes
misunderstood or misrecognized the correct translation as “emptiness”. According to real
Buddhists (i.e. Nagarjuna) emptiness designates an emptying of entitihood, flot a denial of
existence.
Il Gerald Vizenor, author of Man(fest Manners: Postindian Warriors ofSurvivance (Wesleyan,
1994), writes about the cultural strategies of survivance for a people constructed by a racial and
colonial discourse, designated in the categories cf simulated representations, and observed and
interpreted by the surveillance of ethnological practices. In the chapter entitled “Shadow
Survivance” Vizenor discusses the central probtematic of postindian literature. How does one
inherit and generate a tribal presence originatly mediated by an ancient form of orality, the
dynamic, mobile and holophrastic nature of which has been contaminated, flattened, and
misinterpreted by the literacy of an anthropological institution that has transformed its life
world into folk literature?
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in order to integrate thoughts and feelings; instead they hold onto a threshold of
attention at the limits of language, a threshold that does flot reduce but marks the
gesture where silence, distance and self coalesce.
for Vizenor, tins opens up the possibffity of finding another relationship to
language through haiku since it is “a concise mediation” generating a field of action
into winch, through winch, and out of winch, the dynamic materiality of the world and
the motions of memory run. Ibis is consistent with Barthes’ remarks of the privilege
the hailcu poem enjoys of escaping the rhetorical excesses of definition and description,
flot as a motif of” illumination” or “symbolic hyperesthesia” in winch the subject is
swollen with sense, nor as a gesture of “heavy, full, profound, mystical silence”
through winch the emptiness of the soul might be fihled by the divine, but as an
immense Zen praxis, of winch haiku is only the literary branch, “to hait language”
(1987 [1970]; 74).
le haiku, au contraire, articulé sur une métaphysique sans sujet et sans dieu,
correspond au Mu bouddhiste, au satori Zen, qui n’est nullement descente
ifiuminative de Dieu, mais «réveil devant le fait », saisi de la chose comme
événement et non comme substance, atteinte de ce bord antérieure du langage,
contigu à la matité (d’affleurs toute rétrospective, reconstituée) de l’aventure (ce
qui advient au langage, plus encore qu’au sujet). (1970)
Barthes’ remarks suggest that tins practice of hailcu is flot simpiy a question of
«halting» language, but of suspending a certain relationship to language. In other
words, language, under the zen satori, would be arrested as a mere vehicle of
communication and information and tins would place the instnuaental relationship to
language in abeyance. In tins instance, language would be neither possessed nor
possessing, neither sent nor sending, language would be “that towards winch we are
aiways on our way”. In these Heideggerian terms, language would be the medium of
an awakening to the world, not an end that could be mastered verticafly. The
substantive relationsinp to language would be reversed because the accidental
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eventfulness of things would be experienced in their happening, and writing haiku as
that activity of invention and adventure that introduces the unknown into language. We
might characterize this « bord antérieure du langage contigu à la matité de l’aventure”
in the light ofVizenor’s argument:
Postindian consciousness is a rush of shadows in the distance, and the trace of
natural reason to a bench of stones ; the human silence of shadows, and animate
shadows over presence. The shadow is that sense of the intransitive motion to
the referent; the silence in memories. Shadows are neither the absence of
entities nor the burden of conceptual references. The shadows are the
prenarrative silence that inherits the words; shadows are the motions that mean
the silence, but flot the presence or the absence of entities. (1994, p.64)
According to Vizenor, the subject must inhabit language as on the ruins of a threshold,
standing-under the shadows of the intransitive motion to the referent, and moving into
contact with the prenarrative silence that inherits words before they are invested with
the power to name, to define, and to describe. The subject would not command
language but become ils medium of transit by tracing the seasons of daily life in a
language paradoxicafly mobile and intransitive. A subject in touch with the motions
and the incidents of the life-world “that mean the silence in memories “, an intransitive
silence that, while surviving virtualiy in the mobile traces of shadows, cannot be
reduced as the substrate ofthe representational knowledge.
Returning to Tarkovsky’s remarks on haiku poetry, tins exemption of meaning in
hailcu permits the plunging dive through a salient language of pure events beyond the
barrier dividing thought and cosmos, intellectual life and nature. “The reader of haiku
has to be absorbed into it as into nature, to plunge in, lose himself in its depth, as in the
cosmos where there is no bottom and no top” (p. 106). Tins form of absorption and
plunging dive is also related to the magical-mimetic experience afforded by the
cinematographic image; both haiku and the cinematographic image envelope and
dissolve the place of the subject before language; the subject is flot set outside or before
the world, working a sense of direction to tins world through a command of language,
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rather the subject “plunges into” the world through the medium of language, being
touched by things from ail sides.
Haiku, in other words, while promising a kind of immediate and cosmic contact and
communion with things is flot that which escapes, because it suspends, language;
instead hailcu, by moving the subject into the world through a special relationship to
language, cails attention to the way the subject inhabits and is inhabited by the medium
of language. Hailcu would be that which indicates “the idea of language” which,
according to Agamben, is the first principle of political philosophy, the only
unpresupposed principle: “language, wbich for human beings mediates ail things and
ail knowledge, is itseff immediate. Nothing immediate can be reached by spealdng
beings—nothing, that is, except language itself mediation itself’ (1999; 47). Since
language, in these Heideggerian terms, is flot linguistic in itself flot being an object but
a medium, it necessarily misses itseff even when it speaks and presupposes
“something” on which or about winch it might speak. By raising the problem of the
mediation of language to this metaphysical height I mean only to suggest that audio
visual technique does flot replace nor compete with language, but moves us even more
closely to the very idea of language, as that winch lies under the subject, and tins alone
provokes a kind ofpbilosophical wonder.
In the second part of the dissertation, I wffl touch upon the problem of the speed of
images as they upset and scramble this ground, especially the ground of historical
knowledge. Before making this argument, however, I would like to insist on
emphasizing the notion that audio-visual technique moves us into a different
relationsinp to language than that by winch we are accustomed to speak in literate
culture; tins explains, in part, ail of the plunges into the salient mystery and suspension
of haiku-technics. The biggest mystery, of course, is flot that we have recourse to
haiku-technics in order to describe audio-visual technique, but that the rnodemity of
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audio-visual technique discloses a more ancient and cosmological relationship between
the subject and language, being and knowledge.
Auragraphy
While Tarkovsky suggests that the cinematographic image reveals this first principle of
mediation in language, it is also aiways created through a special form of observation,
«made incarnate, visible, and four dimensional ;» it embodies «a gllmpse of the
truth permitted to us in our blindness,» an « indivisible and elusive» correlation and
contact between human consciousness and the palpable worl&2. How can we
characterize tins “correlation and contact” in terms of mechanically reproduced images
9
Haiku poetry, like the camera, holds the power to arrest, to suspend, and to inscribe
historical movement itseff in the complex production of the image’3. for Barthes,
hailcu poetry is a kind of photographie act because it performs the deixis of the
interjection «so» and writes with «a flash or a slash of light» that illumines without
revealing, « it is the flash of a photograph one takes very carefully (in the Japanese
manner) but having neglected to load the camera with film» (J).$3). Yet for Benjamin
the scene of what I am cafling “hailm-technics” haunts photography, and rather than
12 In light of these remarks on haiku poetry, I will be arguing in the third section of the
dissertation, how well Tarkovsky continued something of the post-symbolist modemism in
the “Acmeist” impulses of Russian poetry (as embodied in the works of Arma Akhmatova
and Osip Mandeistam etc.), having inherited the explosion of poetic forms that took place
even beyond the haiku form, extending for many generations and into the traceable influence
of the film-maker’s mentor-poet, his father, Arseney Tarkovsky. In this sense, Tarkovsky’s
cinematography, like the Acmeist “Guild of Poets”, continued the search for a revolutionary
economy of the image in the dynamic, concrete materiality of the world and in the search for
the clarity and austere simplicity of the word.
‘ Eduardo Cadava, in the preface to Words of Light: Theses on the Photography ofHistory
(New Jersey: Princeton UP, 1997), recalts how Benjamin’s writings, as «photographically
thetic» writings, are faïthful to the search for this kind of relationship: «Like the gaze of the
camera that momentarily fixes history in an image, the thesis condenses a network of
relations into a frame whose borders remain permeable > (p.XX).
76
captivate à technical impossibility of reproduction and a necessary absence of film in
the apparatus, this scene is thought of at a particular historical juncture in bis essay “A
Short History ofPhotography.”
On a summer noon, resting, to follow the lime of a mountain range on the
horizon or a twig winch throws its shadow on the observer, until the moment or
hour begins to be a part of its appearance—that is to breathe the aura of those
mountains, that twig. (Benjamin, 1980 [1931], p.209)
This snapshot cliché, winch may seem to be a belietristic gratuity, emerges also out of
Walter Benjamin’s later essay, «The Work of Art In the Age of Mechanical
Reproduction». It was written and recycled in another essay in order to elaborate a
response to the question, « What is aura?» and the ambiguous metaphysical daim, « A
strange web of time and space: the unique appearance of a distance however close at
hand» (1931; p.2O6). It does not define a principle except insofar as it explores a
hailcu-like action carried on between an observer and a iandscape in a summer season
at the peak of the sun’s cast of light. In the scene of this action a specific duration and
distance inscribe themselves, or breathe into, the material appearance of a shadow or a
lime; an aurai light glowing and fading through an apparitional medium and into winch
a material process(ion) of time and space casts a shadow’4; or what may be called,
auragraphy’5. Who is the observer? He is the haïku poet as photo-grapher, writing
words of light.
“Apparitional medium” may be understood as the duality of André Bazin’s notion:
to take a picture is to moid a death mask of the life-model as it is sculpted in the
‘ Garreil Stewart opposes these terms helpfully in: « Modernism’s Sonic Waiver,» from
Sound States: Innovative Poetics and Acousticat Technologies. Chapel Hill : The Universïty of
North Carolina Press, 1997, p.239.
Alain Buisine, in Eugène Atget ou la rnélancholie en photographie (Nîmes: Editions
Jacqueline Chambon, 1994, pp. 1 15-122), discusses the Latin etymology of aura as air or
breath, the physical laws of light-refraction producing the aural-effect, as wefl as the
theoretical notion of aura informing the writings of Watter l3enjamin.
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plasticity of light’6. In this instance, the photographic medium does flot merely liberate
phenomena from their temporal succession. By “embalming” them., it marks a ghostly
falling-away, a hazy glow, in the veiy emergence of their appearance’7. The “material
process(ion)” is flot given immediately as a distance between two points in space;
rather, the distance is perceived as a mediation of a rhythm, a material inscription of
time accentuated periodically by a shadow or lime.
The notion of photography as apparitional medium may be corroborated by
Benjamin’s remarks on the magical value of photographs since they frresistibly compel
viewers to seek the coexistence ofthe future anterior in the flash ofthe here and now:
In such a picture, that spark has, as it were, burned through the person in the
image with reality, finding the indiscemible place in the condition of that long
past minute where the future is nesting, even today, so eloquently that we
looking back can discover it. (p.202)
The notion of photography as material process(ion) is suggested by Benjamin’s
comments on a special relationship revealed by early time-lapse technique : «The
procedure itseff caused the models to live, flot out ofthe instant, but into it; during the
long exposure they grew, as it were, into the image» (p.2O4). Photography, as a
medium of time-passage, radically re-organizes the conditions for being in time and for
thinking through time. The instantaneous flash in which the present is produced and
bumed in the photographic image may also hold, as in a nest, something of the shaped
anticipation of the future. Tins is to assert something different than what is normally
admitted by theorists of the indexical trace of photographic images, according to whom
16 Andre Bazin. « The Ontology of the Photographic Image,» from What is Cinema? Voti.
Trans. Hugh Gray. Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press, 1967, pp.12-I5.
‘ Samuel Weber, in the chapter « Art, Aura and Medium in the Work of Walter Benjamin»
(Mass Medïauras. Form, Technic, Media. California: Stanford UP, 1996), connects this
phenomenon intimately with Heidegger’s essay, «The Age of the World Picture» by
discussing how the aura returns even in the age of televisual reproduction as the irreducible
appearance of setf-detachment: « The aura would then be something like an enabling limit, the
ernanation of an object from which it removes itself a frarne falling away ftom its picture and
in its fali, in its Verfait, becoming light : a bright shadow» p.8$.
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the “present” in winch the photograph was taken may re-appear as materiaily
coterminous with the future moment of the gaze of the photograph, relaying two
historical moments in the passage of light’8. Benjamin daims that photography does
more than fix and arrest historical movement; instead it reconfigures the conditions of
the appearance of tins movement by “finding the indiscernible place in the condition of
that long past instant where the future is nesting.” Neither the iconic characteristics of
the photographie image, nor its indexical quality is quite as interesting as the interval of
time marked by the exposure of the image. In this sense, photography, however much
it is marked as a mechanicai reproduction by an frrecoverable, aurai, ghostly “falling
away,” however much it is constituted by a kind of indexical death mask, however
much its photo-chemicai traces inscribe the experience of melanchoiy and nostalgia in
shadows and light, is more fundamentally a transformer of the temporal conditions of
life than it is a mere witness ofa process ofdeath and decay.
The auragraphy of photography intimates something of tins “correlation and
contact” between life and audio-visual tecimique, or what I have been calling
Tarkovsky’s “haiku-technics,” and I think it is here, on the other side ofthe thoughts of
theoreticians like Bazin, Benjamin, and Barthes, that the questing aller technics must be
pursued. The auragraphy of photography, to borrow Aristotelian ternis, might be best
understood as a kind of physis witbin winch the continuum of mobile relationships
between generation and corruption makes its appearance in the singular and
irreversible processes of lWe winch persist in the photo-chemical traces of light and
shadow, another kind of organic temporal connection between beings is made possible.
The time-lapse and duration of thefr passage is preserved in the processes of the image
as a passage; in its ephemerai appearance and sirigular alteration, it continues to hum as
8 See: Barthes, Roland. La Chambre Claire, p.I26; Stiegler, Bernard. «Mémoires gauches »,
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it passes. Something of the temporal materiality of the appearance of beings lives on,
impresses itself in the medium, in order to continue making connections with the living.
Borrowing Ovid’s more poetic ternis, the human contact with nature in the technique of
writing light (photo-graphy) undergoes a metamorphosis.
Recapitulation
How might this metamorphosis be qualified? We began this chapter by discussing the
way in which haiku-technics challenges the rational organization of modem knowledge.
We explained how the materiality of the photographic and cinematographic image
defies or resists its placement within the substrate of the subject-centered epistemology
of representation. By loosening the strict adherence between the image-appearance and
its linguistic referent or symbolic signil’ing function, we have opened up the possibffity
of inquiring into the reproducible image as medium/milieu for the experience of a
different relationship to language and to the grounds ofknowledge. The medium ofthe
reproducible image opens a relationship that haits, suspends, and negates the
transcendental aspiration to the fuflness of being and meaning. Emptying this
aspiration, the reproducible image, caffing attention to the way it indexes the organic
and singular breath of life in the medium of its inscription, moves alongside the
immanent eventfulness ofthe adventure oflanguage.
The relationship opened by the medium of the cinematographic image has a
temporal materiality worth qualifying in ternis of the theory of rhythm. In the next
chapter, I will be concemed with articulathig a critical and exploratory theory of
rhythm in the medium of film it is at once a critique of the metaphysical conception
and exposition of time and a critical discourse-analysis of some of the semiotic
linguistic paradigms and narrative and cognitive approaches to the signil’ing practices
of film. In the wake of these conceptions and approaches, it extends the constellation
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of Aristotelian conceptions (techné, physis, poesis) as they link this medium-theory of
rhytbm to the dimension of ethics and politics.
Chapter 3: Rhythm and Fiim-Life
Rhythm and flic Wriften Language of Reality
The critique of the Hegelian conception of knowledge begins on the premise that there
is no identity equation between knowing and being without the intervention of a third
term that mediates between them; this is also a critique of the transcendence of ideas
because it suggests that there is no immediate instance of inteffigence thinldng itself
V.N Voloshinov and M. Bakhtine, in Marxism and the PhiÏosophy ofLanguage, argue
that “consciousness itself can arise and become a viable fact only in the material
embodiment of signs.” There is no such thing as thinldng in any immediate sense but
only a kind ofthinldng-through, a thinking through images, concepts and signs, and this
thinking takes place in time. The medium of filin offers several possibffities for
thinking with audio-visual technique, and the materiality of film may itself be described
as a “semiotics of action.” As Pier Paolo Pasolini has forceffilly argued in Hereticat
Empiricism, the cinema constitutes a written language ofrealîty in images and sounds.
Pasolini clearly indicates that he does flot mean to suggest that audio-visual
technique is some kind of primitive language, nor a written or spoken language
comparable to what is common to Italian and Bantou. Instead, he suggests that audio
visual technique introduces a different kind of language altogether, a language which
for ail of its international and universal character is incomparable to other languages
and language systems. for Pasolini, audio-visual technique is a language that, in its
material contact with the reality of the living world, expresses the becoming of objects
in their movement; a language in winch the images and sounds of objects have become
integral to that which presents them, a moving picture that does flot “stand for” things
but conducts thefr very material action or agency. Cinema, winch according to Pasolini
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is more appropriately identffied with audio-visual technique, is on the side of existence
and pragmatic action because it is made by the acting of the living; in this, it reveals
what he cails the “written manifestation of a natural, total language, which is the acting
of reality” (1988; 205). In his quasi-tautological words, the cinema “expresses reality
with reality”; the objects, colors, faces, rhythms of the material world with winch it
deals are inseparable from the cinematographic image. Tins material dimension of
film, the irreducible persistence of the historical present, is ofien compared by Pasolini
to the way a kind of orality persists in written language; a relationship to language that
is neyer completely eliminated with the advent of literacy and the movable type of the
printing press; a relationship, finally, that contaminates the “literate” pretension to a
stable, certain, and transparent form of historical knowledge founded upon the modem
concept of representation. Just as orality contaminates literacy, so too material reality
intervenes in the medium of film and radically cails into question the conditions for
writing history and representing the historical event in the medium of film’.
Gifies Deleuze returns to the semiotic/semiological tradition behind tins argument
concerning the written language of reality in the cinema (Eisenstein, Pasolini, Metz,
Hjemslev and Jakobson). However, Deleuze does tins flot in order to discuss the
economy of orality in audio-visual technique but rather with the purpose of showing
how the process of signification (semiosis) is itseif grounded and conditioned to work
with the kind of plastic signaletic material inscribed in the movement-image of film.
Ces composés de l’image-mouvement, du double point de vue de la
spécification et de la différentiation, constituent une matière signalétique qui
comporte des traits de modulation de toute sorte, sensoriels (visuels et sonores),
kinésiques, intensifs, affectil, rythmiques, tonaux, et même verbaux (oraux et
I will return to this argument in Part II. For a more thorough treatment of the
epistemologicat implications of this comparison in Pasolini’s films and critical writings, see
the following works by Silvestra Mariniello: «Oralità e scrittura nella linguistica
pasoliniana ». Eutopias, 15, 1993. Valencia; Pier-Paoto Pasolini. Madrid: Catedra, 1997;
<(Techniques audiovisuelles et réécriture de l’histoire. De la représentation à la production du
temps au cinéma >. CINéMAS, automne, vol. 5, n.l-2, 1994.
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écrits). Eisenstein les comparait d’abord à des idéogrammes, puis, plus
profondément, au monologue intérieur comme proto-langage ou langue
primitive. Mais, même avec ses éléments verbaux, ce n’est pas une langue ni un
langage. C’est une masse plastique, une matière a-signifiante et a-syntaxique,
une matière non linguistiquement formée, bien qu’elle ne soit pas amorphe et
soit formée sémiotiquement, esthétiquement et pragmatiquement.( 1985; 43-44)
for Deleuze this means ultimately that the images and sounds in film do flot exist as do
the utterances of language, for they have not been organized yet to signify; they are the
material potential of utterances (l’énonçable) insofar as they are a kind of non-linguistic
matter in reaction to winch language exists. This is why, for Deleuze, the filmic
utterance and instance of narration, while founded in the cinematographic image, is not
given by the image but rather by the reaction resulting from the transformation of non
linguistic material and language itself
Deleuze is interested in this transforming encounter between the phenomenal
materiality of the world and the agency of cinematography insofar as tins encounter
challenges or escapes the figurai power of language, something very similar to haiku
technics. Tins explains also why the Metzian model of “discursive” signification is
rejected in favor of the idea of “material agency” of the thought-machine of cinema.
The cinematographic image is at odds with its systematic insertion in a structural order
of discourse; in its materiality or “matière signalétique”, the cinematographic image is
flmdamentally opposed to being reduced to a linguistic code, or that winch produces
discursive units (paradigms and syntagmes) in various discursive modes (narrative,
descriptive, poetic, or reflexive). As Marion froger has suggested in reference to tins
opposition in Deleuze’s semiotic thinldng, «les images sont moins la représentation des
choses que leur précipitation dans une solution où entrent toutes les composantes de
l’image» (2000; 16). These quasi-chemical terms suggest a way of investigating the
relationship between the cinematographic image and the act of thinking outside of an
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analysis which categorically pretends to describe the co-incidence of thinking
operations with discursive enunciations and logical deductions (froger, 2000; 18).
Indeed, these terms would seem to offer another way to explore film as a medium of
contact in wbich the material becoming or agency of the world, unaffected by the
operations of discourse, transforms the conditions for tbinking and experience in the
inflnitely reproducible phenomenal presences of sound, light, color, and rhythm, etc.
For Deleuze, the materiality of film ultimately bas the power to restore and to invent
certain modes of thinldng and belief in the world winch are unattainable by discourse.
Ibis is not merely to see in the cinema a way of recovering a lost. because unpracticed,
form of faith or cognition. In the words ofBonitzer and Narboni, it has more to do with
that power or potential in the cinema to bring about an embodied form of knowing:
“[...] rendre le discours au corps et , pour cela, atteindre le corps avant les discours,
avant les mots, avant que les choses soient nommées» (Bonitzer et Narboni, p.3$).
Ibis is also the power of haiku-technics, the way that film brings us back into the
world, flot through the spatio-temporal structure of linguistic presupposition in which
everything--including language itself--is objectffied into discursive units, but into the
very utterable potential of language, in reaction to the material of winch we exist as
thinldng beings.
If thinldng can arise only in the materiality of a medium, then we are entitled to ask:
what is the orgarizing principle of the medium of film? According to Tarkovsky, the
fundamental principle of the medium of film is rhythm; the capacity of film to take an
impression of time. Rhythm is flot understood merely as one compoflent among others
in the signaletic materiality of the motion picture. While related to motion, rhythm is
irreducible to that winch moves in the motion-picture since rhythm makes time visible
by suspending sensori-motor action. Nor can rhythm be said to be determined
exclusivcly by the innovations in the techniques of the cinematic apparatus (lighting,
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sound, color) to which it belongs historicaÏly. According to Tarkovsky, the rhythmic
principle of the time-based medium of film became evident in even the earliest of films,
the day Auguste Lumière projected L ‘arrivée d’un train en gare de La Ciotat. In other
words, Tarkovsky would probably agree with Deleuze that the rhythmic principle of the
film medium, its capactity to take an impression of time, is the phantom that has aiways
haunted the cinema from its inception, it only took a special kind of critical modem
cinema to give a bodyto this phantom.
According to Pasolini, however, the critical practice of modem cinema gave a body
to the written impression of reality. Can Tarkovsky’s conception of rhythm be
recondiled with Pasolini’s conception of the written language of reality ? In other
words, is rhythm the written language of reality ? This question begs many others
conceming the nature of time, language, and action as they are revealed by audio-visual
technique. The following sections on rhythm wffl set out the terrain for such a
questioning. An initial comparison would suggest that Pasolini’s conception lends
itseffto Tarkovsky’s insights since the idea of “the written language ofreality” must be
qualified in temporal terms; the “writing” is itseff aiways afready an “impression of
time,” taking place, passing, and enduring in the historical present of its impression; the
materiality of this temporal impression, its trace, dynamic flow and organic breath,
could then be said to be its rhythm. Similarly, Tarkovsky qualifies his idea of rhythm
in very material terms:
For the flrst time in the history of the arts, in the history of culture, man found
the means to take an impression of time. And simultaneously the possibffity of
reproducing that time on screen as often as he wanted, to repeat it and go back to
it. He acquired a matrix for actuat time. Once seen ami recorded, time could
now be preserved in metal boxes over long period (theoretically forever).
(19$6;62)
This idea echoes and reliiforces Pasolini’s ideas concerning the revolutionary potential
of film as that winch ushers in a new form of historical consciousness: the matrix for
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recording, reproducing, stocking, preserving, experiencing and repeating actual time on
the screen introduces another way ofbeing historical.
In retrospect, the modernity of Tarkovsky’s cinema might be qualified as a critical
revalorization of this rhythmic principle, a principle which was discarded, suppressed,
or lost in the commercial development of the film industry during the decades
following Lumière’s experiments. for the filin industry, with its “philistine interest”
and orientation towards “profit”, its systematic devotion to adapting world literature
and theater to the screen, subjected the medium of cinematography flot only to a fatal
subservience to the commercial market of entertahiment and the “society of the
spectacle” but also to the hegemony of earlier technologies of literacy as they were
institutionalized and practiced. However, in Tarkovsky’s words, the worst was flot the
reduction of cinema to the ifiustration of a literary culture in a commercial world but
the fhilure to notice the possibffity of exploiting its real potential as a medium for the
material inscription of time, its potential for experimenting with duration and for
offering us, through ils affects and effects, other worlds of temporal experience. Ibis is
close to Jean Louis $chefer’s suggestive words:
Le cinéma est une machine a varier des affects expérimentaux, c’est-à-dire
essentiellement à nous faire éprouver en l’absence d’objets des effets de durée
comme telle: celle du suspens d’action. Il y emploie tous les moyen techniques
par lesquels il expérimente des hypothèses ou des formes de narration:
montages, fondus enchaînés, accélérations, cadres, gros plans
intercalés.. .L’expérimentation sur le temps est ainsi l’objet du cinéma: à elle
seule elle constitue une altération du monde. Le cinéma ne peut que produire (il
l’a su dès son début) des diversifications de mondes et d’univers. (1997; $4-$5)
Iarkovsky qualifies tins experimentation with time on a material level as “ the
possibility of printing on celluloid the actuality of time” (1986; 63). What does tins
actuality mean ? Tarkovsky also refers to its “factuality”. The material nature of tins
actuality and factuality becomes clearer when he compares the impression of time in
cinema to its expression in music. Time is central to the expression and performance of
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music, its “life force is materialized” at the same moment that its harmonic nature is
expressed in a series of contrapuntal moments. By contrast, “the virtue of cinema is
that it appropriates time, complete with that material reality to winch it is indissolubly
bound, and winch surrounds us day by day. Time printed in its factual forms and
manjfestations (1986; 63). Time, together with material reality, is printed as it makes
its appearance in motion-pictures of film: these tbree terms describe the temporal
ontology and phenomenology of the cinematographic image and constitute the principle
of rhythm. If this principle of rhythm is present in ail of its “sigrialetic materiailty” as a
plastic mass, a non-signifying and a-syntaxical material to borrow Deleuze’s words, a
material winch is flot formed linguisticaily, we must wonder whether, to what extent,
and for what purpose, language and discourse must constantly transform it? And does
rhythm, and with it—life, corne out unaffected by this operation ? Or must the
investigation of rhythm aiways be circumscribed witbin the ontology and epistemology
of linguistics in a way similar to that by winch the principles of editing, montage, and
screen-story have been traditionaily studied?
Rhythm as a Critique ofthe Subject
Tarkovsky has a different relationship to cinematography as audio-visual technique
since the director is thought of as a kind of coilector assembling time. At the same
time, he aestheticizes his discoveries and the director is flnaily seen as a kind of
“scuiptor” carving bis owri sense of rhythmic design and developing an artistic author
like signature. Tins moral-aesthetic discourse of Modernity saves him from pushing bis
questions of time ftirther into a theory of mediation or a critique of the subject-centered
epistemology of representation, a subject that sets or frames the world as object under
its ground. In this sense, bis insights must be read “against the grain” of bis modem
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moral-aesthetic discourse of art2 because bis observations of rhythm are suggestive of
such a critique. for example, Tarkovsky discusses how the director in the assembly
editing process must be attentive to the inner necessity and the organic relationship
binding the time frames together. He ofien speaks of the time-frames in terms of water
pressures running through the sequences of images from “brook, spat, waterfall, ocean”
the director would become essentially this—one who directs thne-pressures like water
fiows, one who feeds and joins them.
Although Tarkovsky speaks as if this director were an artist-author-architect
attentive to carving out an individual sense of rhythmic design, bis metaphors more
ofien than not betray the editorial figure as something more like a engineer or plumber
capable of blocking, damming, ifitering, elbowing, and accelerating the fiows of time
afready inherently fiowing out of and into shots. The temporal fabric of the world is
prior to montage and materialiy transforms the place of the subject. The « director» is
flot an arcbitect-genius who, on the editing table, re-creates the world in bis image
tbrough the clips and collisions of images; rather he is one who, in «directing» the
pipelines of time pressures that inhere in shots like water fiows, becomes fiuid and
continuous with the temporal materiality of a world cooperatively creative and dynamic
(1986;l 13-1 15). Editing is guided by the successfiil fitting or assembly of time
pressures and time-intensities imprinted in the frame, yet “one cannot, for instance, put
actual time together with conceptual time, any more than one can put water pipes of
different diameter” (1986; 117).
Nowhere is tins clearer than in Tarkovsky’s own experience of the prodigious
amount of work that went into editing Mirror, for winch there were over twenty
2 While I am suggesting that Tarkovsky’s writings are flot necessarily self-consistent I am flot
proposing a deconstructive reading of the cancellations and interruptions of his thinking. It is
enough to make a broad discursive analysis which indicates the directions which his thinking
takes.
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variants of the final film: “I don’t just mean changes in the order of certain shots, but
major alterations in the actual structure, in the sequence of the episodes” (19$6;1 16).
Realizing that the film did flot “hold together” by some kind of “limer necessity,” at
thnes revising scenes altogether, adding sequences, doubling narrative structures and
the roles of actors/actresses, at other times wondering how to work documentary
fragments into the network of autobiographical instances and lyric memories without
disturbing the distinctive time nmning through the shots and between the shots,
Tarkovsky writes about the desperate efforts of mounting the shots, piecing together
anatomical structures from different temporalities and attempting to fuse them with
some current oflife.
And then, one fine day, when we somehow managed to devise one last desperate
rearrangement—there was the film. The material came to life; the parts started
to function reciprocally, as if linked by a bloodstream; and the last despairing
attempt was projected onto the screen, the film was born before our very
eyes.. . Time itself nmning through the shots, had met and linked together
(1986; 116-1 17).
Witnessing the emergence of the film Mirror, its birth through the plastic circulations
of over two-hundred shots, Tarkovsky takes a decidedly different position on what it
means to direct as director, one very much outside ofEisenstein’s dialectic conception.
Tarkovsky has been notorious for setting himseif and his films over against the
glory and fame of Eisenstein3. for the purposes of argument, this opposition may be
Even when Tarkovsky acknowledges the revolutïonary pathos of Eisenstein’s films and his
respect for cultural traditions and their continuity, as in the following excerpt of an interview
this interview, he stili admits that Eisenstein “didn’t absorb it, in his heart, he was over
intellectuaiised, he was a terrible rationalist, cold, calculated, directed only by reason. He tried
his constructions on paper first. Like a calculator. He drew eveiything. Not that he drew film
frames but that he would think eveiything over and then he’d cram it ail inside the ftame. He
didn’t draw ftom life, life didn’t influence him in any way. What influenced him was ideas
which he constructed, transformed into some form, as a rule completely lifeless, rigid as iron,
very formai, dry, devoid of any feeling. Film form, its formai features, photography, light,
atmosphere — none of it existed for him at ail, it alt had this thought-out character, whether
some quotes from paintings or other contrived compositions. This was in a sense a typical
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explored, outside of the battie of directors and even outside of a particular comparison
of their films, as a distinction related to a critique of the modem subject. Briefly stated,
Eisenstein’s dialectic director is one who organizes actions and reactions into a scheme
of conflicts, oppositions and final resolutions, the movement of winch derives from a
kind of ideology of wifl, a belief that one can infinitely master and extend mastery over
environments, actions and opponents. The cinema is henceforth an instrument in the
service of a “subject” in order to reveal a “world” afready deflned and given (“The
People”, “Reason”, “History”). This scheme of composition supposes a kind of
Hegelian conception of knowledge in winch image, world, and viewer may be
identffied and fused harmoniously in a total image of Truth. Montage and its open
spiral of commensurabifities and attractions, would be that principle empowering a
director to subject the world and its continuous movement in the motion picture to the
workings of a instrumental and calculating relationship to language, a relationsinp that
co-ordinates the operations of seeing, saying, and being; tins relationship may be
named logical because it supposes that the cinematographic image corroborates a
rational order underlying words and things; grammatical because it treats the
materiality of the image as secondary to its insertion into and comprehension by a
linguistic and systematic ordering of elements; and dialectical because it builds, out of a
logical and grammatical treatment ofthe image, a series of totalizing propositions.
Tarkovsky’s practice of audio-visual technique may be seen as “modem” precisely
because it constitutes a critique of tins more “classical” or “dialectical” regime of
knowledge and truth. Tarkovsky’s theory and practice suggests a distinct
transformation in epistemology, a form of knowing through audio-visual technique that
concept of synthetïc cinema, where cinema appeared as a union of graphic arts, painting,
theatre, music, and everything else — except cinema as such wasn’t there. As if the sum of ail
these parts were to resuit in this new art. (Stockholm, March 1985)
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is very much outside of Eisenstein’s theoretical models and adaptations of scientific
positivism, behavioral psychology, and dialectical history. for Tarkovsky, to know is
flot to assume some immediate self.identical relationship to oneself confirming the
division of the world as an object to be brought before a knowing subject, nor does
knowing involve some relationship to ideals and abstractions outside of the world in the
beliefthat the world is an imperfect copy, fallen from a higher order oflruth.
b know is instead to place oneseif in the heart of the life-world, to be a part of a
continuum of existence capable of touching and transforming us in retum. In his
words, “Our knowledge is like sweat, or fumes, it’s a fimction of the organism
inseparable from existence, and has nothing whatever to do with Truth” (1994, p.2$4).
Ibis constitutes Tarkovsky’s principal attack of “intellecftal montage cinema”, because
it is entirely preoccupied with presenting the audience with symbols, puzzles and
riddles, canceling the fllm’s capacity to continue beyond the edges of the screen; the
film is only a kind of screen around a secret to be deciphered and neyer a material
membrane of contact which inspires, respires and aspires-- allowing beings to breathe4.
Such a conception of knowledge does flot necessarily preclude or militate against the
possibffity of thinldng about the revelation of the tmknown and the invisible; yet in the
image the purview of the unknown and the invisible can only be explored at the limits
of the visible and the known, just as the swaying leaves of the trees disclose the
presence of the wind. Audio-visual technique opens another form of knowing the
world, one that is internal to its very organic breathing, its inscrutable opacity, and its
endless openness.
In defense of his critique of Eisenstein, Tarkovsky gives the example of the famous
scene of the battie on the ice in Alexander Nevsky, a sequence in the film which ignores
4lhis may be inferred from Tarkovsky’s remarks (1986, 118), but the idea of the screen as a
“membrane of contact and transformation” I owe to the work ofLaura U. Marks (2000).
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the need to liii the shots with “appropriate time-pressures” but instead attempts to
achieve the limer dynamic of the battie with “excessively short shots”; these shots give
the impression of being “sluggish and unnatural” or “static and insipid” because the
“precipitate” style or ‘îalse and strident” editing itseff bears no relationship to the rime
processes within the shots (1986; 119-120). Tarkovsky critiques this systematic lack of
attention to the rhythmic properties of the medium. This is flot merely a question of the
film poetics and stylistics regarding the representation of the event. Tarkovsky must
radically challenge the role, the work, and the place of director as the subject
traditionally deflned in the institution of film studies: for to direct film is flot to direct
the discourse of representation but to be directed by a force outside of this organization
of shots and locutions.
The work of montage has less to do with building meaning than with allowing
things to breathe, being more concemed with the “pneumas” than with the “logos”.
Here the cinema is flot an instrument in the service of a subject to reveal a pre-given
and rational order of the world that the image would “identify” and “repeat” but a
dynamic medium of material contact with a world that resists its rational and linguistic
given-ness, a world that escapes linguistic identification ahogether. This form of
knowing has a radically temporal character, and audio-visual technique, by blurring and
dissolving the distinction between the phenomenal temporality of the world and the
noumenal temporality of thought, holds out the possibifity of putting thought in touch
with something else, the virtual properties of the world : the “not-yet”, the “open”, the
“unthought”, and the “other”5.
Tins does flot mean that thought is abstracted from the material contact with the
world for it is aiways linked to its very organic processes as they unfold in what
Tarkovsky calis the “inner necessity” and “endogenous development” of rhythm.
These terms wiIl receive a fuller treatment in the course ofmy argument.
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“Rhythm. then is flot the metrical sequence of pieces; what makes it is the time-thrust
within the frames” (Tarkovsky, 1 9$6; 119). Once again Tarkovsky compares this
rhytbm to the force oflife ïtseffi
Rhythm in cinema is conveyed by the life of the object visibly recorded in the
frame. Just as from the quivering of a reed you can teil what sort of current,
what pressure there is in a river, in the same way we know the movement of
time from the flow ofthe life-process reproduced in the shot. (1986; 120)
The analogy is suggestive: cinematography, insofar as it indexes this living and moving
being, conducts and makes visible the passing of time. More, the image-trace of tins
life-process also irresistibly suggests the pressure of the current undemeath the
quivering reed. Despite the regularity of the moving picture of cinematography itseW
24 frames per second, the recorded pressures of time are irreducible to a common
measure but contain a unique inscription ofduration, ofpassing and flow.
Tins explains why Tarkovksy’s opposition of editing to rhythm is flot simply a
formalist concem: “Editing entails assembling smaller and larger pieces, each of winch
carnes a different time. . . Editing does flot engender, or recreate, a new quality” (I 9$6;
119). Strikingly enough, Tarkovsky would flot do away with film editing altogether but
only Eisenstein’s conception of it. In Tarkovsky’s words, “Editing brings out a quality
afready inherent in the frames it joins. Md their assembly creates a new awareness of
that time, emerging as a resuit ofthe intervais, ofwhat is cut, carved out in the process”
(1986; 119). Or again, “Assembly, editing, disturbs the passage of time, interrupts it
and simultaneously gives it something new. The distortion of time can be a means of
giving it rhytbmical expression. Scuipting in lime!” (1986; 121).
Editing is flot a primary principle of creation and engendering but an intermediary
principie of assembly; editing is a bringing-about, a harboring-forth of time as it is
made perceptible through technique; and insofar as it generates a new awareness of
time it is as much concerned with what is omitted in the intentais between shots as it is
94
with what inheres in and flows through shots themselves. In other words, editing
belongs to the Heideggerian constellation of concepts of technics, poesis and phusis.
Editing does flot produce and assign meaning, nor order the orderable, nor reduce the
temporal passing of the world to reporting itseff as that winch progresses dialectically.
In its attention to the dynamic properties of film as a “maldng” of thresholds of
perception, as a “working-in” the foins and the intervals of time, and as a “bringing
about” of new temporal relationships, editing allows time to emerge outside an
instrumental relationship to language.
The rhetorical pressure of being placed before the passing of time in the suspended
time-images of film, takes us outside of the logical and grammatical predication of time
as movement and action. Indeed, Tarkovsky’s critique of Eisenstein might be described
in these traditional terms of the trivium. The subordination of the logical-grammatical
treatment of the time frame in Iàvor of the rhetorical figuration of time shows how the
cinematographic image transforms the modem subject’s relationship to language. The
image oftime as a force or a pressure, unconcemed with producing meaning or logical
sequence, produces the presence of pure passage; “passage” because we are “being
placed before” the force of time passing continuously in the ephemerality of its process
ofpassing. The presence of tins process, according to Wlad Godzich, shows us how we
are “in the midst of a pre-logical affirmation of the world” because the world, in the
magical material repetition of the image, “[...]speaks itself in its own terms. Such a
world is a world deflned without us, a world altogether other, with co-ordinates that do
not cornes from us, a world in winch time is flot our time [...J” (1993; p.19).
In tins sense, by subordinating the montage and movement of shot elements to the
more original inner rhythm of the image within the shot, Tarkovsky’s cinema allows
the pre-logical and a-grammatical forces of time to upset the logical-grammatical
dialectical treatment of the image. It remains to be seen to what extent these forces
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resist or exceed rhetorical figuration. Aller ail, the rhythmic speeds, currents and
pressures allow Tarkovsky to speak of a more “authentic”, “dynamic”, “necessary” and
“appropriate” figuration of time, one intimately related to the “truthffilness” and
“infinity” ofthe cinematographic image.
How does time make itself feit in the shot ? It becomes tangible when you sense
something significant, truthful, going on beyond the events on the screen; when
you realize, quite consciously, that what you see in the frame is flot limited to its
visual depiction, but is a pointer to something stretching out beyond the frame
and to infinity; a pointer to life. Like the infinity of the image... a film is aiways
bigger than it is—at least, if it is a real film. Just as life, constantly moving and
changing, allows everyone to interpret and feel each separate moment in his own
way, so too a real picture, faithffiily recording on film the time winch flows on
beyond ffie edges of the frame, lives within time if time lives within it; tins two
way process is a determining factor of cinema. (1986; 118)
To assert that the cinematographic image lives in time only if time lives within it is to
consider film as an organic medium where a genesis in the temporal phenomena of life
“takes place” as these phenomena make thefr appearance and move, live and “persist”
in the presence of their materiality (bodies, colors, gestures, rhythms, etc.). As film
indexes the traces of life, it simultaneously allows things to breathe in time and time to
breathe into things. It would seem that this “truthfiil” or “faithfiil” figuration of time is
neyer bounded by the visibffity of the frame because its passing presence and material
tangibffity in the flnished and edited roil of film is neyer itseif entirely objectified and
flxed but only crystallized to continue itself as an infinite dynamic process, one that
might link itself to the multiple layers of other temporalities in the shots and sequences
ofthe film itseif, or even in the memories and experiences ofspectators.
Breathing in Time: The Aristotelian Critique of Kant
A brief segue in to the philosophical question of time and its relationship to experience
is in order at tins point, even though it must be somewhat reductive and necessarily
brïef. I would like to begin by discussing the classic opposition between Aristotie and
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Kant, an ôpposition which has recently received attention in the work of Sylvian
Agacisnld’s reflections, Le Passeur du temps: modernité et nostalgie (2000).
The fundamental question to be asked in tins opposition of minds is the
following: can time be thought or conceived if experience is neutralized ? For Kant,
time is a concept impossible to derive from experience because it is a necessary
condition for the possibility of the taking-place and the organizing of experience
itseif—it belongs necessarily to the subject as a formai category of receptivity and flot
to objects nor to their inherent movements. Time is that winch can be abstracted from
the observation of phenomena and defines a priori the formai capabilities of the
sensibility6.
Kant sends time into a pure category of the interiority of the subject as if time
could exist without the experience of movement or repetition. 0f course, things get a
littie complicated because tins a priori form of tùne can flot be immediateiy known by
the intelligence of the subject uniess the sensibility exerts itseif and discloses tins
category to itseif in the midst of an experience. As Agacinski bas noted, it is far from
certain if the a priori category of time is flot itseif a secondary operation a posteriori to
experience itseif—a category winch is abstracted from the duration of experience and
the movement of the things of the world in order to make room for a transcendental
foundation ofthe subject (2000, 45).
Indeed, tins abstraction even exciudes the possibffity of thinking about tbought
itseif as a temporal activity, one that must necessarily aiternate with experience and the
memory of experience and thus introduce a kind of alterity hito itseffi The greatest
probiem with tins abstraction from experience then becomes the impossibility of re
thinking or questioning the very artificial and conventional forms of time winch
6 These remarks, as well as those that follow, are a synthetic reading of the daims made in “The
Metaphysical Exposition ofthe Concept ofTime” in Critique ofPure Reason, 1965, 74-91.
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mediate an.d even precede our experience of time’s passing. It may be argued that the
technologies of Kant’s Newtonian age, which ordered phenomena according the
reversible processes of the succession and simultaneity of events, indicate that even the
philo sopher’s apprehension of time was aiways already mediated or contaminated by
the mechanical clock-work technologies that made time visible and measurable so that
it might be organized in turn by social conventions and then abstracted by
transcendental-metaphysical and political propositions.
What is at stake in the Kantian abstraction of time from experience ? On an
ethical and political level, this pure kind of formalism precludes the possibffity of a
transforming experience for subjectivity. The subject applies the law of perception or
even of action—a law given outside of ail experience—to the given data of experience,
leaving the subject an essential form of mastery over ail possible experiences,
experiences winch could not ffindamentaily upset, disturb, or transform subjectivity.
To this Kantian conception, Agacinski revalorizes the Aristotelian conception—
as that which is philosophicaily more modem, more fit to understanding our experience
of the transformations brought about by the mediation of reproducible images (2000,
47). Because Aristotle surpasses the philosophical dualism separating the temporal
from the etemal and the intelligible form the sensible, he is able to look at the world of
beings in their becomingness, beings winch are touched by the material contingency
and accidentai eventfulness of the world. Moreover, for ail of the formai hierarchy by
winch the teleological potential of the soul could and should accomplish itseff in an
ideal sense, these beings are flot placed in an ideal world in their becomingness; they
are necessarily separated from the possibility of tins formal accomplishment of
generation or corruption by the form oftime itself
What then is time? Aristotie, in the Physics, inscribes the possibility of time in
the point of interference between the movement of the world and the counting soul—
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between the objective worlds of becoming things and the subjective world of the
observer or witness—time being the possibffity of the experience of movement between
the witness and the movement7. In this sense, time would be neither a pure origin nor a
pure interiority that could be separated from the empirical life that structures and
composes it. Movement and time entertain a reciprocal reiationship, the one measuring
the other. The order of succession and duration cannot be measured outside of
experience because they condition the proportions, the regular rhythms or cycles by
which things succeed one another or enter into some kind of the regular retum of
movement.
The most fundamental rhythm or beating of this movement, Agacinski asks, is it
flot that of the breath of life itseff (2000. 53) ? Breathing, in this sense, would be
accordingly be an exemplary experience which permits things to take thefr breath, and
to sense the perceptible beatings of their own bodies, to bring to their consciousness an
occasion to reflect UPOfl their own temporalities. It would occasion a perception and a
consciousness which couid flot be transcended or abstracted but which must
continuously be repeated in order to exchange with the outside the air winch circulates
and alternates with the inside. If time passes ifice breath, then it would flot be given to a
transcendental form of consciousness like an empty and homogeneous formai category
of succession but would belong to the most fimdamental biological-physical
experience ofgeneration and corruption.
In the historical perspective of the development of group formations and
temporal arrangements, this biotic experience or rhythm gradually lent itself to a
‘ The general outiines of Aristotle’s conception of time, experience, and movement may be
surmised in Section 10, Bock 1V ofthe Physics.
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cosmic forrn of reckoning in the form of astronomical calendars8. This allowed for a
kind of conventional periodicity or cycle of days, and traces and markers were
developed in this order of repeated experience. However, the development of a
chronometric art or science using traces and markers should flot be construed as a
fetishization of a time that would exists elsewhere, outside of experience. This
chronometric operation ailowed time to be configured on a calendar, for example, to
make visible the hidden astronomical and social rhythms of time, to commemorate
important bfrths and deaths, and to mark out the possibifities of actions and events for
the anticipated phases ofexperience in the future.
Aristotie is careffil to show that the experience of movement makes time
visible—because time also shows the commensurable difference between periodic
movements; therefore, time must not be construed to be identical to movement, as the
figure of a circle might suggest. The experience of time can only reafly be finally
distinguished from movement because these movements are, for ail of thefr regularity,
entirely singular. This singularity indicates a relationship of irreversibility winch is
fiindamental to the experience of time because it belongs to the principles of generation
and corruption.
It may become clear why the Aristotelian view of temporality needs to be
revalorized in tins context: because it shows how temporal experience is organized by
technics, it forces us to reconsider a theory of the subject in winch the subjectivity is
constituted by the empirical passage and passing experience of images of time. As I
argued at the end of Chapter 1, tins experience of passage may be imagined in the
figure of the time-passer: the one who bas lost an absolute horizon of temporality in
order to pass into multiple and heterogeneous temporalities, the witness and the
8 As Jeremy Rifkin has pointed oui, the shift in ernphasis was a consequence of the
metamorphosis of human societies from the nomadic existence of hunter-gatherer economies to
more sedeniary agricultural forms of existence (1987, 84).
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ferryman who becomes the point of passage of the alterations and velocities of images
that trace and render visible the passing of time. In the experience of the time-passer,
the movement of a negative suspension or emptying is accompanied by an openness
and fullness of attention to the radical alterity and breathing life oftime-images.
Reconfiguring Subjectivity in the lime of the Image
Gilles Deleuze integrates Tarkovsky’s concept of rhythm into bis own system of the
time-image. Deleuze argues that Tarkovsky’s insight regarding the subordination of
montage to temporal duration and rhythm, articulates something of the historical
transition and transformation between two opposing semiotic systems of cinema,
“1’ image-mouvement” and “l’image-temps.” following this division, Tarkovsky’ s
critique of Eisenstein may be inscribed in a more general historical crisis of the
movement-image in postwar cinema; a crisis in which the direct time-image of cinema
cornes to the fore over against the indirect image of time; time no longer being
subordinated to the movement but rather movement, and montage with it, being derived
from a more direct presentation oftime.
These opposing semiotic systems may flot in fact be so rigidly deflned historically
between post-war films and its predecessors but the tendencies in post-war cinema are
sufficiently different from those of classical models of cinema to defend the usefulness
of the opposition in a historical and an extra-historical sense. In the extra-historical
sense of fllm-poetics, I woutd defend the idea that these categories of the time-image
and the movernent-image may even be permeable within the registers of a single film
and even in the frames of a single shot; although the images of a film like Mirror may
belong more emphatically to the model of the time-image, by the subordination of
action and movement to the suspension of time in the image, one might defend the idea
that the time-image and the movement-image alternate and exchange constantly in the
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mobile semiotic powers of the cinematographic image. Something of this mutually
constituting relationship between the movement-image and time-image can even be
discerned in his discussion of Tarkovsky’s ideas concerning the “time-pressures” of the
shots:
Dans un texte de grande portée, Tarkovsky dit que l’essentiel, c’est la manière
dont le temps s’écoule dans le plan, sa tension ou sa raréfaction, « la pression du
temps dans le plan ». Il a l’air de s’inscrire ainsi dans l’alternative classique,
plan ou montage, et d’opter vigoureusement pour le plan (« la figure
cinématographique n’existe qu’à l’intérieur du plan »). Mais ce n’est qu’une
apparence, puisque la force ou la pression du temps sort des limites du plan, et
que le montage opère et vit dans le temps. Ce que Tarkovsky refuse, c’est que le
cinéma soit comme un langage opérant avec des unités même de différents
ordres: le montage n’est pas une unité d’ordre supérieur qui s’exercerait sur les
unités-plans, et qui donnerait aux images-mouvement comme le temps comme
qualité nouvelle. L’image-mouvement peut être parfaite, elle reste amorphe,
indifférente et statique si elle n’est déjà pénétrée par les injections de temps qui
mettent le montage en elle, et altèrent le mouvement» (1985 ; 60).
In this sense, montage no longer fiinctions according to the sensori-motor scheme of
actions and movement but becomes a “montrage” or that winch shows or presents the
very suspension of action and movement, and winch, in the play of speeds and
durations of film, bodies forth a pure optical and aurai perception of time. Neither the
shot nor montage have been overcome but both have changed their function, being
more originally encountered and grounded in the rhythmic forces and pressures of the
time-image, as Deleuze remarks:
Le temps dans un plan doit s’écouler indépendamment et, si l’on peut dire, de
son propre chef: c’est seulement à cette condition que le plan déborde l’image-
mouvement, et le montage, la représentation indirect du temps, pour communier
tous deux dans une image-temps directe, l’un déterminant la forme ou plutôt la
force du temps dans l’image, l’autre les rapports de temps ou de forces dans la
succession des images (rapports qui ne se réduisent précisément pas à la
succession, pas plus que l’image ne se réduit au mouvement). (1985 ;60)
Montage and shot do not contain time but instead are overfiowing with the immanent
plane of time’s flowing duration. Neither montage nor shot can be separated distinctiy
from each other in their “montrage.” In Kantian ternis, shot and montage are the formai
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conditions for the possibffity of having a direct perception of the time-image. Each
component determines the force of time integral to the cinematographic image or the
relationships between different forces of time as these images are set in succession, and
these forces, Deleuze explains, are irreducible to movement and succession.
Here I think it may be necessary to make explicit what is only implicit in Deleuze’s
argument: that these irreducible and singular forces reconfigure perception and
experience by allowing time to flow in its becoming, multiplicity, and irrational
intervals: and this direct presentation of the forces of time changes what it means to
think. It should be remembered that Deleuze’s larger philosophical project privileges a
critical perspective of the cinema as a kind of “thought-machine” in winch several
forms of understanding converge to produce cultural strategies for imaging and
imagining the world. In D.N. Rodowick’s words, “the development of cinema provides
a privileged site for comprehending a decisive shifi in the strategies of signification,
understanding, and beief that is no less true for aesthetic thinldng than it is for
philosophical and scientific thinldng. This shifi concerns the question of time” (1997;
5). The time-image and the lime-image practices of postwar cinema reveal the
possibffity of writing a cinematic history of philosophy and a philosophical history of
cinema. For the cinema may be considered “a kind of thought-machine or spiritual
automata that can map the mental cartographies of an epocW’ (1997; 6). Rodowick
remarks that this is close to what it means to picture an era’s image of thought,
something close to picturing, as on a plane of immanence to its concepts, “what it
means to think, to make use of thought, to find one’s bearings in thouglit” as Deleuze
and Guatarri have argued in Qu ‘est-ce que la philosophie?
The full implications of tins vision of the cinema as a thought-machine are outlined
by Réda Bensmaïa in bis discussion of Deleuze’s concept ofthe spiritual automaton:
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Devenue «automate spirituel» (« machine» non-dialectique), le cinéma devra
aussi conquérir une nouvelle force: celle qui en fera un «automate» toujours,
mais cette fois, comme machine a-grammaticale et a-rhétorique. Une machine
qui aura le pouvoir de « [...J porter l’image au point où elle devient déductive et
automatique, [et deJ se substituer aux enchaînements représentatif ou figuratifs
sensori-motors» (Deleuze, 1985, p.226-227) (194, 182)
These forces then fundamentally change what it means to think because they sketch
something of the movement of thought outside of discursive reference by putting it into
contact with an “automatic” power to apprehend the forces oftime, or what I have been
calling the a-grammatical and non-dialectical rhythm of the cinematographic image9.
Not only would this mean that filmmakers like Tarkovsky think through the time
images of cinema as philosophers think-through concepts of time, but also that this
power might begin to show philosophy how another very powerffil form of conceptual
thinldng might be mediated by the time-image. In Marion froger’s suggestive words,
[...J la structure cristalline peut envelopper « les ruptures », «les catastrophes »,
«les bifurcations» par lesquelles passe la pensée et qui lui donnent, si elle sait
les rendre, le pouvoir d’appréhender le temps. L’image-cristal en tant qu’image-
pensante décrira ainsi un mode de manifestation du concept qui se libère du
carcan logico-déductil de l’enchaînement de propositions. Les images
pensantes du cinéma seront des concepts en acte. (2000; 17)
What do we gain by arguing that the crystalline structure of the time-image would be
that which mobilizes a noetic force of thinking that is not predicated by rational
discourse? On the one hand, tins would seem to suggest the possibility of conceiving
the work of thinking outside of its seat in a transcendental subjectivity and those modes
of language in winch tins subjectivity is constituted, a way of conceiving of the
movement and act of tbinking within tins temporal mode of immanence in the world.
Again, I hesitate to qualify this power as a-rhetorical because the figuration of time seems to
be suggested even when discussing the image as a « crystal »; therefore, the effort to theorize
that which escapes figuration cannot itself be a-rhetorical thinking but only a different order
or mode of figuration itself, in this case a crystalline chemical mode over against a linguistic
narrative-discursive mode.
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The crystals of the time-image would liberate thinking insofar as they allow this
immanent subjectivity to travel within several different modes of crystallizing time.
If the crystalline order of the time-image makes these irrational and multiple
intervals of immanent becoming feit and known to the attentive time-passer
(director/spectator), then clearly the inquiry into the nature of time cannot be separated
from a theory of subjectivity; this is also the true meaning and pertinence ofthe concept
“temporality” since it designates the phenomenal experience of time for subjectivity.
Deleuze’s Bergsonian demonstration of the material fabric of duration in film does
indicate a way of thinking-through tins inseparable relationship between time and
subjectivity. The time-image of the cinema shows us that time is itseff neither a pure
exterior substance through winch we move nor something internai to us and winch is
made available for psychological “introspection”. How so ? Briefly stated, the time
image, suspended from dominance of sensori-motor movement and action, is
experienced as a complex intercalation of perception and memory in winch body, mmd,
and nature cannot be so easily opposed; an intercalation in winch the phases oftime co
exist, coalesce, and circulate between virtual and actual states for a subjectivity in a
state of becoming. For the purposes of having a working hypothesis to be tested and
modffied in the course of the question concerning rhythm, I would like to cite
Deleuze’s recovery ofBergson’s definitive distinction oftime:
La seule subjectivité, c’est le temps, le temps non-chronologique saisi dans sa
fondation, et c’est nous qui sommes intérieurs au temps, non l’inverse. Que nous
soyons dans le temps a l’air d’un lieu commun, c’est pourtant le plus haut
paradoxe. Le temps n’est pas l’intérieur en nous, c’est juste le contraire,
l’intériorité dans laquelle nous sommes, nous nous mouvons, vivons, et
changeons. (1985; 110)
While tins conception of time is important for a renewed critique and conception of
subjectivity in the tirne-image of film, clearly the paradox of our foundation in time will
remain enigmatic until the questioning is pushed further in the direction of a
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phenomenal exploration of the temporality of the image. The metaphysical exposition
of the concept of time is less interesting because of its essential abstraction from
experience, as I argued in relation to Kant’s conception. Exploring Tarkovsky’s theory
of rhythm in terms of the pneumatic experience of the time-image, we are in a position
to show how rhythm names the experience of the material passage of time as it is traced
and as it breathes in the medium of filin. In order to articulate the full implications of
tins materialist conception of flimic experience in terms of its “rhythmic temporality,”
we wffl be led in the direction of the Aristotelian constellation of concepts. Before
following tins less-traveled path, however, it might be best to interrogate the
conventional notions and legacies of the rhythmic features and properties of film. Until
we have taken a critical distance from the institutional practice of film studies winch
predetermines many of the ways by winch the constitution of the subject and the
subject’s relationsinp to time is understood, we cannot inquire into the nature of tins
rhythmic temporality ofexperience.
The Legacy ofRhythm as an Aesthetic Principle in Film-Art
We might begin by asking why the idea of rhythm as the organizing principle of the
film medium is oflen avoided, evacuated or ignored by film theorists. Tins question is
enormous and must be confronted in relation to the modem institutionalization of film
studies. As I have suggested, Tarkovsky’s notorious critique of Eisenstein’s theory and
practice of intellectual montage may be understood as a larger epistemological critique
of the modemity of the institution of film studies in general. For the question of the
medium of film, in tins case the principle of its temporal materiality or rhythm, was
evacuated from film theory and practice for political and pedagogical purposes at a
instorical moment when the cinema was being institutionalized as film-art.
106
Indeed, one might undertake to study how the historical precedence for this kind of
thinldng of the organic relationship between time and filin has been systematically
ignored, suppressed, marginalized or tamed in terms of aesthetic and narrative
principles of fllm-form. This is the direction Silvestra Marinielio’s thinldng takes in
relation to her discussion of Pasolini’s film-practice. Mariniello demonstrates that
Pasolini’s ideas regarding the temporal materiality of the film medium lead him to
define the necessity of filming history by analogy rather than by representation. This is
a film-practice in which the coexistence of present and past (modem and pre-modem)
are neyer collapsed but are presented in their radical distance, separation and
difference. Such an analysis indicates how Pasolini’s film practice flnds other
historical echoes in the work ofKuleshov, Vertov, and Bazin:
Le discours de Pasolini sur l’impossibilité pour le cinéma de représenter le
passé, nous le retrouvons chez d’autres metteurs en scène et théoriciens du
cinéma. On pense à Koulechov, qui parlait, lui aussi, de relation organique entre
le cinéma et la vie, et qui disait que les uniformes d’un policier ou d’un officier
tsariste sont absolument anticinématographiques. On pense à Vertov qui parlait
de l’impossibilité de filmer quelque chose qui ne soit pas là, présent. « Je peux
écrire [avec la caméra] simultanément pendant que les événements arrivent. Je
ne peux pas écrire sur la réunion du Komsomol après qu’elle a déjà eu lieu ». On
pense finalement à Bazin, à sa réflexion sur la matérialité «magique» de la
photographie; à son analyse du néoréalisme italien et à son étude de la durée au
cinéma. Ce n’est pas par hasard si l’on retrouve le même type de discours chez
ces auteurs. Il s’agit de gens qui se sont trouvés à opérer à des moments
particuliers de l’histoire du cinéma: d’un côté, le moment où le cinéma se linsait
institutionnaliser en tant qu’art narratif; de l’autre, l’après-guerre, avec la crise
d’un système de valeurs et le début d’un autre système. (1994 ; 45)
The legacy of Tarkovsky’s ideas may be traced in a similar way: the insiglits regarding
the organic rapport between cinema, life, and time were either put aside when he
became one of the grand “auteurs” of contemporary cinema or they were transforrned
into aesthetic principies of film art. Why should tins be so ? I am arguing, in the light
of Tarkovsky’s critique of Eisenstein, that the living temporatity of flim—its rhythm-
lias been disregarded or removed from attention because it hoÏds the power to upset an
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instrumental relationship between life and the subject and, in its plastic temporal
materiality, also radically dispossesses a rational relationship to language. Rather than
being the primary founding principle of the ontology ami phenomenology of the
cinematographic image, rhythm was relegated to a secondary role in relation to
techniques of montage and editing and became an aesthetic principle for achieving
stylistic effects. Rhythm, as an aesthetic principle, instead of opening free-relationships
to the concept of flim-as-life, consolidated the discursive formation of film-as-art; the
traditional philosophical opposition between technics and life was reinforced instead of
being called into question, and the “unruly” or “h-rational” elements encountered in the
film medium were either tamed or ignored. I have indicated that Tarkovsky’s theory is
inscribed in a profound ambivalence because his insights regarding the time-based
medium of film, while affording a potentially powerftii critique of the
institutionalizatïon of cinema studies under the tutelage of art history and aesthetics, are
re-inscribed in terms of aesthetic principles of art. It is as if Tarkovsky’s experience
and experimentation with audio-visual technique surpassed bis abffity to recount the
significance of this experience without faffing back upon traditional categories. Yet bis
reflections on rhythm afford a suggestive critique of the very system he would seem to
have vindicated.
Something of the destiny of tins traditional concept of rhythm, understood as a
formalist aesthetic principle in film-art, may be surmised in the treatment given it by
David Bordwell and Kristin Thompson’s textbook, afready in its seventh edition: film
Art, An Introduction. Briefly stated, Bordwell and Thompson discuss rhythm as a
formai and stylistic property of cinematography, an art-form that can be instrumentally
controlled to shape certain formai expectations in spectators, guiding their attention,
and affecting the inferences they draw in their understanding of narrative events:
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[...]the fiimmaker decides how long the shot will last on the screen. Within the
confines of the shot’s duration, the director can control the rhythm of time as it
unfolds. Although the issue of rhythm in cinema is enormously complex and
stii flot well understood, we can say rouginy that it involves, at least, a beat or a
pulse, a pace (what musicians cafi tempo), and a pattem of accents, or stronger
and weaker beats. ([1979J 1997; 197)
Bordweil and Thompson neyer hint at Tarkovsky’s conception of “scuipting in time”
when they address the theory of rhythm. Very clearly, the “enormous complexity” of
rhythm serves at once to highlight the controiling power of the director-subject as weil
as the integrity of the spectator subject with respect to the self-identity of bis or her
understanding within the formai unfolding of the film in time. In tins instance, rhythm
“roughiy” reaffirms itseif as a subject of interest insofar as it relates to the proliferation
of technical problems and measurabie possibilities (montage, mobile frame, mise-en
scene, and sound) offered by the pulse, pace and accented pattem encountered in the
production ofthe film.
Yet, we may ask, what if rhytbm is more than a formai alteration of beats and
accents, more than a stylistic problem of the continuous or discontinuous metrics of
images and sounds in the apparatus ? Is the technics or goings-on of rhythm, and audio
visual technique generally, something merely technical ? By posing this question, itself
formulated in the light of Heidegger’s profound hypothesis that the essence of technics
is nothing itseif merely technical, we may be in a position to see how the complexity of
rhythm is more fundamentaily a philosophical question conceming the tecimics of time
in winch a modem theory of the subject is articulated, critiqued, and reconfigured.
Rather than being a “formai aiteration of metricai accents for a given subject,” rhythm
would then be something doser to “the invention and organization of subjectivity in
time’°.” This is, afier ail, what is reveaied in Bordwell and Thompson’s disavowal: the
10 wiIl be returning b the implications of this poetic-ethical-politicai formulation in the light
of Henri Meschonnic’s conception of rhythm outside of aesthetics. This criticai gesture
characterizes the discursive critique and invention of ail ofhis later work (1982; 1990; 1995).
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investigatiôn of rhythm, while relegated to technical and formai problems in the study
of film-art, is consistently related to the organization of a stable place for mapping the
essentially univocal structure of the subject. This structure underlies the understanding
of the subject of the film (narrative and plot) while securing the identity of the viewer
(spectator in the face of a mobile screen-stoiy), maintaining the controlling agency and
intentionality of the director (montage, editing effects), and instrumentalizing
cinematography (the apparatus ofthe mobile frame, etc.). How is this done?
In the flrst place, Bordwell and Thompson’s analysis of rhythm as a metrical pulse,
pace, and accented pattem must begin by considering the cinematographic image and
audio-visual technique as a problem of manipulating movement in a discursively
operated frame of action in order to achieve certain effects. b corroborate this view
they retum in several chapters to the rhythmic editing and sound effects of Leni
Riefenstahl’s Otympia (193$), a film flnanced by the Nazi govemments during the
1936 Olympic games. Bordwell and Thompson explain how the “response cues” of
this film betray the symptomatic meaning of Nazi ideology. However ideological these
cues may be, Bordweil and Thompson marvel at their rhythmic powers from a purely
formai point of view. They defend the abstraction and redefinition of these powers in
the more absolute categories of film-style: the build-up effect of charged editing, the
narrative pace of jump-backs and cuts, the interaction of voice-overs and silences
during shots, the powerful and grandiose Wagnerian-style ofmusic.
The grandiose settings and the framing and editing patterns that tum the athietes
into superhuman beings support elements of Nazi mythology of the supremacy
of certain races. Framing also brings out the regimentation of events. The
Wagnerian music accords with the norms of officiai Nazi culture. Luckily these
ideas have littie appeal for us today, and a modem audience is unlikely to
respond to Olympia in the same way that Germans might have in the late I 930’s.
But by demarcating the fllm’s categories and tracing out pattems of
development, the style can endow categorical form with considerable interest
and emotion.
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Nowhere is it clearer than in this quote how the aesthetic determination of rhythm in
terms of the abso lute categories fllm-form may be used to evacuate history by casting a
so-called modem and educated glance that we are “lucky” to be able to cast upon
earlier propagandistic techniques because we no longer share the ideas that support
them. Rather than share the Benjaminian concem with the “aestheticization ofpolitics”
through film, in winch the mass mediation of the body politic is intimately connected,
articulated and constituted by the inflnitely extendable control of rhythmic effects, they
make this facile and ambivalent apology for film form. Such a perspective, because it
relies upon the distinction between fllm-form and film-content as well as their potential
separation in the study of film-art, makes it possible to understand aesthetics outside of
ideology even when this aesthetics is aiways afready determined by the political
conditions of the work of art in the age of mechanical reproduction. Clearly such a
perspective lias the power of rendering innocuous, if flot unthinkable, the critical
implications of rhythm as a poetical-political-etincal principle by winch subjectivity is
organized in time.
Indeed, in Bordweil and Thompson’s analysis, the probiem of time is consistently
subordinated to the technicai probiems of movement. Even when the mobile frame of
camera movement is impressed with the duration of time, as in the films of Ozu and
Mizogucin (p.251), tins consuming moment of screen time is analyzed only in order to
compare film “styles” or in order to discover the formai mechaiiisms in film that fulfiil
the “arc of raised expectations” given in the narrative unfolding of story and plot. In
this instance, rhythm neyer releases lime in its organic rapport with life, neyer allows
time to be made visible nor audible in its essential negativity, suspension, or
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emptiness”; rhythm is consistently subjected to movement, diegetic action and
cognitive-psychological intention.
Whlle Bordwell and Thompson do discuss the graphic ami rhythmic possibifities of
nonnarrative films using “abstract and associational form” as an alternative to
continuity editing (the films of Stan Brakhage, Bruce Conner, and Léger-Dudly
Murphy, Jean Epstein, Lev Kuleshov, and Jean-Lue Godard are discussed, pp.300-3O3)
they neyer seem to draw out the epistemological implications involved in the
subordination of the temporal and spatial editing factors to rhythmic ones. The
investigation of rhythm neyer upsets the essentïally narrative set-up of film study since,
within tins discursive framework, it can only report the stylistic conventions of film
form. Rhythmic “factors” only imply a form of discontinuity editing, a style different in
degree ami flot in nature from continuity editing, and even narrative film seems flnally
to encompass and to assimilate tins stylistic difference historically.
The analysis of the rhythmic “dimension” of film-sound takes a similar path;
Bordwell and Thompson are alert to the complexity of pace, pulse and accented pattem
of film-sound, but again only in a stylistic sense that reduces rhythm to a problem of the
forma! co-operation of image and sound tracks:
Any consideration of the rhythmic uses of sound is complicated by the fact that
the movements in the images have a rhythm as well, distinguished by the same
principles of beat, speed, and accent. In addition, the editing has a rhythm. As
we have seen, a succession of short shops help create a rapid tempo, whereas
shots held longer tend to slow down the rhythm. (327)
The visual and sonic rhythms are either matched (as in fred Astaire and Ginger Rogers’
choreographies of dance in Swing Time) or they set against one another (as in Chris
Marker’s La Jetée, combining long stiil shots with rapid voice-overs and sound effects).
The argument for this witt follow in my discussion of Deleuze’s Bergsonian conception of
the image-crystal of time in cinema.
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$ince rhythm, for Bordweil and Thompson, is neyer more than a technical
dimension or factor in the style of film form, it is neyer related to the more
philosophical problems of audio-visual mediation rhythm as it relates to the
temporality of subjectivity, the material inscription of experience and memory, or the
speed of historical events’2. Tins is flot to categorically reject nor to discard the
vocabulaiy and methods of analysis in fllm-form and film-art, for we may inevitably
have recourse to them in the analysis of sequences and shots from Tarkovsky’s Mirror.
Rather, it is to recognize the limits of what can be thought under tins modem paradigm
for flim-analysis and to investigate the potential for developing a theory of rhythm that
would be articulated outside of the discursive framework of aesthetics, film-art, and
narrative-linguistic analysis.
This would mean side-stepping the mainstream critique of Tarkovsky’s work, even
those studies winch are sensitive to the questions of time and memory in bis films and
bis writings. Predictably, these studies usuaily foilow this conventional paradigm of
fllm-study by limiting the question concerning rhythm to tbat winch is of a merely
technical, stylistic, or thematic nature. The most recent scholarly publication of
Tarkovsky’s corpus of work by Vida T. Johnson and Graham Petrie, The Films of
Andrel Tarkovsky: A Visual Fugue (1994), consolidates tins paradigm and even
criticaily synthesizes and corrects ail previous reviews and analyses under it. Although
they mention Tarkovsky’s effort to conceptualize a theory and a practice of rhythm,
reiterated in bis films, lectures, writings, and interviews, they do no more than
summarize and reduce this conception in one single paragraph (p. 37), in the chapter
devoted to showing how Tarkovsky was busy “Shaping an Aesthetics,” imagining
himself in the role ofthe prophetic artist-genius in dialogue with the other arts.
12 While flot Iimited to these problems, each ofthese receives extended treatment in Part II.
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Even in the chapter devoted to a consideration of “Imprinted Time,” rhythm is
neyer investigated as anything more than the measurable quality of the chronometric
lime of long-shots and sequences and the manageable quality of the variable number of
frames per second; tins reduces the materiality of rhythm to the instrumental art of
metrics. As such, rhythm is neyer more than one among many stylistic elements winch
“share the conmion fimction in forcing the viewer to constantly readjust his or her
expectations about what will appear on screen, in what order, and how it wifl be
presented” (1994; 198). While suited to an overail narrative analysis of film, tins
cognitive-interpretative approach to film viewing, itself affiliated with the precepts of
transcendental phenomenology and hermeneutics, always unquestioningly reproduces a
modem theory of subjectivity in winch the subject is constituted before temporal
experience, a priori, and is secured over time between the “akeady” and the “next.”
The temporal materiality of film, its rhythm, must be reductively “judged” in narrative-
discursive retrospection as “information” to be adjusted in the light of “new
information.”
Tins is, in fact, what happens as they analyze the shots and sequences of Mirror
(Johnson and Petrie, 1986; 119). For example, the mysteriously unassignable images of
sequence III (the childhood memory of the bam burning beside the dacha) and the
magicaily indiscemible images of sequence IV (the dream of awakening to his mother’s
image) are ail “situated” and “placed” for the viewer in sequence V (Alexei the narrator
cailing his mother). The complex temporal composition of images, the material
duration of elements and phantasmagoric deceleration of shots are neyer explored as
powers of the cinematographic image as an image; instead they are reduced as mere
stylistic elements’3. The overriding objective of such an analysis is to secure the place
of the viewer (and the narrative instance of authority) in the diegetic environment of the
See Part III in which an atternative analysis of these sequences and shots is etaborated.
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fllm’s chronotopes. Yet it seems clear that Tarkovsky’s conception and practice of
rhythm, when pushed to a critique of subjectivity and modemity, might put into
question the arc of expectations organizing the field of this conventional kind of
analysis and open up other possibifities for thought.
Rhythm as Ethos t A Critique of Deleuze’s Crystal-Image
I have argued that this theory of rhythm indicates a way of thirildng about the cinema as
a practice and an action (J)raxis) that aflows the pre-logical and a-grammatical material
reality of the world to appear and to flow before it is spoken for by linguistic utterances
and signifiers. This is suggested by dismantilng Eisenstein’s conception of inteilectual
montage and the dialectical regime of truth; for rhythm is not simply a poetics of
montage but a technics , poesis, and phusis, of temporality in which the logical and
grammatical treatment of the image is subordinated to the rhetorical scuipting of the
forces, pressures or thrusts of time. Secondiy, the theory of rhythm indicates a way of
thinking-through the temporal materiality of the film medium; in this case the dynamic
dimension of rhythm is not an objectifiabie property but a series of relationships,
capable of inlinite variation and experiment. Ibis is suggested by calling into question
the institutionalized theory of rhythm as a definitive formai aesthetic principle in the
service of a signiljing subject; for rhythm is not merely a technical dimension of film-
art but a dynamic principle on the side of fiim-life, movement and becoming, a
principle in winch and by winch subjectivity may be invented and orgariized in time.
for ail of these reasons then, the theory of rhythm may be shaped as a critique of
the discursive configuration of aesthetics, morality and science, the trivium of
Enlightenment thinking winch underlies a great deal of the principles of film studies—
as I have briefly shown in this critique ofthe work by Bordwell and Thompson (1997),
as welÏ as that of Joimson and Petrie (1994). Moreover, the theory of rhythm allows us
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to rethink the Aristotelian relationships between poetics, politics and ethics. Rhythm,
as a dynamic principle of life and a practice of action, is doser to the concept of ethos
than it is to the formai and stylistic categories of aesthetics.
Does Deleuze’s sub-category of the crystals of the time-image contribute to, or
militate against, the open inquhy into this theory of rhythm ? This is the question that I
would like to guide the following reflection. Since Deleuze interrogates the figure of
the mirror and even comments upon Tarkovsky’s Mirror in his discussion of the
crystals of time (Chapître 4: Les cristaux du temps), it would seem reasonable to begin
by understanding what is involved in this concept of the crystal. Deleuze begins, “Le
cinéma ne présente pas seulement des images, il les entoure d’un monde. C’est
pourquoi il a cherché très tôt des circuits de plus en plus grands qui uniraient une image
actuelle à des images-souvenir, des images-rêve, des images-monde” (92). The image
is not simply presented or projected as the photogrammic unity of a original beginning
or ending to be surpassed in a chain of images but becomes rather the milieu out of
which emerges a series of relations to other types of images. As a milieu, the actuai
image opens a path of concentric circuits between different temporal modes (memory,
revery, world) by winch other virtual forms of images might be activated. Contracting
and dilating the circuits of images, Deleuze sees in tins the possibility of imaging for
every actual image a double virtual image that responds like a mirror or reflection.
En termes bergsoniens, l’objet réel se réfléchit dans une image en miroir comme
l’objet virtuel qui, de son côté et en même temps, enveloppe ou réfléchit le réel:
il y a «coalescence» entre les deux. Il y a formation biface. C’est comme si une
image en miroir, une photo, une carte postale s’animaient, prenaient de
l’indépendance et passaient dans l’actuel, quitte à ce que l’image actuelle
revienne dans le miroir, reprenne place dans la carte postale ou photo, suivant un
double mouvement de libération et de capture. (92-93)
The crystal-image is a kind of time-mirror in winch the actual image is aiways co
present with the additional time of its passing or its coming to be and this allows the
crystal image to be something more than a temporal representation, deflned by the
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sensori-motor schemes of action. The double movement of liberation and capture
opened by this circuit between the virtual image and the actual image, allows different
temporalities to become folded and enveloped in their altemating exchange. As
Deleuze goes on to argue, its most contracted exchange, this circuit is constituted
around a point of indiscemabffity; however, when the bifocal image finds its genetic
double element, it can produce larger circles of exchange. When Deleuze argues that
tins image “crystallizes” the indiscemible point between the actual and virtual image,
he insists that tins indiscernibility is not simply in someone’s head, like a subjective
ifiusion, but constitutes an objective illusion, a kind of hallucinating suspension of time.
In other words, it does flot suppress the distinction between the two faces ofthe mirrors
but renders the distinction unassignable because the circuit of the virtual and actual
image is inllnitely reversible.
Indiscernibility is clearly the key to understanding what Deleuze means by the
crystaliine order of the time-image because it shows tins image to have many faces and
these multifaceted crystal images make visible the ceaseless fracturing or splitting of
noncbronological time (Rodowick, 92). The indiscemible circuit of the crystal-image
makes itseif visible, Deleuze explains, by means of three figures the actual and the
virtual (two mirrors face to face), the limpid and the opaque, and the seed and the
milieu.
Mirrors in the films of Losey, Ophuls, and Wefles figure tins circuit between actual
and virtual images: the mirror image is virtual in relation to the actual person whose
image it seizes but actual in relation to a persona who is left only a kind of virtual
existence. In the proliferation of images, their ensemble absorbs the actuality of the
actor and makes of it one virtual image among others. Tins movement of absorption
and dissolution holds the power to shatter and reconfigure subjectivity in Bergsonian
terms, for the body of the subject becomes only one privileged image among others.
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The constant exchange between the actual and the virtual, Deleuze explains, is given a
special expression:
Distincts, mais indiscernables, tels sont l’actuel et le virtuel qui ne cessent de
s’échanger. Quand l’image virtuelle devient actuelle, elle est alors visible et
limpide, comme dans le miroir ou la solidité du cristal achevé. Mais l’image
actuelle devient virtuelle pour son compte, renvoyée affleurs, invisible, opaque
et ténébreuse, comme un cristal dégagé de la terre. Le couple actuel-virtuel se
prolonge donc immédiatement en opaque-limpide, expression de leur échange.
(95)
“Opaque and limpid” then is the expression of the indiscemible passing or exchange
between actual and virtual images, and it points to an increasing clarity or obscurity
depending on whether the actual is brought into focus through the virtual or the actual
obscured and lefi lapsing in a virtual state. In other words, “opaque and limpid”
expresses a scale of inteffigibffity in the image even while tins image is “unassignably”
divided between the actual and the virtual state of becoming; more, tins scale of
inteffigibffity is defined as a ffinction of the quasi-chemical state of the crystal-image
(tins state being defined, for example, by the sharp and hard definition of the image, or
the cloudy, dirty, unpolished surface ofthe image).
Finally, Deleuze explains, the indiscernibffity of the crystal-image expresses a third
relation: “Le cristal ne se réduit plus à la position extérieure de deux miroirs face à face,
mais à la disposition interne d’un germe par rapport au milieu” (96). What does tins
mean ? Seed and milieu, as Rodowick has helpffilly explained, in contradistinction to
tins scale of inteffigibffity (opaque and limpid), “define genetic elements wherein
narratives are created out of the indiscemibility of the actual and the virtual. Seeds are
virtual elements that generate actual diegetic environments” (1997; 93). Tins
disposition of seed and milieu would allow the actual-virtual circuit of the image to do
more than infinitely circulate between the reflections of two mirrors, to become more
than the limpid or opaque expression of tins circulation, but to generate something
else, perhaps something ifice the material out of winch a narrative mise-en-récit or mise-
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en intringue might unfold. Deleuze intimates that the seed and milieu generate
something like diegetic environments by discussing the opening scene of Welles’
Citizen Kane in winch the artificiai snow, falling in the crystal bail dropped by the hand
of the dead Kane, generates the flashback to the snowfail scene of his childhood where
he plays with his sied “Rosebud.”
What do we gain by arguing that the crystafline structure of the time-image would
be that winch mobilizes a noetic force of thinldng or conceptualizing outside of
discourse? On the one hand, tins would seem to suggest the possibffity of conceiving
the work ofthinking outside ofits seat in a transcendental subjectivity and those modes
of language in winch tins subjectivity is constituted, a way finally of conceiving of the
movement and the act of thinldng within tins temporal mode of immanence in the
world. The crystals of the time-image would liberate thinldng insofar as they allow tins
immanent subjectivity to travel within several different modes of time’s crystaflization.
The mode of tins crystallization would potentiaily change, and Deleuze describes
different modalities of crystaffization in different directors : Welles’ unevocable time
image, Robbe Grfflet’s inexplicable time-image, Renais’ undecidable time-image and
Godard’s incommensurable time-image. Each time, what is experienced is a new
quality oftime and oftime’s unfolding in the activity ofthinking.
In Tarkovsky’s Mirror, one might discuss these qualities of temporality in terms of
these figures of the actual-virtual, limpid-opaque and seed-milieu when analyzing the
shots from Alexei’s nightmarish dream in the third sequence. For as we watch the
phantasmagoric image of Alexei’s mother Maria wash her hair, walk through the
liquefied halls of the dacha, and confront her image in the mirror (See $equence 3;
shots 24-25, Part III), time is made visible and audible in ail of its tinckness and pith as
weil as in its undecidable reference, unevocable bcauty and horror, and
incommensurable distance.
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On the other hand, it may be questioned, does this mode of mobilizing concepts in
the immanence of thinking, by means of the different modes of the crystaDization of
time, give us anything more than a sophisticated taxonomy or topology for
understanding the mechanics of thiuking or the mechanisms of the time-image? And
what would this taxonomy or topology have to do with the problematic question
concerning rhythm ? Does rhythm insert itseff within the general system of the
typology of the time-image or does it indicate the necessity for inventing another
approach? To raise this question is to not to attack Deleuz&s enterprise categorically
but to wonder what can and what cannot be recuperated in bis conception of the time
image in the light of a theory of rhythm that questions the category of language itself
One wonders, for example, why Deleuze, after invoking this sophisticated topology of
the indiscemible circuits of the crystal image, a topology that would seem to be
articulated outside of discourse and narrative as it is normally understood, would retum
to a rather banal conception offlashback and narrative?
It would appear that Deleuze’s discussion begins to degenerate at tins moment, a
moment where the argument might have taken other turns. Instead, Deleuze allows the
topology of bis time-philosophy of the crystal image to lapse into what seems nothing
more than an excuse to give a critical opinion on winch dfrectors have the privilege of
entering the crystal-palace hall of faine. In this instance particularly, he contrasts the
perfection of Herzog’s GÏassbead Game to the staid, heavy, and closed imperfection of
Tarkovsky’s Mirror:
Il y a chez Tarkovsky une tentative analogue, reprise de film en film, mais
toujours refermée: «Le miroir» constitue un cristal tournant, à deux faces si
on le rapporte au personnage adulte invisible (sa mère, sa femme), à quatre faces
si on le rapporte aux deux couples visibles (sa mère et l’enfant qu’il a été, sa
femme et l’enfant qu’il a). Et le cristal tourne sur lui-même, comme une tête
chercheuse qui interroge un milieu opaque: Qu’est-ce que la Russie, qu’est-ce
que la Russie...? Le germe semble se figer dans ses images trempées, lavées,
lourdement translucides, avec ses faces tantôt bleuâtres et tantôt brunes, tandis
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que le milieu vert semble sous la pluie ne pas pouvoir dépasser l’état d’un cristal
liquide qui garde son secret. (1985; 101)
Here the narrative structure of the film is suggestively resumed but rather convenientÏy
reduced in the figure of the crystal image. The opacity and the flxity of the crystal
liquid state is critiqued for three main reasons. First, the crystal, however multi-faceted,
only tums on itseff rather than contracting and dilating into other circles of images.
Second, the nationalist questioning apparently repeats itseW rather than opening to the
outside. Third, the genetic elements of narrative, overpowered by the raw material of
the images, seem to be unable to go beyond or become transformed for a merely liquid
crystal state. Having disposed of Mirror, Deleuze can now allow himseff the liberty of
a session of Tarkovsky-bashing by winch bis other works might be judged for their
pessimism, morbidity, and opacity:
Faut-il croire que la planète molle «Solaris» donne une réponse et qu’elle
réconciliera l’océan et la pensée, le milieu et le germe, assignant à la fois la face
transparente du cristal (la femme retrouvée) et la forme cristaffisable de
l’univers (la demeure retrouvée) ? «Solaris» n’ouvre pas cet optimisme et
«Stalker» rend le milieu à l’opacité d’une zone indéterminée, et le germe à la
morbidité de ce qui avorte, une porte close. (1985; 101)
It is clear in the disdairfful brevity ofthese passages that Tarkovsky’s films serve merely
as the foil against winch Deleuze might define his own pantheon of cinematographers.
Yet to recognize this is to miss the point also; for Deleuze underestimates the power of
the crystal images in Tarkovskys films. For example, he reduces the opacity and
indeterminacy of the crystal images in Staïker to a morbid lack of “optimism”; by doing
tins he ignores the potential to conceive of tins opacity in epistemological terms: that
winch holds onto the distance between the visible and the invisible, the evident and the
mysterious, or that winch resists the light of rational operations. Again, entfrely
overlooking the rhythmic features of the fllm—even in a stylistic or formalist-aesthetic
sense—he ignores the rhythmic passages constituted by crystal-image as a fundamental
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problem of time, memory, and temporality. Although his taxonomie vocabuÏary may
be recuperated to discuss the descriptive categories of the image, it does flot indicate a
way to inquire into the non-discursive project of thinking and acting in time with the
ethos of film because it does flot claril,’ an approach to the order of the visible based
upon a theory ofthe materiality ofrhythm.
In those moments when Deleuze seems interested in commenting UOfl the
elemental material composition of Tarkovsky’s images, he neyer moves his thought
alongside the rhytbmic possibifities of bis films. Instead, he makes a facile connection
to Serge Daney’s remarks, for whom the materiality of these images are themselves an
ideological emblem of the slow glacial “defrosting” of the Soviet empire during the
1970’s:
Le lavé de Tarkovsky (la femme qui se lave les cheveux contre un mur humide
dans «Le miroir »), les pluies qui rythment chaque filin, aussi intense que chez
Antonioni ou chez Kurosawa, mais avec d’autres fonctions, font sans cesse
renaître la question: quel buisson ardent, quel feu, quelle âme, quelle éponge
étanchera cette terre ? Serge Daney remarquait que, à la suite de Dovjenko,
certains cinéastes soviétiques (ou de l’Europe de l’est comme Zanussi) avaient
gardé le goût des matières lourdes, natures mortes denses, qui se trouvaient au
contraire éliminés par l’image-mouvement dans le cinéma occidental’4. Dans
l’image-cristal il y a cette recherche mutuelle, aveugle et tâtonnante, de la
matière et de l’esprit, au delà de l’image-mouvement, «en quoi nous sommes
encore pieux». (1985; 101)
However dissatisfying and reductive tins commentary be on the work of Tarkovsky, the
emphasis on the materiality of the image deserves more attention. An image that
intensifies its materiality and becomes densely saturated and layered in a geological
treasure of heavy elements, or--we might add—saturated and layered by the detritus of
14
« Les Américains ont poussé très loin l’étude du mouvement continu (...) d’un mouvement
qui vide l’image de son poids, de sa matière.(...) En Europe, en USSR même, certains se paient
le luxe d’interroger le mouvement sur un autre versant: ralenti et discontinu. Paradjanov,
Tarkovsky (mais déjà Eisenstein, Dovjenko ou Barnet) regardent la matière s’accumuler et
s’engorger, une géologie d’éléments, d’ordures et de trésors se faire au ralenti. Ils font le
cinéma du glacis soviétique, cet empire immobile. Que cet empire le veuille ou non(...)»
Serge Daney, Libération, 29janvier 1982 (cité par Deleuze 1985; 101).
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a toxic landscape of residues, becomes a kind of image-fossil’5 charged with the forces
of time.
When we approach the cinematographic image as a “fossil” slowly accumulatirig
and thickly inscribing layers of time, we are in a position to think about its materiality
as a “revolution waiting to happen” because it releases a carcinogenic and
contaminating influence that makes the present untenable. As an ossffied image oftime
charged with tins revolutionary brealdng, it holds the power to re-collect memories,
private and collective, that have been discarded; a volatile power that cari, as objects.
colors, faces, and voices brush up against the screen and make contact with the
mindscreen of spectators, arouse other memories and activate “inert presences” in even
the most recent layers ofinstory.
As I wifl be concerned in demonstrating in Part II, the “elemental” materiality of
time in Tarkovsky’s Mirror shows how the “poetics of memory” is also charged with
the possibility for tins ldnd of “politics of mernory.” A poetics and a politics of
memory that might challenge the dominant discourses of instory by setting loose the
“inert presences” of other histories and memories winch are “awakened” by the ethos of
film, the material debris and flotsam of time winch is compressed, accelerated, and
expanded in the multiple rhythms of film.
Laura U. Marks (2000) explores the image as a fossil in the chapter, “The Memory of
Things,” in which she investigates how the audio-visual techniques of intercultural cinema
excavate what she catis recoÏlection-objects, irreducibly material objects or artifacts that often
embed unresolved traumas of collective memory and encode social processes of migration and
dispiacement. In addition to tracing the histories of transnational objects, Marks places
particular emphasis on the concepts of the fetish (Pietz), the radioactive fossil (Deleuze), and
the concept of aura (Benjamin; Buck-Morss) as they relate to different orders of contact,
contingency and contamination in cinema.
Part II
The Audio-Visual Mediafion of Memory, History and Forgetting
Chapter 4: How is Historical Knowledge Articulated on
the Work of Memory?
- Introduction to Key Debates
- Nuancing the Question of Truth as a Question of
Contract
• De-Realizing the Historical Event
The Phantasmagoric Power of Images
- The Social Character ofMemoiy and Mourning
• Trauma and Repetition
• The Compulsion to Assume $ubject Positions
• The Subject of Grief: Recondiiation or Pretentious
Pathology?
Between $hoah and Schindier ‘s List: An Ethics of
Accountabffity
Chapter 4: Is There A Filmic Vision of History?
• Introduction
- The Production of Histories
- Tactics of Popular Mernory
• The Poetics ofCounter History
- The Anamorphic Mirror of Counter-History
- The Electr-orality ofllistorical Conciousness
- Rhythm. Electr-orality, and the Voice-Over ofPoetry
Chapter 5: Rhythm and the Mediation ofilistorical Events
Introduction
• The Multiple Rhythms and Temporalities ofHistory
- The Storyteller Stutters
Hyperdiegetic flashes ofMemory
The Last Breath of Ivan Iliych
fabulations and Allegories of Subjectivity in Time
Awakening to the Utopian Memory of Childhood
Chapter 4: Historical Knowledge and the Work of Memory
What is the relationship between the rhythmic temporality of the medium of film and the
construction of historical knowledge ? In order to set out the terrain of tins question and
its relationship to the poetics and politics of memory in Tarkovsky’s Mirror, it is
necessary to sketch out some of the central concerns and key issues raised by the
contemporary debate of the “representation of history in cinema.” I would like to address
the critical discourses’ of two relatively recent anthologies of essays by major
intellectuals, film scholars and historians because both of them renew the terms and
nuance the discussion of tins problematic: The Persistence of History: Cinema,
Televison, and die Modem Event. (Ed.) Vivian Sobchack. Routiedge: NY, 1996; De
l’histoire au cinéma. (Ed.) Antoine de Baeque et Christian Delage. Éditions complexe:
Bruxelies, 99$. At the same time, these two anthologies are vehicles of an implicit
“debate” crossing and dividing the interests of academic inqufry in North America and
Europe. What seems to be a common preoccupation, the persistent burden of histoiy in
cinema, is instead the mark of a clear division, emblematic of divergent institutional
values and orientations. Setting the opening editorial remarks of these two relatively
recent anthologies, each in its own way addressing the problematic of cinema and the
persistence of history,
Ail of the essays in tins volume deal with transformations in the sense and
representation of history winch emerged at the beginning of the twentieth
century, correlative with the birth of cinema, modemity, and « modemism» [...]
The following sections are direct bÏock-citations of my article, “Audio-Visual Mediation:
Reconfiguring the Discursive Problematic of Cinema and Histoiy” CiNéMAS, Vol 11; no.1,
automne, 2000, pp. 153-168.
2 Sobchack’s anthology was edited over several years as a response to a lecture given by Meta
Historian Hayden White on « The Modernist Event» sponsored by the American film Institute
(1992). De Baecque and Delage’s anthology was edited from transcriptions of conferences given
in a research seminar entitled, « Histoire, cinéma, répresentations », from 1995-1 997 at the
Institut d’histoire du temps present «NRS).
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with the ways in which film and television respond to, interrogate, and create
contemporary history [...J. (Sobchack, 1996; p.7)
En animant ce séminaire, notre souhait était de réfléchir à la manière dont le
cinéma contribue à la vitalité et la diversité des réflexions actuelles sur l’écriture
et le statut de vérité de l’histoire [...J (De Baeque and Delage, 1998; p.13).
One is tempted immediately to begin an archaeological dig into the discursive settings
that dîvide academic inqufry in North America and Europe. Historically, neither
anthology addresses the other; yet each lias a way of reverberating, echoing. and
disturbing the voices ofthe other with important effects. While both editors project large
themes, neither shares the initial premise of the other; whereas Antoine De Baecque and
Christian Delage objectify the contributions of cinema conservatively as a vitalizing and
diversilving force in the domain of a philosophical discourse of history afready honorably
estabhshed, Vivian Sobchack underscores how the advent of modernist cinema and other
forms of audio-visual technique have upset the frames of this discourse itsell ushering in
a period of radical transformation about the representation, interrogation, and production
of histoiy.
Without reducing the richness of the diverse articles included in these anthologies, it
might be helpful to paraphrase two opening articles from each of the volumes that best
set the stakes of the debate and to highlight key-words, conceptual notions, and
discourses that animate it. The main purpose of such a double-headed reading is to
produce a fleld of tensions that reveal how a series of fundamental problems in the
critique of historiography have been reformulated, reassessed, and reconflgured by
cinema and television studies in the terms ofaudio-visual mediation.
Nuancing the Question of Truth as a Question of Contract
It becomes extremely interesting to compare the anthologies by discussing the essays of
Roger Chartier, «La vérité entre fiction et histoire,» and Hayden White, “The Modernist
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Event .“ If the critique of historiography seems to have become a sophisticated and
complex debate of problems of rhetoric and theories of narration, one may do well to
consuft Chartier’s essay for some clarification regarding the historical development (from
Hegel to Miche! de Certeau) of the fundamental question of the “truth of the narrative of
history.” Both Chartier and White agree that the question oftruth cannot be reduced to
being an inquiry into the conditions of formai narrativity, of mere!y iocating narrative
poetics within the traditional typologies of rhetorical figures. Instead the question of
truth, explored in the problematic conflation of fiction and historical knowledge, must be
discussed in terms of the mediating relationship to reality or “contract” established
historically between texts and readers or between screens and spectators. In Chartier’s
opening words,
[...J «le statut de vérité du récit d’histoire », concerne. . le contrat passé entre
l’écriture de l’histoire et le lecteur de l’histoire quant à l’accréditation du récit
comme vrai, ce qui renvoie aux parentés et aux différences existant entre toutes
les formes de l’écriture narrative, qu’elle soit d’histoire ou de fiction.. .cette
problématique est proche de celle qui vous est familière et qui s’interroge sur le
statut de la vérité dans le contrat passé entre le spectateur et le film et sur les
effets de réalité produits par les différentes techniques de la reproduction des
images (Chartier, 1998; p.29).
It is clear from tins statement, and from the absence in this essay of any other remarks
made in reference to the reproduction of images, that Chartier considers film as a case of
the problem of fiction. Yet one may ask, can the insights generated by the critique of
historiography, and enurnerated throughout Chartier’s essay, be grafted so easily to
problem ofthe audio-visual mediation ofevents in the twentieth century?
De-realizing the Hïstorical Event
This question may be brought into focus by considering what Hayden White has called
the transformation, between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, of the “historical
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event,” discussed again in terms of transformation of the mediating relationship or
contract:
The relationship between the historical novel and its projected readership was
mediated by a distinctive contract: its intended effects depended upon the
presumed capacity of the reader to distinguish between real and imaginary
events, between “fact” and “fiction,” and therefore between “life” and
“literature.” (White, [199211996; p. 1$)
While reviewing the universally contested status and interpretation of Oliver Stone’s
film, JFK (1992), White goes on to contend that post-modernist docu-drama or historical
metafiction dissolves this “contract” that originafly mediated the nineteenth-centuiy
author and reader, flot 50 much by reversing the distinction between the real and the
imaginary but by placing these distinctions “in abeyance” (p. 19). Consequent to tins
dissolution, White discusses how, the notion of “the historical event” has undergone
radical transformation as a resuit of the occurrence of events in our century of a scope,
scale, and depth unimaginable by earlier historians and the dismantling of the concept of
the event as an object of a specfflcally scientific kind of knowledge. The sanie is true for
the notion of “story;” it has suffered tremendous ftaying and an at least potential
dissolution as a resuit of both that revolution in representational practices known as
cultural “modemism” and the technologies of representation that made possible by the
electronics revolution. (p. 22-23)
Following this argument, White links the problem of the loss of transmittable
experience, wisdom, and knowledge, (the virtualization of the “storyteller” as discussed
by Walter Benjamin) to what frederick Jameson has described as the “de-realization” of
the event. White goes on to discuss how this loss was in tuni explored as a de-realization
by literary and ifimic modemism,
[...J by constantly voiding the event of its traditional narrativistic function of
indexing the irruption of fate, destiny, grace, fortune, providence, and even
“history” itself into a life f...] and give the life thus affected at worst a
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semblance of pattem and at best an actual, transsocial, and transhistorical
significance. (p.24-25)
The Phantasmagoric Power of Images
In Hayden White’s essay, images of twentieth century catastrophes are discussed, from
Chemobyl to the Holocaust, and explosive cases of social interpretation, from the Rodney
King video to the Space Shuttie Challenger explosion, in order to qualify the “explosive”
and the “uiistable, fluid, and phantasmagoric” power of the images of modem media.
These images have exerted endless fascination and debate precisely because they are
impervious to explication and resistant to narrative representation. The effort to slow the
medium down, to bring these phantasmagoric images under the control of words for
subjects within the purview of the culture of “literate” television-joumalism, was only
exacerbated by the repetitive frequency of their transmission, manipulation, and
transformation.
It is in this final sense that White nuances the question of tmth and the problem of
the dissolution of the “contract” alluded to earlier. The modemist images of film, video,
and television do flot merely constitute a case of the historiography/flction debate as
Chartier implies, but open a series of questions about the new conditions for the
mediation of the truth of historical events. According to White, these new conditions are
intimated by the emergence of techniques of flctional modemism (stylistic innovations
are discussed in reference to substantial citations from J.P. Sartre, Vfrginia Woll and
Gertnide Stem). For this reason, the “anti-narrative” techniques of these writers (i.e. the
existential shard, the vagrant interval, or the fusion of the inside/outside of stories) are
not raised polemically as a critique of historiography since they explore and open new
relations to the temporality of the word and the unveiling of truth. Rather than negate
“the burden” of history, these modernist techniques hold out another possibffity for
bridging a “contract” with audio-visual culture: the capacity to negotiate traumatic
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experience in the presence of the phenomenal explosion of images and to moum what is
unsayable in the scrambled sense of events witnessed in the twentieth century.
In the sixth chapter of the dissertation I wffl be concerned with continuing these
remarks in the context of the “Post-symbolist modemism” of the Russian Poetry and the
heritage of “Acmeism”, particularly as it is transformed in the audio-visual technique of
Tarkovksy’s Mirror. Before discussing the problems of the temporality of poetry,
however, it is necessary to discuss the problems of the mediation of the event and the
transmissibffity ofhistorical experience in terms ofthe problems ofspeed.
The Social Character of Memory and Mourning
Paul Ricoeur’s erudite essay « Mémoire et histoire» opens the anthology De l’histoire au
cinéma, addressing broad epistemological issues of historical knowledge and cultural
memory. Like Chartier’s article in the same anthology, mentioned eurlier as a counter
example to Hayden White, it is clear that for Ricoeur the problems posed by the history
of cinema and the powers associated with cinematic histoiy/memory are implicitly
situated in the midst of this larger philo sophical problematic of the mediation of memoiy;
these problems and powers of cinema invoke and open a discursive site of questioning,
unexplored by Ricoeur’s earlier work, Temps et récit (1983-1985). However, for the
editors of the anthology, tins questioning seems less a discursive concern and more of a
thematic strategy since they reduce Ricoeur’s remarks somewhat, in an effort to
circumscribe ail the essays within this predicament:
Loin de constituer un simple catalogue d’informations sur ce qui s’est passé, le
cinéma construit avec ses spectateurs une relation esthétique et
historique.. .voire même idéologique.. .nous aidant à mieux comprendre la
corrélation entre 1’ «intériorité de notre mémoire» et le «processus de notre
socialisation» (Paul Ricoeur), entre une représentation du monde (le cinéma) et
la manière dont les hommes vivent dans ce monde (l’histoire) (De Baecque et
Delage, 199$; p.15).
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Ricoeur, while neyer speciflcally mentioning the place of cinema among these issues or
any particular films, does foreground his epistemological inquhy by mentioning the gaps
and the excesses of the memoiy of WWII, the danger of such widely available
“corrective” collective memory and the possibilities of transforning it. This underscores
a concem with the way historical knowledge is contested, rewritten, and therapeutically
confronted with the processes of and pathologies ofpersonal and collective memory. The
central problem becomes, in Ricoeur’s words, «comment la connaissance historique
s’articule-t-elle sur le travail de souvenir et le travail de deuil» (p.23)?
In order to prepare the ground for tins question, Ricoeur discusses the difflculty of
establishing anything more than an analogical “correlation” between the ontological
concept of “interior memory” (St.Augustine/Hegel/Locke) and the merely operative,
sociological concept of “collective memory” (Halbwachs). The dilemma is posed in the
following terms: «Quand on parle de mémoire collective, faut-il alors supposer
l’existence d’une mémoire collective ? Halbwachs n’hésitait pas à le faire ; mais alors qui
est le sujet qui se souvient ? Peut-on parler d’un sujet collectif? (p.1 9)» Dissatisfled with
Husserl’s solution, by winch we may speak of intersubjectivity, or the transposition ofthe
subject onto the collective categories of identity and consciousness, Ricoeur decides to
break with the philosophical tradition winch forbids thinldng beyond the
singular/collective analogy : he proposes the hypothesis of a direct correlation between
two subjectivities, individual and collective, that mutually constitute one another (p.20).
Ricoeur justifies tins hypothesis on the basis of the most common phenomenological
experience ofmediation and memory:
Pour se souvenir, même de façon solitaire et privée, il faut recourir à un médium
langagier le souvenir est un discours que l’on se tient à soi-même. Platon
définissait déjà la dianoia, la pensée, comme un dialogue que l’âme se tient à
elle-même. Il n’y a pas de mémoire sans langage. Or, la médiation du langage
est d’emblée de rang social. [...] Cette convergence de faits — médiation
langagière, médiation narrative de la mémoire la plus privée — conduit à se
demander si l’intériorité présumée de la mémoire n’est pas corrélative du
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processus de socialisation. Ce serait dire qu’intériorité et socialité se constituent
simultanément et mutuellement. Au fond, avant l’échange langagier, l’échange
narratif il n’y a que la dispersion d’une vie, qui ne trouve sa connexité, sa
cohésion, que dans la connexion narrative qui est publique (p.20).
Tins insight, regarding the correlation of the individual subject to a collective subject
through the mediation of language, is corroborated and expanded by discussing the work
of two key thinkers on the subject of history and memory the application of Reinhart
Koselieck’s “Augustinian” notion of historical consciousness as a sense of orientation in
time structured on a personal and collective level; and the possibffity of applying Freud’s
pathological categories of individual memory to collective memory. Tins allows him to
discuss the problematic mediation of traumatic memory, situated as it is--in the wounds
and scars ofthe collective and individual memory ofevents.
Trauma and Repetition
finally, historical consciousness, grief and melancholy are related to Ricoeur’s
preoccupation with the “subject” of narrative and time; since literary narrative is a
homeostatic model of historical narrative, featuring the prototypical tropes,
configurations, and resources for the mise-en-intrigue of history and of persona, its
potential for generating other positions paves a way by winch an individual or collective
subject might negotiate the experience oftraumatic events:
Raconter autrement, mais aussi être raconté par d’autres. Or, dans une histoire
racontée autrement, les événements ne sont plus les mêmes, dès lors que leur
place dans l’histoire est changée. Ces variations narratives ont une fonction
critique remarquable au regard des formes les plus figées par la répétition les
plus ritualisées par la commémoration. On voit là à l’oeuvre le travail du
souvenir mais aussi celui du deuil. Raconter autrement et être raconté par les
autres, c’est déjà se mettre sur le chemin de la réconciliation avec les objets
perdus d’amour et de haine (p.23).
Like Hayden White’s essay discussed previously, Ricoeur sees the possibility in literary
fiction of assuming the burden of history and mediating the traumatic memory of modem
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events. Whereas White emphasizes the renewed contract made possible through the
techniques of fictional modemism, Ricoeur insists on the recondiling work of repetition
and commemoration inherent in collective and singular acts of narrativity. While both
Wbite and Ricoeur problematize the connection between the medium of language and
narrative mediation, only White goes on to discuss their relationship to the techniques of
audio-visual mediation. Nevertheless, Ricoeur does leave room for speculation by
redefining a theory of the subject in the context of collective and singular memory in a
setting itselforganized by the larger problem ofmediation.
The Compulsion to Assume Subject Positions
The possibifities and the limits of this theory might be tested were we to discuss the
memory of the subject in the historical and cross-cultural context of the cinematic
representation ofthe Holocaust. We may refer to Thomas Elsaesser’s important article in
the Sobchack anthology, “Subject Positions and $pealdng Positions from HoÏocaust, Our
Hitler, and Heirnat, to Shoah and Schindier ‘s List.” On the more historical level of
popular cinema, especially the post-war and neo-realist cinemas in Germany and
Hollywood representing the history of fascism and Nazism, Elsaesser’s article follows
something of the path of Ricoeur’s guiding question. He emphasizes how several
generations of contemporary directors in cinema and television have offered perspectives
on the way in winch historical knowledge is articulated alongside the work of memory
and the work ofgriefand mourning.
According to Elsaesser, with the advent of audio-visual media, in winch the divide
between memory and History is being crossed and recrossed in either direction, in winch
the past is “digitally remastered,” History has entered a conceptual twilight zone, lost its
hold on public interest, and has become the very “signifier ofthe inauthentic.”
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No longer is storytelling the culture’s meaning-maldng response, but something
doser to therapeutic practice has taken over, with acts of re-telling,
remembering, and repeating ail pointing in the direction of obsession, fantasy,
and trauma. If civil wars, communal strife, and tribal violence suggest a
compulsion to repeat at the level of action—because buried memories, rekindled
by fresh hatred and local grievance, seek to redress wrongs suffered centuries
ago—what obscure urge is soothed by the compulsion to repeat so typical of
television? (p.l46)
Elsaesser continues these remarks by insisting that the cinema, as the “public art” of the
United States, has aliowed the history ofthe Vietnam War, for example, to go beyond the
“history books.” By association,, such a statement challenges what Ricoeur’s text
qualifies as the work of reconcifiation inherent in the repeated storytefling of historical
memory:
C’est en s’initiant à la confrontation entre écritures historiques rivales que les
mémoires malades s’exercent non seulement à raconter autrement, mais à
structurer différemment la compréhension qu’elles prennent d’elles-mêmes au
niveau des causes et des raisons. A cet égard , je voudrais souligner l’importance
du phénomène de réécriture (Ricoeur, 199$; p.26).
Were Elsaesser to offer a reponse to this notion of therapeutic re-writing, he might ask:
What about the confrontation between films exploiting the ifis of an endlessly rewritten
and war-tom memory ? Films like those representing the Vietnam War (The Deer
Hunter, [Cimino, 197$]; Apocalypse Now, [Coppola, 1979]; Full Metat Jacket, [Kubrick,
19$7J; Flatoon, [Stone, 1986]; Dear America—Lettersfrom Home, [Couturie, 1987]), do
flot bear witness to one history or even to plural histories but have produced “history” by
doing the “mouming work” ofa nation, for a nation with a burdened conscience.
The Subject of Grief: Reconciliation or Pretentious Pathotogy?
Without directly critiquing Ricoeur’s ideas, we may try to test their scope, their
pertinence, and their limits in the historical context of cinema by deiberately setting them
against some ofthe poignant remarks and questions Elsaesser poses throughout bis essay.
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These questions themselves are organized by the problem of audio-visual mediation. for
Elsaesser explores and evokes them in the context of what lie cails “the subject positions
and speaking positions” of individual and collective memoly, particularly the historical
memory repeatedly transformed and contested in several generations of cinema and
television. Such a “confrontation” wil in tum allow us to expose what is at stake in
contemporary cinema by asking the following series of questions, emerging from a
critical engagement with Elsaesser’s text:
• Can the “obscure urge” of television and cinema to exorcise buried memories,
“soothed by the compulsion to repeat,” itself be quallfled as a “concffiatory” act
ofre-tefling ? (p.146)
• What would such reconcifiation mean when it continuously produces “a
secularized and debased response” in a “melodramatic interpretation” of historical
events ofthe “incomprehensible” magnitude ofthe Holocaust ? (p. 14$)
• In the context of the postmodem debate on the historical representation of
Auschwitz, and in the effort of safeguarding the memory of such terror--beyond
an “epistemologically compromised form of realism” or the “silent despair before
the incomprehensible”--what would it mean for cinema to preserve the sense of
Jean-françois Lyotard’s imperative: “the sublation, or the double negation: the
effort to preserve the fact that the unrepresentable exists?” (p.l 4$)
• Do such films need to be “ruled by an aesthetics of detacbment and distance” in a
modernist hermeneutic of pathos and irony to be worth their intellectual sait, or is
there a healthy purpose at work in the popular, spectacular culture of obsessive
memory, in the highly charged emotions and affective responses produced by
these films and television series’—even when they elicit the “excessive, perverse,
ami compulsive” affects of violence, “melodrama, sentimentallty and pmrience ?“
(p.l50)
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• To what extent can we lend credence to either critical impulse, whether it be
“ironically detached” or “emotionally excessive” when both are grounded, to
some extent, in cinema’s “postmodem hubris,” namely the implicit “theodicy” or
daim
“[...] to redeem the past, rescue the real, and even rescue that winch was
neyer real ?“ (p.l 66)
• Is the idea of “mouming work” in cinema or television seriously worthy of
defense as an essential form of historical knowledge in the twentieth century, or is
it merely a hollow pretext to valorize films that stop short at self-pity and
sentimentality “[...J acknowledging compassion only at the price of playing
victims off each other in the vain hope of squaring accounts ?“ In other words, is
the idea of a “recondiling confrontation” between individual and collective
memory in the public sphere of film a pretentious “over-evaluation of the political
importance of the aesthetics of moral rectitude,” according to winch “the
experience of one’s own loss may serve as a prelude to acknowledging the Ïoss of
others ?“ (p.l71-172)
These questions and problems are opened as Elsaesser describes the divided “subject
positions” among the directors of the New German Cinema of the 1970’s-19$O’s,
including among others Wemer Herzog, Wim Wenders, Hans Jtirgen $yberberg,
Alexander Kiuge, Hehna Sanders-Brahms, Voilcer $cinôndorlE Edgar Reitz, Rainer
Wemer Fassbinder, and Marcel Ophuls. Explaining how these directors assumed
paradoxical “speaking positions” of alienation and representation when responding to the
fascist past, the Federal Republic and the possibffity of German unification, Elsaesser
evokes the problems of identification, identity politics, and the price of empathy. His
rernarks corne to a head in words that are explicitly central to Ricoeur’s own enterprise:
But if “mouming work” cannot open up that space of othemess, what can? What
kinds of affect might possibly “unlock” numbness, apathy, indifference, and
recondile memory and hope, commemoration and forgetting, or mediate
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between pity , sentiment, and shame ? [...J In the face of narcissistic forms of
identification in conventional narrative and fictional dramatization, such an
“affect of concem” is meant to break through any coherent and thus comforting
subject position and shock spectators into recognition. Yet such strategies of
shock, increasingly used to convey the suffering caused by human or natural
disasters, also imply the deeply ambiguous modes of address typical of news
broadcasts and current afihirs programs: soliciting (emotional) response, while
disempowering (civic, political) action. (p.1 72)
Such dilemmas help to refocus the generic divide between documentary and fiction film
according to the “ambiguous or extreme subject positions they are able to sustain” rather
than according to the traditional distinctions of “what they show or do not show,” or
whether or flot “one is more or less authentic than the other” (p. 173).
Between $hoah and Schindler’s List: An Ethics of Accountability
Particular attention is given throughout the essay to the spectrum of differences between
two notoriously opposed films, $hoah (Claude Lanzmann, 1985) and Schindler List
(Steven Spielberg, 1993). contrasted in the following terms:
Two kinds of eschatology, then, seem to confront each other: the tragic vison of
life of the European Jew Lanzmann, and the life-affirming vision of the
American Jew Spielberg. {. . .J By affirming that whoever saves one life, saves
mankind, Spielberg accepts the principle that the one can represent the many,
that the part can stand for the whole. Shoah is based, explicitly and
emphaticafly, on the exactly opposite premise: that no one can stand in for
anyone else. Afier six hours of testimony in Shoah—a testhnony that, in
different ways, records only absence, one is lefi with the overwhelming thought
that no history can contain, let alone signify or represent, the palpable reality of
so many individual, physical deaths. (p.l 7$)
Yet the problems of “representation” underscored by the confrontation between these
films as they negotiate two contrary forms of personal!collective memory serve also to
highlight the problems ofthe subject/speaking positions that films project and sustain.
The collision between the two films implies, aesthetic, moral, as well as
religious differences, but it also includes the most constitutive division in film
history between Hollywood and Europe, itself a scene where the same drama
seems destined to play itseff out over and over again. I want to take tins case,
and look once more at the relationship between historical events and their
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representations. but also at what it means to bear witness—especiaily when
public history lias inevitably superseded personal memory—and to speak for
someone, or find oneseWspoken by someone, in the medium ofcinema.(p.147)
Yet what does it mean for a subject to speak in the context of a hypermediated world,
when speaking is no longer grounded in the mere exchange of language for a subject who
“stands by” bis word with other subjects, as Ricoeur might have it; when speaking—even
political speech-- is aiways afready an act of ventriloquism “voiced-over” into
microphones, speakers, and screens of audio-visual media, an act of “tbrowing one’s
voice” or finding oneseif “thrown” in the new cultural sphere of public history and
memory ? As Elsaesser argues, even a “historical unconsciousness,” itseff part of
“representing history,” may be made to speak in the subject positions framed by a film’s
mode of address. What happens to the subject of speech in tins “postmodern condition of
contemporary cinema,” when even “the text no longer speaks for the author ?“ (p. 175)
No modernist defense like “exile, silence, and cunning” can protect the
fiimmaker as author, but the public arena of magazine and television interviews,
published diaries and essays, the promotional machinery that makes the dfrector
“speak.” These speaking positions, I think, need flot refer to biographical
individuals, nor even to “auteurs,” but are instances of historical and personal
accountabffity. It is in tins context that one can view the one-sided exchange
between Lanzmann and Spielberg. (p. 175)
Elsaesser goes on to describe how the subject positions of both films, determined by thefr
respective genres when touching upon an identity politics of historical and religious
values that neither can transcend, both work “[...]on the borders of the unifled and the
shattered self’ (177). According to Elsaesser, Lanzmann, whule attempting to evoke a
documentary history for winch there is neither redemption nor exorcism, suspending ail
preconceived and unifying narratives and explanations, stifi very carefully created a
“persona” for himsell’, a kind of phantasmic and “Dantesque” super-ego of the voices
heard and unheard-- of the faces seen and unseen—of the memories coaxed or lefl
undisturbed.
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Lanzmann works with each individual memory as a unique “archaeological” site,
requiring different tools and different techniques. Whether he flattened someone’s
complacency or patiently stalks someone else’s elusiveness, whether lie takes the man
who shaved the women at Treblinka back to bis barber shop or listens to the prisoner
from Chelmo teil how bis singing voice saved bis life, Lanzmann creates a multitude of
speaking positions by separating them as sharply from each other as possible, while
embedding them in sympathy, even when they must have appalled him or when pity
threatened to overwhelm him. (p. 174)
Spielberg, on the other hand, re-appropriates the “fashioned” reality of the history on
the movie production sets in the streets of Krakow, in the afler-life of the ghetto “scene”
become a famous shot-on-location. While providing a master-narrative transgressing the
taboo of narrative emplotment, lie strategically shatters viewer identification by
projecting melodramatic sentiment in a flctional form bordering on the perverse. More
generally, and more paradoxically, Spielberg, by putting into circulation a discourse
which suggests that tins was a “personal” film, bas given himseff the license to do exactly
the opposite: namely to speak on behaif of others, to make the step from direct testimony
and personal memory, to narrative and history.(179)
These paradoxes show at once bow easily and yet bow ambiguously Ricoeur’s ideas
of collective and personal memory, as simultaneous and mutually constituting subjects,
may be applied to the cultural phenomenon ofcinema.
for to the extent that a film creates a public sphere, a space for discourse,
confrontation and debate, it is tins space that produces the speaking positions
winch in tum are the extemal limits of representation. One reason for dwelling
on these examples is that they underscore the difficulties, when taking facism as
the “limit” case of historical representation, of determining any author’s
speaking position, yet also assert the necessity ofdoing so in each case.(p.179)
It is clear that Elsaesser sees the bistorical necessity and hope of assuming or inventing
an ethics of responsibifity to “account” for ail of the repeated inversions, reversions, and
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perversions of subject positions and speaking positions that have obsessively recalled the
traumatic events such as the Shoah!Holocaust. In this, there is the expectation and the
hope of an ethos committed to understanding how historical knowledge is contested,
therapeutically confronted, and rewritten in the grief ami mouming of memory. An ethos
that recognizes how such knowledge has become, inevitably and frretrievably, the
predicament of positioning the subject for speech in the audio visual techniques of
television and cinema.
How does this conception of ethos stand with respect to the earlier argument I made
regarding the rhythmic temporality of film? Something of the principle of tins ethical
commitment, I would argue, emerges out of the rhythmic materiality of film and the
transforming contact it makes with the time-passer as it “awakens” the witness
(cameramanleditor/director/spectator) to the materiality of History and the radically
different shores of time. In the next chapter, I wffl be concerned with showing how the
rhythmic temporality of Tarkvosky’s Mirror constitutes a kind of ethical opening and
awakening to tins Historical passage and passing.
Chapter 5 : Is There A Filmic Vision of History?
This question is articulated in an important chapter of Marc ferro’s study, Cinéma et
histoire, and posed in the following terms:
Le problème est de se demander si le cinéma et la télévision modifient ou non notre
vision de l’Histoire, étant entendu que l’objet de l’Histoire n’est pas seulement la
connaissance des phénomènes passées, mais également l’analyse des liens qui
unissent le passé au présent, à la recherche des continuités, des ruptures (1993 [1977];
XIX, 217).
ferro implies that there may be a deep relationship between the emergence of audio-visual
technique (cinema and television) and the modification of historical knowledge; that the
understanding, analysis, and perceptibffity of past events might have a different character or
sense of linkage and even rupture with the present. The implication is that cinema and other
technologies like television, far from merely reporting history as it has been written and
adopting the image of the past as it has been represented by historians, actually produce new
reiationships to History by changing the character of its production, perception, and
reception. On a political level this means that audio-visual technique reveals to the attentive
historian a radical decentralizing power, capable ofrestoring to society at large the History or
histories from which they have been dispossessed by the hegemony of the institutional
apparatus of transmission. Audio-visual technique would be able to give voice to the
voiceless, produce archives instead of falling back on officiai ones, break up the institutional
monopoly on the conscience of History and demystify the apparatus of its production (Ferro,
1973; 22-26).
The Production of Histories
In order to appreciate the nuances T wouid like to suggest regarding the critique of
historiography implicitly and explicitly articulated by work of historical memory in
Tarkovsky’s Mirror, it is necessary first to discuss ferro’s helpfiul schema, or global
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classification, outlining the relationship between film production and the production of
various discourses ofHistory:
Propositions pour une classification globale des films dans leur rapport à l’Histoire
Il est apparu que les discours sur la société émanent de quatre foyers:
• Les institutions et les idéologies dominantes, qui expriment aussi bien le point
de vue de l’État, d’une Église, d’un parti ou de toute organisations qui porte
en elle une vision du monde.
• Les opposants à cette vision, qui élaborent une contre-Histoire ou une contre
analyse, pour autant qu’ils en ont la capacité et les moyens.
• La mémoire sociale ou historique, qui survit par la tradition orale, ou par des
oeuvres d’art légitimées.
• Les interprétations indépendantes, scientifiques ou non, et qui procèdent à leur
Propre analyse. (1987; XIX, 224).
His schema speaks to a social theory of media whereby one can discern, in the agency of
cinema and in its production of a critical discourse of modernity, a series of institutional
problems. First, the cinema catalyzes a breakdown of the uiiivocal discourse of History in
winch the “worldview” of dominant subjects gives way to the production of disjunctures
between a plurality of “worldviews.” Second, tins breakdown brings about a reconfiguration
of what constitutes the “public” sphere and the credibffity of “official History” with the
renewed circulation of private memory and the resurgence of oral and popular traditions in
cinema. finally, tins schema indicates the necessity for a reappraisal of relations of political
power as contesting spealdng positions and subject positions on the subject of History are
sustained by the signilring practices of cinematography. In tins, ferro’s schema outlines
something of the duty of the historian as it is practiced by Miche! foucault and femand
Braudel from the Annales school. By confronting different historical discourses against each
other the cinematographer-as-historian would be able, by means of tins very confrontation, to
discover, access, and intervene in a portion of social reality ordinarily invisible.
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The four distinct social forums of discourse outlined in ferro’s tableau are articulated
along two main axes of pertinence: that of officiai history versus counter history, and that of
artistic and oral tradition versus individual interpretation and documentary science. The first
axis (official!counter-history) underscores a concem with the way historical knowledge is
confronted, contested and rewritten in the iarger context of the institutions of social life and
cultural memoiy; cinema being both a potential vehicle for ail instances ofpower but also for
ail instances of resistance. Cinematography, as a technics of memory, an audio-visuai
mediation of experience, and a mass medium of historicai production, has the power both to
upset and to reaffirm the authority of institutions, the persistence of traditions, and the
discursive framework by which historicai truth is revealed and transrnitted. Retroactively,
tins means that ffim-maldng as a social practice, while exacerbating the modem crisis of the
representation of History, aiso reveais what Foucault would cail the profound historicity of
ail other institutions and practices that legitimate and authorize officiai History. In tins sense,
it may be argued that the proliferation of counter-histories in cinema and television foster
what Jean-François Lyotard has qualified as the characteristic trait of the postmodem
condition, namely the “incredulity” towards the meta-narratives that confer legitimate
authority on the production of knowiedge. However, it may be argued that tins very
incredulity towards the institutional practices and operations of History, has also created
other regimes of belief that structure social and cuiturai memory.
The second axis of Ferro’s schema articulates another tension, no less important to the
very essence of the technology of cinema, between independent and modem scientific
research and the social and instorical memory surviving in artistic and oral traditions. Tins
tension wouid seem to intimate the ciassic sociological opposition between fail of tradition
and the rise of modemization, revealing the paradoxicai way that audio-visual technique
belongs both to the “modem spfrit of research and scientific documentation” and also to the
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“survivance of traditional artifacts’.” The reproduction of the image in cinema belongs as
much to the scientific impulses to record and systematicaily document objective reality as it
does to the impulses of tradition to transmit the memory and identity of a people; the
extraordinary power of the reproducible image resides in its transmissibllity afier ail. What
then is the relationship between the production of counter-history and the complex survival
of tradition in cinema? Counter-histories are embedded in a form of wisdom and belief that
may be seen as the opposition between the collectible or transmissible over against the
merely traditional; or what Hannah Arendt, describing Walter Benjamin’s technique of
thinldng, has called the coilector’s chaotic impulse to hold on to the transmissibility of
objects, fragments, and citations that work directly with the past but winch are ignored or un
handled by tradition (196$; 45). The coilector’s impulse to tear things from out of their
contexts, holding onto them as a form of citation or quotation, is “contrary” to the cumulative
persistence of tradition because it is not based upon an authority that systematicaily and
chronologicaily organizes and separates the positive from the negative, the orthodox from the
heretical, the obligatory and relevant from the merely interesting or exotic, but holds onto
Even Walter Benjamin hinted at the retreat ofthe authority of tradition in the age ofthe technics of
mechanical reproduction. Contemporary social theorists like John B. Thompson have made some
important distinctions regarding the relationship between modernization and “detraditionalization”,
arguing, for instance, that although tradition has been unmoored from its power of legitimation and
authority, its has simultaneously been re-embedded in new contexts of social life owing to its efficacy
as a means of craffing identity and hermeneutically making sense of everyday life. In the chapter,
“The Unmooring of Tradition,” (Media and Modernity: A Social Theory ofMedia. Stanford UP,
1995) Thompson argues powerfully that in the age of modem media and in the cultural space of
migration, diaspora and deterritorialization, we are actuaily wÏtnessing the radical revatorization and
reinvention of tradition. Tradition, considered as the work of transmission itself has been radically
deritualized, depersonalized and delocalized from local, face to face contexts of social interaction.
Yet the “unmooring” of tradition does flot imply that it cannot simply float fteely; instead, tradition
must 5e re-embedded in new contexts in order to be handed-down; provoking, for example, what
Hobsbawm has qualified, “the invention of tradition” and the “invention of nationalisms.” The
interest ofsuch a perspective does not lie in debunking the authenticity or original purity of tradition
but in throwing light on the essentially mediated character of transmissibility itself and the
historicaily fashioned or constructed nature of social identity and memory. This is ail the more true
when oral traditions and legitimate artworks serve as a foil, not to production of formai research or
independent opinion, but to the reconstruction of social memory, constituting what may be qualified
as a politics of memory and forgetting.
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them contiguously as material shards revealing and redeeming another relationship to
History. Audio-visual technique is concerned with this kind of historical citation and
collection., materiafly inscribing the flows of time while wrenching these temporal fragments
or “vessels” from their contexts. It encodes social memory as a form of counter-history by
registering tensions of disbelief in institutional regimes of belief practicing a kind of
“heretical empiricism” to borrow Pier Paolo Pasolini’s suggestive phrase, and actively
appealing to what Deleuze bas characterized as the “powers of the false” circulating in the
time-image of filin.
Tactics of Popular Memory
The second axis of pertinence also suggests another important problematic out of the
dichotomies of social memory and independent research, scientific reporting and oral
traditions, documentary evidence and artifacts. Ibis problematic concems the emergence of
“the popular” in the leamed discourse of modernity, or what Michel de Certeau bas
repeatedly characterized as the “other” of instrumental reason, productive rationahty,
political power and its epistemological operations of violence. In other words, the popular
might help to define the very disjuncture and difference, expressed radically and decisively
by Tarkovsky himself between popular culture and the State, ordinary practices and
instrumental reason, orality and literacy, social memory and foildoric representations. The
“popular” wffl also help to delineate how the second axis (social, traditional, artifact
memory/independent scientific research) intersects the flrst axis (officiai History/counter
history), since its “diversions” are an implicit critique of the instrumental rationalism of
scientific research and the subject-centered epistemology officiai History.
How might the audio-visual technology of memory in the medium of film upset the
traditional organization of popular memory ? In order to go fiirther with these questions, it is
necessary to discuss the theoretical origins of the concept of the popular in the work of
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Michel de Certeau. Informing and generatmg the analyses of de Certeau’s important works
of cuhural critique, La Culture au pluriel (1974) and L ‘invention du quotidien (1980), is the
idea that culture bas been fundamentaliy shattered into myriad forms and is no longer
organized under a universal literary model, nor capable of being anthologized under an
exclusively scriptural economy.
fascinated with the plurality, mobffity and multiplicity of the practices or “arts de faire”
(techné) of contemporary societies, de Certeau constantly turns bis attention to the rifis
between representations and the “represented.” This ailows de Certeau to explore the
tremendous gap between the orthodox symbolic languages and techniques used to manage
and control social life (such as foucault’s schema of “disciplinary micro-techniques” or
Bourdieu’s concept of the “habitus”) and the creative usage or reappropriation of these
languages and techniques in “the invention” of everyday life. The implication is that the
category of the “popular” escapes the discursive operations of scientific reason and its
inscriptions of “proper” meaning, while opening the possibffity of another kind of knowledge
related to “savoir-faire.” Neither a transhistoric constant, nor the emblem of facile
distinctions of class, race and gender, nor an aesthetic category, the popular “. . .works rather
as an unstable term for the analysis of hierarchical social organizations winch divide a
culturally productive minority from a vast majority of apparently passive consumers”
(Aheame, 1995; 161).
h is in these terms that I would like to argue that a counter-history is produced through
what de Certeau has called the tactics and ruses of “popular memory” that disenfranchise the
strategies and the scientific rationalism of modem historiography. Since a counter-history is
flot produced merely through a clash of institutional speaking positions and subject positions
of State and society, this also means revising signfficantly the importance accorded to the
mere narrative “enunciation” of a position or a view on History from the perspective of the
child-figure. For example, in the earliest of Tarkovsky’s ffihl-feature films, ferro notices the
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importance of the orphan-figure, flot as an allegorical figuration of the very dislocation of
time as I will argue, but as the instance ofthe enunciation ofa counter-history:
Avec L ‘Enfance d’Ivan de Tarkovski, une ère nouvelle s’annonce. La vérité de la
guerre apparaît, qui n’est pas la vérité officielle. Toutefois, pour dire cette vérité, sa
vérité, Tarkovski doit, comme le fait Klimov au même moment, passer par le relais
du regard d’un enfant (1989-1993; XVII, 206).
b speak of the “tactics” of popular memory in the time-image of film is to dispiace,
somewhat, the attention normally afforded to questions of the rhetoric of montage, filmic
narrative or subject figuration. This makes sense of ferro’s remarks on the production of a
counter-history in winch the resurgence of tradition is mediated by fllm ideological
considerations aside, another way of understanding history and histoiy-maldng is made
possible. «On l’a compris, on dissocie volontiers l’idéologie du film du savoir-faire du
cinéaste» (1987; XIX, 220). If savoir-faire may be dissociated from the mere production or
reproduction of ideology, as Ferro suggests, this is perhaps for more than aesthetic reasons
the audio-visual technique of mass media may not lx exclusively determined as an
instrumental means of subjectification.
Savoir-faire implies a non-instrumental relationship to audio-visual technique; like
techné, it is a mariner of being entirely “at home” in a medium, it does flot stand imposingly
without; it is a way of crafiing materials or of “working with” their potential agency, its
mastery is not given as a scientffic expertise that “takes hold” but is rather granted in the
handling, touching, and transforming; savoir-faire is, flnafly, a way of “getting around” and
knowing one’s way about, it moves and insinuates diversions in strategic rnaps and rational
calculations. Now to put the question less abstractly t How does one handie the
magicallmimetic mirror-effects of cinematography with savoir-faire ? And what miglit it
mean “to sculpt time” with the rhythmic-effects of the cinematographic image and fashion
the very stuif of history and memory? The question of tactics concerns the problem of
rhythm, temporality, and technics; at the most intuitive level, tactics is the critical “tact” or
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“attentivenèss” film affords as a way of coming into contact with and “touching the pulse” of
different orders of time, bringing about a threshold of perception that is, properly speaking,
only available as a rhythmic pressure, compression, acceleration or collapse between
temporal experiences. In the chapters that follow, I will be exploring the implications ofthis
rhythmic temporality as a form of critique of modem practices of historiography, and as a
politics and poetics ofmemory emerging in the signil’ying practices ofcinema.
The Poetics of Counter-History
It might be helpful to understand the politics of this fllm-poetics in order to highlight how a
counter-history is produced in Tarkovsky’s Mirror, one related to the resurgence of tradition
and memory in “popular” culture. For epistemology, this production of counter-history
problematizes historical knowledge in ways that are afready familiar to contemporary film
theorists of postmodem historiography2:
• by recounting the past self-reflexively rather than assuming the impersonal,
disinterested and objective tone of the scientific historian; Mirror is narrated in the
autobiographical fonn of an interior monologue and does flot simply reconstruct the
phases of the lived past but continuously plays with its remembrance in reflexive
ways;
• by eschewing the traditional order of story and plot and reorganizing the sequence
“beginning-middle-end,” refusing to “sum-up” the meaning of the past; Mirror does
2 for a summary of some of the key issues of the debate regarding the “poetics of postmodern
history” as they are related to a series of contemporary films, one may consuit: Robert A.
Rosenstone’s article, “The future of the Past” In The Persistence ofHistory. New York $ Routiedge,
(1996; pp.2O3-2O6). Although I take issue with some of the facile and sweeping gestures of bis
argument, which entirely ignores or effaces the question of the mediation of the event, the distinctions
he introduces are interesting, useful, and descriptive.
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flot chronicle the past-present-future narratively3, nor make sense of history in terms
of the intrigue of an unfolding plot, but deploys a topical itinerary of links and send
ofl to recurring places or stations ofmemory (lieux de mémoire)4;
• by indulging in “creative anachronisms,” superposing stories and juxtaposing
storytellers, exploiting the cinema’s potential for repetition and narrative
undecidabffity; Mirror confuses temporal orders deliberately by forcing spectators to
confront the phantasmagoric “unheimlich” of the medium as a place for the exchange
between actual and virtual images, between the imagined and real, through the use of
doubles (the same actor playing the child of the narrator and the narrator as a child;
the same actress playing the wife of the narrator in the present and the narrator’s
mother in the past);
• by foregrounding the normally concealed attitude historians have to their material;
irony and melancholy being the overriding mood of the rhetorical tropes that
explicitly organize historical discourse and memory in Min-or;
• by working with audio-visual fragments and scraps to form intermedial “collages” of
memory resistant to the totalizing power of prose narratives of history, ffie
conventions of historical time (chronology, progression, completeness), and the
scholarly apparatus of footnotes, bibliography, and written sources; Min-or projects
history as a hallucination made possible by the vision and voice of a “collector” who
does not justil,’ and corroborate the accuracy of bis discourse, a collector interested in
This quality may flot be specific to the medium of film. As t argued carlier in Chapter 4, the
modernist techniques of writings by Joyce, Wo!f, or Stem significantly cal! into question the
organization of narrative, plot and intrigue.
“ I am flot referring to the more nuanced concept of “lieux de mémoire” discussed, notably, by Pierre
Nora. I am referring to the distinction between autobiographical narrative tropes and the topoi of the
“autoportrait” introduced in the work of Miche! Beaujour (1980. Miroirs d’encre: Rhétorique de
1 ‘autoportrail).
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working against the grain of officiai history by means of found newsreel footage,
traditional painting and lyric-epic poetry;
by implicitiy calling into question the authority of the medium of historicai
inscription (codex, parchment, printing); in Mirror history and memory is a kind of
rhytbmic pulse “sculpted in time” through the medium of cinematography, time
emerging outside of or imaffected by, written or spoken discourse.
When considering this final point, conceming the rhythmic temporality of film over against
the mere narrative “enunciation” ofa position or a discourse on History, I think we are forced
to tbink about the time-based medium of film outside of any simple notion of spectator
identification, seduction and consumption. for the temporal fabric of film, as a dynamic
passage of time aiways in a state of becoming, challenges its fixed status as an object to be
consumed by letting itseff be experienced only in a mobile series of relations. The
consideration of the medium as a signil’ying practice allows us to reflect upon the cinema as a
social activity without reducing the dynamic links between film production, circulation and
reception: continuously generating other experiences, acknowledging the plural texture of
life and the intervals between words, sounds, silences, and images, constantly inviting
viewers to follow the trace of a creative gesture that may be in tum restored, unmade or
remade5.
The Anamorphic Mirror of Counter-History
Following Ferro’s classification, I would like to argue that the historical discourse reflected
in Tarkovsky’s Mirror, and refracted between ail four social forums of discourse on the
production of history mentioned earlier, produces anamorphic effects. This would suggest a
correspondence to the anamorphic tricks of the mirror, tricks that bend that space between
Trinh T. Minh-ha discusses this point in “World as Foreign Land” In When the Moon Waxes Red,
p’95.
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truth and falsehood, clarity and mystery, perfect correspondence and distortion. Bend a
portrait photo into a cylinder shape and place it on the surface of a plane mirror: the features
wffl meit, distend, break apart on the mirror surface. Reverse the experiment and trace the
distorted traits onto a flat piece ofpaper and collect them once again at the virtual center ofa
cylindrical mirror. Such a transformation of geometrical dimensions is made possible in the
exchange of perspectives as they distend and extend between a flat surface and a cylinder.
Tarkovsky’s film is something of a such a flat mirror-surface reflecting the gaps, ruptures,
continuities, and dispersions oftime, as it were, caught in a cylinder.
In other words, the mirror-function of the cinematographic image in Mfrror is
anamorphic flot because it blurs, bends, distorts or deforms the image in itseff but because it
blurs that point of perspective, through the gaze of the child figure of the rebel-orphan. by
which a history might be produced—its place of production under one regime of belief being
destabilized and upset by several orders of truth. Tins would help us to take into account
Marc ferro’s second level of classification, according to winch films are produced either
from above (observing instance of power), from below (W the questions are analyzed from
the point of view of the masses, peasants, or workers), from within (as when a narrator
implicates himself in the go-between with the object of research), or from without (by
reconstructing social or political objectives without necessarily an interest in reconstituting
them in formai work). Although Ferro hesitates to categorize Tarkovsky’s position, in
contradistinction to his categorization of a host of other prominent directors, lie does remark:
“Toutfois il est posé, au préalable qu’une oeuvre filmique ou non, peut participer à plusieurs
instances”(1987; 225).
Tins is the anamorphic effect of Tarkovsky’s mirror of counter-History, that it
ambiguously reflects these positions form above, below, within and without, sometimes
simultaneousÏy contrasting these different positions and projections. Moreover, it is
anamorphic because it conceals and encodes a special way of seeing, specific to audio-visual
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techniques of cinematography and radically different form wriften historiography, by winch a
counter-Histoiy miglit be articulated from within the very frames of the dominant
institutional History without being subject to censorship6.
I would like to discuss briefly some of the stakes involved in the anamorphic-effect, on
the level of spectatorlreception theory and on the level of epistemology. For
spectator/reception-theory, the anamorphic effect assumes the necessity for viewing
difficuhy and for a multiplicity of views in the absence of a single linear-narrative economy
of causality. It is guided by the principle that, in order to access, to navigate, and to transmit
a counter-History, one must train spectators to understand the mechanics of orientation, of
the possibffity of registering the forbidden and the taboo by means of an optics of mirror-like
transformation of perspective. As Lacan noted, regarding Hans Holbein’s baroque
masterpiece, The Ambassadors, the anamorphosis is effected in the dramatic entr’act,
intermezzo or intermedium, of viewing when spectators change their position in the gallery
of tableau’s exposition and, looking back—in a glimpse--catch sight of or are caught by the
specter of death.
Examples of this anamorphic effect abound in Tarkovsky’s Mirror as he plays constantly
in that space opened by a mobile center for the production of history, at times identilying
with institutions and at other times with counter-institutions, with oral traditions, memories
and artistic artifacts. The anamorphic effect is signfficantly mediated by the figure of the
orphan-rebel who permits the passage from personal to collective memory when the hostile
yet innocent gaze is transformed into an apocalyptic vision. Masayev—an orphan boy,
having lost bis parents in the Leningrad blockade, also becomes a rebel and refuses to obey
the military discipline of the training master’s commands to tum about-face, to shoot the
6 should be noted that as that as the officiai organ of approvai and censorship, Mosfilm operated
mostly on the basis of the written script, the subtieties and tricks of images and sounds were rareiy
noticed by the police-culture of Iiteracy. Therefore, they were highiy suspicious of Tarkovsky’s
desire to operate on the basis of a script that would be adaptable to the unforeseeabie possibilities of
the set and the actors.
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target, or to remain obedient outside practice; instead he tums about-face twice, shoots
obliquely, and throws a dummy hand-grenade onto the shooting platform. It is through his
rebefflous eyes that the Lake $ivash documentary sequence, itself an orphan-flim archive7, is
introduced and paralleled in montage. As this scene ends, we see the rebel-orphan introduce
other apocalyptic clips of war and Maoist euphoria afier having dlimbed a snowy hifi into a
cinematographic recomposition of the tableau by Pieter Breugel the Elder—The Hunters in
the $now; lis gaze, as it faces and receives a bird (emblem of memoiy and of the Holy
Ghost), transforms the temporality ofthe historical material ofthe documentary clips through
the intermedial frame ofthe Breughel-tableau into an apocalyptic vision.
The complexity, ambiguhy, and contradictory nature of such a scene as it produces a
discourse on the production of the temporal experience of history and memory cannot be
underestimated. Mirror reveals that to transmit is also to transform this personal experience
of rebefflous refusai to speak in the name of the absent—a shattering of mirrors—refracted in
the polemical and abandoned eyes of the child and reoriented as a wifi to face the dead in ail
their enigmatic opacity, silence, and irrevocable distance. In other words, there is an ethics
poetic-politics in the tact of tins counter-history; Tarkovsky does flot contest official History
for the purpose of skirting its authority with playfiil irreverence like some Dadaist modemist
fllmmaker; on the contrary, Mirror reverently reflects the utopian dimension of this History
negatively in the anamorphic effects of the temporal medium of film. Tins is the importance
of understanding the time-passer as a child, an orphan, hostile to instruction. Tins child is
flot merely an instance for the enunciation of a counter-history or vision but a figure of the
very dislocation and transformation of time itseil through the blockade-boy we are put into
contact with a kind of temporal transformation of experience, that through winch the noise of
Orphan-fiims are cinematographic and televisual archives that have been abandoned by institutions
and anonymous producers for varions historic reasons. Their Ioss, and thus of an irrecoverable audio
visual testimony of the historicat events of the twentieth century, has been the subject of renewed
critical interest internationally.
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time may be heard and that through which the breath oftime may be feit. The anamorphoses
produced by Tarkovsky’s Mirror, then, are flot merely discursive reflections of a plurality of
contesting ideological positions; rather, on the level of the medium as a signli’ing practice,
they effect a serial metamorphosis of the temporal experience of reality. If this temporality is
thinkable in ail of its complexity and multiplicity as the movement of popular memoiy, then
wbat is the critical relatïonship between the inscription of this memory and traditional
historiography?
The Electr-Orality of Historical Consciousness
In order to inqufre into the savoir-faire of popular memory we must first discuss the place the
cinema occupies historicaily between a textual and a visual economy of history-tefling and
history-maldng, and the specific qualities of cinematography as a medium of historical
experience. In the words of Jean Louis Schefer,
Le cinéma dont j’ai été tenté de dire quelque chose non pas sur l’invention ou les
expérimentations narratives mais sur une mise en fonction de l’image embrayant des
appareils imaginaires, induisant des représentations d’univers, proposant comme
ressource poétique des explorations de détails, de durées, des modes
d’enchaînements, de décalages de réalité; le cinéma, lesté de la position
expérimentale du spectateur, a inventé une espèce de plasticité de durées dont les
détours, le rythme, les scansions longtemps articulées par des récits et des chroniques
écrites, composaient l’imagination presque exclusive de la vie et de l’Histoire (1997,
$7).
Considerations like these prompt Schefer to think about film as a technology of memory that
has fundamentaily changed the relationship humans have to history and to life, producing a
cultural mutation of knowledge and temporal experience equal to, if not more important than,
the changes brought about by the tremendous pressures and the speeds of twentieth century
events themselves. Tins is especiaily true because the cinema offers an entirely new
mnemonic technique ofrecording, witnessing, arid remembering reality.
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Le fait ou la possibilité même de l’enregistrement, ou de la constitution de bandes de
mémoire dont la préservation et la réactivation sont indépendantes des consciences de
sujets individuels (les consciences sont cadrées par des durées de vie), amorce une
mutation considérable de l’idée même de l’histoire: la mémoire des faits est devenue
réversible, susceptible de montage, et surtout d’accélération.(Schefer, 1997; 86)
Earlier in the dissertation I discussed how the mirror-figure of cinematography suggests more
than documentary realism of past events but brings about an original relationship to the past
and to the future as produced in the present, a relationship bom out of the persistent
materiality of the image and its rhythmic inscription of time, an inscription that would
contain the possibffity for the transformation of the perception, knowledge and experience of
human duration. Remarks like $chefer’s corroborate and extend these reflections.
One important consequence of tins “independence” of historical life from subjective
conscience is that film liberates a new relationship to language by restoring or re-inventing
something close to an earlier epic-form of oral memory, a kind of secondaiy orality brought
about by audio-visual technique. As Schefer explains, the popular memory of the historical
imagination, once constituted by the “scansions and rhythms of the written page,” would be
framed by the duration of life itseff in flim—expanding, compressing, repeating itseff in a
technological-material embodiment of memory winch is larger and infinitely more
extendable than the individual, a living breathing imaginary of rhythm moving freely through
and independently of individual consciences. In order to quali1r the transmissibility of tins
orality in film, an orality belonging also to other media and new technologies, T would like to
cail it an electr-orality ofinstorical consciousness.
In the rhythms of an economy of electr-orality, historical knowledge would undergo a
radical mutation for tins economy would disrupt the ontological structure of the scriptural
economy of writing. Edouard Glissant in ins essay “Le chaos-monde, 1 ‘oral et l’écrit”
discusses the promise of a “poetics of relation” in the “chaos-world” of beings—a visible
sign of the crisis of writing and its pretension to Being. According to Glissant, the age of
Western modernity is characterized by the rise of an instrumental relationship to language
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that structures the Being of beings in a universal system of transparent models of
“humanity,” an instrumental relationship constîtuted by the mediation ofwriting:
La prétention à l’être, qui définit des modèles transparents d’humanité et qui organise
des échelles d’accession à l’humain, est liée à l’apparition du signe et en particulier
du signe écrit. Il y a eu en Occident, en même temps et parallèlement, une marche
vers la transcendance de l’écriture par rapport aux oralités premières, et une
aspiration à l’être. (1994; 112)
The hegemonic insertion of oral culture in the culture of literacy involved the systematic
stabifization and recomposition of oral works in writing; this reinforced the pretension to
Being—and flnally, to consolidating the founding myths of the origins of a people upon a
territory. According to Glissant, the return of a poetic orality in contemporary writing,
including the modernist crisis of the “parole éclatée” is afready the sign of an opportunity to
rethink intercultural relations and historical truth by celebrating the pro liferation of beings
and by productively embracing the distance and the opacity of the total reaim of existence.
Tins radical experience with the word is afready being crossed in audio-visual technique, and
tins brings about the crisis of tins Western ontic model of language (1994; 115). In other
words, audio-visual technique, as it inscribes the temporal materiality of the world also
inevitably inscribes its resistance and its opacity, and this introduces another way of
remembering, another way of being bistorical and relating to the proliferation of beings and
their stories. Audio-visual technique marks the advent of another historical relationship to
language in a world marked by the distress ofthat winch is lost and that winch remains “afler
prose”, a relationship that can only be explored by caffing into question the fundamental
epistemological categories that structure historical knowledge8.
See Silvestra Mariniello’s discussion of Primo Levi’s experience of poetry in the concentration
camps : «Nous vivons dans Paprès-prose: dans un univers où la technologie alimentée par
l’économie de consommation a créé une nouvelle oralité; dans un univers qui nous impose de
repenser toutes nos catégories épistémologiques. Nous vivons la transition d’une hégémonie à une
autre, un temps de «détresse », si l’on veut reprendre Hèlderlin et Heidegger, lui aussi marqué d’un
double manque : le «ne plus» de certains dieux enfuis (l’Etat, l’écriture, l’Histoire linéaire et
progressiste, etc.) et le «pas encore» de ceux qui vont venir. La Shoah et l’expérience des camps de
concentration marquent à jamais la coupure et la distance infranchissable entre les deux: le «ne
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Do the multiple rhythms of film as an audio-visual mediation of historical time lay daim
to a competence for rendering the plurality and the multiple rhythms of temporal experience?
Or do these multiple rhythms of film disrupt the temporal framework of historical narrative
because they disturb a sense of ontology continuously stabilized, visibly or invisibly, by the
practices of historiography—even those with multi-temporal features? This question wffl be
explored in the next chapter when comparing the narrative competence of “Braudelian”
history in film.
At this point, however, I would like to ask the question in order to highlight the potential
disjuncture between the literate comprehension of the rhytbms of historical events and the
electr-orality of historical consciousness invented by the rhythms of film. The question may
be asked, even while recognizing the impossibility of venturing into a thorough historical
discussion of the conditions for the transformation of the ontic structure of language. I am
referring to the work of a investigation which, according to Wlad Godzich, has “flot yet”
begun due to the historical and theoretical poverty of the debate concerning language; for
even in spite of the distinguished efforts of language and media scholars like Goody,
McLuhan, Ong, and Illych, no comprehensive account is available to us (1993; 2). Part of
the theoretical poverty of the debate, Godzich contends, is its lack of critical attention to the
modem processes of literacy that adhere to the Parmenidean doctrine, a doctrine in winch
authority of being and saying are “identffled” in the subject, a structure consolidated for
example by the “language market,” the culture of “literacy” and by the rise of the nation
state in the mass-culture ofprint9.
plus» et le «pas encore ». Et la poésie ? La poésie, cette «combinaison de matérialité et
d’immédiateté », peut-elle nous aider à redéfinir notre façon d’opérer dans le monde, notre façon
d’être «historiaux» ? Peut-elle constituer une forme de médiation historique qui nous permettre
d’assimiler les expériences ? Comment? faut-il encore parler de poésie?» (1997; 67).
‘ Nonetheless, Godzich does attempt to sketch the broad features of such an argument in ail of bis
work, ftom bis collaborative work with Jeremy Kittay in The Emergence of Prose (1987) to the
collection ofcritical essays in The Culture ofLiteracy (1994), many of which are critical prefaces to
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In his essay, “The Language Market Under the Hegemony of the Image,” Godzich daims
that “[...Jthe introduction of print technology insured that the ideological commitment of
humanism to linguistic universalism received the support of literacy[.
. .1” (1993; 4). Godzich
goes on to address how tins definitive role that literacy played within Modernity, as an
organizing political force responding to the requirements of the vast expansion of the state,
the economic sphere, and the production of knowledge, is now being re-defined or mutated in
the context of the hegemonic mediation of images of electronic media, entailing a
“diminution in the role played by the type of language that the culture of literacy is built
upon: the so-called natural language as universal mediator, the language of presence and
fiillness of experience” (1993; p.9). This historical premise frames the speculative reflection
conceming language and the hypokeimenon in the Modem World-Picture: the changeable
relationship that the modem subject entertains with respect to the identity of being and
saying. In the age of literacy, the subject is marked by the consciousness that this identity of
the “sayabffity of being” is perhaps a “fiction” and even becomes ironically detached from
the ground of his/her uuerances; and the process ofthis realization is marked by at least three
definitive moments of modem subjectivity: revolutionary disifiusion, pragmatism, and
cynicism.
In the more humble margins of tins dissertation, the question concerning the
technological mediation of language is raised in order to highlight the inadequacy and
conservatism of that kind of thinking that has essayed to address the question of the audio
visual production of History in a “postliterate” age. The potential for thinking, discovering,
and inventing what Glissant has called the “chaos-world,” a world in winch the historical life
of the imagination undergoes a metamorphic change in the electr-orality of audio-visual
technique, is rather conservatively “tamed” even by those critics advocating the rise of a new
the work of seminal studies in Narratology and Historiography which have been translated and edited
by the University of Minnesota Press.
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kind of bistory in film. Tins chaotic potential concerning the material agency of the
historical life of beings is once again occluded in order to make legitimating daims about the
organization of knowledge within the culture of literacy. It is generally conceded that the
historical world created by film “stands adjacent” to written and oral history; film being itseff
in between both, a “postliterate equivalent of the preliterate way of dealing with the past”
(Rosenstone; 2001, 65). Critics like Rosenstone often stop here by admitting that literacy has
inevitably and irreversibly intervened in the historical comprehension of the past; in order to
be taken seriously, the “preliterate poetics” of film must add to rather than “violate the
overail data and meanings of what we afready know of the past” and must stand “apposite to
the truths of that discourse” legitimated by the print culture of literacy, where documentary
realism of event and detail prevails in the practice of historiography (2001; 66). Rather than
being radically interrogative of the hegemony of literacy in print culture, audio-visual
technique and its affiliation with preliterate forms of memory are additive supplements, or
simply distracting elements, to the acquisition of an accumulative knowledge of history. The
potentially contaminating influence and unsecuring function of the problem of pre-literate
memory discovered in audio-visual technique is reduced and placed back into the logic of
“supplementary proof’.
The Past as Passage
On another level but in similar terms, tins explains some of the resistance feit towards the
practices of the “ferro school” of cinema-historians who, according to Christian Delage and
Serge Daney, too oflen looked to the cinema for a confirmation of knowledge afready
acquired elsewhere, reducing the cinematographic image of time to a kind of “supplementary
proof’ of documentary history. As Serge Daney explains, “En fait, ne voyant dans le cinema
que l’aubaine d’une source d’information supplémentaire, elle passait à côté de ce qui est,
dans le cinéma, ontologiquement historique» (1991; 88). Taking André Bazin’s ontological
160
grounding of the question of the historie ontology of the image, the interesting problem
raised by ferro’s opening question “Is there a flimic vision of History?” remains in ail its
initial enigmatic mystery : How does the cinematographic image of time activate the links
and ruptures of the past in original ways and allow the past “to pass” in way unknown to,
because unfixed by, the medium of written and spoken discourse ? The past as passage,
materially shaped in the magical mimetic and rhythmic medium of film would mark the
advent of another history made possible by audio-visual technique’°. What might this mean
? It seems that there may be at least three complementary aspects of the idea of the
mediation of the past as passage. I would like to sketch the broad implications of these
aspects before exploring them in more detail in Chapter 6.
first, the passage of the past can be understood as kind of historical experience made
possible in the medium and remaining uncontained by the final edited and distributed form
and content of the film. Following this reasoning, the space of filmic discourse on History
should flot and cannot be reduced to the production of a filmic object since what matters is
flot the final edited film but the social process of meaning inscribed in the presence of the
film, a mobile continuum of relations crossing the context of the fllm’s production,
spectatorship and critical appropriation as weil as the irreducible and dynamic contact
between cinematography and reality”.
Second, this mobile continuum of relations is itseff constituted by the infinitely
reproducible material presence of the film, its very temporal materiality, the series of
temporal folds, speeds and pressures inscribed in the duratïon of shots and sequences. for
the singularities of events remain, leaving material traces in the ribbon of the film, however
much they be edited, spliced, or transformed in tum. The temporality of these events would
° I owe the very phraseology of this thought to the suggestive research and reflection, currently
undertaken by Silvestra Mariniello, “Le cinerna: t ‘avénement d’une autre histoire”... (publication
forthcorning).
Talens and Zunzunegui, «film History as Narration» (1997, 33) paraphrasing Mariniello, Et Cine
et et fin dcl arte (1992).
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resist bein reduced to the substrate of representational knowledge constituting modem
historiography where it is ftxed by the conceptual framework of homogenous and empty time
and oriented largely by the scheme of linear progression, sequential causality and narrative
chronology’2. Instead, these rhythmic traces would radically change the perceptibility of
events and alter the character of thefr intelligibiïity.
Indeed, liirror is an implicit critique of historiography from this point of perspective, for
the phases of historical time are transmitted outside of their setting and placement within an
absolute temporality in the scriptural economy of a chronicle of events. Like many postwar
films, Mirror demonstrates that when time is fragmented and chronology is pulverized--like
so many pieces of a shattered crystal shaving the past, present, and future phases of time--the
merely chronological continuum of history and memory is flayed into a distinct series of
discontinuous and incommensurable intervals. For when time is no longer derived from
movement but eccentric and aberrant movement derived from time, then story, memory and
experience are fundamentally transformed because they are mediated by incommensurable
intervals and irrational divisions oftime.
This brings me to the third consideration of the past as passage. As the incommensurable
and irrational divisions of time “pass” in the rhythmic temporality of film, they bring about a
narrative crisis which foregrounds a larger crisis in that form of knowledge and truth
consolidated by the literate pretension to Beingt3 : for that winch divides the inside from the
outside, the mmd from the body, the mental from the physical, and the imaginary from the
real are no longer decidable qualities because a certain regime of truth, to use Deleuze’s
Nietzschian terms, has become “falsffied” by the “irrational” powers ofthe time-image.
12 The critique of this conception and orientation of time, as Walter Benjamin has rigorously argued
in his Theses on Ihe Philosophy of History, constitutes a critique of the notion of the progress of
mankind itself and history must be rethought in revolutionary terms.
13 These terms about the < literate pretension to Being » refer back to Edourd Glissant’s critique,
mentioned earlier, conceming the Iiterary «dispositif» in which the techniques of writing consolidate
a transcendental aspiration to Being (1994).
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In this sense, the scrap-book of genres in Mirror—from autobiography, epic and lyric
poetry, flctional docudrama, and documentary—should be viewed beyond its challenge to
aesthetic principles of the poetics of cinema as a more fimdamental challenge to
epistemology. My hypothesis, although it needs to be tested, is that the multiple
temporalities of these diverse film sequences resist thefr fixation in a poetics of genre—
however modemist the techniques; they do flot simply make a more various narrative
structure or introduce a multi-temporal history. When the forces of time outstrip the
narrative capabffity of history then time can no longer be slowed down or “made human” by
written language; for the passage of time in the image would make written language stutter,
flot in order to get back to some pseudo pre-linguistic reality but in order to melt language
down’4, to make it shudder and become the medium of a passage of a world of examples that
do not have their eo-ordinates in us, that are no longer organized as utterances to speak
themselves in a manageable scriptural and textual economy’5. The rhythm of film would
introduce the historical materiality of the chaos-world of beings into another form of history
making, in winch the voices, bodies, vapors, waffing cries, ambient noises, whispers,
shadows, lights, glows, gestures, faces, and colors of events would pass in time, breathing in
14 Gilles Deleue and Claire Parnet speak in these ternis when defending the possibility of inventing
another relationship to language, one characterized by its «minority usage» or by the repetition and
movement of its rhythmic musical returning, its ritournelle «... .inventer le bégaiement, pas pour
rejoindre une pseudo-réalité pré-linguistique, mais pour tracer une ligne vocal ou écrite qui fera
couler le langage entre ces dualismes (multiplicité/totalité; rhizome/arbre; géographie/histoîre), et qui
définira un usage minoritaire de la langue... » ( Dialogues, 1996; 42).
15 Michel de Certeau, discusses the possibility of making literate language shudder in ternis of the
material practice of reading: in the duration of the pause or in the acceleration of reading, there is the
possibility of inventing the “given” use of the print-language of texts, for the eye and the mmd can
cross the text in a kind of “braconnage” that gives back the itinerary, the pulse, the voice, in short —
the life that belongs to the breath of the word. De Certeau argues that this puts the reader in touch
with that which escapes the scriptural economy of representing and organizing the moments of
enunciation. In his words, “Il y a partout ces résonances de corps touchés, tels des “gémissements” et
bruits d’amour, cris brisant le texte qu’ils vont faire proliférer autour d’eux, lapsus énonciatifs dans
une organisation d’énoncés” (L ‘Invention du quotidien 1: Arts de faire, 1990; 238).
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the duration of images and magically repeatÏng themselves in the inlinitely extendable life
world of film.
The past as passage wouM mark the advent of an electr-orality of historical consciousness
because time would breathe alongside and into the movement of the word, a word which
does flot pretend to represent or to comprehend the totality of beings and existence in a
univocal and transparent structure of Being, a word which integrates the opacity, the distance
and the ceaseless becoming of beings in its movement with the world. This movement of the
word “speaks” in its silent encounter with the historical milieu of the image. No longer
bringing the narrative capabffity of speech or story to explain or to insert the rhythms of film
in a structure of organized ufferances, the speaking of this word is also a suspension of
speech, an opening to othemess.
In Mirror, the history of the orphans of the Spanish Civil War (Sequence DC), forced
to leave their homeland and who, as refugees and immigrants in Russia, can neyer retum
home; this history of exile cannot be written or represented but only analogicaily suggested
and evoked in the space between the mise-en-scene and the re-play of documentary footage.
First, we witness a mise-en-scene of these orphans as adults in the scene of thefr unexplained
reunion in Mexei’s apartment. It becomes clear that their memory, identity, and traditions
are founded in the loss of the homeland and that tins loss is inscribed in the body, in the
deterritorialized and fetishized relationship between language, body, music, and image.
Hostile to the postures of the buil-ring matador and the false choreographies of the flamenco
dance, one of the orphan-refugee-adults, Luisa, speaks of the ignorance and the vanity of the
others’ attempt to re-produce the presence of a Spain irrecoverably missing in their
memories. When Natalia attempts to draw her out by asking about Luisa’s feelings of the
homeland, Luisa leaves in silence for her experience cannot be spoken.
Yet the elect-orality of historical consciousness in the historical milieu of images
intervenes in tins silence and opens freely and indirectly into the sequence of documentaiy
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newsreel footage of some of the Spanish refugee-orphans, their faces persisting in the
magical materiality of the image. The bodily presence of these orphans in the rhythms of
film suggest the negative temporality of exilic experience, the terril,ring experience of forced
deracination; and yet thefr voices, sometimes audible and sometimes silent in the duration of
the time-image, seem to rend and to consume the image itseif in the hot desperation of their
trembling and wailing bodies. Especially there, in the face of the littie girl, ($hot 79, B/W
documentary newsreel) holding a doil, who tums to the camera as the mournful sound of the
boat-hom beilows in the distance. Her expression is impressïvely recorded in the duration of
the shot, expressively changing from a kind of listless drifiing gaze--to that of total
surrender--to that, flnally, of absolute and terrilying interrogation. Viewers are confronted
wfth the “heat” of those moments and also with that gaze, “faced” with the question in her
eyes: Is it possible to give a face to the grievous wailing and Ioss of that frremediably
historical moment, weighed in the wake ofthe heavy silence ofthe boat-hom?
And yet the image cuts, breaks into the interval of another, quite unrelated sequence: the
B/W documentary newsreel of the record-brealdng Soviet ascent by balloon into the
stratosphere (early 1930’s). Unrelated historically and chronologically, yet related by the
materiality of the rhythm and organicafly connected and joined in the temporal
correspondence of drill and suspension. Total silence. A long-shot from below reveals a
soldier seated on a swing dangling from a perfectly round hot-air balloon. This bailoon and
soldier are seen juxtaposed next to the loose strings and enormous presence of a mother
balloon, an image that suspends speech, as it lifis and drills out of frame.
Rhythm, Electr-Orality, and the Poet’s Voice-Over
Speech soars into the air at the same time that one sees the earth sink more and more
into itseif.. . And if the voice winch speaks to us of corpses, of a whole me of corpses
that have just lain beneath the earth, then at tins moment, the least stirring of the wind
across tins deserted land, across tins empty space you have beneath your eyes, the
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smallest hoilow in tins earth, ail of tins takes on meaning. (Gifles Deleuze, < Avoir
une idée en cinéma» (translated by D.A’ Rodowick, 1997; 139)
The movement of speech Deleuze describes here is also the movement of the pneumos in
Min-or : the inscrutable breath of a wind, the dynamic ethos of rhytbm. Tins movement of
speech is also the voice-over of the poet as it interacts dynamically with ffie historical
passage of the past, the newsreel footage of Lake Sivash being a particularly remarkable
moment of tins interaction (Sequence XII). Tarkovsky notes the “aching poignancy” of this
documentary sequence because the simple people fllmed are recorded “in one single event
continuously observed” by an extraordinarily gified camera-man who penetrated the dramatic
moment of the Soviet advance through the Crimea in 1943 (1986; 130-131). I have afready
described the way in winch this sequence is “enunciated” through the hostile and abandoned
eyes of the rebel-orphan Afasyev—transforming the gaze into a vision, working a
metamorphosis in the temporal experience ofreality as the orphan-footage passes.
Yet it would be more accurate to say that the Lake $ivash sequence is introduced
analogicaily by recording the step of the children as they are put into a kind of contact with
the rhythms of the documentary film. for afier playing the prank of the hand-grenade with
the sheil-shocked instructor, Afasyev takes his leave (Shot 110) and the children march
behind him. Tins brief shot makes the cinldren’s mardi parailel to the newsreel footage of
the trudging soldiers. It is from tins point of perspective that the footage is to be seen, since it
is enunciated socially by Masyev and the troop of children he leads: the cut to their rising
off the platform demonstrates the way spectators must bridge the gap separating the shot of
the children as they rise to take their leave and the shot of the «fali» of their «fathers» in
the previous shot. The social practice of the historical imagination in Min-or is inseparable
from this emblematic eschatology: the visibiilty and visuality of the scene imposes, in the
passive but open attentiveness of spectatorship, an act of the imagination to take on or pass
within the historical burden implied by the economy of tins transition from the orphan
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children to the lost fathers, a transition that is structured by the “horizon of the end.” Yet
how does this sequence speak?
Behind the splash of boots we hear the drums and voices from the requiem refrain
building and falling. Underscoring the continuous splash of the water, we hear the dim
regular beat of the drums of Artemeyev’s requiem-refrain, itseff iooseiy discontinuous with
the spiash of water. The disjunction of sounds has the remarkable quality of supporting the
frregular rhythm of the men’s feet even while it cails attention to, and hoids onto, the
historical distance between viewers and the bodies on the screen. It creates an aurai daze in
the viewing experience, one located in the disorientation ofthe ear to the reality ofthe image.
In the next series of shots, we witness the traces of an historical event recorded in ail of
its singularity: the soldiers marching and trudging through the mud along an endÏess gray
horizon, shoring up their strength and attempting to salvage their cannons and equipment on
a rail to cross the Lake. Shot 117 is recorded like an immense melancholy time-scuipture,
but as a “sculpture” it does flot commemorate the dead and the absent but bears witness to
them in thefr distance; although it may be cailed by some to be a witnessing of a kind of
heroic sacrifice by and for the peopie of the Russian nation in a time of the Soviet
engagement in World-War16—it does flot set viewers in the empty homogeneous time of
historiography, nor does the witnessing have the character of a tribute to the “anonymous
soidiers” with whom the viewer might identi1 and conmmne in the invisible image of the
nation-state; it articulates another temporality—one of profound un-mooring--one to winch
the movement ofthe rafi offers a suggestive parallel.
Tins audio-visuai drill and dislocation permits viewers to pass and become the passage of
the historicai traces of film, to become witnesses of a time to winch they do flot belong but
Again Tarkovsky’s own remarks confirm something of this interpretation: “The scene was about
that suffering which is the price of what is known as historical progress, and of the innumerable
victims whom, ftom time immemorial, it has claimed. It was impossïble to believe for a moment that
such suffering was senseless. The images spoke of immortatity, and Arseniy Tarkovsky’s poems
were the consummation ofthe episode because they gave voice to its ultimate meaning” (1986, p.’30)
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winch brushes up against them, activating memories and inventing another form of historical
consciousness. This is why Tarkovsky daims that he knew upon seeing this “orphan
newsreeP’ for the first time that this episode had to become “the heart and nerve” of a picture
that bad started off merely as bis own “intimate lyrical memories” (1986; 130).
How does the voice of the poet speak ? In $hot 122, the time-monument recedes out of
the frame and this time we see two officers moving against the current to encourage the men
with the wave of their hands to continue onward and onward. Music and water give way, in
the insistence of this very gesture to push onwards, to the steady, musical, heraldic voice of
the poet, Arseniy Tarkovsky, reciting his poem « Life, Life .» It is significant that the poetic
recitation does flot chime in from the beginning of the sequence, but follows mid-way and
takes its eue from the marching of feet, the irregular splash of water, as well as the dim
suspension of the requiem-refrain. The oral-voice is underscored and lifted by the material
rhytbms of the world, the marching tread of a generation of living soldiers; more, this
rhythmic temporality is the very key signature and stave along which the oral voice is
registered and transposed. The rhythm of his voice—the historical breath of the body and the
imaginary of the poet--dynamically interacts with the step of the soldiers’ boots and the
gestures and the traces of film.
The historical “flesh” of the voice of the poet speaks over the endless horizon of grey
earth, water and sky, in prophetic exhortation: “Ail of us are on the sea-shore now, and I am
one of those who haul the nets when a shoal of immortality cornes in. Live in the house---and
the house wffl stand.” Nowhere do the words and the images seem to betray and to oppose
each other more; the visual traces inscribed by the camera cannot coincide with the strident
echoes of Tarkovsky’s utopian exhortation to build the house; yet a powerful dimension of
film is formed out of their incommensurable but complementary relationship. The past
cannot be saved nor salved by the words of the poet; the word of the poet passes alongside
the passage of the past and out of the temporal division of word and sound, secular past and
16$
utopian future, perception and anticipatory ifiumination, a powerful act of the historical
imagination is relayed.
The poetry of tins sequence of shots does flot consist in the mere recitation of written
verse about the meaning of life, a meaning winch would symbolically “explain” the sense of
the images. As I have argued repeatedly, in order to corne to thinking a non-instrumental
relationship to technology, particularly to the mediations of audio-visual technique, it is
necessary to rethink the relationship between the subject, language, and the world as it is
revealed in the medium of film. This rethinldng marks the moment of poetry as a practice, a
practice the revolutionary movement of winch may be discemed in the dynamic rhythm of
film. Film rhythm may be discerned in the movement of its temporal materiafity without
being defined because rhythm cannot be restrained, contained, or flxed by the subject
securing function of formalist poetics, genre criticism and modem aesthetics as rnetrics. To
foliow a reflection on poetry outside of these categories and forms of knowing means
rethinldng the relationship between poetry and subjectivity, where poetry is no longer the
stylistic “expression” of an interior subjectivity, no longer the narcissistic lyric-monologue
closed on the individual. Poetry cannot be contained by its designation as “verse-writing” or
“cine-genre”.
for this reason, the relationsinp between “cinema and poetry” needs to be thought
together, outside of those paths suggested, for example, by Maya Turovskaya in her study,
Tarkovsky: Cinerna as Poetiy (1989), especially in her thematic chapter on cinema as poetry.
I would like my essays to begin where her essay ends, by calling into question the necessity
of defining the essentially “poetic” nature of Tarkovsky’s cinema through the legitimating
words ofthe great spokesman ofthe Russian Formalists, Victor Sfflovsky:
There is a cinema of prose and a cinema of poetry, two different genres. They are
distinguished from one another not by rhythm, or flot by rhythm alone, but by the fact
that in poetic cinema elements of form prevail over elements of meaning, and it is
they, rather than the meaning, winch determine composition (cited in Turovskaya,
1989; 101).
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Accepting the distinction between “cine-genres” in winch either the “elements of form” or
the “elements of meaning” prevail and determine the composition, Turovskaya describes how
Tarkovsky’s films strove to work in a kind of “compositional poetic form” over against a
“prosaic, plot-centered form,” because the “straightforward narrative” could flot “contain the
pressure of ideas awakened by the story” (1986; 101). Rather than content ourselves with
these formalist categories ofnarratology (prose/poetry; plot/stoiy), we may wonder about tins
pressure of ideas and this awakening to story as a flmction of rhythm. Rhythm in Mirror,
the historical compression and acceleration of time flowing in the shots, through shots, and
analogically connected to other shots, provokes this kind of awakening to the historicai
irruption of events. An awakening to the material pressure of time—not onlyto the pressure
of ideas—a series of multiple rhythms that scramble and suspend the narrative capabffity of
speech—making it stammer and stutter.
for these reasons, I would like to advance the idea of poetry as a practice, a dynamic
mediation of experience brought about continuously by working in the experience of
technological mediations, of winch verse-writing and film-maldng are only moments. As a
practice with the multiple traces and rhythms of historical experience, poetiy is eminently a
poetical-political-ethical activity. As Meschonnic argues,
Le lien entre le rythme et le sujet vient de ce que j’entends par pensée poétique, une
invention du rythme, au sens où le rythme n’est plus une alternance formelle mais une
organisation du sujet. Et la poésie et la pensée poétique, je la définis comme une
invention du sujet telle qu’elie invente indéfiniment d’autre sujets. (Meschonnic,
1995; 13)
How might we follow Meschonnic’s lead about the “mutual invention” of subjectivity and
language in the rhythm of poetry and apply tins thinking in the study of the rhythm of film?
We might begin by saying that the rhythm of the voice-over of the poem is not simply a
formai alternation of accents and beats, nor merely the phonic materiality of sound and the
oral grain of the voice, but the material organization of movement in language by a subject
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and of thê subject by language. As this subjectivity and historicity dynamically and
organically interacts with the rhythm of film, a potentialiy inlinite work of historicity is
begun, by which one subject passes into another and by wbich an electr-orality of historical
conseiousness is created in the passage from subject to subject.
Such a thought takes us into the heart of Osip Mandelstam’s revolutionary thinking about
the power of the word and its relationship to culture, on the one hand, and the power of
rhythm and its relationship to the state, on the other. In his essay “The Word and Culture,”
Mandeistam explains the historical situation of Russian post-revolutionary poetry—a
situation which is also the situation ofthe poetry ofAndrey and Arseny Tarkovsky:
Poetry is the plough that turns up time in such a way that the abyssal strata oftime, its
black earth, appear on the surface. There are epocbs, however, when mankind, flot
satisfied with the present, yeaming like the plougbman, for the abyssal strata of time,
thirst for the virgin soil of time. The life of the word has entered a heroic era. The
word is flesh and bread. It shares the fate of flesh and bread: suffering. People are
hungry. The State is even hungrier. But there is something stili hungrier : lime, lime
wants to devoir the State. . . b show compassion for the State winch denies the word
shail be the contemporary poet’s social obligation and heroic feat. (1997 ; pp.7O-7l)
If the poet stands between the hunger of lime and the hunger of the People and the State,
then his social obligation, bis place in the polis is deflned by the brealdng and the sharing of
the breaxi and the flesh of the word. Not only is the poet’s place politically deflned, but the
political life of the state cannot be thought and the culture of the people cannot be built
without the compassion of the poet. b be the guardian and the ploughman of the word
winch is inscribed with the geological strata oftime, one must understand that the crafi ofthe
“word-smith” ofpoetry defines and constitutes the spirit ofthe collective—living and dead.
Tins is why Mandelstam placed such high importance on the principle of rhythm in
poetry. In bis essay on “Govemment and Rhythm,” Mandeistam states that “The collective
does flot exist. It must still be born. Collectivism appeared before the collective, and if social
education does flot corne to its aid we shail be in danger of collectivism without the
collective” (1979; 67). The mass ofthe new society is held, according to Mandeistam, by the
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sotidarity ôf a concord of goals. The collective is held together by rhythm; but neither
collective nor rhythm exist--nor are they prepared to be bom yet. In Mandelstam’s words,
the “syncretic fusion of the political-poetical elements of body, space, time and motion”
which would be necessary for the creation of a future history has only just awakened from
prolonged lethargy and. . . has flot yet realized ail its possibifities” (69). If a state based upon
collectivism has lefi out the collective, it has lefi out the place ofrhythm and the place ofthe
poet in the polis; the collective does flot exist and the people are “not yet” because rhythm
bas flot yet been given an intennediate and independent position suitable for such a social
force.
Returning to the practice of poetry and rhytbm in Mirror I would like to suggest that the
dynamic historical materiality of these shots and the breathing imaginary of the voice-over
bring about the beginnings of such a creative utopian position and such a social force of
energy: Rhythm inscribes the not-yet and the unlcno body of the collective in the fiirrows
and the strata of time. This is why the poet cari make a daim on the “immortality” of the
people—not because the people are afflmied in some timeless and essential identity and
rescued by the prophetic power of the poet—but because the principle of a people’s utopian
hope to live together is projected in a kind of anticipatory illumination that would transfigure
the scars of mortal existence. The time-machine of the cinema generates this promise even
more irresistibly, for however much it mummifies and embalms the presence of bodies in
time, it also works to re-activate the immanent becomings of the body of the collective. I
wffl retum to the paradoxically “dystopian” character of this utopian “awakening” of the
historical imagination in the next chapter.
Chapter 6: Rhythm and the Mediation of Historical Events
These poetical-political-ethical considerations indicate the necessity of developing a
theory of the rhythmic temporality of film in order to understand the radical novelty of
audio-visual technique for historical knowledge. What is meant here by rhythmic
temporality? The experience of time that is made possible or mediated by the material
inscription of events of different speeds. The speed of the modem event is that winch
challenges the narrative competence of the subject and also that winch allows time to be
shown and perceived in the time-image as a play ofdifferent rhythms and cadences.
As Walter Benjamin intimated’, speed defines something ofthe political dimension of
the work of art in the age of mechanical reproduction: for technics radically transforms
traditional relationships to property. For Benjamin tins is flot only because a
revolutionary politics is released in the mass distraction of media, as boundaries
separating producer and audience are erased, or when opposing discourses on History
clash and expose a hidden reality about the institutional apparatus of history-making. On
a more fimdamental level, technics transforms property because the relationship to what
is “proper” to substance itself the “Aristotelian” stuif of matter, is reversed as the
possibffity of its transmission; that is, speed, reproducibility, and portability have become
structural and flot merely accidental to the transmissibility of mass-media materials2.
Historical knowledge is flot merely transmitted into a different medium without being
affected; in its transmission, and as a dynamic form of the transmissibility of events, it is
also transformed materially. A social theory of media does flot exhaust the implications
of the question that ferro raises in the first place; the question concerning the original
“The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” In Illuminations. New York:
Schocken Books, 1968.
2 For these remarks, I am grateful to Rey Chow’s insightful commentary in “Media, Matter,
Migrants” Writing Diaspora, Bloomington: lndiana UP, 1993. p. 170.
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links and ruptures introduced by the cinematographic/filmic vision of history. This
question opens the possibffity for reflecting on the mediation of the historical event in the
rhythmic properties of the film medium, and it is here, I thinlç that the question must be
pushed flirther. How does film-transmission transform the substance or “materiality” of
History?
The Multiple Rhythms of History
The audio-visuaÏ technique of the time-based medium of film, far from merely
representing, circulating or contesting History, constitutes a new form of historical
experience and knowledge in the rhythmic temporality of film. This affirmation takes us
into the heart of the problem conceming the mediation of the historical event in the
multiple rhythms of film. Do these multiple rhythmic traces escape or resist ail models of
narrative predication? To begin to answer tins question, we need to take a brief detour
into another model ofthe critique ofhistoriography and its potential application in film.
Michèle Lagny, a flim-historian interested in applying Braudelian modes of
historical-writing to the filmic narrative, resumes some of the main premises on winch
historical narrative was contested by the Annales school: 1) the disqualification of
narrative as founded upon a succession of political events and figures; 2) the
reconfiguration of the axis of time and its treatment by historians, who no longer
privilege a univocal, linear, and continuous framework, but ailow narrative to function
on the principle of several temporal axes and orientations; 3) the valorization of a
historical practice of writing based on larger and more massive structures of socio
economic and discursive phenomena recorded as the organization of different levels of
time occurring at different speeds; 4) the invention of a historical grid structured as much
upon rupture and discontinuity as it is upon continuity (1994; 18).
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At the same time, Lagny, in the wake of Paul Veyne’s critique of historiography, is
particularly vigilant when applying these forms of critique in the fleld of flim-studies.
She denounces the “simplistic and reductionist” tendencies of critical gestures in film
studies that dismiss, with a kind of disdainful brevity, ail historical narrative as founded
upon a kind of linearity which can now be easily surpassed. It is flot enough to state that
the irreverent poetics of contemporary film-practices liquidate, once and for ail, the
“linearity” of historical narrative when in fact much of this narrative has been
preoccupied, at least implicitly if flot explicitly, with rendering the plurality of temporal
experience. In an attempt to correct this tendency, she describes the problem in the
following terms:
La vraie question qui se pose est de savoir quelle place et quel statut donner à
l’événement, et comment trouver le mode narratif qui fasse la part des lenteurs
de la longue durée, des rythmes cycliques, des crises, comme le réclamait
Braudel lorsqu’il insistait sur le caractère polyphonique de l’histoire et sur la
nécessité de l’exposer sur un mode quasi musical. (Lagny, «Le film et le temps
braudélien », 1994; p.19)
Lagny relies on the competence of cinema to render the pluri-temporality of History in ail
of its quasi-musical polyphony and complexity. Insofar as the cinema can weave a
narrative made of events with phenomena of a longer duration, she argues that it has a
large part to play in the re-writing of history since it is able to conserve, in the diegetic
strategies of film, something of the epic and global part of historical narrative, as in
Braudel’s quasi-Homeric study La Méditerranée.
On the other hand, Lagny adds-- in the light of Rancière’s critique, cinema may help
to generate alternate ways of recounting the piecemeal and fragmentaiy history of a
contemporary world winch no longer has great myths oforigin.
Pour Rancière, c’est justement parce que, depuis l’âge à la fois de la grande
industrialisation et de la démocratie, depuis l’âge des «masses », les structures
symboliques anciennes et devenues inadaptées ont été détruites, mais pas
remplacées. C’est aussi parce qu’il n’y a plus de modèle pour régler
l’organisation du discours-récit: il n’y a plus de Livre, ni de Loi, qui puisse
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servir de fondement (d’origine) au récit, en même temps que de centre (de lieu
d’articulation) à la diversité des rhythmes temporels. (1994; 2$)
In the absence of the central identification between a discourse of the logos with a
founding mythe story of origin or muthos, Lagny defends the idea that contemporary
film can produce a kind of « post-Braudelian» piecemeal narrative, an alternate form of
narration generated by the coalescence of historical and flctional temporalities. We
might add to tins, the suggestion that an alternative fonn of witnessing, tracing, and
remembering history becomes possible in the electr-orality of historical consciousness—
because it is marked by the absence ofterritorialltextual myths oforigin.
According to Lagny, tins fictionallhistorical coalescence is rendered by the temporal
plasticity of film, the permeable borders of historical and fictional temporality being
crossed by the concordances and disjunctures of images and sounds, or by the crystalline
circuits of the time-image—the indiscemible exchange between actual and virtual
images. Clearly such a perspective on the filmic vision of history is pertinent to the
analysis of the rhytbmic temporalities of Mirror, a film winch is structured by the
altemation between the rhythms of collective memory and personal memory. In
Tarkovsky’s Mfrror, the long durations of major events in the twentieth century are
punctuacted, perforated, and folded by the short but intense durations of daily life, of the
utopian and dystopian memories of childhood; tins alternating exchange between
personaVcollective memories and long!short durations is structured by the free indirect
passage between historical and fictional temporalities and by their coalescent exchanges
in the time-mirror ofthe “crystalline image.”
In the flrst place, Mirror reveals the ffindamentally social character of memory, the
way in winch personal memory and collective memory mutually constitute each other,
and it is upon tins mutually constituting work of memory that the historical narrative of
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the film is articulated in ail of its complexity3. The complex narrative emplotment of
history in Mirror makes its appearance in the film in the altemate exchange between the
trans-generational story of a broken family (the narrator’s son repeating something ofthe
story of the narrator as a boy) winch is expanded onto the history of generations of other
families (Soviet and Spanish) broken by the events of WWII. Tins alternating exchange
is made inteffigible in the complex visual structure of the cbronotopes4 transmitted by the
memories of a narrator and other members of his family (1930’s at the dacha; 1940’s
events of WWII; 1970’s narrator’s apartment). While being itseff uncertainly shuffled
and “fabulated” between the historical and fictional temporalities of image-crystals, this
exchange would seem to make recognizable at least the semblance of a transhistorical
destiny ofa people (family/nation).
If there is flot any clear central Text/Law or eschatological narrative around winch
these multitemporal sequences are organized, we may at least say that tbey carry the
burden of the absence of this law; in other words they do flot simply hereticaily reject
this mythic-epic Law nor lose it to memory but they are inscribed in the memory of its
loss. A memory of loss already carried by the tropes of XIX century Russian literature
(Dostoevsky/Tolstoy/Chekhov/Pushkin) and the prophetic word and utopianldystopian
vision of the poet, Arseniy Tarkovsky the director’s father. This memory of loss
organizes the intertextual-intermedial work of memory in Mirror, a memory that is a
mixture of the material supports that articulate, structure and constitute its recording—
from the book of reproductions of Leaonardo Da Vinci’s paintings to the voice-over of
the Arseniy Tarkovsky’s poems. The religious impulse surging out of Tarkovsky’s
for n more elaborate articulation of this, sec my discussion of Ricoeur’s essay “Mémoire et
histoire” in chapter VI.
4I borrow this term from the llteraty criticism of Bakhtin (1937; 84). Chronotope : the “time
space” of a fictional setting where historical relations become visible and stories “take-place”.
No priority is given to either time or space but they are fused into one organic whole; time
thickens, becomes visible and “takes on flesh” and space become charged with the movements
oftime, plot and history.
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liirror organizes and transmits this mythic order of truth somewhat diabolically tbrough
the absence or loss of the father/master artist/Moses-figure. This also explains bis
relationship to his father Arseniy Tarkovsky; the duty, feit in poetiy and projected in
cinematography, to let Mirror continue to mediate and to dedicate an audio-visual echo to
the poem inscribed in bis joumal, itseff an “echo” feit to the paternal traditional by bis
father as a dedication and named, Dédicace sur un livre:
J’ai quitté ma famille, la chaleur du foyer,
Un givre trop précoce a teinté mes cheveux
Et la voix de celui qui crie dans le désert
Est devenue la mienne au pays de mes pères.
Comme l’oiseau, mendiant, comme IsraI, boiteux,
Jamais encore je ne me suis trahi,
Et ma langue, devenue la langue de la fierté
Est restée pour les autres une langue ignorée.
Et Voici que j’entends de mon rire, de mes pleurs,
L’écho qui va s’affaiblissant
--Dieu de justice t—est-ce cela chanter?
Comme ma propre vie, tout ce qui est sacré?
Car j’ai —naguère——brûlé, vécu, chanté...
(Arseniy Tarkovsky, traduit dans Journal, p.6)
However much Mirror models itself on the work of the passage of patemal tradition and
the memory of its loss, stii it should be emphasized that this work of memory in Mirror
is nor a clear transmission of any kind of memory but a passage into its oblivion also, a
stammering through the gaps separating co-existing temporalities, the impossibility of re
unions, the opacity and difficulty of homecomings. These gaps are narratively imagined
in Mirror through the divorce, misunderstanding, and absence of family relationships (the
hyphens separating three generations of father-son, husband-wife, son-mother relations).
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More, these gaps are rhythmically inscribed in the medium of film, in the difference of
time-pressures in scenes and between scenes, and in the different charge of historical and
fictional temporalities.
for this reason, one might make an equally compeffing case for Mirror as a film
winch belongs to the Deleuzian logic of the time-image, a film in winch the direct
expression of time puts into question the order of rational “truth” organizing historical
narrative. The semblance of a transhistorical destiny of a people (family/nation) would
then only be an “umecognizable” or “less recognizable” semblance, for it is itseff
uncertainly shuffled and “fabulated” between the historical and fictional temporalities of
the crystalline circuits of the time-image. Afier ail, the social work of memory is folded
in the dream-work of the narrator, rendering the passage from one frame of memory to
another difficuit to assign to the agency of particular subjects5—and this unassignability
ailows us to apprehend time as a force. The material duration of the time-image and its
multiple rhythms, aiways in a state of becoming, would remove the possibffity of there
being any rationalizing or stabilizing logic to manage the multiplicity and speed of
temporal experience by winch historical events might be chronicled—even in a
Braudelian sense.
The Storytdller Stutters
The attempt to understand the divided heritage of Mirror, between the “Braudelian” and
“Deleuzian” modes of indexing the historical event, must confront the problem of the
decline of the mediating role of the traditional storyteller in audio-visual culture. Walter
Benjamin signaled the decline of tins role, as he discussed the waning tradition of
storyteiling techniques in the fiction of Nicolai Leskov. As Benjamin recognized, in
See Shot 6, the childhood memory of the dacha, for a good example ofthis.
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what has practicafly become a commonplace in critical discourse, human experience
retreated from the reaim of its possible transmission in story due to the acceleration of the
explosive forces of tecimological mediations such as those shocking the human body on
the battlefields ofWWI6. If history can no longer be put into the narratMty of story and,
refusing to be mastered, breaks down into images that outstrip the potential structures of
human comprehension, then that history “passing in real time” can only be witnessed in
its radical aherity7.
Wbat is the relationship between the storyteiler and the time of the story? Walter
Benjamin reflects on the traditional relationship and Osip Mandeistam on the radicaily
new one:
The storyteiler: he is the man who could let the wick of bis life be consumed
completely by the gentie flame of bis stoly (Walter Benjamin, “The $toryte&r”,
XIX: 10$-109).
My desfre is to speak not about myseif but to track dowu the age, the noise and
the germination of time. My memory is inimical to ail that is personal. If it
depended on me, I should only make a wry face in remembering the past. I was
neyer able to understand the Toistoys and Aksakovs, ail those grandson
Bagrovs, enamoured of family archives with their domestic memoirs. I repeat—
my memory is flot loving but inimical, and it labors not to reproduce but to
distance the past. A raznochinets8 needs no memory—it is enough for him to
teil of the books he bas read, and bis biography is donc. Where for happy
generations the epic speaks in hexameters and cbronicles I have merely the sign
of a hiatus, and between me and the age there lies a pit, a moat, flfled with the
6
“With the [f irst] World War a process began to become apparent which has not halted since
then. Was it not noticeable at the end of the war that men returned from the battiefront grown
silent—not richer, but pooer in communicable experience? What ten years later was poured in
the flood of war books was anything but experience that goes ftom mouth to mouth. And there
was nothing remarkable about that. for neyer has experience been contradicted more thoroughly
than strategic experience by tactical warfare, economic experience by inflation, bodily experience
by mechanical warfare, moral experience by those in power. A generation that had gone to
school on a horse drawn streetcar now stood under the open sky in a countryside in which nothing
remained unchanged but the clouds, and beneath these clouds, in a field of force of destructive
torrents and explosions, was the tiny, fragile, human body. (“The Storyteller,” 1968; p.84)
See: Johanne Villeneuve and Brian Neville, whose synthetic critical preface helped me to
articulate this: La Mémoire des déchets: essais sur la culture et ta valeur du passé. Québec:
Editions Nota bene. 1999, p.149.
Raznocinec: an intellectual associated with none of the principle social classes, such as the
nobility, priesthood, merchants, etc.
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clamorous time, the place where a family and reminiscences of a 1mily ought to
have been. What was it my family wished to say ? I do flot know. It was tongue
tied from birth—but it had, nevertheless, something that it might have said.
Over my head and over the head of many of my contemporaries there hangs
congenital tongue-tie. We were flot taught to speak but to babble—and only by
listening to the sweffing noise of the time and the bleached foam Ofl the crest of
its wave did we acqufre a language.
(Osip Mandiestam, The Noise of Time; “La Komissarzhevkaja”, p. 77)
Mirror situates the stoiyteller somewhere between Benjamin and Mandeistam, between
the storyteller as a guardian of culture, transmiffer of counsel and wisdom, crafisman of
an intergenerational memory that “would consume” his own life as it gently handies the
wick of story begun before himsell and the storyteller as an orphan of the cultural
traditions of fumily; a tongue-tied listener to forgeffing flot a teller of memory, a
forgetting that is the fragmented, incomplete, and inchoate “noise of time” and temporal
rupture; a forgetting that breaks the continuity of speech, stammering and stuffering.
Perhaps these visions of storytelling are flot so opposed since to remember is also to
forget; to assemble members of memory is to transmit an orphaned archive that seeks a
home beyond the orphanage, a foster-home of remembrance. What does it mean to
sustain in the crafiwork ofthe storyteller that sacrificing effort to bring a perfect narrative
about through a variety of retellings ? Is it not also to listen attentively to the atavistic
imperatives ofthe absent, the untold, the dead?
This is another way of asking how one can cail attention to the force of forgetting
always afready structuring the act of remembering. Placed in the context of remembering
and forgetting the experience of modem technological warfare and the catastrophic
meaning of death in the twentieth century, we may ask whether or flot tins ritual of re
teffing is inevitably marked by the symbolic effort to redeem the voices, faces, and things
of the past from thefr usury and mutability as mottai beings in time ? Or is tins re
listening/re-tefling aiso structured by an opposing impulse—a refusai to remember, a
hostility towards finding ciosure in the remembrance ofmourning and grief?
‘$1
Clearly the decline of storyteiling as a cultural mediation of history-maldng has met
with the popular rise of a kind of therapeutic practice of remembering, repeating, re
telling in the audio-visual techniques of television and cinema—techniques that point in
the direction of obsession, trauma and fantasy (Elsaesser, 1996). Clearly there is a
difference to be made between the kind of obscene repetition of the society of the
“spectacle,” which Guy Debord has thoroughly critiqued for its self-enclosed circulation
of simulations, and the kind of repetition offered by the serial experiences mediated by
films that are charged with the historical materiality of time. If we limit ourselves to the
second form of serial-experience, the question then becomes: What motivates the
compulsion to repeat ? Can it be in any sense be qualifled as a redemptive impulse?
The implication is that these two moments of the storyteller may flot structure each
other afier ail, but reveal opposing epistemological tendencies in the work of memory and
forgetting: one attempting a “remembering of the dismembered” in the reconciling work
of mouming, in winch the sickness of memories are negotiated and re-worked in the trials
of opposing narratives and re-teilings, rebuilding the “protective shield” of the past or
repressed ‘îorgefting” that Freud saw as penetrated by trauma; the other, winch wishes to
bear wïtness to the sources of the past in their opacity, to hold the wounds open rather
than let the scars heal, one that listens to the melancholic spade of the grave-digger and
refuses to let grievous Ioss be commemorated. However opposed these tendencies may
be, an opposition particularly exacerbated by the crisis of the representation of history,
they are stifi both structured by the utopian promise of the future, of the settling of final
tbings in the last-analysis—by the horizon of eschatology. In the flrst, tins promise and
tins hope is “restored” to the “horizon of experience and expectation” dilating in the past
and re-told to help bring new perspectives into the horizon of the present9; in the second,
Ricoeur’s essay, “Mémoire et histoire” (1998) thoughtfully ends by invoking something like this
possibility. In the discussion concerning the curative function of re-writing history, he invokes
Reinhart Kosseleck’s renewal of the Auguistinian historical categories of the “space of
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the principle of this hope is melancholically deferred by the form of time gaping between
present and past and aliegorically repeated in its heterogeneity until the epoch-ending
Messianic moment of apokatastasis’°.
Most crftical analyses suggest that historical horizon of the work of memory in
Tarkovsky’s Mirror is essentiafly “restorative” by pointing out the redemptive motifs
and a few of the commemorative themes that structure the complex narrative; this is
Iegitimated and even reinforced to some extent by Iarkovsky’s writings and declarations
of the film as an emblem of “historical sacrifice,” as I mentioned earlier in Chapter 5
regarding the interpretation of the Lake Sivash sequence. The possibility of another
perspective is precluded by the rather superflcial attention to narrative/thematic patterns
and authorial intentions which prevail over any consideration of the time-based medium
of film itseW I would like to argue for this other perspective by showing how the film
cafis attention to rhythm, the way the image speaks the melancholy work of memoiy and
mouming in time.
In Tarkovsky’s Mirror the storyteller is orphaned from the home of memory;
witnessing the clamorous noise of time the storyteller stutters. It is no accident that the
prologue-sequence of Mirror, a brief television documentary about the hypnotic curing of
a young man’s stutter, introduces and initiates the complex work of memory in the film.
Several interpretive accounts have been made of this prologue. Johnson and Petrie
discuss it as a clear metaphorical device used for the Russian audience, a device that
“unmistakably voices an artist’s and a whole society’s need for unfettered expression,” the
event of clear speech being “an optimistic guide” for Tarkovsky’s and the narrator’s
experience” and “horizon of expectation” (1985), in order to show how the future anteriority of
lost or forgotten horizons of experience and expectation might be restored in the re-writing(s) of
histoty, particularly by revalorizing the place of eye-witness accounts and testimonial-stories in
history-making.
‘° For a more detailed discussion of the emergence of this tendency in the work of Walter
Benjamin, see Martin Jay’s essay, “Walter Benjamin, Remembrance, and the f irst World War”
(1996).
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“coming toterms with the past with which the film deal&’ (1994; 116). The problem with
such a metaphorical and ideological interpretation of the prologue is that it reduces the
problem of the stammer-stutter to that which situates the film in the context of
Kruschev’s Post-Stalinist thaw of speech in the Soviet State, collapsing the problem of
the stammer-stutter as an emblem of a political problem from the outside which has been
overcome now that the film begins. In this view, the prologue bas “no narrative
significance” in the film itself
Any serious study of Mirror makes such facile critical gestures of criticism
problematic especiafly since it does flot, as a film, speak loudly nor clearly—but takes
one through the stutter and the stages of such a hypnosis sequence by sequence.
Moreover, from the point of view of the audio-visual critique of historiography to which
the entire film responds, it significantly questions narrative capabffity itseW The
prologue is more than the metaphorical springboard for the rest ofthe film but that winch
metonymicafly imparts a certain temporal tonality, tenor, and tremor to the various pieces
of the shattered experience of memory to follow. As a prologue to Mirror it would
naturally seem that this scene does, however, signal the fllm’s interest in the effort to
overcome the stutter : the hypnotic recail, the attentive concentration, paralysis and
release, the hand-head-eye co-ordination of energy that would re-invent, recail, and
redeem the voices, gestures and words of the absent. We must ask: does the effort to
overcome the stuffer, especially as it is metonymically cast into time-mirrors and voice
overs of the film, restore or undermine the authenticity and authority of speech for the
subject?
Tins question wffl become clearer if we situate and interrogate Mark LeFanu’s critical
perspective on Mirror, or what he cails the fllm’s effort to reaffirm the sacred-prophetic
and simple-poetic power of speech in a modemist/post-modemist age that can only speak
in ironical self-effacements and cancellations (1984; 82-83). For Lefanu, tins reading of
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Tarkovsky’s prologue would seem to be a way to settle accounts with the theoretical
trends and attitudes exemplified by the films of Godard, and also with the academic
dïscourse of “post-modernism” for its denial of the subject’s mastery of speech, the
relationship between speech and authenticity, and the capacity of the word to speak the
Truth. Describing the stuttering scene in relation to the voice-overs of Arseniy
Tarkovsks poetry throughout the film, Le fanu declares: “The power of the word,
combined with its ability to define tmth is almost, perhaps, the single central article of
faith tbat Tarkovsky is testi1,ring to in Mirror” ($3). for ail of its provocative charge,
such a statement ignores the problem of mediation; more specfficaily, it occults the
problem ofthe mediation ofthe word in time. Clearly, literacy has intervened even in the
critic’s position by giving him the capacity to read the ffiflness of meaning transmiffed
immediately by the power of the word as it defines truth. It does flot occur to LeFanu
that the temporal dimension of the movement of the word, its rhythm, encountered in the
powerful materiality of the voice as it interacts with the time-image of the film, might
disenfranchise these “articles of faith” conceming the identity equation of subjectivity,
authenticity, and Truth. For in the act of the stutter and in the voice-over of poetry, the
word has been unmoored from its anchor in subjectivity and fliled with the breath of
time, and the identity between being and saying has been disjoined. To consider tins
unmooring and this breath is to inquire into the power of the word in the “post-literate”
age ofaudio-visual techniques like the cinema and television.
Hyperdiegetic Flashes
Beyond the mise-en scene of the stuttering boy, Mirror manifests tins stuttering-effect of
the historical event by pushing narrative principles (mise-en-récit, plot) to their limits,
accelerating diegetic strategies so that they no longer regulate the periodic occurrence of
events in a narrative structure but, in a kind of hyperdiegetic suspense, mark their arrivai
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in a flash of memory. Mirror does flot employ the technique of “flash-back”; events do
flot flash in order to receive retrospective causal explanation., nor in order to generate the
narrative succession of action. I wouid like to argue that ifie “flashing” work ofmemory
in Mirror marks the moment of the arrivai of events in order to provoke a kind of startled
“awakening” to their radical alterity.
In what sense is this flashing work “hyperdiegetic” ? Edward Branigan, in the
chapter, “Beyond Plot: The Complex Temporality of Hyperdiegetic Narration1 “, makes
the following usefiil distinction: “the hyperdiegetic, then, stands for the barest trace of
another scene, of a scene to be remembered at another time, of a past and a future scene
in the film (a hybrid scene) for a scene that is evaded and remains absent” (190). This
concept may be applied to a great number of the moments of Mirror because h is a film
concemed with tire ffiDness of memory, flot as it is recoilected in a story, but as it is
founded in loss and absence and dispersed in the fragments and traces of a story.
However, in Mirror, the sense of the hyperdiegetic does not apply to what Branigan
describes as the logic of anticipation and suspense found in the hyperdiegetic narration of
actions but suspends this theater of action and intrigue in favor of a suspended experience
of tire agency oftime itself How does the hyperdiegetic work in Mirror?
Enigmatically enough, one of the key narrative moments of Tarkovsky’s Mirror,
featured towards the fllm’s ending, concerna the death of the narrator Mexei to which I
have afready alluded. In this scene we witness the narrator Mexei lying down to lis death
in a room of bis apartment (Postwar 1 970’s), hidden behind a screened curtain, and lying
next to a wall of mirrors and we are informed by a doctor that he is dying for personal
reasons untreatable by medical science. We are told by two women that he is dying in bis
guilt—of being unworthy of bis family; one of these women, knitting, recails literary
images of Fate, the other allusively recalling the familiar image of the poetess Arma
Narrative Comprehension and film. London : Routledge, 1992.
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Akhmatova (apparitions we have akeady seen before in a haunting scene with the child
of the narrator). 11e tefls the doctor and his visitors repeatedly to leave him alone. His
hand, lying on the sheet next to bird-droppings, reaches out to pick up a smafl wounded
bird with wet feathers. In slow motion, the hand clasps the bird, turns gently and then
caresses ils head which peeks out beneath the thumb. Mexei, with shortened breath—an
ominous sign of his last breath, says, “Everything wiil be ail right” as if addressing the
bird. Again he sighs and whispers, “Everything wifl be...” and he is heard breathing and
expiring... In the softness of this expiration, the camera lifts and holds the frame of the
image just above bis hand; the rhythm of the breath and of the duration of the image
emphasize this contemplative suspense of this lifting. In slow motion and silence the arm
lifts into the frame and the hand, capturing the light of the suri, opens: the bird is tossed
into this light, lifting into the horizon of the next image. As we follow the flight of the
bird we are lifted by the camera into the last scene ofthe film.
In tenns of the dying narrator Mexei, we witness the narrative trope or pretext that
would anthologize as well as generate the heterogenous series of memories reflected
throughout the film of a mari acquiring a conscience on the edge of death. Yet this scene
surpasses the techniques of narrative “flashback” as a moment that would gather a causal
sequence of developments in a voice-off make-over in the interior monologue of a
character; for Mirror is organized by the effiptical “emboîtement” set between two
mirrors that, facing each other, reflect the inuinite series of exits and entries set between
the gaps of three generations of family—of the narrator as a child and the child as a
narrator (DeBaeque, p.7$). We do flot hear the narrator speak of his feverish guilt of
being unworthy as a father-husband in a family fragmented by war, misunderstanding,
and divorce; his gesture and his breath however do generate the work of memory,
opening out towards the luminous presence of the “child-figure” and to the half
remembered and halfforgotten experiences of his childhood projected in the Ïast scene.
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Significantly, the hyperdiegetic work of memory, a moment of startled awakening to the
figure of the “child” and the utopian memory of cbildhood’2—is founded in the respiring
expiring breath ofthe time-image.
The Last Breath of Ivan Illych
The scene ofthe “last breath” ofthe narrator is a more or less direct adaptation/citation of
Tolstoy’s celebrated novella “The Death of Ivan Iliych”; this seems appropriate, for in
both cases the last breath shows how no one in either stoiy seems to belong to the same
temporality, an un-belonging or disjuncture in temporal experiences especially
accentuated at the moment of death. This is true for Ivan Illych: as a judge whose offices
must be replaced, his mortal illness is viewed by his associates and friends as a delicate
but rather unfortunate moment in a bureaucracy of inevitable successions and
promotions; as a father and husband protecting and providing for the social vanities and
the daily needs of his family afihirs, his dying is viewed as a miserable inconvenience in
a life lengthened by the banality of diimers, bails, marnage proposais; finafly, as a man
facing himself brooding over his imminent death, exasperated by the unworthiness of his
life and bis guilty conscience, his life is ffluminated with new meaning in the anticipation
of death since it reaches out towards the horizon of etemity —with the help ofthe Christ
like figure ofthe peasant Gerasim.
This is indeed a novella that characterized the autobiographical situation of the film,
especiaily the ambiguous ending winch is so close to life that it “shakes us to the depths
of our being” ($culpting in Time, p.lO8). In Tarkovsky’s words, “Mirror was flot an
attempt to tallc about myself not at ail. It was about my feelings towards people dear to
me; about my relationship with them, my perpetual pity for them and my own
12 address the connection between the “technology of memory” in film and the utopian figures
of childhood and awakening as they relate to the possibility of mediating the modernïst event in at
the end ofthis chapter.
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inadequacy—my feeling of duty left unfiilfflled” ($cuÏpting in Time, p.134). Tarkovsky
describes the last scene of Ivan Illych as the search for forgiveness and authentic life feit
by an unldnd and limited man dying of cancer who, although surrounded by a nasty wife
and worthless daughter, insensitive to bis suffering and preoccupied with thefr social
vanities, nevertheless is overcome by a feeling of goodness, pity, and forbearance
towards them.
And then, on the point of death, lie feels lie is crawling along in some long, soft
black pipe like an intestine.. .In the distance there seems to be a glimmer of
lights, and he crawls on and can’t reaeh the end, can’t overcome that last barrier
separating life from deatb. His wife and daughter stand by the bedside. He wants
to say, “Forgive me”. Md instead, at the last minute, utters, “Let me through”
(Scuipting in Time, pp.107-1O$).
The difference between these two phrases is the difference of a rhythmic gap, a
stammering, for literafly in the Russian “Forgive me” is prosteete and “let me tbrough” is
propoosteete; the syllabic difference that uffers the poos between pro and steete stammers
between Heaven and heil, light and darkness, grace and gravity. Far from being a literal
or a semi-autobiographical adaptation of Tolstoy’s novella, Mirror begins where Toistoy
ends, by recording something of the rhythms of Ivan Illych’s breath—this gasping—
between what Ricoeur lias cafled the intentio animi (prosteete) and the distentio animi
(propoosteete). The poignancy of this rhythmic gap between words, this caesura marking
a kind of pause of breath, is also emblematic of the inscrutable separation between
generations, the impossible passage of a retum to the same. Like Mandelstam’s prose
essays, Mirror inscribes this pipeline of pressures between the living and the dead, flot as
a vesse! of domestic or inter-generational connection but as an abyss germinating with
the noise oftime.
We may discuss how the mechanics of tins gasping is sustained throughout the film,
from the opening documentary clip of the stutteririg fit; to the narrator’s opening
telephone cali with bis mother in winch he recounts bis dream and asks her forgiveness, a
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request she denies in the click of the phone; to the repetitive dream of trying to access
entrance to the dacha of childhood; to the final death-bed scene in which the narrator, in
despair of neyer being granted his mother’s forgiveness, launches the bird into the hall of
communicating memories. In this sense, Mirror is less interested in transmitting this
story as a story than in re-organizing it in terms of its gaps, send-backs and canceflations;
introducing the pause, the hyphen, and the stirner to speech. Seffing time loose from the
structures of story, Mirror transmutes temporal experience. The sequential passage of
one historical or fictional scene into the next must be seen as a flmction and configuration
of this enigmatic transformation of temporality. The temporal materiality of film, its
rhythm, effects a serial metamorpho sis of reality; in the attentive absorption to the alien
rhythms of the film we witness the passage of time, from the intensity of its compression
to the plasticity of its expansion—and in the inscrutable cipher of pressures of this
historical material of duration—we relay the radical alterity of this serial-becoming of
temporality through which we too must pass.
Fabulations of Subjectivity in lime
Deleuze’s logic of the time-image affords another approach to the problem of the dis
location of the subject from the narrative capabffity of story. Since the time-image
presents time as a “series” it also presents storytelling (in the french, “légender”) as a
performative speech-act that “fabulates.” In its “direct presentation”, the thickness of
time flows and inheres in the time-image in its virtual potentiality and time is presented
as a force and as a series engendering various forms of fabulation. The construction of
time as a series mearis that time would no longer be organized as an open totality of
movement and subsumed under a linear unfolding of organic narration; instead it would
assume a serial form of narration continuously becoming other because it introduces into
the time-image a series of incommensurable intervals and interstices. Instead of
190
organizing history upon a limited number of central myths of origin, this power of
fabulation—equafly a power of the false, a power of fiction—would promote the
construction of new situations through which a people and their stories might corne into
being. Indeed, the entfre process of re-producing the life of Tarkovsky’s memories in
the re-producible images of the semi-autobiographical Mirror belongs to this movement
of repetition and difference in the moment of becoming other: the image of the mother,
faithfuliy recorded and phantasmagorically “doubled” throughout the film, makes her
fiulest appearance in the moment of childhood remembrance; the set of the dacha,
reconstructed over its niins from original photographs, generates the topical movement of
memory and forgetting for ail of the flctional and historical chronotopes in the film, the
flelds of buckwheat, replanted and grown in front of the dacha in order to correspond to
Tarkovsky’s childhood memories, make visible the inscription of time in the rhythrn of
filin and bend to the breath that sweeps between the already and the not-yet of this
childhood. The historical subject of Mirror (the author, the narrator, the family, the
people) is flot an ideal image of unity that afready exists and must only be awakened into
self-consciousness, it is a profoundly historicai image, re-membered in virtual and real
circuits, on the basis of which a future might be invented by aliowing the occluded
elements ofthe past to creatively invent the future.
In tins section, I would like to argue that the time-images of Tarkovsky’s Mirror are
constituted by the powers of the false even in those sequences and shots that seem to
seem to offer a kind of total narrative resolution and a retum to the origins of a founding
myth because they introduce “incompossible’3” moments of time in the materiality of
allegorical images.
The incompossible names a relationship to the co-existence of different temporatities in the
materïality of the image, a co-existence which is Iogïcally “impossible” within the abstract
structure of chronological time. Rodowick (1997; 98-100) traces the concept of incompossibility
in Deleuze’s concept of the time-image, demonstrating how Deleuze founds this concept by re
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The images in the final sequence of shots ()OUI; 201-208), in winch viewers are
taken from the scene of the sick-bed of the dying narrator Mexei into the vision of his
cbildhood, would provide an excellent test-case cf tins hypothesis. Shot 201 offers the
image ofthe hand ofthe dying narrator (Alexei/ apartment 1970’s) picking up a broken
winged bfrd and launching it upwards in bis expiring breath; in shot 202 viewers are
taken presumably back to the moment before the narrator’s conception (dachWl93O’s)
where bis young parents are pictured lying in the grass below the house wondering if they
would have a boy or a girl; in the long duration of shot 203, Maria’s (Mexei’s younger
mother, played by Margarita Terekhova) face makes several expressive changes—as if in
the pause cf her husband’s question her face were anticipating a lifetime of tremendous
events: passing from anxious curiosity to warm surprise, from hopeffil bewilderment te
pure desperation; flnally in shot 204 Alexei’s mother Maria is pictured as an older
woman (played by Tarkovsky’s own mother, Maria Tarkovskaya) steps into view from
behind holding a wash basin. $he is accompanied by a young child, presumably the
image of the narrator as a child. Together they behold the image of the hifi where the
dacha used to be. The co-existence of different temporalities reaches a climax in tins
image; for we have passed from the image of the young mother Maria in the last shot
(early 1930’s) to the image of herseif as a old woman (1970’s) and paradoxicafly, we
have passed from the deathbed of the narrator who now remains the “ageless model” cf
the child—holding hands with bis aging mother.
reading Leibnitz througb Bergson: Leibnitz proposes the incompossible in order to evade a
contradiction between the determinate infinite power of God and the undetermined fteedom of
mankind; Bergson argues that our entire past is preserved as non-chronological co-existence in
time, virtually expanding ftom the points of surfaces and borders of the present and leaping into
it; for Deleuze, this Bergsonian conception of the past liberates humans by giving them a
determinate power of creation and invention to move with the ceaseless forkings of non
chronological time. This time-scheme subtends the various forms of serial narration recognized
by Deleuze in the time-image; for example, the discontinuous leap through “sheets” of the past or
the alternating movement between them, etc.
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Critics like Jobuson and Petrie find in this series of shots an extraordinary power of
explanation because they represent a “reconcifiation of the conflicting forces in the
hero’s life” as the “tenuous borders” crumble between dream and memory, between past
and present, between real and imagined characters (Jobnson and Petrie, 1995; 129). The
juxtaposition of images might suggest such a narrative analysis. It might step beyond this
to suggest that the hero is flot the narrator but time itsell that the screen “enacts” the
fiction of a “resurrection” of time. The narrator-hero/anti-hero would then be the
figuration of time bringing about the vision of that reconciliation which may be expected
at the end of time. How is this figuration of time imagined ? The off-screen voice of the
“narrator” heard throughout the film seems to be a topical figuration of mortal being at
the limits of time: he makes his appearance in the penultimate sequence at bis death bed,
who then in the final sequence is only a unspeakable possibihty of mere conception
before birth, and who now appears as an ageless model of the child. The argument for
such a topical figuration might be reinforced by insisting that the shots and sequences of
Mirror are modeled as a “martyr-ologue,” they function as a kind of imitation of the
passion of Christ cinematographically fashioned in the wake of the Russian literary
tradition of Dostoevsky’s tormented and confessional anti-heroes and overheard in the
baroque harmonies ofJ.S. Bach’s Passion According to St. John.
However seductive and pertinent such an analysis may be, h does ignore that winch is
equally present in tins shot : the persistent materiality of the time of the image and the
historical ruins and debris of the “place of memory” that it inscribes. I would argue that
the “tenuous borders” do flot crumble but are in fact made even more “tenuous” and
permeable as the complex temporalities of the major chronotopes in the film merge in
phantasmagoric and allegorical images. Just as the images of the mother can neyer be
unifled but are radically disjoined in time, the narrator/subject is separated from himself
by the impersonal forrn of time, by the “incompossible” forking or spiitting of non-
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cbronologiéal time. Would the historical-materialist gaze of this sequence be
irreconcilably opposed to this eschatologîcal vision ? Perhaps they may flot be so
opposed, for the historical-materialist gaze grounds the esehatological vision as aflegory
rather than as symbolic representation.
The fundamental difference between aliegory and symbolic representation as it
appears in the image and as it speaks in language is its constitution by and in time. The
time-image of cinematography, its material constitution by and inscription in time
(rhythm) and its profound “historicity,” afready intimates its affiliation with allegorical
images generally. As the work of Walter Benjamin reminds us, the image of atlegoiy,
while pointing towards--and hoping for--the triumph of the “immutable” at some infinite
and absolute horizon, neyer coincides with tins state of being “out of time.” The image of
allegory is itseff founded in the ruins of history, grounded in the frrevocable loss of
memory and the engraved with the materiality of time in the image of a death-fflce
mask’4. The language of attegoiy, as Paul de Man’s work on the “Rhetoric of
Temporality” reminds us, neyer coincides nor identifies with the fliilness of its meanings
because they are themselves constituted by the temporal trace of thefr endless anterior
repetition. Accordingly, the subject of allegory, renouncing an ifiusory identification
between self and non-self’, establishes itseff in the “void of this temporal difference”
(1983; 207).
Even outside a mere consideration of the materiality of the time-based medium of
film, I would argue that the historical-materialist gaze of the camera in these shots aiways
grounds the eschatological vision as allegory in terms of its mournful nostalgia. Strictly
speaking, the following shots are not simply a nostalgie mode of “reconcifiation” in
14 This is my own synthetic understanding of several passages in which Benjamin descrïbes the
death-mask of allegory. for example, the significance of the material fusion of the transitory and
eternal in the allegorical image is aiways being prevented by guilt—from finding the “fulfiulment
of meaning in itself.” See: “Allegory and Trauerspiel,” In The Origin of German Tragic Draina,
p224.
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which the narrator encounters himseff seemingly “out of time” at the end or at the
beginning of human-time; in favor of this revelation, the profound nostalgia motivating
these shots is itself a painful recognition of being aiways only “in time” even at the
horizon of the ending or beginning of time, that the return to origins is irremediably an
endless repetition of anteriority. Moreover, tins nostalgia indicates that the illusion of the
ffiflness of memoiy must be renounced for the possibffity of inhabiting the historical ruins
of memory and forgetting; that the self is constituted by the non-self and the non-human
in the temporal distance and the difference ofthese historical sites!sights.
How does tins possibffity structure the relationship to the ftiture ? $pealdng in
Nietzsche’s terms, when we discover that the forms of “truth” are fundamentally
temporal, then we are freed from the somewhat passive position of automatically reacting
to the historical eventfulness of the world by “discovering” pre-existing truths. If the
time-image of cinema gives a “direct” presentation of time this means that we apprehend
time as a force that can disrupt repetition as the return of the same. In the logic of the
“incompossible,” time forks in repetition and returns to not-necessarily true pasts. In
Deleuzian terms, to think of the passing moment of thne, as that winch could not have
started, nor finished, becoming; tins is to put thought into contact with the potential to
generate new possibifities for life, affirming the highest form of difference in the serial
movement of repetition, a difference that might ultimately affirm the dormant, the
unthought, the latent potentiality of the “not yet” of a people and their stories. As D.N.
Rodowick argues, this “flot yet” of a subject or a people describes a vfrtuality or
potentialization of forces that is “flot unlike Ernst Bloch’s concept of utopia as Vorschein
or anticipatory illumination. Utopia is flot an unrealizable ideal here. It too is virtual and
real as material forces that urge, perhaps unsuccessfully or successftiily, an immanent
becoming” (1997; p. 154). The gathering intensity of such a material and virtual force
may also be related to Walter Benjamin’s messianic conception of the profane
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ifiumination, for: “. . .just as a force can, through acting, increase another that is acting in
the opposite direction, so the order of the profane assists, through being profane, the
coming of the Messianic Kingdom” (“Theological-Political fragment” In Reflections,
197$; p. 312). How does one keep this potentialization of forces alive in the serial work
of memory except by structming historical experience around the figure of an
“awakening” which, retuming continuously to the dreams of childhood, neyer finishes
awakening?
Awakening to the UtopianfDystopian Memoty of Childhood
What are the relationships which various traditions of the utopian imagination have
established with histoiy and memory ? Although they are very difficuit and complex,
many of them converge around the figure of an “awakening” to the light and the darkness
of perception, memory, and experience; an “awakening” to the possibffity of another
form of knowing and being in the world— paradoxically characterized by the way in
winch the non-place (u-topia) either fiattens time, makes thne cycical or intensifies the
irruption of lime. One lias only to think of the poor soul in Plato’s Repubtic who must
“turn” his/her eyes from the phantom-appearances projected in the cave towards that
other light, and who, in hisfher startled bewilderment and disorientation—must find
another way of seeing the world, an “awakening” to true knowledge through the powers
of recollection. Without going into great detail one can clearly surmise the relationship
between a technique of awakening, a power of recoilecting, and a radical tuming to
another form ofknowledge.
In bis immensely suggestive work The Arcades Project, Walter Benjamin, writing
from the perspective of the Messianic conception of the utopian imagination,
characterizes what he catIs “the Copernican revolution in historical perception” in terms
of an awakening. For Benjamin the flash of awakened consciousness gives birth to a
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utopian politics of memory. Benjamin characterizes this project and this method of
“awakening” as a “graduated process” in the life of the individual and in the collective;
revolutionary historical knowledge 15 constituted by the temporality of a flashing dream
which reveals to the individual and to the collective how memory and remembrance must
bring “the new world into symbolic space”; for the utopian dimension of historical
knowledge can only be articulated on the dream-work of collective-individual memory
when it remembers “the task of childhood” (1999; pp.38$-39O). Paradoxicafly, the
darkness of the individual’s experience of siumber is recuperated to discuss a technology
of collective remembering and political awakening. Referring to the experimental and
theoretical work of Marcel Proust and Ernst Bloch, Benjamin distinguishes bis own
historical project,
What Proust intends with the experimental rearrangement of fumiture in
matinal half.slumber, what Bloch recognizes as the darlmess of the lived
moment is nothing other that what here is to be secured on the level of the
historical, and collectively. There is a not-yet-conscious knowledge of what
has been: its advancement has the structure of an awakening. (“Dream City,
Dream House, Dreams ofthe future” The Arcades Project, 1999; p.389)
Benjamin’s conception of the dream-work of awakening and remembering offers a
startling perspective on the utopian dimension of memory in as it is set loose in the
materiality of film. Remembering in Tarkovsky’s Mirror is neither a psychological
memory where the individual narrator recails a repressed past nor simply a historical
memory that would represent the occluded story of a people; the time-series of
remembering, bifurcating throughout the film, shows how the inside and the outside, the
public and the private, the individual and the collective can meet and generate a
collective enunciation of history based upon the utopian potentials of the not-yet, the
darkness of experience, the half-awakened siumber of the dream; a history that generates
its remembrance around the figure of the child and the disorienting experience of
dreaming about childhood. My hypothesis so far bas been that the utopian memory of
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childhood in Mirror is invariably related to the problem of the mediation of the
catastrophic historical events; the pathology of the narrator is related to the traumatic
remembrance of history, one in which individual and collective memories are transposed
in the redemptive work of mouming or in the aflegorical work of melancholy grief In
this section I would ifice to argue that the memories of childhood generate—out of the
material pressures and repetitions of historical time—an awakening and an openness to
the potentially radical alterity ofthe future.
li a philosophical sense, childhood is what activates memory, it is the cradie of the
house of memory: childhood plays with remembrance by miniaturizing the immense
space of the world or by accelerating or decelerating the time of the world; the child is
also the figure of that kind of innocence and naiveté that could be invested with the
unspeakable power to hold, because he does flot possess the language that might organize
for speech, ail memory and ail experience. When language stutters and “histoiy breaks
down into images” in Tarkovsky’s Mirror , the child is the rebefflous orphan-figure
through which the velocities and the fragments of the image must pass; however, the
child is also the ageless model of innocence who inhabits the dacha of memory, the
mobile symbolic space in winch tins history must be organized for the future. The
narrator’s tortured journey back to childhood and bis repeated effort to access the house
of memory (seen from sequences XVIII-XXII) take viewers to the dark-luminous visions
of hope and desperation, for the child is inevitably tom between the melancholy of a lost
world and the utopian wish to generate a new world.
Part III
Sequence-Shot Analysis of Andrey Tarkovsky’s Min-or (1975)
Prologue-Sequence I (Hypnosis of the Stuttering Boy)
Opening Sequence 11 (11e Dacha Remembered and the Buming Bam)
Sequence III (Awakening The Phantasmagonc Image of t}ie Mother)
Seqeunce W (Maria and Lisa at the Printing Works, I 930’s)
Sequence V (Alexci Quarrels with Natalia over Ignaes Upbringing)
Sequence VI (11e Exilic Chronotope of the Spanish Refiigee-Immigrants)
Sequence VII (B/W Documentary of Spanish Refugee Children)
Sequence VIII (Documentaiy Newsreel of Balloon-Flight)
Seqeunce IX (May Day, Ignat’s Déjà-Vu, the Apparition ofAkhmatova)
Sequence X (Afasyev’s Pranks on the Shell-Shocked Instructor)
Sequence XI (B/W Documentary Newsreel of Lake Sivash)
Sequence XII (B/W Newsreels of WWII: Prague, Reichsberg, Hiroshima)
Sequence XIII (B/W Newsreel of Mass-Maoist Euphona, P.R China)
Sequence XIV (Father’s fareweil)
Sequence XV (Natalia and Alexei, Boredom and Repetition, f 970’s)
Sequence XVI (Alexei’s Recurnng Utopian Dream of the Dacha)
Sequence XVII (Alexei’s Dystopian Dream of the Dacha)
Sequence XVIII (Hunger Masha and the Prosperous Doctor’s Wife)
Sequence XIX (The Dacha Retumed)
Sequence XX (Alexei’s Deathbed and the House of Memory)
Sequence-Shot Analysis of Andrey Tarkovsky’s Mfrror (1975)
PROLOGUE-SEQUENCE I (Hypnosis of the stuttering boy)
SHOT I
(Color, 1970’s, in the apartment of Alexei, the narrator) Ig-nat tums on the screen of the television. It is
signiflcant that Mirror begins with the shot of the television screen for it foregrounds the concern with
what might be called, in Ishaghpour’s terms, the new modernity of contemporary cinema in the age of
television. Sigrnflcant too, that Ignat is identifled with the television; throughout the film we learn that
he seerns to be sometbing of a dissapointment to bis father for bis being a dunce, flot possessing the wit
or consciousness that would seem to corne from literary competence. As Ignat steps back and we see
the back of bis head and hear the voice-over of the television documentary about the curing of a young
manTs stutter.
SHOT 2
(B/W documentary) We hear a frail and lank young man speak bis name, Yuri Zhary. When the doctor
asks where lie is from we hear him tremble and stammer between several syllables over at least twenty
seconds, bis head shaking and bis eyes occasionally moving back into bis sockets as he rocks fonvard in
the noise of bis breath, before catcbing the place-name, Kharkov, and declaring that he goes to a trade
school there.
11e female doctor, a strong and robust woman, declares that it is rime to begrn the hypnosis
session and we see ber in profile, medium shot, as she points to lier eyes, and teils him to concentrate.
The camera moves in to her face and her finger and captures the attentive pause as she hypnotically
pulls Yun, as if by invisible strings towards her. He leans in the trance and his body interrupts and
shakes off the pull when the learnng takes him off balance.
The sarne tactic is used from bebind, the doctor placing her hand on Yun’s head, teffing bim that
her hand is drawing him backwards. As she gradually lifts her hand off of bis head and Yuri leans into
her pull, the camera itself pulls backwards as if in imitation of the hypnotic movement. Again, Yuri’s
back leans into the trance unW its interruption.
The doctor tums to face Yuri, takes bis hands and tells him to place bis
attention there in the co-ordination of head to hand. As lie does this, she teils
him to place bis great desire to succeed in bis hands, and to concentrate as he
conducts the tension from bis head into tbis paralysis of bis hands.
200
At the count of tbree she teils him that bis hands have become ngid, that he caimot move them. Her
words do not describe the action of hypnosis but perform and constitute the measure of its enactmcnt.
The camera pulls in to capture their faces close-up, as she puts her hands on bis head and teils bim
that as she releases the tension in bis hands and bis speech, he shail now speak clearly and effortlessly,
loudly and clearly for the rest of bis life. At the third count, she pushes bis head back teils him “Say, I
can speald” J-Je nods and repeats after her in die measures of a voice that seems to be released from the
tension of die stutter.
OPENING SEQUENCE II (The dacha remembered and the burning barn)
SHOT 3
Color, long-shot. The camera tracks in slowly bebind a woman, Maria (played by Margarita Terekhova)
who we later leam to idennfy as the mother of the narrator, set back in the summer of 1935. She is
sitting languidlly on a fence, smoking a cigarette and stanng off into the distance of the Ignatvevo fores t
stretching before her. The mournful sound of a train’s whistle in die distance gives way to the narrator’s
voice-over explaining that tbis was the farmstead-dacha where summer clays were spent before WWII.
As Johnson and Peine remark, “The peaceflul scenery, tbe woman’s willowy
shape, lier white embroidered dress and comfortable black cardigan, the silky
blond hair pulled loosely into a braided bun—everytbing is radiant with the
golden glow of the setting sun and clearly imbued with die nostalgia for die
past” (116). Maya Tarovskaya also notes that for die generation bom in die thirdes this image holds
“die elusive charm of recognition. . . for die semi-rural and semi-urban existence. . . of die fragile, pre
war days” (1989; 65).
SHOT 4
The distant figure of a man appears, walking around die bush from die padi of
die dark oak woods. As due camera turn to capture Matia’s face, composed
but anxious, due narrator explains diat diey could usually recogrnze a member
of die family. “If he appears from behind due bush and walks towards die
house, it’s father “.... die camera tracks left, foflowing Maria’s profile as she expires her smoke, to die
odier side of flue fence where due wind blows gendy tbrough due leaves, as if respinng in retum... “if
flot then h isn’t hiru, wbich means diat he will neyer retum again.” Henceforth, due wind will evoke die
irrecoverable absence of due Fadier as well as bis mystenous presence, die consciousness of loss aiways
associated with this rhythmic respiration orpueumas that haunts several of due fflm’s shots.
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SHOT 5
Maria is seen against the backdrop of the house, long shot, and we hear birds chirping and the strident
echoes of a dog’s distant barking, a sound used throughout Mirror and in many of Tarkovsky’s films.
Sounds often cue die settirig of die scene or mark its placement and dispiacement; in this case die
barking echo has die effect of opening die setting of die image to an absolute outside for an entering or
exiting into a different place or order of expenence. A stranger, not die Father, walks towards die
house (played by Anatoly Solonitsyn).
SHOT 6
The camera turns to die stranger, a doctor who we learn cornes from die nearby village, Tomsbino.
Having forgotten bis house-key, lie wonders if Maria might have a nail diat he could use. She very
nervously replies diat she does flot, die camera abruptly mms and tracks downwards towards her as she
says this. The doctor teases her and asks to take her pulse. When she threatens to cail her husband he
shrugs and remarks diat she seems flot to lie weanng a wedding ring, implying eidier that diere is no
husband or that he is ambiguously chenshed if there is. As she expires her srnoke, die camera careflilly
swings 90° around her, isolatmg die back of her head in a close-up against die background of die forest.
The doctor enters die fratrie of die image and asks for a cigarette. They are now set facing against
another, Maria’s back to bis front, as in one body. The relay of die gestures and gazes is very carefully
composed: just as he leans down for die flame-hght she is holding for bim, she turns her head left 1800
towards her son who in die hammock bebind them, who seerns to be half-awake and half-asleep, but
looking nonedieless towards bis modier. From die perspective of die narrative storyteffing, Johnson
and Peine justly remark:
Aldiough tbis scene is presented in voice-over by die aduit narrator, it cannot be a direct
memory, as he was bodi too young to understand it and asleep while it took place. Even if tbis
paradox is flot fully assimilated on a frrst viewing, it gives die film an unusual viewpoint, for
die past which we are being showu is built up flot simply out of direct expenence but as a
mosaic of what die narrator knew flrsthand, what he xvas told, what he dreamed or imagined,
and what happened around him as part of a historical process that he shared with millions of
other people (116).
Medium shot, diagonal perspective die doctor sits on die fence and asks hef
why she is so sad. The fence breaks under bis added weight, and they faR
togedier backwards. Bantering back, wbile he is heartily laughing, she asks him
why he is so happy? “Because it’s cice to fail with a pretty woman” he says. He is seen laying flat on
die ground, and this sudden unexpected communion with die earth seems to sober bis laughter and
SHOT 7
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darken ffie moment. He gets up, and as Maria brushes the twigs off her cardigan, he discusses the way
that humans have been alienated from the awareness and perception of the life-tempo of plants and
frees. The camera foilows him from behind as he wailcs mto the darker shadows of the trees: “They’re in
no huny, while we rush around and speak in platitudes.” The dogs’ barking is heard. He tums and wa&s
graduafly and obliquely towards the camera “it’s because we don’t trust our inner natures, there’s ail this
doubt, haste, lack of time to stop and tbink.”
1vfaria does not encourage him to continue his monologue on lime but seems to be womed,
perhaps if he has not been wounded by the fail. “No, no, no have no fear, I’m a doctor you know.”
When she replies, “What about WardNo. 6 ?“ he says, “It’s ail Chekhov’s invention!”
This is the flrst, but not the las t, intertextual allusion to I 9e” century Russian literature. It is
suggestive that Chekhov’s taie should be mentioned in reference to this doctor’s musings on time, for it
is a taie about a complacent doctor and director of a ward who is seen by the outside world around him
to be slowly losing bis sanity as he discusses, with one of the ward patients, the questions of lime, death
and eternity.
He takes bis leave, inviting her to corne to Tomshino. The camera turns to Maria, medium shot,
and she teils him that he is bleeding.
SHOT $
Long shot of the doctor shrugging, wiping bis scar, and walldng down into the field of barley stretching
towards tue Ignatyevo forest. The frame is sf11 and we watch bis figure descend and diminish in the
duration of the scene. The dog’s barking-echo is heard again, and the doctor pauses in the middle of the
field. Again, the wind powerfuily descends into the field, made visible by means of the tilfing barley
grain; in its gathering immensity and sudden rush, the pneumos sweeps the doctor off balance, and moves
towards the camera. The invisible presence of the wind ahvays cedes to visibility and impresses itself as a
fine-pressure, a movement the duration of which is powerflilly inscribed by the rhythm of the film.
SHOT 9
A bnef shot of Maria against the blowing trees, looking off, wondenng...
SHOT 10
Long shot of the doctor, whose turning towards her is accompamed again b)’ another rush of wind—the
bush in the distance wildly blown. He pauses for several moments, shrugs, turns around and makes bis
way off.
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SHOT11 j JS
Close shot of Maria’s glowing melancholy face.
She tums and wa&s gradually up the incline N Z74 H
towards the dacha. As the camera follows her
from behind, we hear the voice-over of the
poem “First IvIeetings’ (composed and recited
in a voice-over by Andrey Tarkovsky’s father,
the poet seney Tarkovsr’. The poet’s
voice-over in this sequence powerfully displays what Roland Barthes has called the rhetorical technique
of “wrifing outloud” (l’écriture à haute voix), an art of the timbre and the grain of the voice which is
more phoneric than phonological, seeking die pulsing incidents and infiections of the voice, over above
the clarity of the message, a language “carpeted with skin. . . the patina of consonants, the luxuriance of
vowels, a stereopboiy of deep fiesh. . .“(my translation, from Le Plaisir du texte, 1973; 105). In Henri
Meschonnic’s terms, while die rhythm of the voice inscribes the phonic materiality of sound, this
rhytbm is not reducible to this phomc dimension of material sonority for rhythm is what happens to
language as die body moves through it; in other words, rhythm engages a breathing imaginary that
the entire living body with its history (1989: p.270). In this sense, the images that
accompany die voice-over are not merely a decorarive backdrop against winch the meaning of poem
might corne to light; instead, they open up the very space in winch the voice might matenalize itself, as
if it were called out of the saps of the dark interior panels, the warmth of the hearth, die heaviness of
die jug. Although the father/husband is not at home yet bis absence speaks and breaths in the history
of the house.
Every moment that we were together was a celebration, like Epiphany, in ail the world the two
of us alone, you were bolder, lighter than a birds wing, heady as vertigo you tan downstairs two
steps at a time, and led me, through damp ifiac. . .At these words, we witness the pages blowing in
an open book on die windowsffl of the dacha, presumably a book of the father’s poetry, and the book
fails to die grouncL The mother seem to have a premomtton and turns to her right.
SHOT 12
The camera cuts to a child’s face looking obliquely downwards, he is outside of the dacha in front of an
outdoor fireplace that is buming. He tums towards bis mother... into your domain, on die other side
of the mirror. (With bis crew-cut and indiscerrnble features he is not easily identifiable. Nor is he meant
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to lie idenflfied, although he may be the narrator as a child; he is above ail, a model or an emblematic
figure of the “child”).
As the camera pans left, we see another child sleeping near a wooden box in die grass. A Nanny or
aunt, dressed in a black robe and also unidentified (but in later scene clearly ailuding to the great Russian
poetess-figure, Anna Akhmatova) picks up die child. When night came I was granted favour, the
gates before the altar opened wide and in the dark.
SHOT 13
Inside the darMy glowing Ïntenors of the wooden dacha two children are siffing at the kitchen table,
where we see a loaf of opened bread. One child is eating cereal, another placing a pile of sugar or sait on
neck of a kitten who is busy lapping up a smail puddle of spilled milk Just as the obsessive attentiveness
to the details of everyday life, as if in cinematographic transformation of stifi-life, seems to transfigure
their ordinary presence in the image, so too the poem continues to expresses the transfiguration of daily
life through love: . our nakedness was radiant as slowly ït ïncined. And waldng I would say
“Blessings upon you !“ ami knew my benediction was presumptuous: you slept, die lilac
stretched out from the table to touch your eyelids with a umverse ofblue...
The camera tracks nght in the darkness where Maria is standing behind the curis of the iron
bedposts in the glimmering corner of die room and gazing obliquely at the camera, her hands crossed
on her arms.. .and you received the touch upon your eyelids and they were stifi, and stiil your
hand was warm. She leaves the frame of the image and die voice-over continues to fil the empty
space. Vibrant rîvers lay inside die ctystal, mountains loomed through mïst, seas foamed...
The camera tracks siowly nght, where die books and papers on a letter-writing desk are seen
scattered, a dried fiowers in a vase in a windowsiil. . . . and you held a crystal sphere in your hands,
seated on a throne as stiil you slept.. . The camera closes in on Maria, now sitting despondently by die
wail as if listening to die wind and ram outside. . and —God in heaven!—you belonged to me. you
awoke and you transfigured die words that people uttered every day, and speech was filled to
overfiowing, with ringing power, and die word “you” discovered its new purport: it meant
“ldng”.
The camera moves away from Maria slowly directmg itself into die windowsffl above die open
book of poetry, looking out through die curtain of ram at die trees and simple objects (iron, doth, glass)
on die ironing table outside: .. . ordinary objects were at once transfigured, everything—the jug,
die basin—when placed between us like a sentinel, stood water, laminary and firm. Memoiy
seems to be bathed in these objects and elements which reappear throughout die film.
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The camera gently lifts into the trees as if watcbing the movement of the iovers in the poem.
We were led, flot Imowing wither, like mirages before us there receded cities built by miracle,
wild mint was laying itseff beneath our feet, birds traveling by die same foute as ourselves, and
in the river fishes swam upstream...
SHOT 14
Close shot of Maria’s dandy glowing face. Tears, which do not seem to fail
from some idie melancholy, cut her breath. . .and the sky unrolled itself
before our eyes. When fate was following us in our tracks like a
madman with a razor in bis hand. The poern’s cumulative account of the
lover’s ascent out of time into the epiphany or transfiguration of the world
catastrophic moment, the irremediably secular and unbearably histoncal image of the fatefril razor.
SEQUENCE III (Burning barn)
SHOT 15
Two sounds are heard, as if a tipped bowi were rolling on its nrn—and a strange wbisffing cali. Maria
turns her head left, then right. Camera pans left as she exits out of frame into another room, the
barking of the dog is persistent and louder; Maria enters back mto the kitchen and teils the children at
the table that it’s a fire, and not to shout. 11e children exit ieft, the camera pulls back into the threshold
of the door: the image of the table and chairs is held Uke a stiil-life but the obsessive patience and
stillness of the shot is broken by a bottie that roils on its side from the table and drops to the floor. It
should be mentioned that this figure of die faffing bottle is a chronotope that receives repeated
treatment tbroughout the film.
SHOT 16
The camera turns mto the frame of the door, the dark wooden matenality of the door frame and back
walls are blurred in the close sweep of the image. Darkness. The camera sweeps left into the surface of
an old mirror and die screen of the film merges with this mirror-screen: the surface is at flrst blurred
out of focus as if the camera were haptically touching the pocked black marks of the mirror-surface, a
surface distinct from itself as the mirror-image cornes into focus the distinction is lost, giving way to
the clean depth of die image reveaied bebind. Off-screen we hear die anxious voices of parents,
presumably peasant caretakers of die dacha-residence, worrying about die whereabouts of their son,
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wondering if he is in die burning bam. The mother wails: “What if Vitya’s there ? What if he’s buming
to death ?“
The urgent desperauon of this voice seems to heighten the strangely
etemal hope of the image revealed in the mirror : t’vo children standing
side by side transfrxed by the scene of the burning bain, tain beading from
die roof above them, an enormous water jug at their side. This image will
in fact be explained as a childhood memory of Alexei the narrator in die sequences to follow, but die
histoncal mode of remembrance is afready presaged in die image itself. The duration of die image is
impressed with die glowing light of nostalgia, as if die image before us were simultaneously inscnbing
die duration of burning wood and also virtually co-exisiing with die remembrance of this scene. This
way of sensing die passage of time in two registers is reinforced by die verv composition of the image:
die irreversible flow of passing time is capwred only indirectly in die image reflected backxvards by a
mirror, die light of die flame is at once burning and glowing--giving die matenality of die image a kind
of soft patina effect or grain, and die backs of die children standing in die image literally direct die gaze
to a look back into die age of childhood.
SHOT 17
We hear footsteps inside die bouse and die voice of die fadier caffing for his son outside. The mirror
image of die burning bain swivels left as die camera mms slightlv into die corridor. This turning,
because it collapses die vanishing point of perspective given in die mirror-image into die flatness of die
next image in profile, makes die appearance of die peasant boy seem to emanate from behind die mirror,
leaving viewers with die impression that he vas walking, perhaps, directly out of die image. This bas
die compelling effect of heightening die magical-mimetic powers of die cinematographic image itself:
for die rnirror-image is both a mimetic reflection of die real constantly exchanging and transforming
itself widi die magical entrances and exits that occur at its phantasmagoric surface. In die matenality of
die image, die virtual and actual states of urne seem to circulate and communicate; a reflected image
imparts a motion fonvards out of itself and acquires die deptb and die
mystery of anodier time and space. The camera follows die boy tbrough
die daik interiors of die bouse, tracking through die door to capture a
beautiful long shot diat is explored by slowly panning right along die
balcony of die house : before we see or hear die fire we aie presented widi
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the sight and sound of ram beating and falling irregularly off the roof and the dewy pile trees; tracking
past columns and a ladder the image lingers before the scene of the buming barn, the raging orange
flames are presented against the wet verdant landscape, the figures of the father and mother are joined
in a triangle as their son moves in by their side.
SHOT 18
Medium shot of Maria in profile against the dark-green background of the forest. The camera follows
her as she moves down towards the well; the sound of ram and her footsteps give way to the roar of the
fiames. fire, water and earth seem to speak to each other in the human-silence of this shot. Maria
reaches out to the bucket hanging from the immense wooden crutch and lever over the well, sits down
and washes her face, the bucket swings languidly and heavily and squeaks lisdessly and eerily tbroughout
the rest of the shot; Matia’s repose is set against the unrest of the male caretaker who is seen running
towards fric bam, the persistent sound of the roaring fiames reinforced by the darker, percussive sound
and brushing-roil of an off-screen tympany.
Eduord Artemeyev’s use of sound, under Tarkovsky’s direction, shows how elemental sounds and
orchestrated sounds may fiow into one another without being distinguishable in the final electromc
sound track; this permits them to travel synthetically in the luminous images, creafing a kind of orgamc
union between the aurai traces and the matenai elements of the visuai image. As the sounds fiow
through the image they connect with multiple layers of temporal experience without tigidly
distinguishing themselves in the filmic world ofreality and fantasy ÇTruppin, 1992; 243).
Sudden cut to B/W (black and white). Close-shot of young boy
stirred from his sleep and sitting up in bed, awakened by the
sounds of a hootirig owl and a mysterious clattering outside.
This introduces the first, and perhaps most important,
sequence of the film concerned with awakening and drearning.
For a full treatment of the question of the mediation of the
historical event the figure of “awakening” to the
utopian/dystopian memory of cbildhood (Refer to Part II, last
section of chapter 5).
SEQUENCE III (Awakenîng: the Phantasmagorïc Image of the Mother)
SHOT 19
20$
SHOT 20
B/W medium-shot of trees in the forest behind the house. The gentie current of air turning the leaves
is suddenly stirred and a rush of wmd bends the trees fonvards. Smce the shot is captured in slow
motion, the motion itself seems to peel away or become suspended by the effect of its stretched
duration; this bighhghts the rhythmic temporality of the film, the pileumas of time respinng within and
between shots.
SHOT2I
B/W close-shot of the young boy sleeping or lying
down again. F-le awakes, sits up, and says “Papa!” As
he chmbs down, we hear the cinking of the omate
brass bed and the owi whistling once again outside.
The camera follows him past the wash basin and die
chair at the edge of the bed. As he peers from die
tbreshold of the bedroom into the adjoimng room,
we see a mystetious white shirt being thrown from
the next room across die top of the screen.
B/W medium shot of the father in profile, each gesture mysteriously thick and suspended as it is
presented in slow motion. He is leaning down and pouring water from a pan and behind him we see
flames from a gas stove burning in the background. Presumably he is prepating a basin of wann water
for bis wife to wash her hair in, yet the mystetious deceleration of tbis movement alerts us to the
mystery ghostliness of the enfire scene to corne; die ordinary reality of die scene is metamorphosed into
die extraordinar. As he stands up and exits left off- screen die camera dips slowly down to reveal die
mother washing or tansing her hait.
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Her head is face down, her hait forming a wet curtain that stretches mto die depths of tEe basin. The
sound of dripping water accompanies die sight of bnght leaping flames from die stove bumer in die
background. As she lifts her head in die slow motion frames of die film, her face concealed behind her
dripping hait, her amis outstretched and lier hands flapping, die camera tracks back. This smoodi but
swift track backwards, accompamed by die cool sound of die dripping water and die sound of Eduard
Artemyev’s eÏectromc organ-chord held out at lengdi, makes die image of die mother seem to float
hypnoticafly. In such a time-image, however stylistically composed, we are presented with die
irreducible inscription of die matenality of elements (water, dripping sounds, electronic music, light and
shadow) and their dynamic and organic interaction in die rhythmic medium of film effects a
metamorphosis in die expenence of time, conferring a kind of mythical dimension on ordinary actions.
Medium-shot, die camera lingers over die image of die modier standing, lier head stiil bent
forward and die curtain of her hait stiil dripping to die persistent sound of water dropping. The walls
of die room can be more clearly discemed; they look as if diey are melting because they are covered
unevenly and heavily with a thick tar-like substance that reflects specks of light. The mother is standing
in a white shift next to die stove on her right and die t’vo flames of its bumers are reflected on her left
in die standing mirror.
SHOT 23
B/W Medium-shot of die same room, this time
without tEe presence of tEe modier. This absence
gives way to anodier presence: what vas merely die
sound of tnclding water drops in die last shot
becomes a vision of tain falling in slow motion from
die ceiling. This time only one burner on die stove is
stiil flaming. The dry room with hard wood floors
visualized in die previous shot is suddenly liquidated
and die waterlogged plaster on die ceiling begins to fail in heavy wet lumps, spiashing in die puddles on
die floor. The tonality of this vision is set by die effects of sound also: a befi clangs once and over die
electronic build-up of noise one can hear die barely perceptible, low bass pneumatic singing of a
traditional orthodox canticle or requiem.
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SHOT 24
B/W Close shot of Maria in profile. The camera tracks left in slow motion as she passes into the
corridor. The tar-melt walls are streaming and trickling unevenly with water, giving the sense of passing
into dark cavems or a mythical underworld of the dead.
The mysterious music continues to build up as she pulls up lier hair and tums to face the camera..
She crosses the tbreshold of another passage in which we can perceive the dark and opaque reflection of
a glass window or mirror. She turns, holds her head back, smiles mystetiously and the sound of the owi
is heard once again.
The camera tracks left past the threshold as she passes into the reflection of a mirror that is divided
by a stream of water trickling down its surface. However, in this play ofvanishing perspectives between
tbreshold and mirror, tbe image of Maria seems to be emanatang from the tbreshold itself and she
appears to be passing tbrough the surface of the mirror from behind, as if the actual image of the flat
surface of die mirror were virtually the depth of glass through wbich ber reflection were passing.
Darkness. The cool tactile texture of die image of water flowing down the rough textures of the cavemous
walls and its spangled lights is impressive, giving it a metamorphic quality. The cavemous wafl gives way
to an adjacent room of white plaster and brick, water is stiul trickling down these walls. I\{atia is not
shown from the right; rather, she is shown suddenly facing the camera in this room. It is as if the
metamorphic darkness dwiding lier “passage through the mirror” were now conjuting another Maria,
her double-other. Wrapped in a knitted shawi like an old woman, Maria walks now from the left, as it
were, from the other side of the mirror.
SHOT25
B/W cut to a mirror-image of an old woman wearing a shawi ami in a similar position to Maria. It is as
if Maria were encountering herself in die temporal depth of die mirror, at a later urne in her life as an
aged woman. This impression, that it is die aged mother of die narrator Alexei, will be conflrmed later
in die film. The narrative retrospecuion may help to situate lier appearance without, however, explaming
its mysteryt. What does reninn clearly enigmatic in this time-mirror is diat a face to face encounter is
impossible; Maria cannot be con-temporary to herseif but is aiways separated by die form of time in die
distance between lier younger and ber older reflection.
Adding to ail of die strangeness of this image, die aged woman is played by Tarkovsky’s own mother,
Maria Tarkovskaya, and die uncanny resemblance of mother-images between his own mother and her
representation by die actress Margarita Terekhova, makes this “transference” especially interesuing from
a psychoanalyuical point of view.
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This is an image composed of luminous superpositions and its haptic visuality2 transforms the
hardness, flatness, and cootness of the mirror-surface mto a series of soft diaphanous curtains that
breath into each other; die darity of the surface gives way to a depth of multiple perspectives. The
image of a landscape seen distandy through an arched door is reflected in die mirror-surface; out of the
vanishing perspective of this landscape and doorway, the oid woman with the shawi wa&s towards the
surface; as she walks into perspective on the center-iefr, the light of the diaphanous landscape is
dimmed and the image is shifted bebind her to die center-nght; tbis effect, together with the flame seen
behind lier (similar to that burning in the stove of the previous shots), makes lier appear to walk out of
the rnirror itself.
This illusion is broken however when we sec her stop to look at herseif, examining the soft
materiality and fuzzv resolution of her image against the texture of the stucco wall reflected behind her.
She stretches out her nght hand and this hand is met, in reflecuon, by the hand enteting the frame from
the left. The haptic softness and depth of die image is aiso broken, for as the hand touches the mirror
surface it makes a hard squeaky wiping sound. While this touch literally “brings us to the surface” of
the image and awakens us, as it were, from the oreinc illusion of deptb, stiil we hear the sound of water
dropping, as if heard from inside a deep well. Even Tarkovsk-y’s use of sound makes the surface and die
depth of the dine-image an undecidable quahty; in Deleuzian terms, the crystal image of dine aiways
opens a circuit in between the “actuai and the virtuai” states of fine, made intelligible by its “limpid or
opaque” expression, and generating diegetic environments out of the disposition of its “seed and
milieu.” We can no longer situate who is looking on which side of the mirror: Is ït the younger Maria
projecting an image of her elderiy self or the eider Maria seeking her youth?
SHOT 26
Color, close-shot of a child’s hands in prayer: they are extended in
profile against die darkness and holding die wick of a long flame that
makes die hands appear transiucent. This image is repeated in die
earring scene in which teenage Alexei is staring into die mirror, and
Ignat cornes across similar images of hands in prayer as he leafs through
die pages ofDaVinci’s drawings in Sequence X, shot 88.
2
am borrowing this term as it lias been redefined by Laura U. Marks (2000; 163) using Aloïs Riegel’s
terminoiogy. Marks considers images of intercultural works of video and fin which privilege die tactile
over against die visual sense and thus die matenal presence of die image over against its representational
power. As she explains, these are images diat discern texture radier dian distinguish form, and since
thev are “more indlined to move than to focus, more incined to graze than to gaze,” diey locate
perception and subjectivity in an embodied form of knowmg.
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SEQUENCE W (Narrator and Mother on the Phone, Moscow apartment/1970’s)
SHOT 27
In color, the camera slowly mms and explores the space of the present day apartment of the narrator
Alexei, late I 970’s. The phone is heard insistently ringing and the image of a French poster of
Tarkovsk7’s film Andrei Rlib/ev is seen against a wall. An off-screen telephone conversation is heard
between Alexei and bis mother. While the camera explores the spacious mtenors of the apartment, he
teils her that he has flot spoken for tbree days and that titis has done him some good, “words being too
mert to express a person’s feelings.”
The camera takes a long shot of the corridor of the apartment and its commumcaiing rooms.
As it tracks in slowly towards the dark curtain at its end, the depth of the two adjommg rooms is pulled
through the frame slowly and gradually and we see how the thresholds between rooms open and also
close what is accessible to vision. Each room is marked by a portrait-photo of bis moffier and then by
one of bis father and these topoi of the rooms open the space in which the conversation about Alexei’s
rumination of memory takes place.
As Alexei teils bis mother that he has just dreamt about her, the preceding B/W dream of
Sequence W (shots 19-25) may seem to be more easily situated and placed by viewers. Yet in fact tbis
sequence is only situated within another transference, as it were, a “hall of communicating dreams and
images”: the narrator dreaming of himself as a child awakening only to have another visionary dream of
the mufti-temporal economy of bis mother’s image (half-recognized as the image of bis wife).
Alexei asks bis mother when the bam had bumed down and if bis father had left them in 1936
or 1937 ? These dates may leave viewers to wonder whether or not he had been arrested dunng the
time of the Stalinist purges. When she answers that both happened in 1935, tItis does cue and help
viewers to situate the cbildhood memory of the burning bam in Sequence 111 (Shots 15-1$) as the
“time-frame” for Alexei’s early childhood, as Jobnson and Peine suggest (1995; 119). However, when
titis personal memory of childhood is assigned and placed within the periodic chronologv of the life of
the narrator, the matetial powers of the time-image of childhood are flattened; for example, titis
perspective of narrative-cbronology ignores how the very magical and mystetious matenality of the
shots of Sequence III generates a topical frame of social memory wbich is explored and put into
dynaniic relation with other time-frames tbroughout the film. Moreover, by insisting that this shot
sequence is a narrative instance that would generally situate and explain other previous sequences, titis
perspective also tends to reduce the temporal effect of alienation and disonentation between Alexei and
bis mother, felt in the obsessive duration of the long-shot.
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When Alexei’s mother tels bim that Tisa, her coworker in the printing press, has died he
expresses no svmpathy; instead he asks what time it is, whether it is morning or evening. \Vhen she
snaps back, “What’s wrong wiffi you ?“ he asks “why are we forever quarreling ?“ imploring her to
“forgive him”. Silence foilows, suggesting that such forgiveness cannot be granted nor spoken so easily,
that their experiences of deatb, amdety, and loneliness cannot be so easily shared nor their brokenness
so easily mended. The silent pause gives way to the impersonal click and beeping of the telephone, and
ftnaIly we hear the echo of a metallic scraping sound : in the place of the movement of the voice in the
word, we hear only the stuttering-stammenng noise of lime, gaping between genefadons, a gaping that
leads viewers into the time of fear and suspicion in the next sequence.
SEQUENCE V (Maria and Lïsa at the printrng works, 1930’s)
SHOT 28
B/W long-shot. The ominous metaffic sound, carrying over into this shot, is not easily recognizable;
sound’s potenlial for ambiguity and abstraction is suggestive here: its literai or referential function of
attaching itself to a familiar object is abandoned in order to provoke a de-familianzation or a dis-
orientation.
An off-screen voice of a conductor anriounces that we are at the “print works.” Maria is seen from
the back running in obvious panic and distress tbrough the street. The camera focuses on ber face
moving behind the bars of the fence of die print-works factory and her breath and humed footsteps are
heard ver closely.
SHOT 29
B/W long shot. Maria runs in obvious pamc across the street, the pouting ram and duil grey buildings,
as weil as the effect of the black car parked on die street (for Soviet viewers, an obvious sign of the
“Black Marias” of the Stalinist era) ail add to the building intensity and suspicion of the image.
SHOT 30
B/W Medium shot. Maria opens the door and steps inside a
k security check-point, show her papers against the glaring barsh
light and passes once again to the outside.
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SHOT 31
B/W medium shot. Through the pouring ram, Maria descends the stairs mto anodier building. She
steps down into an outdoor courtyard littered with enormous blocks of old stacked newspapers against
the wails, wasting in the ram. In tbe background, another security officer is seen watching her and
tuming to wave to the light of a surveillance camera.
SHOT 32
B/W medium shot of the disheveled Maria entering her own office building. As the door closes the
camera tracks back, isolafing ber in the rather prison-like atmosphere and allowing ber to move forward
in die shot. The camera foilows her as she enters the doors of her office, the lights on the desks glaring
harshly as she moves to the back of the room. Except for die young proof-reading assistant Milochka,
the office is empty. Maria rushes to die windowsffl and rummages for the copy of the proofs she had
sent to be printed.
SHOT 33
B/W shot of the assistant exitmg the office briefly to corne back with Maria’s coilegue Tisa, mentioned
earlier in the telephone conversation. Tisa asks her if she needs the proofs for the evening Goslit
edition, her unshakeable confidence and cairn suddenly giving way to a sense of fear.
SHOT 34
B/W medium-shot of die ail three women exiting the doors of the office and quicldy walking through
die halls towards die cabinet of die pnnt-shop in order to chase down die proofs. The halls are littered
with paper and enorrnous industnal-size roils of fresh but unraveled newspnnt. As they walk, die
atmosphere between begins to get tense: Maria’s terrible silence, followed by llsa’s reprimands “there
must neyer be misprints in die final proofs”, and die assistant’s weeping cr and gasp. The assistant is
told to stay bebind.
SHOT 35
B/W long-shot in slow motion. Tisa is seen rushing out to catch up to Maria in die room and to
whisper something in ber ear. Their voices and footsteps are drowned in die heavy noise of die steady,
irreversible engines of die book-printing machines to dieir right. They tum into anodier room of giant
newspnnt machines.
The ominous suspension of lime is strangely stretched out in die slow motion of die shot. This
effects more dian a stylistic investment in an unspoken psychological intrigue; this suspense meets widi
an even more powerfiil suspension. In this shot, die time-machine of film unravels and transforms die
regular-time of die print-machine in die plav of accelerated and decelerated motions; die sound of die
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hard letters of movable type is rendered rnalleable, its newsprint roils at a different speed on the reel of
fUn], and an irregular interval of time is introduced in the suspension of regular moving beats.
SHOT36
B/W medium shot of Maria walking through a senes of connecting rooms, presumably dealing with the
transfer of die proof to its more tecimical settirig in reproducible type. In die overwheiming rhytbniic
clatter of the machinery she passes the drafting boards and an aisle of smafler printing machines which
leads to a back room where the proofs are stocked in a cabinet. As she opens the cabinet several
technicians corne towards her,
Mer womed impatience attracts more attention and lier boss, Ivan Gavrilovich, who follows ber
out, tries to cairn her, and flippantly and enigmarically answers her affirmation that she is flot afraid, “let
some work and let others be afraid.”
SHOT37
B/W medium-shot. Maria humes to sit down by the window on the other side of die room to examine
the proofs alone. A smafl crowd of technicians and typesetters crowd around her, one of whom teils
her that these proofs have already been set so “if sometbing’s wrong, they are already run.” The small
black printing-machine beside her, its arms and frames rising and faDing regularly, reveal a revolutionary
poster of Stalin’s face set against a duster of portraits of revolutionary workers. Maria studies the
proofs, and flips the pages to verify what we can only imagine to be some of special collection or edition
of Stalin’s work (this is conflrmed by Tarkovsky’s screenplay but neyer mentioned directly in the film).
She looks up in puzzled bewilderment and relief gathers the papers, crosses the typesetting machines
and die poster of Stalin and as she heads to the back of the room without saying a word to anyone, ail
of the arms of the machines lift and become silent as if the machines, as well as the people behind them,
were astomshed and surpnsed.
SHOT 38
B/W close-shot. Afrer turning the corner of the pnnt-shop, Maria is seen walking alone in a long white,
weil-lit corridor. The camera pulls back keeping just ahead of her and the vanishing perspective of the
window-lines and white industrial pipes creates a sense of luminous spatial depth. Over die click of her
footsteps, die voice-over of die poet, Arseney Tarkovsky, reading “From Morning On” is heard. The
poem is flot presented as if it were being remembered by consciously her but radier as if it were caffing
out to fier, speaking to fier in die pace of her steps down die corridor, in die anxious lonehuiess of her
breadi. Moreover, her own sense of beiiig perhaps “freed from suspicion but aiways too late for
happiness” is echoed in a poem expressing die rnelancholy of “irrecoverable belatedness.”
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From morning on I waited yesterday,
They knew you wouldn’t corne, they guessed.
You remember what a lovely day ït was?
A holiday! I didn’t need a coat.
You came today, and it turned out
A sullen, leaden day,
And it was raining, and somehow late,
And branches cold with running drops,
Words cannot soothe, nor kercbiefwipe away3.
As these words close, her face darkens as she passes into the threshold of another room; the image
lingers behind hef, gathering the duration and the pipeline-perspective of the corridor. Tisa is seen in the
back walking towards the screen.
SHOT 39
B/W medium shot of Maria bent over her desk in her office, weeping into
lier hands and then apparently laughing as Tisa sits down next to her. Maria
whispers secrefly into Lisa’s ear the error she had imagined comrnitting and
both roil eyes and laugh. Their boss, Ivan Gavrilovich, steps in and offers
them alcoliol to drink. As Maria stand up, wipes the tears of relief from her
eyes, and declares that she wffl go take a shower, the camera switches to Tisa and the mood changes
suddenly.
SHOT 40
B/W close-shot of Tisa siffing, her face in the shadows of the glaring light, staring hard at Maria as if the
scene of friendly conspiratorial confession had turned sour and become an invitation to diabolical
interrogation. She tels Maria that she reminds her of Maria Timofeevna (a minot character ftom
Dostoevsky’s nove!, T/e Devi/) the half-witted sister of Captain Lebyadkin and wife of Niko!ai
Stavrogin. As Tisa stands and raises her voice, she compares Maria to a character who seems to expect
everything to be at her beck and cail. Tliis gives way to an irritable expression of open hostility directed
at Maria for lier seif-sufficient and emancipated ways, her inabffity to admit her mistakes, and her
incapacity to keep her marnage afloat. The tirade continues even as Maria drops to her knees in tears.
Johnson and Peine account for this shifi of mood brought about by this interdiscursive litenary allusion
as a way of conveying the overail situation and individua! strain of “the atmosphere of Stalinist
suspicion, terror, mistrust, and repression” (1995;121).
This translation of “From Moming On” is taken from that made by Kitty Hunter Blair in Scuipting in Tirne,
1986; 123.
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Maria opens die desk-drawer for a sponge and soap, stands without a word and
leaves. The phone is heard ringing.
SHOT 41
B/W medium shot in slow-morion from the daxk corridor outside the office. Maria is shown leaving in
haste and Tisa cails out to her “Masha!” (a common diminutive of Maria) imploring her to wait. 11e
corridors echo die clicks of her heels and she continues on without tuming, closes the shower-room
door bebind her and leaves Tisa flrnbling with the door handie. Tisa turns and exits down the corridor,
jumping and cicking her heels like a litile girl, reciting die opening lime of Dante’s Infirno “In die middle
ofour life I found myseif in a dark wood.”
Whatever we make of die symbolic use of die literary allusions diemselves--in relation to die Mbror
and Tarkovsky’s overail citation-like dialogue widi various traditions of art and literature, we can at least
say diat dis is also directly a mise-en-scène of die effects of die culture of literacy and die mass culture
of ptint upon die consciousness and conscience of individuals. Major and minor characters tbroughout
die film remember, compare, copy and cite literary texts as if die very fabric of their memories were
constituted by die textual warp and woof of die moveable type of print. It is perhaps no accident that
Dostoevsky and Dante are cited in diese shots; they are cornerstones of a canon of dassic works in
Western Literature shared by a large community of readers (and viewers), a canon of printed works diat
has developed die workings of a national consciousness by building die bistorical structure of “timeless”
national literatures; works diat might be revalonzed by “guardians of tradition” like Tarkovsky himself
and metonymically transmitted in die medium of film.
However, to state this without going flirther would be to miss a more ambitious argument
about die problem of mediation. For this bistoncal consciousness, transfonned by die workings of mass
reproduction in prnit culture and having intemalized a potentially infinite collection of citations,
becomes internai to their “citabffity.” The question concernmg “die work of literature in die epoch of
its citabffity in film” does not concern simpiy die survival or die deadi of die literary. In fact, film shapes
amodier kind of literacy for die subject (director; character; viewer; cntic) by making available a position
or positions from wbich die course of History and historical events (die intrigues of daily life under die
Stalinist regime) might be made legible or readable and hence intelligible. 11e intennedial practices of
citation and transference in Min-or raise die problem of mediation and rhythm to anodier level: What is
die relationsbip between audio-visual technique and dis literacy that conditions die way we are
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bistorical and the way we insert or position our understanding of events ? Does the rhythmic basis of
the urne-image of film merely tender this capacity to read the historical event more complex or does it
radically alter tbis capacity? If film does not radically alter but only renders literacy more complex, it
may stili transform the conditions under which it operates. This would raise another equally important
question: If the audio-visual technique of film produces another level of litcracy of die histoncal, does it
also reproduce and reaffirm the ontological underpinnings for die production of national consciousness
or does h radically intervene and unmoor subjectivity from its “Statist” relaflonships to being, language,
social belongmg, and territory? While die polincal and epistemological stakes may be outlined in these
terms and articulated tbroughout die analysis of die shots and sequences ofMi,rot, an adequate response
to diese questions may not be made available to us.
SHOT 42
B/W medium shot of Maria in taking a shower winch is cut
short by a shortage of die supply of water. A metaffic scraping
sound, very similar to die one hear opemng die sequence (shot
28), is heard through die pipes as Maria holds out her hands,
waiung for die water to return. The camera closes in, die
scraping sound becomes more heaving and hotly gurgling.
Maria tums around, hands dasping her face and her back against die wall, and a sense of comic
frustration overcomes her. As she pulls her head back in momentary relief she is again overcorne but
widi some other painflil emotion. The matenality of die shot, die heavy sounds, die dripping water, her
short breadi, die expressiveness of her face, aldiough diey may give a sense of tEe inner state of a
character, show how memory is activated by die motions of die material world. As Proust has so
suggestively written in À la recherche du tempsperdu, die part is somewhere out of die reach of die intellect
in itself—and unmistakably present in some object or in die sensation some object “arouses” in us,
although we may neyer know winch and may neyer even have die chance to corne across it again.
SHOT 43
Quick cut to a very buef long-shot in color: a burning fire in die distance of a green countryside at dusk,
die reverberaung electromc sound of a dissonant organ-chord echoes heavily. Although it is a somewhat
different setung than die scene of die burning haro (shot 17), it seerns to echo die memory or image of
h; certainly it has tbis effect for viewers and die two have often been conflated. Then again, h may be
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an image of another time and place which is reverberatmg with this image and memory of the past, smce
it effects the transition into the different chronotope of the next scene.
Like the bnef image of the child’s hand in prayer, this image flashes and pulses, llnking images,
subjects, memories without the help of language or narrative framings.
SEQUENCE VI Mexei quarrels with Natalia over Ignat’s upbrïnging and his own)
SHOT 44
Color, close-shot of a young woman sttidying her face and blowing against
the surface of ii mirror. Although this woman is played by the same actress
who plays Maria, Margarita Terekhova, visual cues do identify her as another
woman; she seems younRer, her facial expression harder, her hair straihter
and combed down. At the same time, the image as an image is nonetheless constituted by the resistance
of the material mscnbed in it, and the unavoidable participation and ernanation of the face of the actress
we must idennfy over against, or alongside, the fiction of her re-presentationaÏ playing of any character
whatsoever. The uncanny resemblance and strange difference between tbis young woman (identifled
for viewers as Alexei’s ex-wife “Natalia” only much later) and Alexei’s mother Maria, is stressed even
more forcefully when we hear the off-screen voice of Alexei state “I aiways said you resembled my
mother” and she replies, “That’s probably why we broke up.”
As she talks into the mirror, Alexei stiil invisible and off-screen, she adds that she “sbrinks to see
Ignat becorning more like bis father,” ironically smirking “neither you nor I could communicate.”
SF10145
Color cut, medium shot, situated in the chronotope of the f 930’s/dacha and Alexei’s off-screen voice
adds “When I recail my cbildhood and my Mother.. . somehow she aiways has your face.” In the image
we do not see her face but instead the face of a maidservant, who enters the screen holding a sleeping
child and exits in profile left (played, intereslingly enough, by Tarnara Ogorodnikova, the mysterious
wornan who appears to Alexei’s son Ignat in the Pushkin-reading scene to corne (Sequence 10; shot 91)
and whose face clearly resembles that of the celebrated poet Anna Akhrnatova). As Alexei continues, “I
think it is because I feel sorry for both of you” the camera tracks right to show Maria’s from the back as
she slowly wallcs up the graduai incline to the dacha in her white linen dress, walking in pace with--but
away from--the manservant at her side.
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SHOT 46
Color cut, medium shot, situated back in the chronotope of die 1970’s/Alexei’s apartment. Ignat is
shown facing die camera from the doorway of bis father’s office, passively observing bis parents
argument, and holding a crystal glass of wine in bis hands. His father’s voice, abruptly changing tone
from the tender remmiscence of bis cbildhood, teils bim to put it down.
The camera pans left to a close shot of Natalia’s pale face and hardened expression, set against die
coÏd refiecnons of die metaffic xvafl bebind her. Out of die cool, beffigerent exchanges of their
conversation viewers leam diat Alexei bas equally strained relations with bis ex-wife and witb bis own
modier lately (confirmed afready by die telephone cail, Sequence 5, shot 27). Tbis becomes
understandable because be only seems to entrench himself more deeply by direcfly and ver7
impertinently blaming bis self-centered egotism on bis “upbnnging by women”; he urges Natalia to get
married so that Ignat might avoid die same fate. This seemingly relentless “repetition of fate” between
Ignat and bimself4 reveals that bis estrangement with Natalia very clearly repeats something of that
strain between bis father and bis mother Maria (of wbich we leam by hearsay).
Alexei is heard sadly remarking diat he and bis modier are “drifiing apart” and Natalia teases him
for bis plaintive stammering as he says this. The camera pans left bebind Natalia’s head and dieu at an
angle diere is a long-take of ber face looldng into anodier mirror. The reftection is hazy, unclear, and
paradoxically distant—as if die face were coming out of another time, a face circulating in die distance
between Natalia and Maria—die resistant matenality of die face being itself magically and
metamorpbicafly warped across time, producing a sense of half-recogrntion to die face seen earlier in die
diaphanous layering of face/landscape in shot 25. However, die time-image can only be “crystallized”
at a point of indiscemability because it emerges out of die rhythm of die cinematographic image itself.
In die crystalline order of die image, time is not arrested but ceaselessly splits, passes, and receives die
current from odier images.
SHOT 47
Color, medium shot of Ignat, leaning against die tbreshold of a door eating an apple. Off-screen voices
are heard speaking Spamsh. After taking a bite, Ignat walks left bebind a wall and leans into anodier
doonvay, die camera following and taking us from die frame of one space into anodier. By framing die
Although autobiographical detail need not explain the composition nor the motivation of sequences and
shots, it may be mentioned that such an unhappy state of affairs was also deeply feit by Tarkovsky himse1f, vis
à vis his own parents’ irreconcilable separation and divorce; whether or not the dramatized projection ofthese
feelings in film would constitute an exorcism or catharsis of bis feelings of anger or guilt we will leave to
other psycholanalytical investigations.
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passage mto another doorway, the ifim prepares viewers for the introduction of an “outside” into the
time-space of the family drama.
As soon as Tarkovsky has set up these personal links between past and present in the complex
visual structure of the chronotopes, he prepares to expand the broken history of an individual family
across the bistoiy of generations of offier familles broken by the events of WWII, in Sequences ViI-IX
This “other” history, against wbich the broken bistory of two Soviet generations is understood, is
metonymically flgured by a mysteriously umdentifled group of Spamard-guests, whom we leam are
refligees exiled from dieir homeland and living an ex-pattiofic life in the Soviet Union with no hope of
return. The quiet antagonisms, unexplained silences, and bitter alienations of die narrator’s family (bis
parents/himself as a parent) are set against and shot tbrough with the pre-war and post-war expenences
of these “deterntonalized” refugee-immigrants.
SHOT 4$
Color, medium shot of a Spanish man in profile caffing out to someone off-screen named Maria and
asking her what is happening.
SHOT 49
Color, close-shot of Natalia’s face. Alexei’s voice directs ber off-screen nght, asking ber to go distract
the Sparnard from bis repetifive tirades about the homeland. Her glazed eyes look off left, then down,
and then sadly and heavily tight. As she moves into the passage she looks at herseif once again in the
mirror aiid the heavy expression of her face has changed back to die hard glare she gave in shot 44. She
arranges her hair and hotly breathes into the mirror, a breath that takes us immediately into the roar of a
crowd in the next televised newsreel sequence.
SEQUENCE VII (The Exïlic Chronotope of the Spanish Refugee-Immigrants)
5H01 50
B/W televised newsreel sequence of a matador in die bullring, facing an ultimate moment of die “kiR.”
The off-screen roar of die masses in die stadium rises to an even more excited pitch as he elegantly
stabs die head of die buil with bis upraised sword.
SHOT 51
Color, medium-shot of die enthusiastic Spaniard in profile near to die television set, explaimng and
imitating die mobile postures and minute gestures of die matador. Entranced by die masterful patience
and lidie skffl of die matador, he entrances everyone in die room with a replay performance.
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SHOT 52
Color, close-shot and very short cut to a second Spamard in the room with a Cbrist-like face and beard,
seen in profile shaking bis head in light-dismay and lighting a cigarette.
SHOT 53
Color, close-shot of Natalia laugbing in surprise and asking about this man and bis performance. A
third Spaniard, sitting next to her, explains that he is imitafing the famous Spanish matador, Palomo
Lrnares.
SHOT 54
Color, medium shot of the matador-fan facing the screen with outstretched arms, shaking and unable to
contain bis passionate attachment to the model on the screen.
The bnef clip reveals the exile’s quasi-fetishistic relationsbip to the mediated newsreel sequence of
the homeland, one based in the mimetic relationship between technology and the body; mimetic
because he incorporates the mediated rhvthms of the newsreel into those of bis own body, quasi
fetishistic because he seems to be irrecoverably transflxed by the images and sounds tbrough wbich
massive presence of the matador, bullring, and crowd is producea
SHOT55
Color, close-shot of the face of an older Spanish woman, whom we wili learn is named Luisa, lifting her
disheartened eyes and turning ber head to die light on the nght. Her gaze introduces the next brief cut
to a B/W newsreel clip, the direction of her eyes indicating already the direction of the movement in the
clip.
SHOT 56
B/W documentary newsreel images of several soldiers running across a city street, one person is visibly
handicapped and is being transported on the back of another. Most critical reviews concur that these
are documentaiy images taken from die Spanish Civil War.
SHOT57
Cut back to color, medium shot, in die space of die apartment with die Spanish guests. Two girls,
presumably twins, with austere faces, long hair, and heavy, gray, wool-knit sweaters are seen in die
corner of die room. One of them walks diagonally nght and sits down, and die kinetic tbrust of her
movement wffl be taken up and carned back and forth by other figures in die next two shots, die
rhythm being carned from die matetiality of one body/epoch to another.
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SHOT 58
Color, close-shot of the Christ-like face of the second Spamard, walking pensively to the left. In the
background we see z wall of antique mirrors in the narrators apartment.
SHOT 59
Silence. Cut back to the B/W newsreel sequence of the Spanish Civil War. To the tight, a woman is
seen crossing die poor district of a city street lined with sandbags. As she passes in front of the ruined
gates of storefronts holding a long-mirror which is chipped and broken, another off-screen voice of a
Spaniard is heard: “He was ovenvhelmed by the fareweil.
SHOT 60
Color, medium-shot of the matador-fan looking sadly down, bis profile set against die wail of mirrors.
As if die joy of participation in die televised replay of die matador’s bullring were founded in die
sadness of some deeper loss, he is seen and heard in die background reciting z more personal historical
anecdote in Spamsh about bis leaving die homeland as a refugee child. The off-screen voice continues
die translation for Natalia: “The entire city saw him off but bis modier couldn’t, she was di. Ris father
stood sadly on die sidelines. He knew diat they were both thinking die same diought would they ever
see each other again ?“ After he shrugs and assumes bis heavy downward gaze, we may guess diat bis
family and friends wish to change die inevitably bitter and despondent tum of bis tales. The off-screen
sound of traditional flamenco music is heard, die strong strumming of die guitar accompanied by die
strident cail of die singer.
SHOT 61
Color, close-shot of die pale and austere young woman responding to die music and assummg die
posture of die flamenco dance. The camera moves from her turning head to capture die gesture of her
twisting hands, and dien focuses in on die rocking of her bips. Although sincerely executed, she seems z
litile awkward in die dance, as if die rhythms of die music and die dance she interpreted were flot quite
her own. If flamenco music and dance transmits die identitv, memory and tradition of a people it must
transmit this through z particular practice of die body. What happens this tradition, memory and
identity of a people when die practices no longer inhere in die performing body?
SHOT 62
Color, medium shot of die matador-fan (who we leam is also die father of dis young woman) violendy
interrupting her dance and slapping lier for a performance that seems to be direcfly “mocking” him. The
record needle is tipped across die surface of die record and die song ends in dismpfion.
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SHOT 63
Cut to a short take in color. A close-shot of the face of the older
Spanish woman, Luisa. She is nervously playing her fingers on her
lips. Off-screen voice of the matador-father exciaiming that even after
years of training she stiils does flot know how.
Çfhis image to the left does not appear in the final copv of Mirror but
is interesting for what it shows about the “frames” of the apartment:
in the background is a portrait photograph of Arseney Tarkovsky,
behind Luisa the “Christ-like” figure, in the background near the
windows, one of the shy twins.)
SHOT 64
Color, close shot. Luisa’s voice is heard saying, “He was living in Spain but he didn’t understand a
thing.” Cut to the image of a series of Russian-Orthodox iconic-inscriptions and reigious motifs, drawn
in black pen by another figure (presumably Luisa’s husband). The camera lifts to show this passively
observer who seems bored, lost in bis cigarette smoke, and lisdessly doodling. It would seem from her
voice and her face, that she is cut to the heart by wimessing the “mockery” of these nationalisms tbat
of the half-witted, ex-painofic “performance of Spain” from the matador to the flamenco dance and
that of her disinterested husband lost in bis orthodox emblems.
When the off-screen voice of Natalia asks Luisa if she ever did wish to go back to Spain, she
explains that she cannot because her husband and lier cbildren are “Russian.”
SHOT 65
Color, long-shot of the whole apartment room of guests. Luisa stands up in front of the desk where her
husband is drawing and without a word to the other guests, makes a move nght to quickly exit the
apartment.
The camera tums into the entrance-comdor; in the stiil-frame we see Luisa fleeing the others, even
those who cry out to her asking what is wrong. Natalia follows ber and cries “Luisa!”
SHOT 66
Color, close-shot of Luisa’s face turning nght against the door in the shadows and light. Her face
literally “folds” into the next documentary sequences, ;ust as hef face had signaled their passage earlier.
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SEQUENCE VIII (B/W documentary of Spanish refugee chiidren)
SHOT 67
Cut to B/W newsreel. The flamenco music heard earlier dunng the daughter’s dance returns now to
accompany the entire senes of shots in the newsreel sequence. The fast rhytbm of the music, its
reverberafing refrains and echoing response-cnes from another singer, and the clattering of the castanets
give another dimension to the explosive urgency of the sequence ïtself. The music does more than
accompany the images but together with the silent matenality of the newsreel footage creates a kind of
new, orgarncally connected entity.
Medium-shot of a mother and father running for shelter in a building across a city street. They are
holding a baby and duck into the darkness of a large doorway.
SHOT 68
B/W images of air-borne planes releasing bombshells.
SHOT 69
B/W. Explosions of debns are thrown out onto the smoke-fllled screen.
SHOT 69
B/W. Long-shot of city street. Tow well-dressed young women holding large flower-arrangements are
rushing across traffic down to the subway entrance.
SHOT 70
B/W. Medium shot of another women running, camera pans up and smoke Lils the sky.
SHOT 71
B/W medium shot of a group of boys wearing special large hexagonal war tags with numbers on them.
They are walldng along a quay beside a seaport, the bridges and pale towers of the city looming bebind.
The camera follows one of them walldng ahead as he wipes bis tears wiffi a doth.
SHOT 72
B/W Medium-shot of young women and mothers crowding around the dock in tears.
SHOT 73
B/W close-shot of a tiny little girl sitting on the ground in between the frocks and long coats of adults
around her. She is toying with her coat and dress and wiping a stain.
SHOT 74
B/W close-shot of another young girl, facmg the camera and wailing, an image of wailing that rends her
mouth and the viewers eyes so much that it seems to consume die image itself.
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SHOT 75
B/W close shot of the crowd of parents and children, swaying in their mass of movements, the camera
swaying in die movement of unrest As the flamenco music dies down, the last cry of its refrain blends
in with the voices and sounds of the historical milieu of the shot itself. Over the clamor of voices, a
child’s waiilng cry is heard—tearing tbrough the image. The camera follows one small boy as he
receives bis father’s kiss and makes bis way tbi:ough the crowd with bis litde suitcase, moving forward—
like a gentleman, neyer looking back.
SHOT 76
B/W cut to an older woman kissing her daughter.
SHOT77
B/W cut to a younger mother kneeling down to the level of her son and giving him a last kiss. He kisses
the head of bis little sister, a nursling stiil in the arms of her mother, and darts off to the right.
SHOT 78
B/W cut to the face of an older woman seen against a brick wall just outside the heart of the crowd,
holding her hand to her collar in astomsbment, holding herseif back from her next breath.
SHOT79
B/W cut to a family wallcing along die quay, ail die children wearing their tags and holding their bags,
die father walking at dieir side aiid odier cbildren seen straggling behind.
SHOT 80
B/W cut to an older pale gentleman wearing a beret seen in die mass of die crowd kissing bis son,
holding bis head in bis hands with intense affection.
SHOT 81
B/W cut to a medium-shot framed by several young women in black flocked around two children. As
die heavy boat hum sounds—the wbite apparition of their faces.
SHOT 82
B/W close shot of yet another little girl holding a doil who tums to die camera. Her expression is
impressively recorded in die duration of die shot, turning from a kind of lisfless drifting gaze to diat of
total surrender to that of absolute interrogation. Viewers are confronted with that gaze, “faced” with
die question in her eyes: Is it possible to give a face to die grievous waffing and loss of diat irremediably
bistorical moment, weighed in die wake of die heavy silence of die boat-hom?
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SEQUENCE iX (Documentary Newsreel of the Hïstoric Soviet Balloon-Flight)
SHOT 83
Cut to another B/W documentary newsreel of the record-breaking Soviet ascent by balloon into the
stratosphere (early 1930’s). Total silence. Long-shot from below reveals a soldier seated on a swing
dangling from a perfectly round hot-air balloon. This balloon and soldier are seen juxtaposed next to die
loose strings and enonnous presence of a mother bailoon.
However unexpected the cut to this sequence from the last, there is a corresponding sense of
rhythmic drift, and from the images of the cbildren taking final leave of their parents to this image of
man’s fragile body in flight—there is a corresponding figuration of orphanage and human un-secunng
in the age of technology and war. Neither sequence would have die same effect without the other, nor
either have the same astonishing quality of speaking to something else beyond its frame.
SHOT $4
B/W long-shot, in silence: two piots seen suspended in swings from small balloons on either side of
the enormous mother-balloon. The heavy measure of their suspended drift prepares the opemng to a
musical outside.
SHOT 85
B/W long-shot of another image of one of the piots and bailoons against die surface and the
tremendous shadows of the mother balloon. The violins of Pergolesi’s Stabat Mater, No.12, open into
this image and seem to be holding the weight of the bafloons.
SHOT 86
B/W long-shot. One of die small balloons is seen against
the brighdy lit surface of the mother balloon, the piot
soldier bmshes up against its surface and kicks off. The
rhythrnic alternation of the violin bows on the solemn
sound of the strings interacts dynamically with the
historical duraflon and floating presence of the images.
SHOT 87
B/W long-shot of the terrestnal horizon with the landing of one of the balloons as it passes bebind
another landed bailoon. A crowd of spectators looks on as the plot and bailoon drifi to the left. In the
hazy glowing light, the sun appears small but a kind of aurai glow envelops the image, especially since it
is seen in die processional musical cadence of the Pergolesi’s music.
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SHOT 8$
B/W medium-shot of the piot descending, seen from below. In die quick rhythm of the shot, he
seems to be jerking and shaking on the dangling cords of his swing as if he were a marionette; he is
pulled down by a camarade.
SHOT $9
B/W medium-shot. A CCCP balloon takes off for ffight, the basket-balloon tising from below, gendy
drifting and rising towards die left of die screen, an image striking for its majestic poise and pause.
SEQUENCE X (May Day Celebrations, Ignat’s déjà-vu, and the Apparition ofAkhmatova)
SHOT 90
Confetti shot of May Day Parade of 1939. B/W Documentary newsreel shot. Pergolesi’s Stabat Mater,
No.12, heard instrumentally opernng previous documentary footage of balloon-flight, opens in this
confetti-shot with die otherworldly voices of children singing the liturgical refrain: Quando corpus
morietur fac ut animae donatur paradisi gloria (While my body here decays, may my soul Thy goodness
praise, safe in paradise with Thee) . This brief parade shot is paradoxicafly worldly and otherworldly,
invoking celebration and warning, asserting social unity in the parade-procession and yet dissolving in
the dispersion of shadows and lights like an impressionist painiing: world at peace, world in dispersion,
impressionist world.
The impressionist image is also an image of the body of the people, but that of a different body, the
image of the “mass” is flot idendfied and restored, for film produces a different mode of “presence”—
than that which we are accustomed to seeing in a stadium or on the stage of die theatre for example.
Nuancing the problem of die cinematographic presence of bodies that André Bazin flrst articulated in
relation to die mediation of die visible, Deleuze remarks:
Mais, si le cinéma ne nous donne pas la présence du corps, et ne peut pas nous la donner, c’est
peut-être aussi parce qu’il se propose un autre objectif: il étend sur nous une «nuit
expérimentale» ou un espace blanc, il opère avec des «grains dansants)) et une «poussière
lumineuse », il affect le visible d’un trouble fondamental, et le monde d’un suspens, qui
contredisent toute perception naturelle. Ce qu’il produit ainsi, c’est la génèse d’un «corps
inconnu» (« Cinéma, corps et cerveau, pensée)) dans Irntge-tet.’îps, 1985 ; 262).
If die rhythm of this shot participates in die genesis of anodier body, in die temporal inscription of
luminous fiecks and in die suspending drift of die children’s voices, then this rhythm par&ipates in die
friture, in die unknown. Radier than being an image of cheering solidatity, radier than being an image
of mere commemoration of die dead and die living, it puts viewers in touch widi die genesis of
something “phantomatically embodied” that is not yet an action or a figure of action: in other words,
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with that which impresses viewers with the absence of the dead, and that which—for the “ordinarv
man of the cmema” (Schefer, 1980) opens up another mode of the visible and engenders other
possibifities for life. Tbis is the political-ethical dimension of the poetics of rhytbm in film, the un
thought in tradinonal cinema-studies.
SHOT91
Diagonal-oblique color-shot of DaVina’s middle-aged, self-portrait in profile, drawn in red chalk,
reproduced in the Broghaus ediflon. The well-measured choral music continues to sustain the
reverenflal continuity of the shot. This autoportrait opens what we might cail a «scene» because
another DaVinci autoportrait, (also drawn in red chalk but at a much older age and flot in profile but
obliquely facing), is pictured twenty minutes later (Sequence XVI, shot 154), open-face on a picnic table
outdoors with pine needles in its rnargins; it literaily folds the entire « scene », in the logic of
autoportraiture Qvlichel Beaujour, 1980), tbrough the figure of the vise philosopher/master-arflst/father
of tradition. But what does the scene fold, if it js flot the irrecoverable absence of the father and the
shattering of tradition ? This loss and tItis absence is figuraflvely imagined in the temporal guif that
opens between Ignat and Alexei, the child of the narrator and the narrator as a cbild.
We are given to pause upon the un-veiling of those images that participate in this histoncal
ambivalence, between the impossibffity of sacred art and the explosive potenflal of humanist art
featured in the red chalk portrait in profile of Isabeila D’Este; the charcoal study of the angel for the
painting, Madonna of the Rocks; the cartoon-smdy of the figures of Mary and St. Aime holding the
Christ-child, a study for the flnished Vugin and St.Anne and recalling the centrai disposition of the
unfinished tableau opening Tarkovsky’s Saciifice, T/e Adoration f the Mtgi; and flnaily, the charcoal
drawing of Christ (Cod. Forst., III, folio 29) upon which image a leaf is placed to mark sometbing of its
life and love in the eyes of lis former beholder.
Finally, Alexei folds over the most emblemauc image of ail, in which we see a tableau-study of
different pairs of hands in prayer, hands opened, cupped, clasped, and ail emerging from the darkness
and illumined in their gesture upwards. As intimated afready, Minw2s relationship to images as images is
analogous to a kind of cinemaflc prayer organized topicaily around important “stations of the cross”
which are folded and transposed in the rhythmic temporalities of the film medium. The sacred choral
music once again sets the cantusjbwitis for such a prayer, itself neyer spoken but suggested by the lofty
suspensions and cadences of Pergolesi’s Stabat Mater. We hear the heavy book close. Darkness. SlowÏy
die camera lifts to Alexei’s face illumined by die window. Ibis light and titis gaze out die window
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permits the passage to another epoch, from the narrator as a child (Alexei) to the child of the narrator
(Ignat)5, a gaze that genefates a vision from father to son, passmg through the 1930’s to the 1970’s.
SHOT 92
The light from the window passes through Nathalia’s shining hait, despite herself as she is genuflecting.
As she gets up, the Requiem music abruptly stops, and she asks Ignat to corne over smce she is leaving.
We sec bim sitting on a table nearby the window, daydreaming, paraflel to the position of bis father as a
boy. Fie moves and we hear footsteps, and as he passes mto the corridor we bnefly notice a nineteenth
cenmry world-rnap on the wail.
Nathalia gets up and tums around only to lose her
purse, spifiing its contents on the floor. Ignat bmshes
lier back with bis hand and fails to the floor to help her
pick them up. She says « When you’ie aiways in a
hurry !....Just pick them up...» Cfbis phrase about being
in a hurry is echoed at the beginrnng of the film,
spoken by the stranger-doctor who fails from the fence
of the dacha with Alexei’s mother, Maria).
As she hurriedly picks up paper belongings, Ignat slowly gathers coins, buttons, or earrings and,
reaching for the final one, receives an electnc shock. He says « li feels like electricity...It feels like it ail
happened once, but I’ve neyer been here before» and as lie says these words, the percussive electric
music of Eduard Artemyev begins to ring out the metaffic dissonance’s that wffl punctuate and underlie
the test of the shot. Nathalia responds: «Stop imaging things and give me those coins ». As she adds «
And fldy up a bit» we hear the dim voices of what we may cail Artemyev’s requiem refrain. She gets up,
takes her coat and the camera follows her dosely as she moves quickly and makes a complete 360
degree turn, the electronic music suddenly making a dizzying flourish, around the corridor and opens
die door. In tbree seconds there is the disquieting strangeriess that time has been warped.
SHOT 93
Signiflcantly, the camera cuts to a medium-shot of the white, cold-light of the tattered ceramic wail of
the backroorn, now looking like a prison-space, and travels alongside the wail to Ignat’s face, warmly
kindled in yeilow light against a dark librarv-wafl of books. Ignat and bis mother are both separated by
the heavy, glossy-white oil-painted door, that hinges between the two warmly-lit spaces, precluding
Note: most commentary confises the identity of young Alexei and Ignat in this shot (Ex: Johnson/Petrie,
p. 122), an understandable mistake since both roles are played as doubles by the saine actor Ignat Daniltsev.
Yet judging by the uncut haïr, heavy coat, and pale features it is Alexei.
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them from being seen together. Nathaha’s face, learnng m and out, and sufflised with that iconic, golden
light, says « Don’t touch anything. And teil Maria Nikolayevna to wait if she cornes » (the name mdicates
that it must lie the boy’s grandmother). Ignat closes the door and bis face receives the pallor-coloring of
the door. Looking up, back, and then tuming round again he is followed alongside the dark librarv-wall,
this time his face is pale and we hear again the ghostly chant-refrain; he touches a book, makes a 360
degree turn and hears a teasp000 cirilting : time is warped again.
SHOT 94
A woman (played by the actress Tamara
Odorodnikova, left) with a maid makes her
apparition, sitting at the table for tea-time (the
same table on which Ignat xvas sitting earlier as he
was davdreaming in the window-light) and
hearkens tu Ignat: « Corne in. Hello. x’ Light fades,
Most film crirics fail to idenflfy her unmistakably allusive evocation of the poetess, Anna Akhmatova,
(image on the nght), lier maid—the image of fate or her Muse6. As she remarks to the maid, « A cup of
tea for the young man,» die camera follows her out of the room, around the corner and the frarne of
the world-map and opens backwards in a depth-of-fleld shot that seerns to extend the spaces of the
room. Centered and open to view: a baroque-looking, elaborately carved chair with red satin cushion,
an oddly curious furnishing, fit for Prince Hamlet. Electric organ music seers and suspends the
dissonances heard before. The maid tums off the hall-light and walks on, die theatricabty of die scene
6 Tarkovsky’s is known to have disavowed this resemblance despite its especially “evocative” and
“talismanic” power. For example, when discussing some of the image-ridUles of his fi[ms, images without
much explanation but with quite a lot of evocative power, Tarkovsky added: “for example, peopie would
say: “and who is this older woman sitting over there asking him to read the leffer from Pushkin to Chaadayev?
What woman is this? Akhmatova?” — Everybody says that. She in fact does look a bit lilce her, she has the
same profile and she could remind her. The woman is piayed by Tamara Ogorodnikova, our production
manager, she was in fact aiready our production manager for Rubtov, she is our great friend whom I
photographed in almost ail my films. She was like a talisman to me. I didn’t think this was Akhmatova. for me
she was a person from “there’ who represents a continuation of certain cultural traditions, she is attempting at
ail cost to tie this boy to them, tie them to a person who is young and lives in this day and age. Ibis is very
important, in brief ils a certain tendency, certain cuiturai roots. Here is this house, here is the man who
iives in it, the author, and here is bis son who somehow is influenced by this atmosphere, those roots. Afler ail
it is not precisely delineated who this woman is. Why Akhmatova?
— A bit pretentious. This isn’t any
Akhmatova. Simply put it is preciseiy this woman who mends the tom thread of time — just as in
Shakespeare, in Harniet. She restores it in a cuiturai, spiritual sense. lts a bond between modem times and the
times past, the time of?ushkin or perhaps a later time — it doesn’t matter.” (Res Pubtica; 1987)
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heightening the spectral nature of the visitors—themselves aiways already at-home, as if the world of
the dead were one co-terminus with the world of the living. Akhmatova and her maid are thenceforth
aiways associated with tins switching off and on of lights, the theatrical symbolism of their being
«shades» is clear. Their « apparition », in the phenomenological sense, takes them beyond mere
symbolism since they do not merely stand-for the dead-absent, but show-forth in the plasticny of light
and darkness, in the magical mirror of the image, and allow things to appear as agents of vision and
visibility since they set the screen/stage of seeing.
SHOT 95
Ignat is shown in profile; he makes another about-face turn when he hears the teaspoon clinking.
Akhmatova is seen between two windows, a radiator and a ruinous, water-stained, plaster wall and
replies: «Get the notebook on the third sheif» Ignat pulls the well-thumbed, leather volume from the
shelf and tums to face her as she tels him to read from the book-marked page. Music is subdued and
finaMy silenced. We sec Ignat in profile, lit from the back by a light that catches bis car as if to emphasize
the catecbism-like attention to be given to an important recitation. He reads a fragment copied in the
notebook: «In replying as to the effect the arts and science have on our mores, Rousseau said, ‘A
negative one’ » She interrupts him and directs him elsewhere, teffing him to read only what is
underlined. He recites a fragment of a letter from Pushkin to Pytor Chaadayev (we leam this only after
the recitation), a letter, the interpretation of winch fires a debate about historical discourse among the
frlm’s many contending critics.
For the bureaucrats of the Goskino/Mosfilm studios, as well as for many Soviet critics, the
recitation of tins letter xvas an appropriate endorsement of Soviet nationalism since it ailuded in the
nationalist debate that took place a century earlier: « it was a key text in the Salvophile-Westemizer
controversy raging in the second quarter of the nineteenth century: should Russia adopt the West as its
cultural and political model or look to its own indigenous reigious and histoncal traditions?» (Johnson
& Peine 1994: VII, 124). For foreign critics it was denounced as an unfortunate and rather
embarrassing instance of the manipulative ideology of Russian messianism or an example of histotical
mythology and popular legend, to be excused, compensated, or ignored only in the light of the director’s
otherwise masterful talents .
7
.. ,
.
. . ,
. ,For example, many critics would agree that ferro s comparison ofEisenstein s Nevski to Tarkovsky s Andrei
Rublev might easily be extended to include Mirror, in which his remarks on the advent of another kind of
histoiy are aiways tempered in ideological terms : Le regard érudit, positiviste, n’exclut pas l’appel à d’autres
critères. La réalisation de Nevski ou de Rublev, par exemple, est due à deux artistes aussi attentifs l’un que
l’autre à ces exigences: ils n’en ont pas moins ressuscité les mêmes moments de l’Histoire (ou presque) en
réalisant deux films qui ont une signification inverse: dans Nevski, l’ennemi mortel est l’Allemand, le
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John B. Dunlop has also discussed, in the context of the production of Soviet films of the
I 970’s, the often refractory and “indigestible” Russian nationalist themes systematicafly expressed in a
quasi-Aesopian manner to avoid censorship. Citing the French cntic Jacques Graut, he agrees that
Mirror is less a means of refiection than an a-Marxist barrier (barrage) placed between the flimmaker
himself and a world lie refuses in sec and to discuss, this SCCflC 0f the reutation of Pushkin’s letter being
an exemplary case in point. “In opposition to the Soviet ideocracy, Tarkovsky places “thousand-year
old” Christran Russia” (1992; 242). Dunlop argues that scene by scene, Mirror literally mirrors ail the
concems, fears, and hopes piwng Russian nationalists against tlie legitimizing ideology of the Soviet
regime, Marxist-Leninism, as descnbed below.
[...] Russian nationalism can be seen primadly as a desire to preserve to presewe ethnic
Russians themselves from souo-demographic attrition (tlie resuit of sucli perceived plagues as
the break-up of the family, plummeting bfrth rates, and juvenile delinquency); in preserve
Russian histoncal monuments, especially ancient churches, from the wrecker’s bail and
bulldozer; to preserve the endangered Russian environment from defilement and pollution; in
preserve the national religion, Russian Orthodoxy, from extinction. It also seeks to preserve
the mneteenth century Russian classics (Dostoevsky, Toistoy, Chekhov, etc.) from neglect, and
it manifest a strong suspicion of moderrnzation, urbanization and the so-called “scientific and
technical revolution (1992; 231).
Again, Dmitn and Viadmir Shlapentokh discuss Tarkovsky’s films as one of the hallmarks of movies
made in the penod of Brezhnevian conservausm (1968-1985), movies that cliailenged “the regime with
movies that were sf11 loyal to officiai ideology but contained some elements that irritated officiais”
(1993; 147). They argue, for example, that Mùror is an excellent example of the use of diversified officiai
ideology for social critique, as it sets the liberal wing of the Russophile ideology of the political cite over
against the other core Breznevian, neo-Stalinist, and neo-Leninist (or liberal socialist) ideologies. Films
like Andrei Rublev (1971), Solaris (1972)and Mirror (1974), far from being xenophobic projections of
Western consumerism and promiscuity or facile adulations of Russians as models for the world, ail
speak in the special destiny of the national traditions and Orthodox Christianity of Russia.
In his somewhat autobiographical film Mirro, Tarkovskï was again absorbed by the fate of
Russia. He referred in the polemic between Alexander Chaadaiev, a Russian philosopher in
the beginning of the nineteenth century, and his famous contemporary, the poet Alexander
Pushkin. The director sidcd with the poet and argued agamst Chaadaiev’s pessimistic vision of
the future. The characters of the movie, refined Russian intellectuals, commend Russia for the
salvation of Europe from both the Mongol invasion and the Nazis. Even Stalin’s terror has
some positive implications in that li would cleanse Russians tbrough suffering, thereby raising
their spirituality (1993: 162).
Teutonique, et dans Rublev, le Tartar, le Chinois. Ici, ce qui sauve la Russie, c’est sa sainteté, son
christianisme; alors que dans Nevski, le héros est volontairement laïcisé (l9$7; XIX, 219-220).
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It is unnecessary to refute the facile provocations and reductions of such ideological commentary and
much more interesting to test the limits of such a position by demonstrating how Pushkin’s letter to
Chaadayev is handled cinematographically in Tarkovsky’s Mirror We may profit from a heightened
sensitivity to the mise-en-scène of the recitation of the letter, which far from being simple, is quite
complex and intriguing and contributes as much to the sense of the letter as the letter itsclf, taken at
face-value. Letters are, after ail, messages sent; the medium of their transmission, as McLuhan reminds
us, is also the message. How is a letter, originally sent from the poet-figure Pushkin, selectively copied
and underlined by the father-narrator and recited by a child to the apparition of Akhmatova, and filmed
in the audio-visual techniques of the poet-anematographer Tarkovsky? Film-crrncs are stiil too closeiy
tied to the culture of literacy even to ask this question and reduce the film to an ideological paraphrase
of the letter, the transmission of the letter in die contcxt of the film being understood in the rhetoric of
die synecdotal figure of the literary “dispositif.”
As I have argued, a carefiul consideration of the matenality of the medium of film has another, non-
discursive power, a power that is not motivated by the effort to “preserve” a nationalist politics and
people that already exist but which carnes out, in die practice of rhythm and die emergence of a new
order of due visible, flue invention of a politics and a peopie who are not yet, who might emerge in flue
future tense of this not-yet, in flue darkness of flue expenence of this hope which must be carned by die
figure of die child.
Ignat begins: «The division ofthe church separated us from Europe.
We did not take part in a single one ofits great events. But we had oui
own speciaipredestination. > At this moment in die recitaflon, die camera
tums and focuses out from Ignat’s profile, and peeking over die pages
focuses in on Akhmatova, flue ghosdy refrain-chant echoing here. The camera makes a graduai close-up
on Akhmatova and her tea-ceremony as we hear only due voice of Ignat reciting: «Russia and its vast
expanses absorbed the Mongol invasion. The Tartars did flot dare to cross our Western borders.
They retreated to thefr deserts and Christian civilization was saved. To achieve this goal we
underwent a change which, while preserving us as Christïans, alienated us from the rest of the
Christian world. As for our historic insinLt4ïcance, I cannot agree wfth you » Lighting is dimmed,
receiving a cue from Akhmatova’s nodding, and as die camera reaches a medium-shot profile she
reaches out to take a sip of tea. Ignat continues t «Do you flot find sornething sinificant in Russia ‘s
position to arnaze due future historian ?Alihough lam truly attached to the TsarS.. » Camera pans
left to die stiil-life composition of due rounded, marbled, glass tea-cup, saucer, and biscuits on die tabie,
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a stiil life that recails, if only dimly and in the horizons of the French and Dutch masters of similar stiil
life tableaux, the symbolic power of the Eucharist, of taking the body and the blood of Christ. « I am
not at ail mspfred by what I see arotmd me. As a writer I am annoyed I am insulted .» Lighting
changed and brightened. Cut to a dose-up of Akhmatova’s profile Qeft) suddenly facmg opposite to her
previous profile: «... but not for anything would I change my country...» Camera face to face with
Ignat, himself backed against a dimly visible photograph, a face-to-face portrait of his grandmother,
Maria Nikolayevna (in real-life, Tarkovsky’s moffier) as he ends : « or choose another history than the
history ofour forefathers, as God ordained it. Pushldn to Pytor Cbaadayev, Oct 19, 1836»
If we do propose an ideological reading of this recitation we may say that the discourse of
Russian Messianism is performed in a speech-act that takes on the burden of its histoncity and by
transforming what is easily reduced as its nationalist-linpulse in the light of its prototypical imitation of
Christ. We see the cinematographic development or «glose », explored in the careful choreography of
darkness and light, sound and image, of the very Byzantine imaginary under discussion and the problems
of its safeguarded transmission. The Son reads the Words underlined by die Father (Alexei and Pushkin)
to the Holy Ghost (Akhmatova). The religious economy of this recitation, wbile originating in Christian
theology, does flot necessarlly support the Orthodox church, but serves to relay or to mediate a message
of salvation, in the residues and ruins of a Christian world, through die breath and the eye of the poet
(Pushkin-Akhmatova-Tarkovsky (father and son). In other words, it does not, as a speech-act preserve
die rooted idenflty of die past in its repeated transmission but, remembering the loss of dis tradition in
the materlal fragments of previous visions of utopia “sparks them back into flame” in the moment of
their re-articulation, and moves thought into the space of die invisible and die not-yet in die duration of
die image.
Ignat finishes, pauses, turns his head towards Akbmatova who returns bis gaze and teils him to
go open die door. In die elaborate choreography of de corridor and its eerie, diabolical lights, we are
given to sense a kind of Bulgakovian attention to die dwellings of die commune apartment (The Master
and Maiarita). The camera foilows as Ignat mms his head back around again, as if foilowing die
circulation of her gaze and is lost to view in die darkness ; ail die time die soundtrack is heard dimly but
percussively chanting-chiming and building crescendo’s diat parailel die kinetic thrust of bis gesture to
open die door. The first inside-door is opened, and Ignat crosses in de darkness die threshold dat
earlier he had been separated from, preduded from die view of bis modier Nathalia, and makes a gesture
to open die outside-door. It is opened, apparently from without, or perhaps both hands have touched
die doorknob at once. The glossy-wbite oil-enamel door dramaticaily and suddenly enipts die darkness
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of Ignat’s space, refiecting the light from the outside corridor of die commune apartment building; die
choral voices, built up in haunting momentum, are released and coalesce in their evanescence with die
strange voices, wbispers and echoes from die corridor outside so diat we cannot teil die difference
between die living and dead.
Ignat is face-to face widi his grandmother, Maria Nikolayevna
(Tarkovsky’s own mother), die same woman against whose photograph he
standing before Akhmatova. Apparendy he does not recognize her
nor she him. She looks up, perhaps to check die apartment number, says
«Oh, I’ve got die wron apartment» turns and leaves.
Ignat peeks out btiefiy and dien closes die door. Darkness. Ignat crosses into die window-light of die
back room where Akhmatova made her appearance and has now disappeared; die music is low and
hollow, and we hear Ignat’s footsteps awk-ward and heavy.
The shot seems to unfold in itself, in terms of a dialectic economy or oikonomia of light and
darkness, in terms of what makes sight and seeing possible, of what makes die invisible or opaque cede
to visibffity, what crosses or does not cross diat threshold of night, allowing subjects to be seized by
light. Light is die dynamic principle that makes vision and visibility possible and its circulation, from
windows, mirrors, and thresholds is also die dynamic principle folding die figures of die family into each
other. Maria, herseif estranged from her son as weil as her grandson, cannot cross die threshold or be
folded in this body of light but must stiil remain as diough visible only dimly tbrough die frame of die
picture on die wall, only seen in stiil-life, in die impenetrable distance and unattainable proximity
revealed in die mirror-magic of die photographic image itself.
SHOT96
The camera cuts to a dose-up of a humid vapor of a water ring vanishing on tEe table—die surface of
which is crossed widi refiected panels of window-light. The music rises again in ail its intensity, warped
as die voices of die low chant are drawn out, accelerated, and concentrated into die terminal pitch of
die alarm.
The camera cuts to a close-up of a humid vapor of a water ring vanishing on die table--die
surface of which is crossed widi refiected panels of window-light. The music nses again in ail its
intensity, warped as die voices of die low chant are drawn out, accelerated, and concentrated into die
terminal pitch of die alarm. This climatic pitch suddenly vanishes in die silence diat ensues, a silence diat
is not simpiy die absence of sound but its very implosion, pregnant and resonating widi die momentous
memory of die rise of voices—and launched as if into anodier atmosphere. Moreover, die musicaily
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climatic cry dispiaces the perception of the graduai, vanishing celerity of the humid mark, by surpassing
the rhythmic water-pressure, irrupting and accomplishing itself outside of its material duration in time;
breaking the sound-barrier it seems to pass “out of time.”
This disjunction between soundtrack and time-image allows for a new category of perception—the
dynamic pnnciple of matenal mediation--and we literally stand suspended and gaping before the
phenomenahty of something so ordinary and yet unperceived, the inevitable collapse and the eternally
fleetrng sense of material being in time. This perception is accenmated by its being a natural, elemental
mediation of vapor, its being between the elements of water and air, being between visibility and
invisibility, and being between death and etemal metamorphosis/transfiguration.
Audio-visual technique such as tbis operates an allegoncal inscription in the Benjaminian sense
of the term, as allegory is disnnguished from symbol (The Ongin of German Tra&ic Drarna/Trauerspiei):
rather than symbolizing the etemal moment, it allows fime to seep into and materially inscnbe itself in
the etemaily fleefing nature of the work of art as a fragmented passage, mm, and reminder of the
immanence of death in historical being. Paradoxically, and tins is also one of die insights of Tarkovsky’s
allegorical audio-visual technique, in its very grounding in the matenal-elements, in its tbinking-through
material being in dine, and by presencing the phenomenological horizon of death, li places the
cinematograpbic medium into contact with something more, beyond, accelerated out of, invisible, yet
accessible to, or in dialogue with diat hope and that memory generating die more-than-mortal-being-in
time, and death is merely a function of this transformation. The heat-mark from die absent tea-cup
evaporates die magical water of Lethe in order to remember die truth (a-letheia) of that eternal side of
change and mortality, just as die rhytimiic gap of die musical reverberation bears more dian mere
silence/absence of voices but continues to afflrm die ontology of dieir tonal presence in die weight,
lifted by die overtone, of their echoing memory. The poetry of Tarkovsky’s dnematography, from tins
point of perspective, mediates this resurrection-expenence and again, titis is why die heat-mark is left
appropriately by die apparition of die poetess-figure Akhmatova.
SHOT 97
We see Ignat facing die window, medium-shot, and just as he announces bis wonder «Eh!» we hear
immediately, and widi jarring familiarity, die telephone-ringing. He crosses die corridor, face again
fflumined against die dark walls and reaches for die telephone. Ris fadier Alexei cails hum and asks if bis
mother Maria came to winch he replies diat a lady came and left because she had die wrong apartment.
Clearly estranged from bis son and trying to cope widi Ignat’s indifference, we hear die voice of Alexei
asking hum if he might want to invite over a fnend or a girl perhaps. We sec Ignat’s Hp tremble widi
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amused embarrassment as bis father recails a memory of bis love for a redhead : «Her lips were aiways
chapped. Our shell-shocked military instructor like her. » Again we notice the economy (oikonomia) of
the transition between shots: the voice of the fadier, transmitted to the son, opens effortlessly out to a
vision in memory during XWII.
SEQUENCE XI (Afasyev’s Prank on the Shefl-shock Instructor)
SHOT 98
The redhead is seen up-close in profile and the change to radiant red-color from the chiaroscuro of shot
5 to 6 is striking. She moves swiffly and silently towards the left, past the shadows of several dark
figures, out of focus and in the background. As her figure becomes clearer from the receding distance
we notice the fight-fitting winter clothes she wears and tve hear the well-measured trudge of her boots
as it literally operates a rhythmic prelude to Purcell’s chamber music. As her trudge disappears into the
music we see lier full-figure operating a visual passage into art since she literafly walks into the winter
landscape of what we shail be exploring in die next few shots as Tarkovsky’s cinematic derivation of
Peter Breughel die Elder’s tableau, Hunters in The Snow. She is an important figure for understanding die
audio-visual intermediality ofMirro,
SHOT 99
We see die pained expression of Alexei, medium-shot, as he looks back; die violins of die music
flourish tins sense of feeling. Alexei drops bis head against die raffing, facing diagonal-left, and we see
only die back of bis leather cap. This gesture is not only one of disappointment but of prayer and desire.
R is refiected, doubled, and inverted in a later scene in winch we see Alexei alone in die dark, warm
interiors of what we may cail die dacha ofabundauce (during die famine, he has accompamed bis mother in
order to seil her earrings to a weahbier, more fortunate, and pregnant woman), looks into die refiections
kindled by die gentle wick of a candie and sees, for an instant, die golden radiance of this Redhead of
bis desire nursing an infant by die side of die stove-fire.
SHOT 100
Close-up shot of die round aim-piece and black muzzle of a rifle, held at die same angle as Alexei’s
head. The rifle symbolically interrupts die drift of tins desire but visually links Alexei, since he is facing
die muzzle of die rifle and as die camera gradually pans left down die muzale, to diat of die cbild
holding die rifle who is brought into focus, medium-shot, oblique left.
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SHOT 101
We see full-figure and lined diagonally to the left, three cbildren Qvlarkov—young Alexei—Afasyev);
the first two are turned about-face towards the targets according to the master’s instructions. Afasyev
resists the about-face and faces the camera instead as if frozen with determination and fear. Interrogated
as to whether he has studied the manual, lie insists that about-face means a 360 degree turn. The camera
closes in on bis face as he says this. The instructor steps behind Afasyev (we do not sec bis face) orders
him to forget the degrces and turn about face—Humpf! Again, Afasyev disobeys atid tums full circle.
The instructor crosses in front of the rebel as if ignoring bis recalcitrance, and unable to exact any
discipline, nevertheless shouts orders for the boys to get down in their firing-posinons. He turns
around, obviously disappointed, and declares : « I want to sec your parents ». As we hear Afasyev ask
«What parents?» we watch the instructor close in from behind fric chfid, enveloping die space in
wbich lie stands and we hear the giggling background of die cbildrcn, amused to sec things taken so far.
The camera travels dosely down from die angry face of the instructor to the tearful face of the cbild as
he asks «which position?
The camera follows the Instructor’s proffle as he methodically steps in front of die boys,
completing a haif-circle that panoramicaily distorts as it takes in the surrounding scene as in a bowi;
during which time lie asks Markov « What are the parts of a....
SHOT 102
The camera dits to Afaseyev as he makes bis way off the platform in a straight lime backwards, up fric
stairs, to join die kids who are hanging on the raDings and wrcstling above. Out of this rhythmic gap, the
Instructor resumcs bis question « of a...of...a rifle?»
SHOT 103
We follow die match of the Instructor (much in fric same way as wc do Domcnico’s attcmpt to cross
the drained spring with lighted-candle in die last scene of Nostaghia) as bis itineraiy visually marks the
pattern of the prayer of die cross he marches down die nave of die gallery, markcd by Markov, circles
around bim and bow to die ground at die right end and picks up bis bullets 111cc rosary-beads and
procecds left, bending down at regular intervals, die camera’s focus on die hands as diey distribute tbree
bullets to each of die tbrec children taking airn. Markov’s slowness to answer die question of bis
catechism concerning die rites of die rifle foregrounds die comedy of die scene « The stock... die
muzzle... » As die Instructor sardomcally replies «You’rc a muzzle...» Alcxei asks, in ail sincenty, « Then
what’s a muzale ?» The instructor does not answer but takes bis chair to die snowy corner, back left, to
supervise from a distance.
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SHOT 104
The camera cuts a view from above, long-shot, in wbich we see from bebind, the three figures of the
boys shooting their targets at irregular intervals. We hear once again the cawing of birds and see the
trees as in a hazy landscape as the camera moves in gradually to focus on the target-wall, a wall wbich
suddenly takes on the aspect of the dacha, turned inside-out (See Sequence XVI, shot 150 for another
visual correspondence of this).
SHOT 105
Darkness. Medium-shot, from above: Afasyev sitting in die upper deck and unpacking a hand-grenade
from bis leather bag. The camera follows bis hand as he sets it down on the table. The following
sequence is slightly disonenting and fllmed mostly in close-up. ‘11e rowdy voices of die children are
bandied about like birds-caws and an unknown hand grabs the grenade, and passes it around as if to
emphasize its being handled by die entire group. Darkness and lattices of light ; in the ensuing noise die
camera pulls back to show the Instructor below, handling a flrearrn. In the excited shuffle and traffic
above we see a hand set down the grenade on the table and hold the pin. Close-up of this hand and
Afasyev’s nght hand clasping the grenade in a golden light Afesyev pulls die pin, roils bis body down
the stairs and tbrows the grenade before the Instructor on the platform.
SHOT 106
Shouting «Afasyev don’t do itLa and « Get down! It’ll kil you !» die Instructor throws himself on the
platform and rolls over the top of the grenade.
SHOT 107
Absolute silence. The camera gives a close-up of the hands clasping the grenade for two seconds.
Focus-out.
SHOT 108
Pan back, medium shot. From bebind, we see the Instructor curled up absolutely stifi and in foetal
position. At the same time, we hear growing gradually louder and louder--the rhytbmic pulse of bis
heart.
SHOT 109
Perspective reversed. Cross back to a position above die Instructor, looking back, depth of fleld. We see
trinity of children, (Afasyev, standing left—unknown, face down---Markov, right, bent fonvard on
knees). The camera dips down and we see die Instructor’s skull-like shell-cap, a diaphanous hemisphere
tumed up like a bowL As die heartbeat intensifies and tbrobs irregularly, die camera continues to dip
obliquely, pulled out of focus as it does so, into die dark impenetrable surface of die wooden-platform
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unifi it moves in verticafly above the hstmctor’s head. The beat overheard is now joined with the visual
close-up, revealing dimly, the throbbing pulsation coursing to bis wounded-scalp.
This shot literally takes spectators through the specter of immanent death, of the anamorpbic
distortion of the skull (a cinematic derivation of the optic tricks of the mirror, as in Hans Holbein’s The
An;basrndori). The anamorphic skull is ail the more « real» since it’s apparition is consumed in sight and
sound, by being pulled spaflally and pulsed temporally in the screen of the set and in the surgical
magical vision of the camera. On a phenomenological rather than a psychological level, tbis temporal
experience may be described in Heideggenan terms as a projection, from out of the temporality of
military routine, into the authentac temporality of being-towards-death.
Finafly Afaseyev announces: «It’s a dummy ». flie rebefflous prank is revealed to be the vanity it is
however in the light of the Instructor’s uhimate gesture of sacrifice and Afaseyev stands «dumb >. The
sound of die pulse fades and the Instructor lifts himself. He faces Afasayev and I’vlarkov, puts on bis
skuil-cap and says: «To think you’re a Leningrad boy)>.
SHOT 110
The camera foilows closely from bebind the back of the Instructor as lie trudges down die side of
shooting ailey, diagonal left, towards die targets, ail this time bis head is equal to die horizon of die
boards, between sky and earth; we hear die slow methodical sound of boots crunching die snowy
boards. He tums haif-circle in die other direction and sits down on die stool, bis head descending down
alongside die ruinous, salty wbitewash of die boards, cap covenng bis eyes from view. Tbis dioughtful
descent transforrns bis down-cast gaze into a vision of memory:
SHOT 111
Silence. Close up of die shawled Redhead, turning ber face to die camera,
fr
...
laugbing (we do not hear a sound). She glances down btiefly and touches die
- blood from die open sore of ber chapped lip ; ail titis time die camera closes in
on her face and we hear in die distant background Artemyev’s requiem-chant orchestration, die pound
of tympanies and die haunting neumatic voices.
As die camera halts on lier stiil face, fingers parted from her lips widi die touch of blood, eyes open,
face radiant. For a bnef two seconds her face assumes die sacred repose of an epiphanic
transformation; she is paradoxicaily terrible and beautifiil, diabolical and divine, erotic and pure; her
image carnes something of die halting power of great iconic images, simated somewhere between die
Modier Mary and Mary Ivlagdalen, she may be likened to die strange-famffiarity of a bewitching
Theotokos (God-bearer).
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The rhythmic intensity of this radiant vision reverberates outside of its duration in the frame of the
shot and is precisely ail the more bnght for lis bnef beaming: this shot, foregrounded by the ominous
music, mtroduces us to this gap and tbis noise of time, neyer resolved in its painful difference, but
experienced on a visceral level by the Instructor and explored like a parable throughout die following
shots (between die newsreel footage and die recalcitrant children) of an irremediably histoncal and
unendurably secular experience of life structured by die Messiamc temporality of Apocalypse and Hope.
Again, die Instructor intimates an imitation of Christ, since this vision of die blood-chapped lip is made
visible by a man who would sacrifice bis life for die salvaflon of children
SEQUENCE XII (B/W Documentary Newsreel of Lake Sivash, Soviet Advance during WWII,
1943)
SHOT 112
Artemeyev’s orchestration continues die war-requiem. Medium shot, looking down from above: a
naked man carrying a heavy crate down a muddy slope, soldiers seen swimming and loading artiflery and
supplies on to a raft. The camera sbifts as die raft fips, wheels crash, supplies slip; piano chords
resound as if a piano were being moved and had failen on its head.
SHOT 113
Afaseyev is seen, long-shot, from die targets of die shooting-alley, trudging up die stairs to die gallery
above. As he makes it up to die top of die stairs, die children, stiul crouched and huddled from die
expectation of die grenade-explosion. take bis lead, stand, and follow, profile left, to match bebind hini
This brief shot makes die children’s match parallel to die newsreel footage of die trudging soldiers. R is
from dis point of perspective diat die footage is to be seen; this is not to say diat they are marching in
die steps of their fadiers—but that a powerful histoncal analogy is performed and imagined between
orphan children and lost fadiers by crossing die rhytbms of their steps.
SHOT 114
- - .- -
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The camera faces the backs of a processional host of soldiers pushing the canon-cart over the ruts of a
muddy earth; we hear, however, the spiashing of boots wading in the water. Tarkovsky notes the aching
poignancy of this documentary sequence because the simple people flimed are recorded “in one single
event continuously observed” by an extraordinarily gifted camera-man who penetrated the dramatic
moment of the Soviet advance through the Crimea in 1943 (1986; 130-131).
SHOT 115
Panorama of an officer, bnghtly buttoned and carrying a camera, and a troop of soldier-engineers slowly
wading through die water holding notebooks, pikes, poles, and surveying equipment.
SHOT 116
Two soldiers seen marching without pants or boots carrying backpacks and rifles: one, loolting like a
Mongolian, briskly marching ahead, hat flapping; die other, morosely canying on. The horizon between
die etemally monotonous sky and die gray murky water is seamless; spiashing water. Close up of thefr
feet pattermg ankle-deep in die water.
SHOT 117
Coniinuous shot in profile, left to nght, of two files of men, immersed knee-deep in die water, pulling
die cords of die boat-raft. The camera travels from die flrst man holding die cord and slowly backtvards
to each man; one feels, in die visual link of die cord pulled gravely into and outside of die frame,
somediing of die effort and die heaviness of die physical pull itself. Water spiashes are siower, more
regular, and deeper sounding. Camera haits at die raft wbich we do not sec in total perspective, but
framed at medium depth, allowing for die boches and die pained, weary, and stem faces of an entire,
monumental host of men, hanging on to die cords of die raft or pushing its wooden poles, to pass
through its lens.
SHOT 118
Pieces of paper seen floating on die opaque surface of die rocking water. Boots are heard frregularly
spiashing.
SHOT 119
Two soldiers, seen dose neck-down, trudging in die thick mud around other boots; camera lifts to
show them hunched under die weight of missiles held in each hand and strung around neck or shoulder.
The monotonous tone of chant-refrain hums like a breath, building ami faffing witbin die dnim
rhytbms.
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SHOT 120
Panorama shot of the raft, packed with wheeled cannons, crates, and the men hanging, standing,
pushing it or wading around its periphery; a shot fascinating for its uncanny resemblance to the
sculptures of war-monuments, except that what is usuaily a solid umfled mass of sculpture in wbich die
motion of bodies are frozen in stone representations is here literally a mass of heterogeneously moving
bodies scupted in tirne in ail of its bistoncal survivance on screen.
SHOT 121
Long shot, probably from die perspective of die raft, showing die back of a man blowing die smoke of
a cigarette, and a host of soldiers carrying rifles dispersed, trudging fonvard and converging at die
horizon, their heavy, feeble boots anlde-deep in die uncertain water and mud. As boots splash, drums
rntensifT.
SHOT 122
Long-shot of die backs of two groups of men carrying die muzzles of cannons like enormous crosses
and here again, die newsreel seems more-than-real in its living ailegory of Christ’s passion. Voices chime
in die duil sustained breadi of die chant, drums pound and build.
5H01 123
Medium-shot of die moving-monument, parallel to seq.7, this lime we see two officers moving against
die current to encourage die men widi die wave of dieir hands to continue onward and onward. Music
and water give way, in die insistence of this very gesture to push onwards, to die steadv, musical,
heraldic voice of die poet, Arseny Tarkovsky, reciting bis poem « Life, Life» (Translation below taken
from Kitty-Hunter Blair, Sti4pting in Tirnt, p. 143.)
I do flot belïeve hi forebodings,
r”
• f
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SHOT 124
Parallel to seq.9. nor do ornens ftighten me, I do flot run from siander
nor from poison. On earth there is no death.
SHOT 125
Parallel to seq.6, as if continued ; the camera focuses on the feeble mud-stained legs of the two soldiers
bearing missiles. Ail are immortal. Ail is immortal. Camera lifts to show another soldier, seen in front
of these two, and loading die missile mto a crate with the help of other officers. No need to be afraid
of death at seventeen, flot yet at seventy. Reality and light exist,
SHOT 126
Long shot, but nothing to focus upon but a small island of stone, no horizon; lake and sky are shown
as a seamless gray glowing light. but neither death flot darlmess. Medium shot, and the monumental
raft pulls mto view again in doser detail. Ail of us are Ofl the sea-shore now, and I am one of those
who haul the nets when a shoal of immortality cornes in. Live in the house---and the house wiil
stand.
SHOT 127
Long shot, tliis time reversing the usual perspective as die horizon is seen behind the entire army of
hundreds of men who face the camera marching in a lime obliquely left; they seem to brim over the
edges of the screen endlessly advancing. I will cail up any century, go into it and build rnyself a
house. That is why your chiidren are besïde me, and your wives, ail seated at one table, one
table for great-grandfather and grandson, the future is accomplisbed here and now,
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SHOT 128
Medium shot, profile of procession of soldiers traveling left. And if I slightly taise my hand before
you, you wiil be left with ail five beams of light. With shoulder blades like timber props
SHOT 129
Long-shot, from behind: soldiers trodding in knee deep water as they proceed to carry the canons, their
cross. I held up cadi day that made the past. With a surveyor’s chain I measured time and
traveled through as if across the Urals.
SHOT 130
Close up of boots lifting mud. I picked an age whose stature measured mine. Camera pulls
upwards, medium-shot, as the procession, endlessly continued is gradually brought out of focus into a
fiizzy light. We headed south, made dust swirl on tic steppe. Tail weeds were tank, a
grasshopper was playing,
SHOT 131
Alffiough the newsreel sequence ends, the recitation of the poem continues to its end as we watch
Afasyev scramble up the snowy landscape, literally falling into the snow-scape, like the Redhead (shot
7), Taxkovsky’s cinematic denvation of Breughel the Elder’s tableau, Hunters in the Snow.
—
—
brushed horseshoes with us whiskers, prophesied, and told me like a monk that I would
perish. Signfficandy, Afasyev gets up at this moment and climbs into the lower space of the frame, as
the camera pulls up panoramically to view the landscape, and its layered intricacy of everyday life:
children rambling, horses pulling a sled, people standing etc...the view of the shooting gallery below
blocked out by Afasyev’s approaching, tear-chilled face, gradually dominating the screen, lips puckered
in a light but sbrill whistle. Watching the life of this tableau-landscape-turned-face take shape, we hear:
I took my fate and strapped it to my saddle; and now I’ve reached tic future I stiil stand
upnght in my stirrups like a boy. I only need my immortality for my blood to go on flowing
t,
247
from age to age. I would readily pay with my life for a safe place with constant warmth were ît
flot that life’s flying needle leads me through the world ifice a thread.
SHOT 132
CÏose-up of Afasyev face-to-face as he tums bis head profile right, a tear on the dght check, and
whisiles. A mere turn of the head, from face to profile, and a lighdy sbrill wbisffing, and we are
propelled into the friture of’WII and its ending.
SEQUENCE XIII (B/W Newsreel sequence of the end of WWII,
Prague/Reichsberg/Hiroshima)
SHOT 133
Urban scene. Night. The blast of the barrels of canons, pointed heavenwards, are fflumined in the
darkness by the blast of the light of their fire, overheard.
SHOT 134
Urban scene. Day. Long-shot looking down at intersection. A tank roils tbrough the cross of the
intersection, piled bigh with men as we are taken tbrough the liberation of Prague, 1945. Camera lifts to
show the facade of storied buildings out of the windows of which we sec people waving hands Qike that
shown in Shot 1, May Day Parade 1939). Tank shown at ground level, soldiers wave. The speed with
wbich this sequence passes in the urban labyrinth does not provide a perception of the celebration of
peace and it is underscored, not by applause, but by the blast of cannons heard before, and a dissonant
alarm of trumpets.
SHOT 135
Night. A split-second perception of thin slivers of shooting, hovering, and falling lights, as of flreworks,
and a panel of projected light from a building: a hailcu-like perception of light scintillating in tEe
darkness. Bombasiing echoes of the soundtrack continue to blast, roar, and rip underneath tbis dazzling
impression of beauty and we hear the slammed sound of the bass-chords of a piano continue to
reverberate and evanesce.
SHOT 136
Day. Close up of the window ledge and the arrns of men and a pole, and traveling down the pole we sec
a dark tom-flag waving in the air, probably signaling German surrender.
SHOT 137
Close up, down right, of the corpse of Hitler (face and torso) in uniform, a book laying open on bis the
right side of bis uniform. Cut back and lift. Camera shows an officer kneeling by Flitler’s side in the
24$
trenches, surrounded by sand-bags, and filming him with an early 61m-camera. It is as if we have moved
back to see the apparatus that filmed the flrst image. Soundtrack: trumpets blowing and building a
dissonant crescendo as of an alarm or warning of bombing.
SHOT 138
Acousticafly, we hear the sky ripping, as a missile tears sound or as a body might take air in too
suddenly. Visually, the sequence is parallel to seq.1 ,3, and 5, as if they were compounded, compressed,
accelerated, and made more powerful: 1) Night, canons and trees revealed in the flashing light of the
dark; 2) Total blackness and then immense showers of blasling light; 3) A flashing glimpse of a flag in
die night-sky. In the showers of light flred heavenward we sense something of the cosmological trance
of technology and war.
SHOT 139
Capturing the reverberations of seq.6 we hear the dark echoes of dissonant piano chords and close in on
a photogtaph of the body of a corpulent man, head bent against the wafl of the trenches with his left flst
shielding bis eyes, one arm propped against the wafl of earth and clutching the crutch beneath this
elbow; a young boy behind bim is looking at him in vonder. Camera pulls out two seconds, in order to
impress a sense of duration to die image and to create a certain habit of attention in its viewing, nor is
there any musical accompaniment but only die suspension of silence. Emblematically, die entire film is
mirrored in this photographic image and die attention given to it, in die relay of die gaze, from witbin
die trenches, of die child to die spectacle and die grief of
SI-lOT 140
Overhead view of mushroom-cloud explosion. Electric organ music holds a dissonant, echoing chord
growing in volume according to die volumetric expansion of die cloud.
SHOT 141
Outside shot of war plane in die distance hovenng above die clouds. Camera cuts to die inside of die
plane behind die plots. Organ chord sustained.
SHOT 142
Nuclear explosion of mushroom-cloud over Hiroshima continues, this time not from above but in
profile, die mushroom dispersing die hazy cloud of light in die sky and expanding, distending and rising
in a colossal column of darkness and light and disdosing die surface below: black dots of islands
rocked lIce boats around die surging base of white. Again, organ music gives way to die dark chords of
a piano, and die tones of dieir reverberation. As I infimated earlier, this shot forms an audio-visual
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visual correspondence to the vanishing ring of the humid vapor left by a CU of tea in the
Akbmatova/Pushkin scene (Sequence X, shot 93).
SHOT 143
Cut to Afasevev in the Breughelesque snowscape: facing the camera obliquely, medium shot, bis brief
gaze seems to contract and to hold this vision of the I-liroshimn cloud, not projectmg but receiving its
rhythmic ±rust as if from out of the future.
FIe turns bis back to the snowscape and we see below, as in ail Breughel’s painfings, the work
of everyday life, sleds, horses, people, continuing their rounds and ignorant of their being in the midst
of mythical events of holy-otherness and horror. Artemyev’s requiem-refrain underscores the scene ; the
ominous, hollow, rhythmic beat of the tympany joined by the voices rising and faffing in the breath,
sustained as the tenor for the viewing of the film and punctualing die flim-sequences in its suspended,
gaping, mono-pneumatic tone.
Afasyev tums right facing the trec and is
fixed in the duration of the scene for
several seconds, medium shot. Suddenly a
small Nid ifies up in the siow motion of
the film rhythm from the left corner of
the scene to perch on bis head, fluttering
lis wings. In Mirror the Nid has the
rhetotical power of mediating temporal
rifts beeen shots and scenes, by - -
transforming the gaze into vision, and die everyday into the apocalyptic.
As explored in the essay, die bird functions like the temporal enigma of a hyperdiegetic trope, and
is associated with the transmission of memory and signaIs the eschatological horizon of time ; li is the
emblem of the rhythmic gap of Ivan illych’s dying breath and wish Çfolstoy), cinematically transformed
and launched (itself being mortally enfeebled) by die hand of die father-flgure/dying narrator in Mirror
in die final shots of die last sequence (Sequence XXI; shot 202). In this sense, die bird, clasped at two
separate moments, also effects or enacts something of die rhytbmic gap in die phenomenal experience
of viewing die film, since die vision of lis being launched towards die end of die film effects a memory
of this sequence widi Afasyev, a sequence which is itself launched forward in memory/forgetting later
through die glowing light of die narrator’s dying, outstretched, open hand. The importance of die
expenence of this gap does not lie in die effort exerted by viewers to make sense of ii causal, narrative
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chain of sequences, or perhaps this is only the begnrning of the problem, since li points to a deeper,
episternological dilemma of how human narrafivity, norrnally sanctioned by death but impotent before
the velocities and mass destructiveness of modem warfare (Benjamin), might be negotiated by another
kind of rhytbmic-temporal mediation of events. Individual and collective rnernory are linked and lost in
light, between a dying narrator and an orphaned child, circulating back and forth, gaping in dine.
SEQUENCE XIV, (SHOTS 138-146, BJW Newsreel of Mass-Maoist euphoria, P.R.China,
1950s -1960s)
SHOT 144
Medium shot framing the faces, extending infinitely beyond the frame, of peasant women and sun
burned farmers; a communal body of voices reciting, shouting and lifting Mao’s « Littie Red Book>)
itself a eminently portable and fetishistic ideological weapon of empowennent for a largely illiterate class
of workers demanding agrarian refomi and cultural revolution in die «Peoples Republic» of China.
This image presents with startling clarity the historical problem of gaining literacy, of modermzing
language with respect to the urgent demands of building a nation-state that would accommodate the
pressures of social and industrial change.
Whereas European intellectuals have looked to China for a revolunon in poetic forms in the
twentieth century, the Chinese intellectuals were concemed above ail with the problem of “cleansing”
their language of the retarding effects of traditional language, making language more usefiil for die
masses and usable by “die people.” Commenting upon tins problem in ternis of die mediation and die
speed of language, Rey Chow writes:
The first criterion for die construction of a “national” language was sirnplicity and expediency:
Chinese was to be cleansed of ail die traditional residues diat stood in die way of die nation’s
progress. Because language is explicidy linked to a purpose: naflon-building—it is dioroughly
medianzed in its conception: Language is understood primadly in ternis of a medium whose
efficiency resuits from being stripped ofits past and dius, we might say, ofits memory. (Hence
old “literary” qualities were die first to corne under fire as obstacles diat dragged die nation
down.) Cleansing langue meant speeding it up. furdierrnore, as in linguistic and cultural
revolutions elsewhere in history, die newly constmcted Chinese language was said to be based
on die vemacular—die people’s .rpeech. (“Media, Migrants, Matter” In JVriting Diaipora, 1993;
p.1 75)
SHOT 145
Close-up of Mao’s diick fiuigers, ifipping mediodically through die pages of bis book but too-quicldy to
be reading. Indeed, in tins sequence and in die sequences that follow, tve see diat reading was not
necessadiy to be practiced as a moment of interior-reflection upon prmt-language and to be interpreted
in private by a cloistered subject (like Alexei’s attention to Leonardo); on die contrary, it was hardly
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read at ail except as a social practice for the gesture of solidarity, a talisman to be carned, waved, and
caressed for its powerful abffity to openly assert, as a text, a massive sphere of publicity (a space of
public-ness) and a long-march for a territory of power. Jndeed «The littie Red Book » was itself
written and exclairned in this public space ; it is itself an anthology of oratorical exhortations, categotical
insuits, and worldly-wise proverbs taken from Mao’s speeches over several years and placed side-by-side
in dramatic juxtaposition, originaily titled Quotationsfrorn Chairman Mao and compiled by the leader of the
People’s Liberatton Army (PLA), Lin Biao in the 1960’s.
Explaining the belated rise and fail of the sphere of writing and literacy in the age of audio-visual
culture, or what may be called the confrontation between the “graphosphere” in the age of the
“videosphere,” Regis Debray comments upon the typographic cuir of the book, the printing press and
the poet in Eastern Europe, Russia and China in mediological terms.
Et du codex rouge, la Chine maoïste s’est fait un talisman. Après guerre, c’est à l’Est, ce grand
conservatoire de formes révolues, que la graphosphère s’est immobilisée. Comme un musée de
la Lettre, un grand gel des sources vives d’antan. Studieux et scolaire, le «socialisme réel» a
l’âme typographique. Les pays communistes où l’économie ahane et l’audiovisuel retarde,
battent tous les records de papier imprimé. Si vous voyagez dans ces provinces au charme
suranné, où notre XIX siècle se survit à lui-même, vous verrez le culte du livre, l’idolâtrie
populaire des écrivains (les stars russes sont des romanciers et poètes, non des vedettes de la
chanson et de l’écran), l’omniprésent dévoration du journal. Atrophie de l’image et du son,
hypertrophie de l’écrit, dont la censure rehausse l’aura. (Debray, 1991; 271-272)
SHOT 146
Long-shot. Parade-procession of organized students (we see their young faces, white shirts and red
cravats) carrying the glassy-frames of Mao’s portrait. The power of Mao’s portrait, as a mobifization of
social energy, should not be underestimated. He very masterfully tapped into the political potential for
the mechauicaily-reproduced poster, distnbuted easily and economicaily, and grafred this political power
on to the religious-economy of icomc art, the sarne Buddhist art which he attempted to extingwsh later,
endowing bis «saindy» image with the passionate force of the conviction of salvation. Ahhough the
confflct between the economies of Mao’s image and bis word may be doubtful, yet, one senses that the
immediate inteffigibffity of the image held sway over the more mediate intelligence of die word. This
sequence, and its contrast with the next, situate again the problems of Mao’s tise to power historicaily as
die problem of orgamzing and bnnging under control, these differential celerities of die word and die
image to cover die territorial distances and sodal-difficulties of attaining mass-literacy on the one hand,
anti political ailegiance/obedience, on the other: in this case, the students must march bebind the
image, demonstrate themselves as a silent, communal body for its support and mobilization—and
defacing the potential power of their speech.
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SHOT 147
As if to emphasize this issue, the camera literally blurs quickly tbrough the faces of the crowd to the left.
As it haits we see the older faces and costumes of the working class, shoutmg and lifting the «liffle-red
book ». Another shot, emphasizes this sanie crowd movrng as dark ocean of bodies pushed left; in
between them and standing stiil, we notice the white shirts of students. This shot is an emblematic
prelude of die cultural white-wash, public trial and confession, brutal encampment and murder of the
tbreatening intellectual class of artists and writers in China (from «The Hundred Flowers Movement»
of 1957 through die Cultural Revolution of 1966-1970 and beyond).
SHOT 14$
A sequence in tbree successive frames and fade-outs, of expanding images of a single photograph
showing an army of sculptures of Mao, lined up in labynnthine trenches and in several sizes, as if to
insure die immortality of die communist «emperor» as he would march mythically through rime—
analogous to bis mardi in die time-series of die infiriitely reproducible image of bis cult-photographs.
SHOT 149
A young peasant boy is shown face to face, in die blurred image of die camera, shoving die littie Red
Book forward; on one page die portrait of Mao, on die other page die printed word of bis quotarions.
This image sums up ail die stakes of literacy, accumulated in die remarks made regarding die preceding
sequences.
SHOT 150
Drumbeats roil and die camera moves in joits and blurs into die scene of die Russian army’s effort to
contain physically die Chinese demonstration at Damansk Island, 1959.
SHOT 151
Oceans of Chinese peoples, crowded in die extensive panoramic frame and biimming outside of it,
cheering and holding die poles of red flags, banners etc.. .The immensity of die social noise, underscored
by Artemyev’s orchestration of drumming and trumpet-alarms, is a jarring contrast to die quiet ridaI
close of silence in die following sequence.
SHOT 152
Close-up, face to face shot of die impenetrably austere and boyish naiveté of a Russian soldier, bis face
juxtaposed to die nght, for two seconds, widi die anonymous hand of die Onental-odier holding bis
own breviary.
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SEQUENCE XV (father’s Fareweil, dacha/1935)
SHOT 153
Medium shot. We see Alexei’s mother Maria (Marusya) from bebind, kneeling on the floor of the dacha,
the floorboards of which are wbite-washed with soot and ice and she pivots to the right (her kneeling
on the floor recails the comdor-scene between Nadialia and Ignat 1970s). The black wicker chair beside
her, without a cushion, is ruinously scared and scabbed with wbite rings and salty water-marks (recalling
the dream-sequence of the lumps of plaster-ceiling) and a kitten wanders in fodomly in die background.
She is holding a duil knife and curnng a piece of floorboard in a set with an uncanny resemblance to the
shooting alley.
It is as if the dacha were turned inside-out, its floorboards dismembered during the famine of die
war for kindiing, its walls and floorboards opened to die elements outside. The utopian image of die
dacha and its warmth and plenitude is inverted in this dystopian image of die ruined dacha and its cold
and desperate poverty. The topical correspondences of die fioor/dacha/apartment in Mirror convey
this kind of double-figuration of utopia/dystopia; radier than being produced by die metaphoncal
polysemy of one image, however, it emerges in die metonymic senes of fragments of images that
produce a serial effect of “layering” and “unlayering” visual pattems and material correspondences.
Suddenly die male voice of Alexei’s fadier is heard (absent dunng die entire film) t «Maruysa!
Where are die children ? ». She gazes upwards from out of ber blackened, burdened eyes:
SHOT 154
The camera looks up, medium shot, to die face of die fadier/husband dressed in uniform and brushing
bis hair to die side, framed as he is in die dimly glowing light, widi die aura and die patina of an early
photograph. Is he home briefiy from die war? Is he off to die baffle-front? Whatever die answer, bis
image speaks for bim as being somewhere between «die already and die not-yet », a kind of apparition
departing in bis appearance, a presence invested afready widi die nostalgia and expectanon of bis
immanent loss.
SHOT 155
Outside die dacha, in die forest of autumnal trees and on a dilapidated picnic table, Alexei is shown
leafing through die Broghaus edition of die DaVinci volume of prints seen earlier (shot 2). Ris sister
Marina threatens to teil die parents that he bas stolen die volume and he retorts «Tattle-tale ! »,
physically shalting her shoulders and forcing ber to ciy. The camera moves to follow ber moving alone,
to a separate space widi ber back-tumed. The fadier’s voice is heard booming out <.t Marina ! ».
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SHOT 156
Again, « Marina » and Marina’s head, wrapped in a black shawi, turns (recaffing die saine iconic-gesture
of the redhead). It is possible that this little girl and sister, seen only once in the enfire film in this image,
is meant to symbolically evoke the memory of poetess Marina Tsvetaeva (1892-1941) since she is an
important part of the literary imaginary of die shades of poet-figures evoked throughout Mitror.
Lkewise, one might say diat the face of the father-figure bears some resemblance to the novelist-poet
Bons Pasternak (1890-1960).
SHOT 157
Camera shot, depth of fleld, of both children halted in the voice of the father. They race through the
leaves. As they disappear in die horizon of die dacha tbrough die trees, die camera dips down into die
leaves (just as it did before die Instructor’s heartbeat in shot 18, in what was described as an anamorphic
transformation), we hear a dark and dim bassoon-melody and tympany accompaniment, and die camera
focuses obliquely on die DaVinci volume open to view at die red chalk drawing of die aged-master’s
autoportrait widi pine needles dropped carelessly in die margin.
SHOT 158
Children seen, long shot, facing die camera and racing towards it. Alexei trips on a twig falling face
forwards, and repeafing die gesture of die «fail », noiiceable so often in die film and acquiring
importance widi each separate falling; it is not a question of original sin but, on die contrary, a comic,
breughelesque reflection of diose instance of daily life which reveal die absurdity, fragility and mortality
of being in time.
SHOT 159
Maria shown, close-up, and against die darkness of die dacha walls and die windows of a pair of door
panels, her face is suffused widi that golden, nostalgic, iconic light; a face and a light seen earlier in die
flrst scene of die film as she tearflilly remembers her absent hushand. She stares widi eyes full of
melancholic dispossession, and mrns her head tu face die darkness.
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SHOT 160
Weeping and sniffing heard from the children. The camera
faces the uniformed father-figure embracing bis cbildren: the
daughter Marina on the left, shawled, folded in the father’s
arms and lost to view; Alexei’s troubled and pale profile is
seen trembling, left. The camera fravels gradually up the torso
of the father and as bis head tums right and left in the
emotion of the moment; as if compounding and confirming
the iconicity of the Trinitarian disposition of the father to the
son and holy ghost, we hear the organ sound and batitone
tenor of the evangelist-voice from a recitative of Bach’s St.
Matthew Passion.
Tbis hybrid, intermedial moment, at the center of the film, is perhaps also its most powerfiil.
Signiflcantly the father is shown folding the son and bis face into bis enveloping chest. The ttiptych has
been dosed and light released:
SHOT 161
Bach’s recitafive fades as the camera jumps into another
intermedial space: DaVinci’s flnished oil portrait of
Ginevra Benci, selected for her terrible beauty and her
uncanny resemblance to the acfress Margarita Terekhova,
herseif doubled between playing Nathaha and Maria,
divorced wife and alienated mother to Alexei; (although
not included in the film-portion, the image of tbis tableau
is translated, as it were, into its negative-image as we see
Nathalia’s face set against the darkness of the following
sequence). A globe of light, suffises and distends on the
surface of the tableau (recaffing the heat-mark and the
mushroom-cloud) and travels right as we hear the swell
of dark oran chords reverberatin.
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SEQUENCE XVI (B/W Natalia and Mexei, Moscow/1970’s)
SHOT 162
Medium shot of Natalia’s face, the narrator’s voice is overheard off-screen. This scene presents itself as
the continuation of Sequence VI, shots 44-49, perhaps one week aftenvards. Together they are
discussing whether Ignat would like to live with father permanently after bis brief visit. The camera
pans left to Ignat, who refuses. The camera pans right to photos of Natalia with “Maria” the mother of
the Narrator (featured in these images as Tarkovsky’s own mother). Alexei stifi wants to reconcile with
bis mother but doesn’t seem to know how, he is too arrogant, and bis mother wants bim to be a child
again
SHOT 163
Medium-shot of Ignat, seen wandering through the corridors and the French doofs.
SHOT 164
Close-shot of Natalia conversmg with the off-screen voice of Alexei. As Jobnson and Petri observe,
“The use of real time (at 3 minutes 55 seconds the film’s longest shot), the mirrors, the restricted color
scheme, and the camera’s almost exclusive focus of Natalia in close-up or medium shot create a
powerfiul sense of daustrophobia, echoing the dreariness and repetitiveness of their arguments, marked
by Alexei’s empty sarcasm and Natalia’s wearly helplessness” (127).
She is seen against a bookcase, asking Alexei if she should marry the journalist she has been
seeing, a wnter whom Alexei mockingly observes has not been published as a real wnter and who is not
named Dostoevsky.. . She smirks, and adds “You’ve changed so much”
Alexei, apparently looking out at the courtyard where
Ignat has started a fire. Fie sarcasfically cails bis son a
“dunce” and tefis Natalia that he thinks Ignat may
even end up getting “drafted” into service, for her
lack of responsibility as a parent. She moves left, in
L the hard light, against the mirror, rocking herseif
_________
against the surfaces of two mirrors. Her ex-husband
begins a discourse about the “bourgeoisie” and the threat of the Asians on the other side of the border.
As he does this, she moves against a dark raining window, turns her back to camera, combs her hait,
and haif listens to her ex-husband taiking about a ftiend’s son who cails t:hem hypocrites and tbreatens
to leave home.. .As he speaks in more moraliaing platitudes, he goes on to berate her joumalist friend
who may think that he’s a writer: “Fie just can’t understand that a book is a deed not a paycheck. A poet
257
must stir the soul, not nurture idolators.” Ignat is seen outside siirring the sticks of a small fire outside in
the coutyard in the light drizzling ram. Natalia backs from window as if receding into another pane,
evoking, for an instant, a strange parallel to shot 25.
She asks him “Should we send bim to a military school ?“ and then looking out of the dark
interior of the room to the outside where Ignat is buming sticks, she asks: ‘Who appeared to Moses ?“
Àlexei answers, “The angel appeared.” Natalia shakes her head, bends forward, wiping her tears and
says “Why didn’t anytbing like that ever appear to me ?“
SEQUENCE XVII (Mexei’s Utopian Dream of the Dacha)
SHOT 165
Long-shot in sepia. Bnef shot of bushes and beechnut trees near the dacha rustiing gently in the wind
SHOT 166
Narrator’s voice-over: “I keep having the same dream” dark intenors of dacha, medium shot of
young woman face moving in and out of darkness, camera pans nght along wall and opens into the
well-lit living room “It seems to be forcing me to return to the bïttersweet site of my
grandfather’s house” Child seen medium shot, on a table unhinging a lamp above; the camera tracks
down to a child (same as first dream sequence) sittmg on a matt and playing with a mirror wbich he
decides to bide under a book on the table. ‘Where I was born on the table over 40 years
ago.. Something aiways prevents me from enterïng”
iother Maria passes through the room in her simply country linen dress, passes into the corridor
and tums back to ask the cbild something as she reaches the doorway to the pantry . Voice-over: “I
keep having this dream” Mother passes tbrough corridor “When I dream of the log walls and dark
pantry, I sense that it is only a dream “ Mother exits outside, beautiful image of child on deck
outside in the sunlight kneeling down to replace the oil in the lamp. In front is a large round glass jug of
water, inside dried flowers on the table capture the sun’s light This sf11 frame of the image remains for
several seconds, gives the impression of depth and duration. “Then joy is clouded, for I know I’ll
wake up. . . sometÏmes something happens and I stop dreaming of the house and the pines by
the house of my childhood. Then I grieve...” Mother enter and tums left.
Camera follows mother from bebind as she walks through the house again in the darkness and
outside the other door. Silhouettes. “ and waÏt for the dream that wiil make me a child
again. . . and I’li be happy again knowing. . that ail stiil lies ahead”
25$
Camera tracks back left mto the darkness of the mtenor. The “child-figure” lights a match and
ifiuminates the darkness in the soft bnef glow “and nothing is impossible.”
SEQUENCE XVIII (Mexei’s Dystopian Dream of the Dacha)
SHOT 167
This black-and white sequence begins with a close-up of a glass vase with the
inside of a dock mechamsm immersed in water (wheels, togs, and a metaffic
loop spiraling around them)... A figure of the dissolution of clock-time and
immersion into a suspended and cycical dream-time. We see die vase inside a windowsffl near a brandi
of drying leaves, beside die fringes of die lace curtains, and next to an open pocket-knife: reading die
stiil-life image allegorically we might say diat this non-chronological, immersed dream urne co-exists
with die time of nature’s generafion and corruption (leaves) and die time of die works and days of art
(lace), and die time of die imminent ending of fate/chance/destiny (kuife). We can momentarily see
dirough die vase die blurred movement of die cbild-figure outside die dacha as he moves to die right.
Fis image moves across die vase upside down and dien disappears upwards in die curve of die glass.
Camera pans right and pulls back, medium shot, following die boy as he
moves outside past die fences towards die dacha. He moves towards a table widi
a wbite clodi , a lamp and a broken loaf of bread.
The camera slowly brings die dacha in focus in die dark light—die boy
outside die picture on die right. As die camera moves us doser to die one of die side windows and
highlights die branches of a young sapling, we hear die boy whisper, “Marna.. .“
SHOT 168
Medium shot, from bebind we see die boy facing die dark wooden door. A hand gestures lighdy off
screen nght and die door creaks open as if beckoned from die outside.
SHOT 169
A hen or a cock breaks open a window panel widi its beak and makes its way out
of die dacha.
SHOT 170
The bushes are seen on die side of die dacha, wind rushing through die trees, die movement is captured
in siow motion. Camera tracks down nght towards die table, die lamp is knocked down and rolling off
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the edge of the table, the broken loaf of bread swept to its side, and the table cloth is blowmg, caught at
the table’s end, the apples in its folds holding it down.
SHOT 171
Trees and bushes blowing near die dacha, a long white curtain blowing in die wind, camera slowly to
die left. In slow motion we sec die boy running around die corner, past die well and hanging pail and
around towards die front of die house. This beautiful image gives die sirnultaneous impression of
lightness (curtain) and weight (slow motion of cbild’s feet) die senson-motor action seeming to peel
itself from die sheer impression of die stretching and running of time.
Ram fails luminously upon die young sapling as it sways in die wind, falling like a sudden shower of
feathery seeds from another tree above.
SHOT 172
Slow-motion close-up of die boy as he advances up die stair towards die pantry-door of die dacha,
camera following him from behind, bis shaved head and die white of bis shirt contrasting starkly widi
die dark panels of die door.. He tries to open die door but cannot. He mms and we see bis face btiefly
as lie descends again.
The camera focuses on die door and tracks down, we see die moisture seeping tbrough die bottom
of die door as if it were flooding from die inside.
SHOT 173
The door opens in slow motion to reveal anodier beautiflil image, a swinging movement not unlike diat
of die panels of triptich altar pieces diat open and fold to reveal die topoi of die Annunciation, die
Birifi or die Passion of Christ: Maria is just beyond die threshold kneeling down in her dress gadiering
and counting small potatoes as if to ration diem, she looks younger here and lier face holds a mixed
expression of empty melancholy and hopeful waiting, die interior seems dry but we can see and hear die
curtain of rain falling on die other side of die panels of a window behind her. The small dog by her side
trots across die direshold and steps outside, moving die camera into die next sequence and into a
anodier temporal order of memory and expenence. Dogs are ofren die dream-messengers in
Tarkovsky’s films, transiting between worlds and different time-orders.
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SEQUENCE XIX (Maria and the Prosperous Doctor’s Wife)
SHOT 174
Color image of a fannstead, long shot, bathing in the lush green and blue light of dusk.
SHOT 175
An image of Alexei, by now a litfle older in bis teens, pacing back and forth in front of the house.
When a woman Qater to be identified as the wife of a prosperous doctor) exits the front door with a
wash basin of water to throw outside, Alexei runs nervously to the left. The dark and nch fabric of her
satin dress contrasts afready sharply with Alexci tattered clothes and bare feet.
Alexei runs around the corner of the house, Maria stops bim, runs her hands through bis hair to
cairn him and tidy him, and they make their way over to present themselves nervously to the doctor’s
wife (played by Larissa Tarkovsky, Andrei Tarkovsky’s second wife).
SHOT 176
Not immediately invrnng them inside with the light ram falling outside, the woman is seen emerging
from the dark interior, asking who they are. When Masha (nickname for Maria) explains that she is the
step-daughter of a man who was a friend of her husband, she enters back in the darkness of the house.
SHOT 177
Alexei, seen huddled against the wall, glumly enters and looks back strangely to mother
SHOT 17$
As the doctor’s wife explains that her husband lias left for the city—the camera focuses on the trees
outside.
SHOT 179
The woman beckons to Masha to step up into the room above, and she enters the well-lit room.
SHOT 180
She reminds Masha to wipe her feet. As Masha wipes her feet she loses lier precious eartings and
stones that she has presumably brought with her to seil in exchange for food during the famine that bit
Moscow after the outbreak of WWTI. She bends to pick up lier valuables. Alexei’s muddy feet are being
wiped on the rag on tEe floor.
SHOT 181
Alexei stroils into the opulenfly furnished room, dark log wails and an ofi lamp in the corner suffusing li
ail with a warm glow.
Masha teils him to watt while she discuss her “private matter” with tEe doctor’s wife in tEe next
room beyond. They close the door and leave him alone.
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Alexie slowly explores the room in real fime, sits down on a chair in the middle of the room
with his head hunched low and bis hands together.
SHOT 182
Close-up image of two small potatoes on a shelf near a small pool of spilled milk. The camera moves
down along the sheif as the milk drops from the edge of one sheif to another, brightly polished brass
cup as it does so.
SHOT 183
Medium shot of Alexei in profile as he looks into the oval and convex-mirror
leaning towards bim from above, a mirror that captures that folds the entire
room into its center where Alexei begins to stare at himself. Purcefl’s
is heard dimly (the same that was heard dunng the scene with military instructor, Scene X, shot 94).
The camera angle is at a diagonal captunng die relay of die gaze between Alexei and bis refiection, die
camera moves in towards die mirror. The lighfing effect is changed on die refiected face, so that die
glowing light of die right side gives way to a colder blue light on die right side, but die change is very
subtie. The movement of light suggests diat Alexei has passed to die odier side of die mirror.
SHOT 184
Camera abmptly changes angle and now faces Alexei on die chair, looking above with saddened
butdetermined eyes. Camera moves in dose-up of bis face.
SHOT 185
Close-up of glowing coals or embers of wood, a small mirror is embedded in die embers or coals and, as
die fiames lap gently around its frames, it dimly but opaquely refiects a figure moving.
SHOT 186
A hand imposes itself from off-screen right and gently pushes a mirror-panel
or door of some kind in its place. As die mirror is pushed back into place it
refiects die red-headed girl seen in die military-instructor scene walking and
blood-chapped lip in scene X. She occupies a small portion of die nght hand part of die screen, and
seems to be sitting and nursing a baby near a cbimney fire-grate widi an open fire. The camera closes in
on her glowing face.
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SHOT 187
Very momentary and close-up shot of a hand held out in a gesture of prayer, holding a burning vax
stick. The fingers glowmg in red shades. It is not clear whose hands these are, Alexei’s or die red-headed
girl’s he dreams of and desires ? The processional baroque music stops.
SHOT 188
Alexei shown in profile, looking towards the lamp, close-up of die oil-lamp and die milkglass globe
over die flame as it flickers and sputters. In this shot, die perception of die rhythmic passage of urne is
inseperably linked to die flickerrng and glowing of light.
SHOT 189
Ibis shot carefully btings into focus and out of focus, into light and out of light, ail
three faces in die scene: die doctor’s wife, Masha, and Alexei. In die background
we hear die trickling of water, as if hearing die dripping of a strange subterranean
fountain. The ambiguous abstraction of sound, and its dissociation from die reference of die image,
once again allows die mystetious aspect of die image to be evoked—one that connects it to die complex
temporal layering of odier sequences in die film.
The doctor’s wife moves into die focus of die image while trying on and showing off her newly
acquired earrings (mirror of vanitv); she fades back into die darkness and is seen in profile moving
behind Masha, whose sad and perplexed face is brought into focus; die doctor’s wife emerges again into
die light showing off her earnngs once more, dien fades from focus; die indistinct and dark image of
Alexei’s face against die dark wood is gendy brought into relief and die sound of water becomes more
evident.
SHOT 190
Doctor’s wife offers to show off her sleeping baby, bends down to look into mirror again. Masha
follows her. Alexei is togedier widi die door as it creaks open (it seems to be paneled widi hay for
insulation).
SHOT 191
She proudly leads Masha and Alexei in to die room, camera medium shot, of bnghdy bedecked and
curtained bed, overfiowing widi white lace, goose-down pfflows and covering and ruffled lace bed
clothes—where a healthly and happy baby boy is sleeping. As die doctor’s wife prattles on about her
baby in die luzurous setting, Masha is seen stroking Alexei’s hair nervously. Very subtie and dark music
underscores, die high-pitched and meffifluous voice of die doctor’s wife—as if diere were constandy a
negauve noise that might at any time upset titis opulent light and serenity.
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Masha’s face is seen, her eyes almost fiuing wiffi teafs. She puts a hand to her neck and turn
abruptly around as if choked by the scene, or about to vomit.
SHOT 192
Door closes from outside, medium shot, Masha seen rushing into the outer rootu The doctor’s wife
foilows, pause to look at herseif again in the mirror, Alexei seen from behind. Camera tracks across
room where Mahsa teil her that she is not feeling weil. Putting a vest on her shoulders and offering her
glass of water from the samovar on the table, she asks her to stay and eat and wait for her husband who
has the money.
She asks her to help her slaughter a cockereL And her insistence seems to overcome Masha’s
reluctance. She hands her a cock, an axe and helps her to place the animal on the cutting block. The
slaughter liappens off scene, the cocks cry and feathers indicating its death. The doctor’s wife turns
towards Masha with what seems to be a stem gaze.
SHOT 193
Tarkovsk7 apparendy regretted the insertion of this shot for its contrived and harsh lighflng and overly
explicit symbolism: Masha’s face is seen in close-up, face to face with the camera as she lifts the heavy
lids of lier eyes and reveals a diabolical smile, her face seen against the dark panel of the wall—dripping
with water behind.
SHOT 194
Masha’s gaze is transfonned mto a vision in the transition to this shot in black and wbite, its langorous
duration making it seem ail the more hailucinatory: under soft organ music, her husband’s pale visage is
seen as if looking from the other side of the mirror. He tums around in slow motion, and we see him
stroking the hand of bis wife who is in the levitating-repose of sleep. This is the first figuration of the
levitated repose of the mother-wife, taken up in various scenes in later films (Nostalgbia and Sacrifice).
The txvo exchange coddling words of affection and
devotion, he asks her if she is iII and she tels him
gendy that she loves him. The camera pulls back to
reveal her figure levitating above the bed, her hair
stretched in a kind of classical manner, and a dove
rises from the tight screen above. This fantasy
reaffirms the impression, given in many sequences
and shots, that certain kinds of experience do flot
Ï
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belong to any one character’s memory or lived-expenence but are carried outside of subjectivity in a
hall of communicatmg mirrors.
SHOT 195
Suddenly and abrupdy Masha exits the room, camera shows the door open from the outside as she steps
out into the darkness.
SHOT 196
The two are seen in the brighfly lit intenor fleeing ftom the apparently astonished woman.
SHOT 197
Exiting quickly outside, unresponsive to the woman’s pleas to stay for dinner and her husband’s retum.
Masha and Alexei step down thorugh the dark green brush and move out of the camera, right.
SHOT 198
Riverside shot, Masha and Alexei walldng die 15 km distance home before mghtfall. As die two are seen
walking, Arseniy Tarkovsky is heard in a voice-over reciting one of bis poems “Eurydice.” A person
has one body, singleton, ail on its own, the soul lias had more tban enough of beïng cooped up
inside a casing wïth ears and eyes the size of a five-penny piece and sldn—just scar after
covering a structure of bone. The camera focuses gradually on Masha’s face as she stops to pause.
Only through the cornea it ffies Ïnto the bowi of the sky, on to an icy spoke, to a wheeling ffight
of birds...
SEQUENCE XX (The Chuld Enterïng the Dacha)
SHOT 199
Black and white sepia shot of trees nears die dacha, die camera moves ominously and slowly .. . and
hears through die barred window of its living prison-ceil, the crackie of forests and corn-fields
the trumpet of seven seas. . .The winds emerges powerfully tbrough die forest like die poet’s pneumos
and sweeps into die bushes below. A bodyless soul is sinful like a body without a shirt—
No intention, nothing gets done, no inspiration, neyer a lime. A riddle with no solution: Who ïs
going to corne back after dancing on die dance-floor where there’s nobody to dance? An image
of die table, die lamp falling and rolling aside, die broken loaf of bread tumbling and a potato and a
spoon roffing near die corners of die clodi (an image repeating shot 164 widi a difference). And I
drearn of a different soul dressed in different clothes : Buming as it runs from timidity to hope,
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SHOT 200
Another sepia image that repeats shot 166 with a difference: The child-figure dllmbing up the stairs
towards the door of the dacha which now opens to him . spirituous and shadowless like fire ït
travels the earth, leaves lilac behind on the table to be remembered by. .the cbild enters die
mysterious dacha in slow-motion, an empty room with a senes of long lace curtains hanging from the
ceilings.
Run along then child, don’t fret over poor Eurydïce, bowi your copper hoop along whip ït
through the world, so long as even quarter pitch with cheerful tone and cold in answer to each
step you take, the earth rings in your ears. (Aseniy Tarkovsky, Trans. Kitty Hunter-Blair, In
Scuipdng in Time,1986; 157)
The shot continues as the camera tracks left. The stillness of the dacha is broken by the breath of
the wind as it fils the lacey sails of the sheets hanging above the pantry room. We hear them blow and
watch the glass-water tank on the table as the water stirs and waves from side to side as if it had been
invisibly rocked to its side.
As the wind blows, the camera pushes its way through the curtains which bfflow out and raise
diemselves to reveal the dark glass of a mirror standing in the background. After a moment of almost
total darkness, the angle is slightly sbifted and the mirror refiects the cbild-figure in the half-light of the
room, holding a large glass vase or ;ug filled with milk (the image is stiil shot in slow-motion and the
milk heaves from side to side as die water in the glass-globe did on the table). Out of the soft darkness
of the mirror the child is seen holding the vase in relative stiulness for several long seconds, the duration
of the image impressing itself upon us. Darkness. Focus-out.
SEQUENCE XXI (The Dacha of Childhood Returned)
SHOT 201
Chuld swimming in real time, doggy-paddling to the edge of die shore where his mother is wnnging the
dothes and setting them out to dry.
SHOT 202
Curtain opens into die very dry light of die dacha, fumishings in place and
suggesting die ease and comfort of die holiday. A puppy is playing on die
table, birds chirping outside. Camera moves across die objects in die room, die
large glass vase of dry fiowers, die lamp on die chair, die eggs and die open book on die windowsffl as it
looks out to figures in die distance (revisiting die topos of shot 13).
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This window frames the image of the cbuld-figure walking beside the tail pines near the dacha
towards the two figures in the distance—bis sÏster as a littie girl and bis mother as an older woman.
SHOT 203
Alexei cails to her as if she were the mother of bis cbildhood and she stares at bim in puzzled
amazement. Wbat usually remained a juxtaposition of cbronotopes in the film (dreams and memories
of the 1930’s contrasted with present in the 1970’s) is fiised into one image in tbis shot—as characters
belonging to present and past appear together. She assumes the same sort of position as Jaria in the
opernng sequence, smoking with hef back to die camera, looking out into die distance of the forest.
SEQUENCE XXII (The Narrator’s Death-Bed and The Dacha of Memory)
SHOT 204
Color, medium-shot in what is presumably the chronotope of the narrator’s apartment (f 970’s). A
series of antique mirrors hang from the vall bebind, wooden door-screens are set in front of die sick
bed, and in front of the screens a corpulent doctor stands in bis wbite ftock talking to the two
mvsterious women (Fate and Akbmatova) who appeared to Ignat earlier in the “Pushkin-Chaadaev”
Sequence X, shot 89.
They discuss the fragile health of Alexei, the doctor explaining that the even the physical illness of
the “strep tbroat” can be dangerous because there are deeper causes and wounds than this. He wa&s
pensively and explains, “It’s a usual occurrence; a mother, wife, or cbild dies suddenlv. . . and a person
wastes away in a few days.”
The camera graduafly zooms in bebind the back of the Akhmatova-figure who says, “But no one in
bis family died.” The doctor sbrugs and says, “No, but there’s bis conscience, bis memory.. .“ As he
says tbis in bis well-measured words, lie passes in front of the camera and exits off-screen nght. The
camera zooms in slowly to a close-shot of the Akhmatova-figure as she lifts her head, showing the
profile of her face. She speaks, “What does memory have to do with it ?“
Such a question, spoken from such a recognizable figure, must be heard with a kind of anguish,
for the careful viewer/listener must recognize at once that the answer can only be heard in die silence
echoing in response to her question: “It has everything to do widi it, everything when memory is
constituted by forgetting and die difflculty of remembenng-forgetting.”
The camera follows die doctor as he continues bis slow pacing right and left. Bebind bim, die
odier maid or figure of Fate is brought into focus. Out of die heavy silence die Akbmatova figure is
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heard off-screen, asking, “Is he guilty of something ?“ The Fate-figure responds “He tbinks he is!” She
looks off right and we hear Alexei’s imtation “Leave me alon&”
SHOT 205
Color, close-shot of the Alexei laying in his sick-bed behind the screen. This is the fÏrst and only lime
he is seen and only from the neck down; he is played by Andrei Tarkovsky bimself, the only cameo
appearance he makes in this semi-autobiographical film.
The camera tracks nght past bis chest down the sheets to bis arms at bis side. He teils the doctor
once again to leave him alone. Ris hand, lying on the sheet next to brrd-droppings, reaches out to pick
up a small wounded bird with wet feathers. h slow motion, the hand clasps the bird, tums gendy and
then caresses its head which peeks out beneath the thumb. Alexei, with shortened breath—an ominous
sign of bis last breath, says, “Everything will be ail right” as if addressing die bird. Again he sighs and
wbispers “Everything will be. .“ and he is heard breathing and expinng... In the softness of titis
expiration, die camera lifts and holds the frame of the image just above bis hand; the rhythm of the
breath and of the duration of the image emphasize this contemplative suspense of titis lifting. In slow
motion and silence the arm lifts into the frame and die hand, capturing the light of tEe sun, opens: the
bird is tossed into tbis light, lifting into the horizon of the next image.
SHOT 206
Color, long-shot. The camera moves slowly nght and panaromically (180°) to take in the landscape and
horizon of the Ignataevio forest in the light of a sunny summer afternoon sky, the fields of barley
extending below. Crickets are heard, barely audible, and then they are overwhelmed by the instrumental
opemng ofJ.S. Bach’s St. Jot)n ‘v Passion, an intense but processional sequence in wbich die slow but high
pitched melody of die oboe ïs chumed undemeath by die curling current of an orchestra of violins.
The camera holds die frame of die image stiil when it reaches the
shadows of die forest in front of die dacha, dien retreats back and descends into
die green shadows of die aider bushes, past die picket fence and down to die
image of Alexei’s parents lying in die grass below, bis mother leaning on top of
bis father who is chewing a strand of badey wbile lying flat ou die ground. Presumably, this image of
tEe young parents takes viewers to die moment of die narrator’s “conception” before birth.
The camera tracks in for a close-shot of die modier alone; die fadier is heard off-screen asking,
“Do you want to have a boy or a girl ?“ Over die course of twenty seconds, Mana’s face makes several
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expressive changes—as if in the pause of the question her face were anticipating
a lifetirne of tremendous events: passing from anxious curiosity to warm
surprise, from hopeful bewilderment to pure desperanon. Without answering,
she bites her Hp and, as the camera pulls back and the instrumental music of the
Passion builds up to the choral refrain, she violently turns her head.
SHOT 207
Cut to a color-shot of young Aider trees as the opening refrain of die Bach’s St.
Jo/»ir Passion powerfiilly sings “Herr, Herr! Und ser Herr?” (God, God ! Where
art thou ?). The camera pans right and the mother as an older woman (played by
Tarkovsky’s own mother, Maria Tarkovskaya) steps into view from behind
holding a wash basin. She is accompanied by a young child, presumably the
image of die narrator as a child. Together they behold die image of die hill
where die dacha used to be. The co-existence of different temporalifles reaches
a climax in this image; for we have passed from die image of die young mother Maria in die last shot
(early 1930’s) to die image of herseif as a old woman (1970’s) and paradoxically, we have passed from
die deadibed of die narrator who now remains die “ageless model” of the child—holding hands with
bis aging modier.
SHOT 20$
Cut to a color, close-shot of a granite rock. The camera turns nght in a kind of blur across small plants,
and rotten wood-logs on which small insects are crawling, moss-covered stones, white wild fiowers
next to an old green-glass bottie, pulling back on die image of one of die heavily chipped corners
of a log-construcdon (die site of die old bam or of die dacha itself).
The camera pulls back to show some old metaDic chairs in die densely forested background of die
mm, dien die image dives down into die ground widi a slow impassivity. The image takes viewers into
die ruined frame of die well, pausing to take in die surface of its standing water littered widi colored
glass boffles and rims.
SHOT 209
Cut to a long-shot of die forest. The camera frame descends to die horizon and, in pace widi die strong
chorus of die Passion, follows die strident walk of die older modier (Maria Tarkovskaya) who has
emerged out of die darkness of die leaves, who has also taken die hands of die figure of die “ageless
girl,” and walked past die figure of die “ageless boy” across die site of anodier frame of ruins which
seem to be die old wooden fence in front of die dacha, now overgrown with weeds and bushes.
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SHOT 210
Color, close shot of the young vIaria (Margarita Terekbova) as she vas seen in the previous image, shot
206, with lier head turned away. She mms ber face back forwards, her glazed eyes shedding tears, ber
teeth biting her lip. She glances up in a kind of wishful anguish and then tums her head back once
agaiii
SHOT 211
Color, long-shot of die older mother walldng through the white-ftowered fields of barley with the boy
and the girl. In the stiil image of the frame they walk up forward towards the screen and as they
approach the iaght hand side, the mother tums to look over her shoulders anxiously.
She moves off screen to the left with the girl and we are left with the image of the boy in the
field, the image of a wooden “cross” looming in the distance where before there were only telephone
poles, and nearby, die strange presence of another figure looldng on at them (it seems to be die
uncarmy, half-recognized double of herseif as die younger Maria).
The camera pulls back into the graduafly dimming darkness of die scene, die distant figure and
die cross stiil visible in die last measure of die music of die Passion.
As die camera tracks genfly nght, diese images and sounds are replaced. Directly following die
end of die Passion die boy’s yodeling cail reverberating in die fields is heard offscreen. The frame
retreats far back enough to hold die image of die boy, die girl and die “modier” wandenng off of a
muddy trail rutted widi puddles; through die barley fields diey cut dieir own patb, out into die light of
die sun setting gently below die tops of die ftr trees in die distance.
Silence, then crickets are heard, and die hoot of die familiar owl. The camera retreats behind
die trees. Aldiough diey are moving fonvard into die field and die camera moving backward into die
forest, die camera seems to be itself paradoxically moving bodi ways, at once farther from die tbree
figures walldng through die fields, and dien seemingly doser to diem as diey are glimpsed through die
openings of die trunks and pine branches. Finally diey are set loose from die visible frame of die image
as die camera recedes into die distance and into die darkness of die middle of die wood.
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Conclusion
I
In the mirror, reality is flot reconstituted but refracted and ftagmented and another world
is reflected out of its debris. In the inaccessible depth and enigmatic surface of
Tarkvosky’s Mirror (1975), historical reality, cultural memory, and temporal experience
are ail transformed. How does one inquire into the principles of the transformation of
temporality, memory and history in the medium of film?
Throughout the dissertation, I have insisted that such an inquiry, guided and grounded
in the site of Tarkvosky’s Mirror and theory of rhythm, must pass through a series of
epistemological shifis. The crftical theory of rhythm is critical precisely because it
interrogates the mirror-theory of the knowing subject and puts into question the
epistemology of representation, characteristic of the knowledge practices of Modernity.
In the wake of this critique, another conception of knowledge and knowing is made
possible in the epistemology of “mediation.”
Aesthetic categories have been critiqued in order to make room for political and
ethical ones: rather than study film as a “work of art” and situate an approach on the side
of the director or the apparatus, I have argued that film is above ail a magical and organic
“medium of relationships” conducting the material-phenomenal agency of the world.
The audio-visual technics of rhythm reveals another way of knowing and coming into
contact with the world, one in winch the potential of living substance and action is neyer
flxed and objectifled in the substrates of representational knowledge, but “productively
embraced” in that movement of knowing by winch the subject yields to the unknown, a
movement in winch a dynamic poetics of relation and immanent being become thinkable.
This movement is measured, witnessed, and relayed in ail of its singularity, duration, and
alternation. inscribed in the materiality of the filmic medium, rhythm articulates and
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constitutes another form of temporal experience and puts thought and action in touch
with the unknown.
The concept of metamorphosis bas become central to the elaboration of this
epistemology of mediation. More than a thematic way of discussing the powers of the
image, metamorphosis names the image as a milieu of material transformations. Here the
image is flot a screen around a secret to be deciphered but a material membrane of contact
which inspires, respires and aspires-- allowing beings to breathe: being more concerned
with the “pneumas” than with the “logos,” the cinema is flot an instrument in the service
of a subject to reveal a pre-given and rational order of the world that the image would
“identify” and “repeat,” but a dynamic medium of material contact with a world that
resists its rational and linguistic given-ness, a world that escapes linguistic identification
altogether. This form of knowing bas a radically temporal character, and audio-visual
tecbnique, by blurring and dissolving the distinction between the phenomenal temporality
ofthe world and the noumenal temporality ofthought, holds out the possibility ofputting
thought in touch with something else, the virtual properties of the world the “not-yet”,
the “open”, the “unthought”, and the “other”.
Between the phenomenal image of time reproduced and the living medium of the
reproducible image, a mobile series of relationships between perception, memory,
experience, and newness become discernable and thinkable. The materiality of the
cinematographic image can then be considered a medium of contact which--in its
middïeness (milieu)--opens itself to the outside in a state of active and intransitive
becoming; it inscribes “dots of life” because it releases the residues of experience and the
layers of memory recorded and deposited in its enduring temporal traces. Such a
principle ailows us to think about what founds our relationship to the image as an image,
metamorphosis being that winch, aiways underlying the subject (hypokeimenon), remains
in the medium (milieu) of the image in a state of dynamic potentiality. More,
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metamorpho sis bridges the knower and the known: the metamorphic membrane of the
film bridges the psychic and phenomenal flux between the “screen” and the “spectator”
and a kind ofmythical contact with the world is made possible and viscerally attractive.
u
Le poète est le gardien des métamorphoses... -Elias Cannetti
This mythical contact marks the moment of a form of knowing very close to the activity
ofpoetry. The practice ofpoetry, as a practice with the memno-technological mediations
of the word, designates another, equally important epistemological shifi: audio-visual
technics mediates another relationship to language than that consolidated by literacy, the
literary “dispositif’,” and the knowledge practices of the mass-culture of print. Audio
visual technics does not replace nor compete with language, but questions the
“sayability” of being; renouncing the transcendental aspiration to Being, it moves in the
opacity and the distance of the “chaos-world” of beings and produces a “poetics of
relation” out of the traces of film. In the time-based medium of film, this poetics of
relation in the chaos-world of beings is articulated and constituted by the multiple
rhythms it inscribes, the irreducible historical-ontological traces of time lefi in the
ribbons of flim—these rhythms being analogous to the rhythms of poetry, the living
breathing imaginwy ofthe word.
In order to intimate something of this mythical relationship to language, I have
discussed several aspects of a non-linguistic theory of language and film: the movement
of the word in hailcu-technics, the breakdown of the logicallgrammatical treatment of the
image in montage, the narrative meltdown of the stuttering speech act, and the electr
orality ofhistorical consciousness.
for example, I showed how the practice, technique, and form of knowing
exemplifled by haiku allowed Tarkovsky to explore a relationship to the medium of film
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aiways carefully articulated within the constellation of concepts of language, image, and
life. As a milieu, the cinematographic image opens a relationsbip to language that haits,
suspends, and negates the transcendental aspiration to the fuilness of being and meaning;
emptying this aspiration, the reproducible image, calling attention to the way it indexes
the organic and singular breath of life in the medium of its inscription. moves alongside
the immanent eventfulness of the ad-venture of language. The exemption of meaning in
hailcu, by suppressing the impulse “to read” the filmic image, places viewers in touch
with the deictic potentiality of the image. Yet this deixis points beyond hermeneutics and
the burden of conceptual reference. The pre-narrative silence that inherits words in the
practice of reading hailw shows, by analogy, how the material agency of film puts
viewers in contact with the shadows and the motions of memories before they are
discursively named and conceptually defined.
Again, we have discussed how and why, in the purview of the modem tradition of
fllm-study, the temporal materiality of film, its rhythm, bas been occluded, tamed, or
reduced as stytistic metrics. Recognizing the limits of what can be thought under tins
modem paradigm for fiim-analysis we investigated the potential for developing a theory
of rhythm that would be articulated outside of the discursive framework of aesthetics,
film-art, and narrative-linguistic analysis. Revalorizing its plastic temporal materiality,
its a-logical and a-grammatical organization, we have shown how and in what way
rhythm releases the “noise of time” and makes language stutter.
I have demonstrated how tins stuttering effect is materialized in Tarkovsky’s
Mirror, how the work of memory constituting inter-generational instorical knowledge is
itself sustained by hyperdiegetic strategies of acceleration, pneumatically respiring and
expiring like the last breath of Ivan Illycli. finally, I have defended the idea that, in the
face of the speeds of modem events indexed by the phantasmagoric power of
reproducible images, the narrative capabffity that traditionally frames and organizes the
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irruption of events—breaks, or melts, down. When the forces of time outstrip the
narrative capability of history then time can no longer be slowed down or “made human”
by written language; for the passage of time in the image would make written language
stutter, flot in order to get back to some pseudo pre-linguistic reality but in order to melt
language down, to make it shudder and become the medium of a passage of a world of
examples that do not have their co-ordinates in us, that are no longer organized as
utterances to speak themselves in a manageable scriptural and textual economy.
I have also argued that the historical transmissibility of experience, although
impoverished by the fraying of story, is mediated by the audio-visual practice of poetry.
The poetic practice of film constitutes another form of historical mediation: it puts
viewers into contact with something like an earlier epic-form of oral memory, a kind of
secondary orality articulated by audio-visual technics; materially independent of
subjective consciousness, this “electr-orality” of historical consciousness is framed by the
duration of life itself compressed, accelerated, expanded, and repeated in the medium of
film to continue itself as an infinite series of experiences. The ideas regarding the
“electr-orality” of historical consciousness might be extended beyond the purview of
ifim-studies into the domain of media studies generally. The question conceming the
transmutation of historical knowledge and experience in the post-literate age of audio
visual technics has only begun to be traced.
However, one of the important implications of the conception of electr-orality, as
it intervenes in the discourse of cinema and history, needs to be highlighted once again.
The historical-ontological traces of the image are not to be thought of as a kind of
“supplementary proof’ to be added to, or winch would stand apposite to, written
historical knowledge—even in the post-literate age of historiography. These traces
introduce a poetics and a politics of memory that corne out unaffected by the operations
of historical discourse, a poetics and a politics of memory that might challenge the
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dominant discourses of history by setting loose the “inert presences” of other histories
and memories which are “awakened” by the ethos of film, the material debris and flotsam
of time which is compressed, accelerated, and expanded in the multiple rhythms of film.
Rather than represent, supplement, or even contest historical experience and knowledge,
these frreducible ontological-historical traces mutate historical experience and constitute
a different form of historical knowledge altogether, one that—in its structure of
awakening to the personal ami collective forms of remembrance--opens an aflegorical
and utopian dimension ofthe future.
III
For many years I have been tormented by the certainly that the most extraordinaîy
discoveries await us in the sphere of Time. We know tess about time than about anything
else. -Andrey Tarkovsky
Tarkvosky intuitively understood the necessity for thinking of Time in its material
manifestations and this is why he thought of the cinema as a time-machine and the
cineaste as a time-sculptor. I have valorized the Aristotelian traditions of the philosophy
of time because subjectivity is conceived together with the mediations of temporal
experience that constitute it. I have transposed Meschonnic’s conception ofrhythm in the
inquiry into audio-visual technics because it shows how subjectivity is invented and
transformed by the empfrical passage and passing experience of images of time. As I
argued at the end of Chapter 1, this experience of passage may be imagined in the figure
of the time-passer: the one who has lost an absolute horizon of temporality in order to
pass into multiple and heterogeneous temporalities, the witness ami the ferryman who
becomes the point of passage of the alterations and velocities of images that trace and
render visible the passing oftime.
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In the experience of the time-passer, the movement of a negative suspension or
emptying is accompanied by an availability to becoming “charged with time” and by an
openness to witnessing the radical alterity of the future. While the time-passer may
designate some ideal director, spectator, or critic, h designates above ail, the experience
of pure passage made possible in the mobile continuum of relations of the film’s
production, reception and critical appropriation. The possïbffity of the time-passer is the
figuration of an experience constituted in the metamorphic powers of these multiple
temporalities into which the viewerlwitness is--inserted. --The-temporal “membrane” ofthe
screen becomes a kind of liminal slipzone where subjectivity can be transformed by the
material traces oftime.
One ofthe major implications ofthis experience of passage is that the time-passer has
lost the absolute horizon of the empty, homogeneous temporality consolidated by the
processes of the nation-state. Having lost the temporality of an absolute law winch is
organized by the vector of an accomplishment to corne, no longer engaged by the
temporality of a national History articulating the progress of a people, and no longer
anchored to the temporal nostalgia of origins, the time-passer would not organize
experience, memory, and knowledge upon the systematic continuity of an abstract
chronology. The experience of the time-passer would be founded in an ethical duty to
affirm the value of pure passage and to think and to act in the world with a knowledge of
temporal finitude, contingence, and discontinuity. In the audio-visual technics of film,
the time-passer would experience the foreignness that cornes into the heterogeneity of
temporalities that pass by the law of generation and corruption. Charged with other
temporalities in the multiple rhythms of film, the time-passer would become the point of
passage for the revolutionary potential to continue life, transforming the temporal
conditions by winch life survives, acts, and transforms itself.
1FilmographyNideography
The Mirror (Zerkalo)
Director: Andreï Tarkovsky
Production Company: Mosfitm, Unit 4
Producer: E. Vaisberg.
Production Manager: Y. Kushnerov.
Assistant Diredors: Larissa Tarkovskaya, V. Karchenko, Masha Chugonova.
Script: Andrei Tarkovsky, Alexandre Misharin.
Photography: Georgy Rerberg, $ovcolor with b/w newsreel sequences.
Camera Operator: A. Nikolayev, I. Shtanko.
Lighting: V. Gusev.
Editor: Lyudmila Feiginova.
Art Director: Nikolai Dvigubsky.
Sets: A. Merkunov.
Speciat Effects: Y. Potapov.
Music: Eduard Artemyev, J.S. Bach, Giovanni Batista Pergolesi, Henry Purceli.
Costumes: Nelly formina.
Make-up: V. Rudina.
Sound: Simon Litivinov.
Poems: Arseny Tarkovsky, read by the poet.
Leading Players:
Margarita Terekhova (Masha, Atexei’s motheriNatalia, Atexei’s wjfe)
f ilip Yankovsky (Atexei, age 5)
Ignat Daniltsev (Atexeillgnat, age 12)
Oleg Yankovsky (Alexei’sfather)
Nikolai Grinko (male colteague al printing shop)
Alla Demidova (Lisa)
Yrui Nazarov (military instructor)
Anatoly Solonitsyn (doctorpassing by)
Innokentky $moktunovsky (voice ofAlexei, the narrator)
Larissa Tarkovsky (rich doctor’s wfr)
Maria Tarkovskaya (Alexei’s mother as an otd woman)
Tamara Ogorodnikova (woman In Pushkin-reading scene)
Y. Sventikov, T. Reshetnikova, E. del Bosque, L. Correcher
A. Gutierres, D. Garcia, T. Pames, Teresa des Bosque, Tamara des Bosque.
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